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37TH CO NG RESS, }

HOUSE OF REPRESENTA'I1IVES.

2d Session.

Ex.Doc.
{ No. 92.

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

HousE OF REPRESEl>TATIVES,

U. S , March 26, 1862.

Re~olvtd, That fifteen hundred and fifty copies of Executive Document No. 243, 1st ses-

sion 24th Congress, Executive Document l\o. 206, 1st Eession 26th Congress, and Executive Document No. 5, 1st session 32d Congress, on fortifications, floating batteries, and
other means of defence, be printed for the use of the Hom;e.

HO. REPS., EX, DOC. No. 243, 24th CONGRESS, 1st SESSION.

MESSAGE
FRO)I

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TO THE

Senate of the United States, accompanied witli reports from the Secretaries of
War and Navy, relative to tliemilitary and na,;al defences ef the country.
8, 183fi .-Read, and ord~red that it be printed; and that so much as relatee to the
militar:v defences be referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, and so much as
re1ate5 to the naval defences to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

APRlL

To tl1e Senate:
I transmit herewith reports from the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments, to whom were referred the resolutions ac1optec1 by the Senate on the
18th of February last, requesting information of the probable amount of appropriations that would be necessary to place the land ancl naval defences of the
country upon a__proper footing of strength ancl respectability.
In respect to that branch of the subject which falls more particularly under
the notice of the Secretary of War, and in the consideration of which he has
arrived at conclusions different from those contained in the report from the Engineer bureau, I think it proper to add my concurrence in the views expressed
by the Secretary.
WASHINGTON,

April 8, 1836.

ANDREW JACKSON.
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DEPARTMENT OF WAR, April 7, 1836.
Sm: In conformity with your instructions, I have the honor to transmit

reports from the engineer and ordnance departments, furnishing so much of
the information required by the resolution of the Senate of February 18, 1 36.
as relates to the fortifications of the country, and to a supply of the munition,
of war. , The former branch of this subject has required laborious investigations on the part of the officers charged with this duty, and their report h~
therefore been longer delayed than, under other circumstances, would have been
proper; but the whole matter was too important to have the interests involved
in it sacrificed to undue precipitancy.
The engineer report was rnceived at the department on Friday last, and I
have embraced such portions of the intervening time as other official calls and
a sHght indisposition would allow me to devote to its examination. I did no:
consider that any suggestions I could make would justify a further delay at thiadvanced stage of the session, while, at the same time, I am aware that thi~
letter will need all the allowance which these circumstances can claim for it.
It is obvious that, in the consideration of any general and permanent system oi
national defence, comprehensive views are not only necessary, but professional
experience and a knowledge of practical details; such information, in fact, a,
must be obtained by long and careful attention to the various subjects which
form the elements of this inquiry. Although, therefore, I do not concur iu all
the suggestions contained in these reports, and more particularly in those which
relate to the nature and extent of some of our preparations, still I have though'_
it proper to lay them before you, rather than to substitute any peculiar view'0l
my own for them. Both furnish facts highly interesting to the community, and
if they anticipate dangers which it may be thought are not likely to happen.
and suggest prepa'rations which future exigencies will not probably require, t~ey
are still valuable documents, presenting the necessary materials for the act10n
of the legislature. The report from the engineer department, in partic~lar,
evinces an accurate knowledge of the whole subject, while, at the same tune.
its general views are sound and comprehensive. I consider it a very able document.
Under these circumstances, I have thought it proper to submit some general
remarks, explanatory of my own views, concerning a practical system of ~efence, and which will show how far the plans and details are in confonmty
with my opinion. I feel that this course is due to myself.
I shall confine my observations to the maritime frontier. Our inland horde,
rests, in the southwest and northeast, upon the possessions of civilized n~tion_E
and requires defensive preparations to meet those contingencies only ~h:ch,_rn
the present state of society, we may reasonably anticipate. In the ex1stmg lll·
tercourse of nations, hostilities, can scarcely overtake us so suddenly as not r,
leave time to move the necessary force to any point upon these frontiers threatene,.
with attack. I am not aware of any peculiar position upon either of the~ilines of separation which commands the approaches to the country, or who~,
possession would give much superiority to an invading or defensive force. J;;
fact, the division is, in both cases, an artificial line through much of its extem.
and a portion of the natural boundary offers scarcely any impediment to military
operations. Under such circumstances, it seems altogether inexpedient to cor;struct expensive fortifications, which would do little more than protect the P~\
under cover of their guns; which are not required as 1Jlaces of depot; wh:c\
guard no avenue of communication, and which would leave the surroundi11country penetrable in all directions. Without indulging in any improper "p -·
ulations concerning the ultimate destiny of any portion of the country in jux- ·
position with us, or looking for security to any political change, we may "at't'.:
anticipate that our own advance in all the elements of power will be at lea ' t eqr
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to that of the people who adjoin us; n~r.does the most pr~dent forecast ~ictaie
any precautions, founded upon the opimon that our relative strength :vill decrease and theirs increase. The lake frontier, indeed, presents some peculiar consideration · and I think the views submitted by the engineer department, respecting Lake Champlain, are entitled to much weight. This long, narrow sheet of navigable water opens a direct communication into the _States of New York an~
Vermont, while its outlet is in a foreign country, and 1s commanded by a position of great natural strength. It is also within a few miles of the most powe1:ful
and populous portion of Canada, and open to all its resources an~ energies.
With a view, perhaps, to possible rather than to pro~able_ e"."ents, it may be
deemed expedient to construct a work at some proper site w1thm o_ur b_oundary,
which shall close the entrance of the lake to all vessels ascendmg its outlet .
.As such a work, however, would be an advanced post, and, from circu~stanc~s,
peculiarly liable to attack, its extent and defences should be in proport10n to its
exposure.
There is already a considerable commercial marine upon the four great lakes,
Ontario, Erie, Huron, and 1\Hchigan, which are open to the enterprise of our
citizens. And this will increase with the augmenting population which is flowing
in upon the regions washed by these internal seas. It is obvious that, from
natural causes, the physical superiority will be found upon the southern shores
of these lakes. The resolution of the Senate embraces the inquiry into the expediency of constructing permanent fortifications in this quarter. And this inq1:_1iry properly divides itself into two branches:
.
.--. 1st. The policy of fortifying the harbors on the lakes ; and,
2d. The policy of commanding, by permanent works, the communications between them.
Both of these measures presuppose that the naval superiority upon these
waters may be doubtful. But it is difficult to foresee the probable existence of
any circumstances which would give this ascendency to the other party. It is
unnecessary to investigate the considerations which bear upon this subject, as
they are too obvious to require examination. They are to be seen and felt in
all those wonderful evidences of increase and improvement which are now in
such active operation. A victorious fleet upon these lakes could disembark an
army at almost any point. If a harbor were closed by fortifications they would
only have to seek the nearest beach, and land their men from boats, so that no
defenc es we could construct would secure. us against invasion ; and temporary
block-houses and batteries would probably be found sufficiently powerful to
repel the attacks of any vessels seeking to enter the narrow harbors upon the
lakes, if we could foresee the existence of any circumstances which would induce an enemy to endeavor to force an entrance into them.
As to the communication between the lakes, the inquiry, from geoo·raphical
causes, is necessarily restricted to that from Lake Erie to Lake Huro~, and to
the straits of Michilimackinac. Of the former, almost sixty miles consist of two
rivers, completely commanded from their opposite banks, while the entrance into
one of these, the river St. Clair, is impeded by a bar, over which there are but
a?out eig_ht feet of water. ~ o armed vessels co?-ld force their way up these
rivers while the shores were man enemy's possess10n, who might construct batteries at every proj ecting point, ancl who, in. fact, might in many places sweep
the decks with musketry. As to the straits of Michilimackinac, they are too
broad to be col!lmanded by stationary fortifications, even if any circumstances
should lead to the construction and equipment of a hostile fleet upon the bleak
and remote shores of Matchedask bay, in the northeastern extremity of Lake
Huron.
I am therefore of opinion that our lake frontier requires no permanent defences,
and that we may safely rely for its security upon those resources, both in the
personnel and materiel, which the extent and other advantages our country insure to us, and which must give us the superiority in that quarter.
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It may, perhaps, be deemed expedient to establish a depot for the reception of
munitions of war in some part of the peninsula of Michigan, and to strengthen
it by such defences as will enable it to resist any coup de main which may be
attempted. From the geographical features of the country, our possessions here
recede from their natural points of support, and are placed in immediate contact
with a fertile and populous part of the neighboring colony. In the event of
disturbances the ordinary communications might be interrupted, and it would
probably be advisable to have in deposit a supply of all the necessary means for
offensive or defensive operations, and to place these beyond the reach of any enterprising officer who might be disposed, by a sudden movement, to gain possession of them. The expenditure for such an object would be comparatively unimportant, even should the· contingency be judged sufficiently probable to justify
precautionary measures.
I had the honor, in a communication to the chairman of the Committee on
Military Affairs of the Senate, dated February 19, 1836, a copy of which wa~
sent to the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, to suggest the mode. best adapted, in my opinion, to secure our
frontier against the depredations of the Indians. The basis of the plan was the
establishment of a road from some point upon the upper Mississippi to Red
river, passing west of Missouri and Arkansas, and the construction of posts in
proper situations along it. I think the ordinary mode of construction ought not
to be drparted from. Stockaded forts, with log block-houses, have been found
fully sufficient for all the purposes of defence against Indians. They may be
built speedily, with little expense, and, when necessary, by the labor of the
troops. Our Indian boundary has heretofore been a receding·, not a stationary
one, and much of it is yet of this character. And even where we have planted
the Indians who have been removed, and guaranteed their permanent occupation
of the possessions assigned to them, we may find it necessary, in the redemption
of the pledge we have given to protect them, to establish posts upou their e~terior boundary, and thus prevent collisions between them and the ruder indigenous tribes of that region. I think, therefore, that no works of a more permanent
character than these should be constructed upon o-µr Indian frontier. A cordon
established at proper distances upon such a road, with the requisite means of
ope.ration deposited in the posts, and with competent garrisons to occupy them.
would probably afford greater security to the advanced settlements than an!
other measures in our power. The ..dragoons should be kept in motion along It
during the ?pen season of the year, when Indian disturbances are most to be
apprehended, and their presence and facility of movement would tend powerfully
to restrain the predatory disposition of the Indians ; and if any sudden impttlae
should operate or drive them into hostilities, the means of assembling a strong
force, with all necessary supplies, would be at hand, and, as circumstances permit, the posts in the Indian country now in the rear of this proposed line of
operations should be abandoned and the g·arrisons transferred to it.
But it is upon our maritime frontier that we are most exposed. Our coaSt
for _three thousand miles is washed by the ocean, which separates us fro~n tho e
~at10ns wh? have made the highest advances in all the arts, and part1cula1:Iy
m tho"'e which minister to the operations of war, and with whom, from o~r.m·
tcrcourtse and political relations, we are most liable to be drawn into col11s1on.
If this great medium of communication, the element at the same time of ~cparation and of union, interposes peculiar obstacles to the progress of hostile cleruontration, it also offers advantages which are not less obvious, aucl which, to b
ucce._, fully resi."ted, require corresponding arrangements and exertions. TIH:·C
advantage, depend on the economy and facility of transportation, on the cclc11 ty
of movement, and on the power of an enemy to threaten the whole ~hor,'
spread out before him, and to , elect. hi, point of attack at pleasme. A powerful
ho ·tile fl et upon the coast of the United States presents some of the featn "
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of a war, where a heavy mass is brought to act against detachments which ~ay
be cut up in detail, although their combined force _would exce_ed the assa1l~ng
foe. Our points of exposure are so numerous and distant that !t would be impracticable to keep, at each of them, a force competent to resist the attack of
an enemy, prepared by his naval ascendency, and his other arrangements, to
make a sudden and vigorous inroad upon our shores. It becomes us, therefore, .
to inquire how the consequences of this state of things are to be best met and
·
averted.
The first and most obvious, and in every point of view the most proper,
method of defence is an augmentation of our naval means to an extent proportioned to the resources and the necessities of the nation. I do not mean the
actual construction and equipment of vessels only. The number of those in
service must depend on the state of the country at a given period: but I mean
the collection of all such materials as may be preserved without injury, and a
due encouragement of those branches of interest essential to the growth of a
navy, and which may be properly nurtured by the government; so that, on the
approach of danger, a fleet may put to sea, without delay, sufficiently powerful
to meet any force which will probably be sent to our coast.
Our great battle upon the ocean is yet to be fought, and we shall gain nothing
by shutting our eyes to the nature of the struggle, or to the exertions we shall
find it necessary to make. All our institutions are essentially pacific, and every
citizen feels that his share of the common interest is affected by the derangement of business, by the enormous expense, and by the uncertain result, of a
war. This feeling presses upon the community and the government, and is a
sure guarantee that we shall never be precipitated into a contest, nor embark in
one, unless imperiously required by ~hose considerations which leave no alternative between resistance and dishonor. Accordingly, all our history shows that
we are more disposed to bear, while evils ought to be borne, than to seek redress by appeals to arms; still, however, a contest must come, and it behooves
us, while we have the means and the opportunity, to look forward to its attendant circumstances, and to prepare for the consequences.
It is no part of my object to enter into the details of a naval establishment.
That duty will be much more appropriately and ably performed by the proper
department; but as some of the views I shall present on the subject of our
system of fortifications must be materially affected by any general plan of naval
operations which, in the event of hostilities, might be adopted, I am necessarily
led to s:nbmit a few remarks, not professional, but general, upon the extent and
employment of our military marine.
'
.
There is as little need of inquiry now into our moral as into our physical
capacity to maintain a navy, and to meet upon equal terms the ships and seamen of any other nation. Our extended commerce, creating and cr~ated by
those resources which are essential to the building and equipment of fleets, removes all doubt upon the one point, and tl,1e history of our naval enterprise,
from the moment when the colors were :first hoisted upon the hastily-prepared
vessels at the commencement of our revolutionary struggle to the last contest
in which any of _our ships have been engaged, is equally satisfactory upon the
other. The achievements of our navy have sta:r;nped its character with the
country and the world. The simple recital of its exploits is the highest eulogium which can be pronounced upon it.
With ample means, therefore, . to meet upon tho ocean, by which they must
approach us, any armaments that may be destined for our shores, we are called
ev~ry prudential consideration to clo so. In the first place, though all .
upon
wars m which we may be engaged will probably be defensive in their character, .
undertaken to repel or resent some injury, or to assert some right, and rendered
necessary by the conduct of other nations, still the objects of the war can be
best attained by its rigorous prosecution. Defensive in Jts causes, it should be
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offensive in its character. The greater injury we can inflict upon our opponent,
the sooner and the more satisfactory will be the redress we seek. Our principal
belligerent measures should have for their aim, to attack our antagonist where
he is most vulnerable. If we are to receive his assaults, we abandon the vantage ground, and endeavor, in effect, to compel him to do us justice by inviting
his descent upon our shores, and by all those consequences which mark the
progress of an invading force, whether for depredation or for conquest. By the
ocean only -can we be seriously assailed, and by the ocean only can we seriously
assail any power with which we are likely to be brought into collision.
But, independently of the policy of making an adversary foel the calamities
of war, it is obvious that, even in a defensive point of view alone, the ocean
should be our great field of operations. No one would advocate the project of
endeavoring to make our coast impervious to attack. Such a scheme would be
utterly impracticable. A superior fleet, conveying the necessary troops, could
effect a la,nJing at numerous points upon our shores, even if the best devised
plan of fortifying them were consummated; and, from the nature of maritime
operations, such a fleet could bring its whole strength to bear upon any particular position, and by threatening or assailing various portions of the coast, either
anticipate the tardy movements of troops upon land, and effect the object bef~re
their concentration, or render it necessary to keep in service a force far super10r
to that of the enemy, but so divided as to be inferior to it upon any given point.
These dangers and difficulties would be averted or avoided by the maintenance
of a fleet competent to meet any hostile squadrons which might be detache~_to
our seas. Our coast would thus be defended on the ocean, and the calamities
of war would be as little felt as the circumstances of such a conflict would
permit.
As to the other advantages of a navy, in the protection of commerce, they
do not come within the scope of my inquiries, and are not therefore ad~e1ied
to; nor is it necessary, or indeed proper, that I should present those considerations of distance, of exposure, and of station, which would render a fle~t numerically inferior in the aggregate to that of the enemy, yet still sufficien~ly
powerful, upon our own coasts, to meet and overcome any armament which
could probably be sent here.
It seems to me, therefore, that our first and best fortification is the nayy. Nor
do I see any limit to our naval preparations, except that imposed by a ~~eregard to the public revenues from time to time, and by the probable condit10~ of
other maritime nations. Much of the mater£et employed in the construction
and equipment of vessels is almost indestructible, or at any rate may b_e preserved for a long series of years ; and if ships can be thus kept without lilJlll:Y
upon the stocks, by being built under cover, I do not see what should restram
us from proceeding to build as many as may be deemed necessary, and ~s fast
as a due regard to their economical and substantial construction will permit, an~
to collect and prepare for immediate use all the munitions of war, and other art1·
clcs of equipment not liable to injury or decay by the lapse of time. Nor do I
see that these preparations should be strictly graduated by the number of seamen who would probably enter the service at this time, or within any sh?rt
period. 1'o build and equip vessels properly requires much time, as well w1th
ref~rence to the execution of the work as to the proper condition of the maten~l e_mployed. And the costly experiment made by England, when ~he ~oo
ha t1ly mcreased her fleet, about thirty years ago, by building ships with 1m·
proper materials and bad workmanship, ought to furnish us with a profi!able
le on. These vessels soon decayed, after rendering very little service. ~a:rnl
m ans should therefore be provided at a period of leisure, to be ready for immediate employment in a period of exigency; and a due regard to prudence
dictates that these means should so far exceed the estimated demand of the
ervice as to upply in the shortest time any loss occasioned by the hazard of
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the ocean and the accidents of war. We may safely calculate that the number
of seamen in the United States will increase in proportion to that rapid augmentation which is going on in all the other branches of na~ional interest. ~f we
assume that at a given period we may expect to embark m w:ar, our capacity _to
man a fleet will exceed our present means by a ratio not difficult to ascert~m.
And even then, by greater exertions and perhaps higher wages, a larger portion
may be induc0d to enter the naval service, while no exertions can make a corresponding addition to the navy itself, but at a loss of time and expenae, and a
sacrifice of its permanent interest.
·
But whatever arrangements we may make to overcome any naval armaments
sent out to assail us, we are liable to be defeated and to be exposed to all the
consequences resultino- from the ascendency of an enemy. And the practical
question is, what shall be done with a view to such a state of things 1 .As I
have already remarked, any attempt by fortifications to shut up our coast, so
that an enterprising foe, with a victorious fleet, conveying a competent force, and
disposed to encounter all the risk of such an expedition, could not make his
descent upon the shore, would be useless in itself, and would expose to jnst censure th ose who should project such a scheme. .And, on the other hand, th_e
government would, if possible, be still more censurable were our important maritime places left without any defensive works. Between these extremes is a
practical medium, and to ascertain where it lies we must briefly look at the vari'ous considerations affecting the subject.
W hat ha ve we to apprehend in the event of a war 1 Is it within the limits of
a reasonable calculation that any enemy will be able and disposed to debark
upon our coast an army sufficiently powerful to lay siege to our fortifications
and to endeavor, by this slow and uncertain process, to obtain possession of
them 1 I put out of view the enormous expense attending such a plan ; the
distance of the scene of operations from the points of supply and support, with
the consequent difficulties and dangers, and the possibility that the convoying
fleet might be overpowered by a superior force, and the whole expedition captured or destroyed. .All these are considerations which no prudent statesman,
directing such an enterprise, will overlook. But beyond these is a question
bearing still more directly upon the point under examination. Is there any object t o be attained sufficiently important to justify the risk of placing a body of
land t roops before one of these works, too strong to be carried by a co1tp de
main, and endeavoring to destroy the defence by a regular investment 1 I think
there can be none.
I tak e it for granted that no nation would embark in the quixotic enterprise
of conquering this country. .Any army, therefore, thrown upon our coast would
push forward with some definite object to be attained by a prompt movement
and by vigorous exertions. Our experience, more than half a century ago, demonstrated that an invading force could command little more than the position
it actually occupied. The system of fortifications adopted in Europe is not applicable to our condition. . There military movements must be made upon great
avenues of communication, natural or artificial, and these are closed or defended
by fortress~s constructed with all the skill that science and experience can supply, and with all the means that wealth and power can command. .An invading
army must carry these positions by escalade or by siege, or leave sufficient detachments to blockade them, or must turn them and move on with all the difficulties attending the interruption of their communication, and with the dangers
which such a force in their rear must necessarily occasion. Works of this
character are keys to many of the European states, whose political safety depends upon their preservation. Their possession enables their governments to
meet the first shock of war, and to prepare their arrangements, political or military, to resist or avert the coming storm. .And .although, during some of the
wars which arose out of the French revolution, when, from causes which history
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is now developing, the armies of France set at defiance the received maxims of
military experience, and justifying their apparent rashness by success, reduced,
with unexampled facility, or carried on their operations almost in contempt ot
the strongest fortifications, tlie subjugation of each of which had been till then
the work of a campaign, still the opinion is yet entertained by many that this
system of defence is best adapted to the condition of the European community.
'.rhere is also a striking difference between the political situation of those
countries and that of ours, which gives to these-defensive preparations a character
of importance which can never apply to the United States. 'fhe possession of
a capital in the eastern hemisph ere is too often the possession of the kingdom.
Habits of feeling and opinion, political associations, mid other causes, combine
to give to the metropolis an undue ascendency. Internal parties, contending
for superiority, and external enemies, aiming at conquest, equally seek to gain
possessi·on of the seat of g·overnment. And the most careless observer of the
events of the last half century must be struck with the_fact that the fate of the
capitals and the kingdoms of modern Europe are closely connected together.
Under such circumstances, it may be prudent, by powerful fortresses, to bar the
approaches to these favored places, and frequently to construct works to defend
them from external attack, or to maintain their occupation against internal
violence.
But there is nothing like this h1 our country, nor can there be till there is a
total change in our institutions. Our seats of government are merely the places
where the business of the proper departments is conducted, and have not themselves the slightest influence upon any course of measures, except what is due
to public opinion and to their just share of it. If the machine itself were itinerant, the result would be precisely the same. Or, if by any of the accidents of
war or pestilence, the proper authorities were compelled to change their place of
convocation, the change would be wholly unobserved, except by the few whose
personal convenience would be affected by the measure. Nor have our commen~ial capitals any more preponderating influence than our political ones. And
although their capture by an enemy, and the probable loss of property, and
derangement of business, which would be the result, might seriously affect the
community, yet it would not produce the slightest effect upon the soci~l or
political systems of the country. The power belongs to all, and is exercised
by all.
It follows, therefore, that an enemy could have no inducement to hazard an
expedition against any of our cities, under the expectation that their capture
and possession ·would lead to political results favorable to them. vVashing~on
may indeed be taken again, and its fall would produce the same emotion wlnch
was everywhere felt when its former capture was known. But an enemy woul~
retire from it with as few advantages as marked its first abandonment, and 1f
his course were the same, with as few laurels as he won by its possession. I
make these remarks, because it seems to me that some of the principles of the
European system of fortifications may possibly be, transferred, to this country,
without sufficient attention having been given to those circumstances, both geograp!1~cal and political, which require a plan exclusively adapted to our own
conchtion.
I consider some of the existing and projected works larger than are now
necessary,_ a:1d calculated for exigencies we ought not, with the prospects before
us, to ant1c1pate. If such is the fact, the objection is not only to the expense .
of their con truction and preservation, but aL~o to the greater difficulty of
d fending them, and. the increased garri,·ons which must be provided and maintained. The hypothe,_i. upon which their extent has Leen determined i~, that
they may be expo .. ecl to inve. tment, both seaward and. landward, and that they
ouo-ht to be capable of re._isting .a comLined attack, or, in other words, that their
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water batteries should be sufficient to repel an assailing squadron, and that their
land defences should be sufficient to resist a besieging army.
It is certain that whatever works we erect should be so constructed as to be
beyond the reach of any coup de -main that 'would probably be attempted ag~i:1st
them ; and this capacity must depend upon their exposure and upon the fae1hty
with which they can be relieved But this proposition is far different from one
to construct them upon a scale of magnitude which presupposes they are to be
formally invested by a powerful land force, and which provides for their ability
to make a successful resistance. A dashing military or naval officer may be
willing to risk something to get possession of au insulated post by a prompt
movement, expecting to accomplish his enterprise before his adversary can be
prepared, or succor obtained; and this, even when he looks to no other advantage than the capture of the garrison, and the effect which a brilliant exploit is
calculated to produce; and when he is awa1;e that he must abandon his conquest
with as much celerity as he attained it. But formal investments of fortified
places, with all their difficulties, and expense, and uncertainty, are only undertaken when there is some object of corresponding importance to be expected.
We have works constructed which it would require armies to reduce. Have
we any reason to anticipate that they will be assailed by a force proportioned
to their magnitude 1
I have already remarked that a European power cannot expect to retain
permanent possession of any part of this countrv. If, therefore, he succeed in
overcoming or eluding our fleets, and is prepared with a respectable land force,
and ready to ri?k its employment upon our territory, he can land at many points
which we cannot close against him. His debarkation is not a question of
practicability, but of expediency. If a safe harbor or roadstead offers itself, and
there is no defensive work to prevent his approach, he will, of course, land at
the nearest point to the object of his marauding enterprise. If there is such a
work, it will be a question of calculation whether it is better to attack and carry
it, or to seek another, though more distant, point of debarkation. I think there
can be little doubt but there are few, if any, positions in our country which an
enemy would not under such circumstances avoid. He would be aware of the
facility of communication which our rivers, canals, and railroads afford, of the
powerful use we should be prepared to make of steam in its various forms of
application, and of the immense force which in a short time could be concentrated
upon a given point; and it is scarcely within the limits of possibility that he
would venture formally to besiege one of our forts, or if he did, that he would
not repent his rashness. Neither the co-operation of his fleet, nor the nearer
proximity of the place of landing to the object of attack, would induce him to
seek these advantages at the cost which must attend the slow process of besieging a fort, when, by removing to another position, he would land in safety, and
save in time, in promptness of movement, and in his escape from the perils of a
doubtful contest, more than he would lose by the difference in distance.
I am aw_are it ~ay be obje_cted that the weakness ·Of a work might tempt an
enemy to attack 1t, and that 1t may be supposed the power of some of our fortifications to resist a siege may hereafter furnish the true reason why they may
not be compelled to encounter one. Certainly the stronger a work is, the less
will it be exposed to :-langer. But this would not furnish a sufficient reason for
making its defences out of reasonable proportion to its exposure. rrhe true
inqu_iry is! What_ circumst~nces will probably induce and enable an enemy to
assail a given pomt, and with what force; and how can we best meet and repel
him 1 And I believe a just consideration of this proposition will lead to the
conclusion that .there are scarcely any positions in our country where an enemy
would venture to set down before a work too strong to resist a coup de main.
In the view, therefore, which I take of this whole subject, it will he perceived
that I do not merely suppose an enemy will not invest our larger works, but
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that they would not do so were these works much inferior to what they are,
both in their dimensions and construction.
What object would justify an enemy in attempting to land an army upon our
coast 1 He would not expect to lay waste the country, for such a mode of warfare is not to be anticipated in the present state of society. All that, under the
most favorable circumstances, he could accomplish, would he to_ gain sudden
possession of a town and levy contributions, or to destroy a naval establishment,
commercial or military, and precipitately retire to his ships before his operations
could be prevented, or his retreat intercepted I cannot, therefore, concur in the
suggestion made in the engineer report, that the first of the three great objects
to be attained by the fortifications of the first class should be to " prevent an
enemy from forming a permanent or even a momentary establishment in the
country." It is not suited to the present and prospective situation of the United
States. I understand the establishments herein contemplated are not the temporary occupation of naval arsenals and cities for the purpose of destruction or
plunder, because these objects are specially enumerated, but are lodgments
where armies may be stationed, and whence they may issue to commit inroads
into the country.
I refer, in these remarks, to our maritime coast generally. There are, no
doubt, certain points less equal to self-defence than others, and where the prep·
aration must be greater. Of this class is the delta of the Mississippi, not only
in consequence of its many avenues of approach, but because its great natural
highway does not at present allow those lateral supplies of the personnel, which,
from geographical formation, and from ihe stat~ of the settlements, can be
speedily thrown upon most other points of the country. · 'I1hfa region, howev~r,
is admirably adapted to the use of steam batteries, and they will form its prmcipal means of defence.
,
To apply these remarks to the plan of fortifications partly completed and
partly projected. Fort Monroe, at Old Point Comfort, co-vers about sixty-three
acres of ground, and requires, by the estimates of the engineer department, two
thousand seven hundred men to garrison it in time of war. Its full arma~ent
consists of 412 pieces of different descriptions and calibre. I have been deSll'ous
of comparing its superficial extent with some of the European fortresses; but
the necessary information could not be obtained within the short time that could
be allowed for the inquiry. I understand from General Gratiot, however, that
it is probably larger than almost any of the single works in Europe whic~ do
not enclose towns within their circuit. Drinkwater, in his history of the siege
of Gibraltar, states that 572 guns were mounted upon that fortress.
. The object to be attained by :F ort Monroe, in conjunction with Fort Calhoun,
mtended to mount 232 guns, is to prevent an enemy from entering H ampto_n
roads, a safe and convenient roadstead. This object is important, because this
bay is perfectly landlocked, and has suffioient depth of water for the largest
vessels, and is, withal, so near the capes of the Chesapeake that it furnishes the
best station which an enemy could occupy for annoying our commerce, and for
committing depredations upon the shores of that extensive estuary. But these
works do not command the entrance into the Chesapeake; nor is Hampton
roads the only safe anchorage for a hostile fleet. Their possession, therefore,
does not exclude an enemy from these waters though th~y will compel him to
resort to less convenient positions from whence to carry on his enterprises. A
ho tile squadron reaching the Chesapeake, and :finding the entrance into
Hampton roads guarded by sufficient works, though much less extensive than
tho c at i~ort Monroe, would necessarily consider whether the possession of that
road tead is so important as to justify the debarkation of a large body of land
troop , and to attempt to carry the works by regular approaches, and this in
th face of the strenuou effort which would be made to relieve it by all the
aids afforded by the mo t improved facilities of communication, and by the light
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and h eavy steam-batteries which, upon the approach of war, would be launched
upon the Chesapeake, and which, during periods of calm, or in certain winds,
could a pproach the hostile ships and drive them from their anchorage, or compel
them to surrender, and most of which, from their draught of water, could take
refuge in the inlets that other arined vessels could not enter. And even if the
works were carried, they could not be maintained without the most enorm?us
expen se, nor in fact without efforts which no government three thousand miles
off could well make, and all this, while Lynnhaven bay, York bay, the Rappahannock, ,.rangier island, the mouth of the Potomac, and many other places,
furnish secure anchorage, and are positions from which an enemy, having the
superiority, could not be excluded, and while, in fact, a great part of the Chesapeak e may be considered as affording good anchorage ground for large ships.
Neith er of them is equal to Hampton roads, but most or all of them furnish
stations for occupation and observation which would render it unnecessary to
purchase the superior advantages of Hampton roads by the sacrifice and hazard
which would attend the effort. The occlusion of this roadstead does not secure
Norfolk, important as it is from its commerce and navy yard. It only prevents
the access of ships-of-war to it. And against these there is an interior line of
defence, which may be considered as accessory to, and, if necessary, independent
of, th e other. And a land force, deeming the destruction of the navy yard at
Norfolk a sufficient object to justify such an expedition, would not sit down before Fort Monroe, if its scale of defence were far inferior to what it now is, but
would debark at Lynnhaven bay, whe•e there is no impediment, and march in
five or six hours through an open country to Norfolk.
New York is, in every point of view, our most important harbor, and its defences should provide for every reasonable contingency. The engineer report
recommends three classes of works : an interior one for the protection of the
harbor ; an exterior one to shut up Raritan bay ; and a third to prevent a hostile fleet from approaching the city through the sound nearer than the vicinity
of Throg's Point. The importance of the first class cannot be doubted. 'That
of the second depends on the value of Raritan bay to an enemy as an anchorage
ground, and on the utility of excluding him from a landing at Gravesend bay,
upon Long Island, whence an army could march, without obstruction, to Brooklyn and New York. The third is proposed to be· erected in order to bar his
access to the lower part of the sound, or, more l;tCCurately speaking, to prevent
his r eaching Hell Gate, a natural barrier which no fleet could pass, and which
is withi.t,_ ten miles of the city. Here, if his aim were New York, he would
land, and would find no works to prevent his approach. The two forts proposed to b e erected at Throg's N eek and Wilkin's Point, eight miles further up
the sound, would compel him to debark beyond the reach of their guns, and
would thus add that distance to his march, while on the north shore Harlrem
·river would be interposed between him and the city. On the Long Island side
there would be no difference but that occasioned by the distance.
I t is obvious then that, in the consideration of this plan involving an estimated expenditure in the aggregate of $5,807,969, and efficient gafrisons in
time of war of nine thousand men, a close investigation should be made into all
the circumstances likely to influence the operations of an enemy. Is the anchorage ground between the Narrows and Sandy Hook of sufficient value to an
enemy, looking to the risk of his occupation of the coast and to the doubts that
may be reasonably entertained of the result of so great an experiment to be
carried on, in fact, in the sea, to authorize the commencement of these works
without a new examination 7 Or is the probability of the disembarkation of an
army at Gravesend bay in preference to some other point upon the coast of
Long I sland, if a convenient one exists, so great as to require these preparations 1
'l'he same questions may be asked respecting Wilkin's Point. The work at
'I'hrog's P oint is in the process of construction, and as the 1·iver is only about
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three-fourths of a mile wide at this place I think its completion would be suffi.
cient for this line of defence till the proposed general examination can take
place.
.
·
1
:rhe situation of New York affords a fine theatre for the operation of floating
batteries, and whether a sufficient number of them would secure it from the designs of an enemy better than the full completion of the extensive system of
permanent fortifications recommended is a question deserving investigation.
Such an investigation I recommend, and after all the necessary facts and considerations are presented the government should proceed to place this commercial
metropolis of the country in a state of security.
The workR at Newport cover about twenty acres and will mount 468 guns,
and will need for their defence about two thousai1d four hundred men. I cannot
myself foresee the existence of any circumstances which now call for a fortress
of this magnitude in the very heart of New England; constructed not merely
to command the harbor of Newport, but
resist a siege which would probably
require nearly twenty thousand men to carry it on. I am at a loss to conjecture
what adequate motive could induce a foreign government to detach a fleet and
army upon this enterprise. The expense would be enormous. 1rhe French
army that invaded Egypt was less than forty thousand men, and required for
its protection and transportation between five and six hundred vessels. The
army that conquered Algiers was about equal in force, and required, it is said,
about four hundred transports besides the ships-of-war. This scale of preparation for enterprises against the shores of the Mediterranean may enable us to
form some conception of the arrangem~nts that would · be necessary to send
across the ocean to this country, in the present day of its power, an expedition
strong enough to form an establishment upon our shores, and to furnish it with
supplies necessary to its subsistence and operations.
It has been supposed, indeed, by the board of engineers, that an enemy wo~d
find sufficient reason for the occupation of Rhode Island in the considerat10n
that it would afford a secure lodgement, whence expeditions could be sent to
every part of our coast. But it is to be observed that no part of Narraganset
bay is necessary for the safety of a hostile :fleet watching that part of our coast.
Gardiner's bay in that vicinity is a most safe and convenient station, which was
occupied by the British during almost the whole of the late war, and it is pretty
clear that it cannot be defended by ·any stationary fortifications that can be
constructed. If it can by floirting batteries, so may Narraganset bay, and ~he
enemy thus prevented from occupying the latter also without these exteusrvc
arrangements requiring·, after Fort Adams shall have been completed at.an expense of one million three hundred and twelve thousand dollars, four other forts
and a sea-wall to be constructed, and eleven hundred and fifty-seven thousand
dollars to be expended.
.
. I do not think that the most prudent forecast ought to lead to the apprehen·
s1on that a force competent to seize such a position would be sent to our country,
or that any circumstances could enable them to maintain it in the face of the
vigorous efforts that would be made to recover it, and in the midst of a country
abounding in all the means to give effect to their exertions. But perhaps the
most triking objection to the completion of this extensive plan is that under
no po,sible_ ci~·cumstance. can it effect the desired object. That object, if .r
understand 1t, IS not the mere exclusion of an enemy from Rhode Island, but It
i to prevent him from taking po . session of a safe and convenient position,
whence he coulcJ. detach his forces by means of his naval superiority to any other
part of the coa t which would thus be exposed to his depredations.
'I he value of Gardiner'.., bay a a place of naval rendezvous I have already
de. cribed. Block i land, in its neighborhood, could be occupied by troops deirino- only a lodo-ement, and so could Nantucket ii:!land and l\fartha's Vineyard,
and the e arc only a few hour;;' ail from Narragansct bay. Buzzard\, bay i~
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also a safe and capacious harbor which cannot be defended., and 1\1:a:-tha'.s Vineyard. sound afford& commodious places of anchorage. A fleet ridmg m these
moorings would have under its command all the islands in this group, and co~lld
secure its communications with its land forces encamped upon them, which
would thus be enabled, at any proper time, to throw itself upon other parts of
the coast. It may be doubted, if there were not a cannon mounted upon Rho~e
Island, whether an enemy acquainted with the topography and resources of tlus
country would select it as his place of arms, if I may so term it, when there are
islands in the neighborhood which would answer this purpose nearly as well,
and where he would be in perfect safety as lop.gas he coul~ maintain his naval
ascendency, and longer than that he could not, under any circumstances, occupy
Rhode Island. And if I rightly appreciate the strength and spirit of that part
of the country, his tenure, in any event, would be short and difficult. I do not
mean to convey the idea that Rhode Island should not be defended. I think it
should be; but I do not think that precautions should be taken against events
which are not likely to happen, As there is no naval establishment here, it is
not necessary to enter into any question concerning defensive arrangements
exclusively connected with tht object.
It will be perceived also that it is proposed to fortify Mount Desert island,
on the coast of Maine, and that the expense is estimated at five hundred thousand dollars, and the number of the garrison competent to maintain it at one
thousand men. This proposition is founded, not on the value of this harbor to
us, for it possesses little, and is, in effect, unoccupied, but on account of its importance to the enemy. Were there no other secure position they could occupy
in that quarter, and which could not be defended, I should think the views
submitted upon this branch of the subject entitled to great weight. But there
are many indentations upon this coast, affording safe anchorage, and which are
either not capable of being defended, or from their great number would involve
an enormous expense, which no sound views of the subject could justify. An
enemy, therefore, cannot be deprived of the means of stationing himself upon
this coast. And before this expenditure at Mount Desert island is encountered,
it ought to be clearly ascertained that the difference, in its practical advantages
to an enemy, between the occupation of Mount Desert island and that of som~
of the other roadsteads in this quarter, incapable of defence, would be sufficiently
great to warrant this measure. My present impression is that it' would not.
And on the subject of roadsteads generally, with a few exceptions, depending
on their local positions, I am inclined to the opihion that any attempt to fortify
them would be injudicious. I do not speak of harbors and inlets which are
occupied by cities and towns, but of mere anchorage grounds, deriving their
value from the shelter they afford. If all could be defended, and an enemy
excluded from them, the advantages would justify any reasonable expenditure.
But this is impracticable, and I doubt whether the circumstances, in which most
of them differ, give such marked superiority to those we can defend over those
we cannot, as to lead to any attempt to fortify them, in the first instance, and
to maintain garrisons in them during a war.
I have adverted to these particular cases in order to present my views more
distinctly than I could do by mere general observations. Certainly not from
t~e remotest design of critic~sing the reports and the labors of the able profess10nal men to whom the subJect has been referred, nor of pursuing the investigation into any further detail.
I consider the duty of the governme-µt to afford adequate protection to the
sea-coast a subject of paramount obligation; and I believe we are called upon
by every consideration of policy to push the necessary arrangements as rapidly
as the circumstances of the country and the proper execution of the work will
allow. I think every town large enough to tempt the cupidity of an enemy
should be defended by works, fixed or floating, suited to its local position, and
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sufficiently extensive to resist such attempts as would probably be made against
it. There will, of course, after laying down such a general rule, be much latitude
of discretion in its application. Upon this branch of the subject I would ~ve
to the opinion of the engineer officers great and almost controlling weight, after
the proper limitations are established. These relate principally to the magnitude of the works, and if I am correct in the views I have taken of this
branch of the subject, a change in the system proposed is necessary. Works
should not be projected upon the presumption that they are to be exposed to
and must be capable of resisting the attacks of an European army, with its
battering train, and all its preparations for a regular siege. Neither our relative
circumstances, nor those of any nation with which we shall probably be brought
into conflict, can justify us in such an anticir•ation. All the defences should be
projected upon a scale proportioned to the importance of the place, and should
be calculated to resist any naval attack, and any sudden assault that a body of
land troops might make upon them. But further than this it appears to me we
ought not to go. The results at Stonington, at Mobile Point, at Fort Jacksim,
and at Baltimore, during· the late war, show that formidable armaments may be
successfully resisted with apparently inferior means. These, indeed, do not
furnish examples to be followed as to the scale of our preparations, but they
show what stationary batteries have done in our country against ships-of-war.
It is to be observed that the great object of our fortifications is to exclude a
naval force from our harbors. 'l,his end they ·ought fully to answer, and in this
problem there are two conditions to be fulfilled :
1. That they be able to resist any naval batteries that will probably be
placed against them ; and
2. That they be also able to resist any coup de main or escalade which might
be attempted by land.
An open battery, under many circumstances, might fulfil the first condition
but not the second, and therefore these works should be closed and regularly
constructed. It is not to be denied that the proper boundary between the magnitude and nature of the works necessary to attain the objects indicated,.and
those required to resist successfully a formal investment, will sometII?es
. become a matter of doubt; nor _that circumstances may not be stated which
~ight in~uce an enemy to open his trenches against one of these wor~rs, beca~~e
its capacity for defence was not greater. That capacity, however, with r~lat1on
to the question under consideration, has a far more intimate connexion with the
magnitude than with the form of the works, because, if unnecessarily larg~,
they entail upon the country a serious evil in the increased means for the~
defence, independe~tly of the additional expense in their construction. It is
principall:y:, therefore, in the latter point of view that I have presented the
doubts which I have expressed upon this point.
Among the hypothetical cases heretofore stated by the board of engineers
was one which supposed that an army of twenty thousand men might be
assembled upon. one of the flanks of our coast, and that we ought to be prepared, at every important pointz to resist the first shock of such a force. I h~ve
alr~ady_ glanced _at. the reaso~s, geog-raphical, political, financial, an~ prudentml,
wh1;ch, m my opm_10n, leave httle room to expect that any enemy will, hereaft~r,
:pro~ ect an enterpnse of this magnitude, so certain in its expense, so uncertam
m. its result, and so disproportioned to any object which could probably be att~med. And. the suggestior.. which was made by.the board, of defending the
city of_ ~a hi~gton by works erected near the mouth of the Patuxent, proceed_s
upon similar VIew . Our navy, our floatino- batteries our means of commun1·
c~tion and concentratio~, seem to me far b~tter adapted to the defence of_ thi5
city than fort at the distance of nearly fifty miles, whose principal effect, 1f an
enemy :wer~ rcsolv~~ upon th~ enterprise, would be to compel him to make ~
detour m h1 expedition, or which would .. end him to some part of the coa~t ot
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the bay between Patuxent and Annapolis, or into the Potomac, where his
descent would be uninterrupted, and where he would be but little, if any, further
.
from Washington than at the head of navigation of the Pa~u~ent.
Ev~m during the last war, when the navy of Great Bntam rode trrnmphant
upon the ocean, but one serious attempt was made to force an. entrance mt? a
fortified harbor, and that was unsuccessful. The greatest possible force wluch
can be brought, and the greatest possible resistance which can be applied, do
not constitute a practical rule for the construction of our fixed defences. Moral
considerations must also have weight. Probabilities must be examined. The
power of the permanent batteries is one of the elements of securitY:· So are t~e
dangers of dispersion, and shipwreck, and all the hazards of a distant expedi- .
tion, as these must operate on the councils of any country meditating such an
enterprise, the efforts of our navy, the co-operation of the floating defences, and
the troops which may be ready to meet the enemy upon his debarkation or
march.
In submitting these reflections, I am desirous only of discharging the duty
confided to me. I am gratified that the whole subject will be presented for the
consideration of Congress in a systematic form, and that the principles of its
future prosecution can now be settled. r.rhe plan originally devised was recommended upon great consideration, and, at the time its initiatory measures were
adopted, was calculated for the state of the country. We had just come out of
a severe struggle, and had felt the want of adequate preparation, and above all,
we had seen and deplored the circumstances which gave the enemy undisturbed
possession of the Chesapeake, and its disastrous consequences. And it was to
be expected that our arrangements for future defence should be planned· upon
the then existing state of things. I im~ine there were few who did not concur in this sentiment. Because, therefore, some of our works, from the wonderful advancement of the country in a_ll the elements of power, and from the
development of new means of annoyance, are larger than are found necessary
at this time, still this does not bring into question the wisdom of the original
measure. And, as it is, they are most valuable and useful ; but the experience
we have l:\,cquired may be profitably employed in re-examining the plans proposed for the prosecution of the system, and in inquiring whether the change
. which has taken place in the condition of the country will not justify a corresponding change in the nature of our preparations, and whether we may not depend more upon floating, and less upon stationary defences.
During the period which has intervened since the last war we h~ve nearly
doubled in our population, and all our other resources have probably increased
in a still greater ratio. Certainly, some of the facilities and means of defence
are augmented beyond any rational expectations. rrhe power of transporting
troops and munitions of war has already opened new views upon this subject,
and such is the progress and probable extent of the new system of intercommunication that the time will soon come when almost any amount of physical
force may be thrown upon any point threatened by an enemy. Nashville may
succor New Orleans in sixty hours-; Cincinnati may aid Charleston in about the
same time; Pittsburg will require but twenty-four hours to relieve Baltimore,
and troops from that city and from Boston may leave each place in the morning, and meet in New York in the evening. '.rhis wonderful capacity for movement incr~ases,in effect, some of the most important elements of national power.
It neutralizes one of the great advantages of an assailing force, choosing its
point of attack, and possessing the necessary means of reaching it. Detachments liable, under former circumstances, to be cut off in detail, may now be
concentrated without delay, and most of the garrisons upon the seaboard may
be brought together, and, after accomplishing the object of their concentration,
be returned to their stations in time to repel any attack meditated against them.
The improvements which are making in the application of steam have fur-
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nished another most important agent in the work of national protection. There
can be but little doubt that floating batteries, propelled by this agent, will be
among the most efficient means of coast defence. In our large estuaries, such
as the bays of New York, of the Delaw'are, and of the Chesapeake, they will
be found indispensable ; and one of the most important advantages to be anticipated from the works at Old Point Comfort is the security they will afford to
the floating batteries co-operating with them, and which will find a secure shelter in Hampton roads. A hostile fleet about to enter the Chesapeake would
certainly calculate the means of annoyance to which it would be exposed by
these formidable vessels. During a calm they would take a distant position,
insuring their own safety, while, with their heavy guns, they might cripple and
destroy the enemy; and their power of motion would enable them, under almost
all circumstances, to approach the fleet, and to retire, when necessary, where
they could not be pursued. I think it doubtful whether a squadron would
anchor in the Chesapeake, or proceed up it, if a competent number of these
batteries were maintained and placed in proper positions.
These considerations may well lead us to doubt the necessity of such extensive
permanent works, while their non-existence at the time the system was adopted
justifies the views which then prevailed ; and without advancing any rash conjecture, we may anticipate such improvements in this bmnch of the public service as will make it the most efficient means of coast defence. These vessels,
properly constructed, may become floating forts almost eq_ual to permanent fortifications in their power of annoyance and defence, and m other advantages far
superior to them. Being transferable defences, they can be united upon any
point, and a few of them be th us enabled to protect various places. We have
been brought by circumstances to a more· rigid investigation of our means of
defence, and to a re-examination of the whole subject. After an interval of
twenty years of tranquillity, public sentiment and the attention of the government were, by unexpected circumstances, more forcibly directed to this matter.
'The result cannot fail to be advantageous. The whole subj ect can be now reexamined by Congress, with all the benefits which much experience has brought,
· and with the advantage of adapting a system to the advanced state of the
country.
There are two bills for fortifications now pending before Congress. One before the House, amounting to $2,180,000, and intended to prosecute works actually already commenced. 'l'he estimates for this bill may therefore be considered
necessary in themselves, under any view of the general subject, and not unreasonable in amount for the present year, because they include the operations of
two years. The incidental expenses, however, may be safely reduced one-half,
as it will not be necessary to make such extensive repairs as were considered
requi&ite when the estimates were prepared.
The bill pending before the Senate contains appropriations for nineteen new
works, and f'lr the sum of $600,000 to be expended for steam batteries. The
estimates on which this bill was founded were prepared at a time when prudence
required that arrangements should be made for a different state of things from
that which now ~xists; An examination of the general system of defence .wa
not then expedrnnt; and the means of protecting the most exposed pomts,
ag1:eeably to information previously collected, were asked of Congress. It wa '
no time then ~o stop, and instead of prosecuting established plans vigorously,
to lose th penod of action by surveys, examinations, and discussions. But the
oppor~m1~ty i. now afforded, without danger to the public interest, of applying
the prmc1]_lle,' cuggested to the works under consideration.
It cannot be <loubted but that fortifications at the following places enumerated
in thi. · bill will be necc , ary :
At Pcnob:cot bay, for the protection of Bangor, &c.
At K uncb •c river.
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At Portland.
At Portsmouth.
At Salem.
At New Bedford.
At New London.
Upon Staten Island.
At Sollers'is Flats.
A redoubt on :Federal Point.
For the Barrancas.
For Fort St. Philip.
These proposed works all command the approach to places sufficiently important to justify their construction under any circumstances that will probably
exist. I think, therefore, that the public interest would be promoted by the
passage of the necessary appropriations for them. As soon as these are made,
such of these positions as may appear to require it can be examined, and the
form and extent of the works adapted to existing circumstances, if any change
be desirable. The construction of those not needing examination can commence immediately, and that of the others as soon as the plans are determined
upon. By this proceeding, therefore, a season may be saved in the operations.
The other works contained in this bill are:
For Provincetown.-And this proposition may be safely submitted to another
inquiry, as the practicability of excluding an enemy from any shelter in Massachusetts bay, a matter of deep interest, and as a work at Provincetown, are
closely connected.
For Rhode Island, Narraganset hay.-This work may await the result of
the views that may be eventually taken on the subject of fortifying this bay.
For a work at the Delaware outlet of the Chesapeake and Delaware canal.This may be postponed without injury till next season; and in the mean time
a project for the floating defences of the Delaware considered, and perhaps the
size of the proposed work reduced.
For a work at the Breakwater.-Until the effect of the deposits which are
going on in this important artificial harbor are fully ascertained, I consider it
injudicious to erect a permanent work for its defence. Another year will, perhaps, settle the question, and if the result is favorable, an adequate fortification
should be constructed here ~ithout delay.
For a fort on the Patuxent river, and a fort at Cedar Point.-Both of thest
works are liable to some of the objections stated, and I think they had better
be postponed for more mature consideration.
For fortifications at the mouth of tlie St. Mary's, Georgia.-This proposition may also be safely submitted to examination.
The estimate for steam batteries may be reduced to $100,000. That sum can
be profitably employed.
If these appropriations are early made, most if not all of these works can be
put i:n operation this season, and the money usefully applied, as fast as their
progress will justify. And I think the measme would be expedient. But it
is to be remembered that the power of the department to push them, during, the
present year, will depend on the reorganization of the corps of engineers. If
that corps is not increased, it will be unnecessary to make the appropriations in
the bill before the Senate, as the objects contained in the other bill will be sufficient to occupy the time of the present officers of the corps.
Should it be deemed proper to re-examine the subject of the proposed fortifications generally, I would then recommend that an appropriation of $30,000 be
made to defray the expenses of a board, including surveyors, &c.
My Teflections upon the whole subject lead to the following practical suggestions on the great subject of the measures for the defence of the country;
H. Ex. Doc. 92--2
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1. An augmentation of the navy, upon the principles before stated.
2. The adoption of an efficient plan for the organization of the militia.

Having already, in two of the annual reports I have had the honor to make
to you, expressed my sentiments upon this subject, I have nothing new to lay
before you, either with relation to its general importance, or to the necessary
practical details. I consider it one of the most momentous topics that can engage the attention of Congress; and the day that sees a plan of organization
adopted, suited to the habits of our people and the nature of our institutions,
and fitted to bring into action the physical strength of the country, with a competent knowledge of their duty, and just ideas of discipl!ne and subordination,
will see us the strongest nation, for the purposes of self-defence, on the face of
the globe. Certainly such an object is worthy the attention of the legislature.
3. '.rhe cultivation of military science, that we may keep pace with the improvements which are made in Europe, and not be compelled to enter into a
contest with an adversary whose superior knowledge would give him pre-eminent advantages. War is an advancing science. Many an original genius and
many an acute intellect are at all times at work upon it; and the Europea_n
communities have such a relation to one another that the profes.sfon of arms 1s
peculiarly encouraged, and every effort made to place their military·establishments, not at the highest numerical point, but in the best condition for efficient
service, both with respect to its morale and materiel. It is not by the mere reading
of professionR.l authors that the necessary instruction in this branch of knowledge
can be obtained; there must be study and practice; a union of principles an_d
details, which can best be obtained by a course of education directed to this
object. This, I think, is one of the greatest advantages of the Military Academy. It cannot have escaped the recollection of those who were upon the theatre of action at the commencement of the last war, that the first year was
almost spent in a series of disasters, which, however, brought their advantag~s.
We were comparatively ignorant of the state of military science, and we did
not fully recover our true position till we had received many severe lessons : at
what an expense of life and treasure need not be stated.
..
4. The skeleton of a regular establishment, to which any necessary additions
may be made, securing, at the same time, economy, with a due power of ex~ansion, and the means of meeting a war with all the benefit of a regularly org·amz.ed
force. This object is attained by our present arm~.
5. The preparation and proper distribution of all the munitions of war, agreeably to the views hereinafter submitted.
6. I think. all the defensive works now in the process of construction should
be finished, agreeably to the plans upon which they have been projected
7. Al: the harbors and inlets upon the coast, where there are cities or to:m5
whose situation and importance create just apprehension of attack., and particularly where we have public naval establishments, should be defended by work"
propor~ioned to any exigency that may probably arise.
. .
Ilavmg already presented my general views upon this branch of the mqmry,
I need not repeat the practical limitations which I propose for adoption. But
before any expenditure is incurred for new works, I think an examination shoulJ
b made, .in every case, in order to apply these principles to the propose~ plan
of op 'ration~, ancl thus reduce the expense of construction where th1 can
prop rly be clone, and, also, the eventual expense of maintaining garrison~
r quired to dc~cnd works disproportioned to the objects sought to be attained.
I woulcl oro-amze a board for thi~ object, with special instructions for it" go,rnm nt.
. . ro_vi. ion P~ould be mad for the necessary experiments, to test the suprnonty of the vanou,, plan . that may be offered for the construction and use of
. t am batterie. ; I mean battericK to be employed as acccRsories in the dcfen
of th harbors and inlet;, and in aid of the permanent fortifications.
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The progressive improvement in the application of the power of steam renders
it inexp edient, at any given time, to make extensive arrangements, c?nnected
with t his class of works, with a view to their future employment. The improvement of to-day may be superseded by the experience of to-morrow;. and modes
of ap plica tion may be discovered before any exigency ar~ses rendei:mg_a reso:·t
to th ese defences necessary, which may introduce an entire revolution mto tlus
department of art and industry. Still, however, experiments should be made,
and a small number of these vessels constructed. Their proper draught of water,
their form and equipment, the situation and security of their machinery,. the
number , calibre, and management of their guns, and the best form of the engmes
to b e u sed, are questions requiring much .consideration, and which can only be
determined by experience. And there can be little doubt that suitable rewards
·would soon put in operation the inventive faculties of some of our countrymen,
and lead to the te:q.der of plans practically suited to the circumstances. As we
acquire confidence by our experience, arrangements could be made for collecting
and preparing the indestructible materials for the construction and equipment of
these vessels, as far as such a measure may not interfere with any probable
change, which at the time may be anticipated in the application of the power of
steam.
9. I r ecommend a reconsideration of the project for fortifying the roaclsteads
or open anchorage grounds, and its better adaptation to the probable future cir1
cumstan ces of the country.
And I would suggest that the works which are determined on be pushed with
all reasonable vigor, that our whole coast may be placed beyond the reach of
injury or insult as soon as . a just regard to circumstances will permit. No
objections can arise to this procedure on the ground of expense, because, whatever
-.system may be approved by the legislature, nothing will be gained by delaying
its completion beyond the time necessary to the proper execution of the work.
In fact, the cost will be greater the longer we are employed in it, not only for
obvious reasons, .arising out of general superintendence and other contingencies,
but becau se accidents are liable to happen to unfinished works, and the business
upon them is deranged by the winter, when they must be properly secured; and
the season for resuming labor always finds some preparations necessary, which
would not h ave been required had no interruption happened.
But t h e political considerations which urge forward this great object are entitled to much more weight. When once completed we should feel secure. There
is probably not a man in the country who did not look with some solicitude .
during the past season at our comparatively defenceless condition, when the
issue of our discussions with France was uncertain, and who did not regret that
our preparations, during the long interval of peace we had enjoyed, had not
kept pace with our growth and importance. W e have now this lesson to add to
our other experience. Adequate security is not only due from the government
to the country, and the conviction of it is not only satisfactory, but the knowledge of its existence cannot fail to produce an influence upon other nations, as
well in th e advent of war itself, as in the mode of conducting it. If we are
prepared to attack and resist, the chances of being compelled to embark in hostilities will be diminished much in proportion to our preparation. An unprotected
commer~e, a defe~celess co~st, and a military mari~e wholly inadequate to the ·
wants of our service, would mdecd hold out strong mducements to other nations
to convert trifling pretexts into serious causes of quarrel.
There are two suggestions connected with the prosecution of our works which
I venture to mak e :
.
First. That the corps of engineers should be increased. The reasons for this
measure have been heretofore · submitted, and the proposition has. been recommended by you to Congress. I will merely add, upon the present occasion, that
the officers of this corps are not sufficiently numerous for the performance of the
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duties committed to them; and that if an augmentation does not take place, the
public interest will suffer in a degree far beyond the value of any pecuniary
consideration connected with this increase. And,
Secondly. I think that when the plan of a work has been approved by Congress, and its construction authorized, the whole appropriation should be made
at once, to be drawn from the treasury in annual instalments, to be fixed by the
law. This mode of appropriation would remedy much of the inconvenience
which has been felt for years in this branch of the public service. The uncertainty respecting the appropriations annually deranges the business, and the
delay which biennially takes place in the passage of the necessary law reduces
the alternate season of operations to a comparatively short period. .A.n exact
inquiry into the effect which the present system of making the appropriations
has had upon the expense of the works would probably exhibit an amount far
greater than is generally anticipated.
The report from the ordnance department shows the quantity and nature of
the munitions of war, estimated to be eventually necessary, and their probable
cost, including new establishments necessary for their fabrication and preservation. The conjectural amount is $29,955,537.
Believin~ it is not expedient, at present, to make any preparations upon_ a
scale of this mag1iitude, I have deemed it proper to accompany this report with
a brief statement of my own views, where I depart from the suggestions that
are presented in this document.
As our fortifications are constructed, their armaments should be provided;
and the amount in depot should at all times exceed the anticipated demand, to
meet the casualties of the service. We have now on hand 1,818 new cannon
for sea-coast defence; and about 1,000 others, most of which are either useless
or of doubtful character. 'The works actually finished, or so far completed as"
to admit of a part of their armament being placed in them, requiTe about 2,0~0
guns. They are calculated ultimately to mount about 600 more. Others ~
the process of construction will require about 1,400. So far we have certam
data for our estimates; unless, indeed, which I am inclined to believe, it should
not be found necessary ever to provide the full complement destined for the
largest of these works. Beyond this, the subject is conjectural. .A.~d the
quantity needed must depend upon the principles that may be adopted m the
further progress of the system of fortifications. There are four private fo'.111·
deries at which the public cannon are cast.' These, if their whole attention
were devoted to the object, could manufacture from 1,200 to 1,500 annually.
As to carriages and other supplies, the amount that could be procured within a
reasonable period is almost jndefinite. Iron carriages are now ma.de for ~ll. ~he
casemate batteries, and they have not only the advantage of indestruct1b1hty
from the atmosphere, but, requiring no seasoned n;iaterials, they may be supplied by the founderics through the country to almost any extent.
We have two armories for the manufacture of small arms, and there are seven
pr~vate establishments which fabricate arms for the government. All these ~pphes arc ?f the_ ~est description, and are submitted to a rigid inspection, which
prevents 1mpos1t10n. The armories can at present turn out about 27,000 anm
annuuliy, and probably 11,000 or 12,000 could be made at existing private
e tabli ·h~ents. Should any exigency require larger supplies, the quantity can
be much mcreased. We have now on hand about 700,000 small arms, and
there have been issued to the States about 180,000 muskets, 25,000 rifles, 30,0 I(
pi tols, and 378 field caunon and carriages, under the act for arming the militia.
If 100,000 of these muskets and rifles are preserved, there are in the country
00,000 of those species of arms belonging to the general or State govern·
ment.
·what may be considered a proper supply is a question admitting much dif·
ference of opinion. It will be seen that the ordnance department fixc' th
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amount at about 600,000, in addition to what are now on hand, and including
the number necessary to arm the militia. We had, at the commencement of
the last war, 240,000 muskets, and during its progress 60,000 more were made
and purchased. At its termination there were but 20,000 at the va:ious arsen~ls.
The residue were in the hands of the troops, or had bi:>en lost m the service.
This consumption was greater, I think, than was p.ecessary, or than would
probably again take place. A plan of accountability_ha.s bee~ introduced, _by
which the men are charged with the arms they receive, and if these are improperly .lost or injured, the value is deducted from their pay. The paymasters
cannot settle with them till this matter is adjusted.
818,282
The stock of small arms in Great Britain, in depot, in 1817, was ..
200,974
In the public service . . . . . . - ................. - - . - - - - - · · · · · ·
Total.................................... 1,019,256
~---The number in depot in France, in 1811, was 60,000, not including the great
number in service.
My own impression, is that 1,000,000 small arms may be considernd a competent supply for the United States; and if so, a large deductioB. may be made
from the estimate of the ordnance department under this head of expenditure.
Although the component materials of these arms are almost imperishable, still
it is not expedient to keep a stock unnecessarily large on hand; because there
is not only some risk and expense in their preservation, but because, like every
other article manufactured by man, they are no doubt susceptible of great improvement. And it may be that those now made may be superseded by an
improved model, which, once introduced, must be adopted, at whatever expense
or inconvenience, by all nations. And the ingenious invention lately exhibited
in this city, by which a series of balls, in separate charges, are brought by a
rotary motion to a common place of discharge, suggests the possibility of a
revolution in the form of our fire-arms.
On the subject of depots for these arms, I accord with the general suggestions
made by the colonel of ordnance. I think the number should be increased,
and arms placed in every part of the country, ready to be used as circumstances
may require.
It will be observed that, in the estimate I have made, I confine myself to the
armament for the public service, connected with the actual defence of the country, whether to be used by the army or militia in time-of war, but I do not
extend my views to a supply for arming the militia, in order to discipline them
in time of peace. The extent of this policy is a question not necessary in the
consideration of the subject before me.
As the arms in depot approach whatever number may be assumed as the
proper maximum, the necessity for additional armories becomes less. When our
stock is once completed, the present armories, without any aid from the private
establishments, will be able to supply the annual consumption. I think, therefore, that two additional armories, as suggested by the ordnance department,
are not wanted. And, indeed, although there are considerations attending the
transportation of the rude and the manufactured article, and other circumstances
which would justify the establishment of a new armory upon the western waters .
at present, yet if the measure is not carried into effect soon its importance will
annually diminish.
But a national foundery for cannon, both for the military and naval service,
and perhaps two in different sections of the country, should be erected without
delay. rrhe best interests of the public require it. But I have nothing to add
to the suggestions made upon this subject in my last annual report.
As to field artillery, the extent to which it shall be provided must depend
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upon the views of the legislature concerning the expediency of issuing it to the
militia. If a more efficient organization does not take place I think the expenditure on this account may well be saved to the public treasury. I consider
all attempts to improve the condition of the militia upon the present plan as so
nearly useless that the whole system has become a burden upon the public
without any corresponding advantage. The principal benefit which result~
from the existing state of things is the power to call into service such portioru
of the population as may be wanted. But this may be attained by a simple
classification without the cumbrous machinery which at present creates expense
and trouble, and which, while it promises little, performs still less.
Very respectfully, sir, I have the honor to be, &c.,
The

PRESIDENT

ef the

LEWIS CASS.
United States.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT,

Washington, ll!J.arck 30, 1836.
Sm : In compliance with your instructions, I have the honor to submit herewith the copy of a report prepared in fulfilment of the requirement of the first
inquiry contained in the resolution of the Sehate of the 18th of February last.
The views presented by Colonel r.rotten on the subject are full and explicit, and
are consonant with the principles heretofore advocated by this department.
The report is therefore respectfully submitted without any further comments.
Very respectfully, sir, your most obedient servant,

Hon.

LEWIS

CAss, Secretary

ef War.

C. GRATIOT,
Chief Engineer.

WASHINGTON, Marek 29, 1836.
Srn: In compliance with your request, I have the honor to hand in some remarks on the fortification of the frontier of the United States.
And am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient,

JOS. G. TOTTEN,
Lt. Col. Eng. Br,.vet Colonel.
Brig. Gen. CH. GRATIOT,
Cliiif Engineer, Washi"ngton.

In presen~in~ a s~mmary statement of the general system of defence of the
country by fort1fi~at10ns, as proposed and in part executed, it is proper to refer
for much mformat10n as to localities, as to particular projects, and for statem_ents
and arguments somewhat elaborate, to communications made at different t1mes
by the board of engineers for fortifications.
rrhe~e communications, of a nature forbidding too great publicity, are to be
found m the records of the War Department in the shape of reports of the
board of engineers of 1817, 1819, J 820, 1821, 1822, 1823, 1824, and 1 25.
Refore?-ce may also be ~ade with advantage to the revised report of th e board
of engmeers presented m 1826, and publisheed as document No. 153 of thr
tate p~pers of the first session of the nineteenth Congress. The report rf
1 26, Just refen-ed to, was drawn up by the undersigned, and was the work ot
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much research and of mature deliberation ; and in giving it now a careful perusal, he thinks that the information now called for by the Senate cannot b~ better
afforded, at least by him, than by again presenting that report, o~cas10na~ly
condensing, curtailing, or omitting portions of the argument and certam descriptions, and addi'ng such new facts as may have been developed b:y further research, or made more prominent and interesting by the progress of improvement
in the country.
..
'l'he elements going to make up the general system of maritime defence are a
navy, fortifications, interior communications by land and water, and a regular
army, and well organized militia.
,...
Tlie navy must be provided with suitable establishments for construct10n and
repair; stations, harbors of rendezvous, and ports of refuge. All t~~s~ must
be cove;.'ed by fortifications having garrisons of regular troops an~ m1htia, an_d
being supplied with men and materials through the lines of interior commurncations. Not being required to remain in the harbors for their defence, the
navy, pre-eminent as an offensive arm, will be prepared to transfer the war_ to
distant oceans and to the shores of the enemy, and to act the great part which
its early achievements have foretold, and to which its high destiny will lead.
Fortifications should, 1st, close all important harbors against an enemy, and
secure them to our military and commercial marine;
2d. Should deprive an enemy of all strong positions where, protected by naval
superiority, he might maintain himself during the war, keeping the whole frontier in constant alarm;
3d. Must cover the great naval establishments from attack;
4th. Must protect the great cities;
5th. Must prevent, as far as possible, the. great avenues of interior navigation
from being blockaded at their entrances to the ocean ;
6th. Must cover the coastwise and interior navigation, by closing the harbors
and the -several inlets which intersect the lines of interior communication, thereby
further aiding the navy in protecting the navigation of the country; and
7th. Must shelter the smaller towns along the coast, and also all their commercial and manufacturing establishments which are of a nature to invite the
enterprise or cupidity of an enemy.
Interior communications will conduct, with certainty, the necessary supplies
of all sorts to the stations, harbors of rendezvous and refuge, and the establishments of construction and repair for the use both of the fortifications and of the
navy; will greatly facilitate and expedite the concentration of military fo;rce,
and the transfer of troops from one point to another; will insure to these
troops supplies of every description, and will preserve, unimpaired, the interchange of domestic commerce, even during periods of the most active external
wa1fare.
The arrny and militia, together with the personnel of the marine, constitute
the vital principle of the system.
It is important to notice the reciprocal relation of these elements of national
defence; one element is scarcely more d·ependent on another, than the whole
syst~m is on each one. Withdraw the navy, and the defence becomes merely
passive; we expose ourselves the more to suffer the evils of war, at the time
that we deprive ourselves of all means of inflicting them. Withdraw interior
communication, and the nai,y will often be greatly embarrassed for want of
supplies, while the fortifications will be unable to offer full resistance for want
of timely re-enforcements. ·withdraw fortifications, and the interior communications are broken up, and the na1.,y is left entirely without collateral aid.
That element in the system of defence, which is now to be attended to, is the
fortifi~ation of the frontier. It may I).Ot be unprofitable here to go somewhat
more mto detail, as to the relation of this with the other members of the system;
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the rather, as the reasons for some conclusions hereafter to be announced will
be the more apparent.
In considering the relation of fortifications, and of the navy, to the defence of
the country, it will appear that the functions of the latter are not less appropriately offensive than those of the former are necessarily defensive; the latter
loses much of its efficiency as a member of the system the moment it becomes
passive, and should in no case (referring now to the navy proper) be relied on
as a substitute for fortifications.
The position, it is thought, may be easily established.
If our navy be inferior to that of the enemy, it can offer, of course, without
collateral aids, but a feeble resistance, single ships being assailed by fleets or
squadrons. Having numerous points along our extended frontier to protect, all
of which must be simultaneously guarded, because ignorant of the selected
points of attack, the separate squadrons or vessels may be captured in detail,
although the naval force be, in the aggregate, equal or superior to the enemy's.
Should we in such a case venture to concentrate, under the idea that the particular object of the adversary was foreseen, he could not fail to push his forces
upon the places thus left without protection. 'rhis mode of defence is liable to
the further objection of being exposed to fatal disasters, independent of assaults
of an enemy, and of leaving the issue of conflicts to be determined sometimes
by accident, in spite of all the efforts of courage and skill. If it were attempted
to improve upon this mode, by combining with it temporary batteries and fieldworks, it would be found that, besides being weak and inadequate from their
nature, the most suita~le positions for these works must often be neglected, ~der the unavoidable condition of security to the ships themselves. If the ships
take no part in the contest, the defence is of course relinquished to the temporary batteries; if the ships unite in the defence, the batteries must be at hand
to sustain them, or the ships must strike to the superior adversary. Placing
these batteries in better position, and giving them greater strength, is at once
resorting to defence by fortifications; and the resort will be the more effectual,
as the positions are better chosen, and the works better adapted to the circumstances.
On the great comparative expense of such a mode of defence, which will
quite apparent after a little reflection, only one or two very ~rief remarks will
be made, viz: ~rhe expense incurred by the nation defending itself on this plan
will, from the first, greatly exceed that incurred by the attacking party; because,
to resist a single fleet threatening the coast, there must be provided as many
equal fleets as there are important objects inviting the attack of the enemy, ~d
even with this costly preparation, all lesser objects are thrown upon his forbearance. 'I1hese defences, moreover, being perishable in their nature, will need
frequent removal and repafr.
.
. ?n the other hand, the proper fortification of the coast, preventing the poss1b1hty of a blockade so strict as not to afford frequent opportunities for our naYy
to leave the ~arbors, our ships, no longer needed for passive defence, wi_ll move
out upon the1r _proper theatre of action, though inferior to the enemy, w1!h confi~ence; knovnng that, whether victorious, whether suffering from the v10le~ce
of tempests, or whether endangered by the vicinity or the pursuit of a supenor
force, they can strike the extended coast of their country (avoiding the more
rmp_o rtant outlets, whe_re alone a considerable blockading force may be supposed
to be) at numerous pomts where shelter and relief await them; hovering around
the. flanks and ~n the rear of blockading fleets, and recapturing their prizes;
fallmg upon 1)ort1011s of these fleets, separnted for minor objects, or by stress of
weather; watc~ing the· movements of convoys, in order to pick up straggling
vess~l. ; breakmg up or restraining the enemy's commerce in distant sea ;
meetmg by concert at remote points and falling in mass upon his smaller quadron , or upon hi colonial possessions, and even levying contributions in his un-
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protected ports; blockading for a time the narrow seas, and. l1arassi:1g the
coasting commerce of the enemy's own shores. These are obJects which our
own history shows may be accomplished, although conten~ing, by means of a
navy as to numbers apparently insignificant, against a marme wh~se force and
efficiency have never been paralleled. Our own history shows, besides, that the
Teason why our infant navy did not accomplish still more, was that the enemy,
possessing himself of unfortified harbors, was enabled to enforc.e a bl~ckade so
strict as to confine a portion of it within our waters. r.rhat tlus port10n, however, indeed, that all was not captured, can be attributed only to respec_t---:--so
misplaced that it could be the result of ignorance only-for the then exist~ng
fortifications; a result amply compensating the nation for the cost of those Imperfect works. It would be difficult, nay, impossible, to estimate the full value
of the results following the career of our navy, when it shall have attained its
state of manhood, under the favorable conditions lrnretofore indicated. The
blockade of many and distant parts of our coast will then be impossible, or,
rather, can then be effected only at enormous cost, and under the risk of the
several squadrons being successively captured or dispersed; the commerce of
our adversary must be nearly withdrawn from the ocean, or it must be convoyed,
not by a few vessels, but by powerful fleets. In fine, the war, instead of resulting in the pillage and conflagration of our cities and towns, in the destruction
of our scattered and embayed navy, and of the expensive establishments pertaining to it, in the interruption of all commercial intercourse between the several portions of the maritime frontier, in the frequent harassing, and expensive
assemblage of militia forces, thereby greatly lessening the products of industry,
a nd infusing among this most valuable portion of our population the fatal
diseases and the demoralizing habits of a camp life; instead of these and innumerable other evils attendant upon a conflict along and within our borders, we should
find the war and all its more serious evils shut out from our territory by our
fortresses, and transferred by our navy to the bosom of the ocean, or even to
the country of the enemy, should he, relying on a different system, have
neglected to defend the avenues by which he is assailable.
Our wars, thus becoming maritime, will be less costly in men and money, and
at the same time more in unison with our institutions-fOTging no weapon for
defence capable of being turned, under other circumstances, against the life of
the State; and keeping our domestic industry and relations, under our internal
financial resources, beyond the reach of assault from without.
It is an incontestible principle in military science, and one fully illustrated
by military history, that the worst mode of waging war, although strictly a defensive one in its origin and its object, is to permit its field of action to lie within
our own borders; and that the best mode is that which longest sustains an
offensive attitude. In our own case, war can be excluded from our territory
o:1ly by forti~cations ; and we can assume the offensive, with the greatest portion of mankmd, only through our navy. The construction of the former secures
the means of creating, equipp\ng, and repairing the latter, and leaves it unencumbered. with duties which it imperfectly performs, to the full exercise of its
great and appr?priate functions. _In accordance with these principles, what, in
general terms, IS the extent to which the government may be called on to prepare ~tself ~ fortifyin~ the coast and in building up the navy 1
. It 1s not m hu~an forecast to decide upon t~1e station of the latter a generation hence. . Political events may foi'ce the n~tion to place herself more nearly
on a level w1tJi some of th~ greatest of mantime powers, or the prevalence of
peaceful rela~10ns may restnct the growth of the navy to that demanded by the
mcrease, rapid and extensive, of our commercial interests. But whatever may
be the amount of enlargement of the naval force, whether greater or less ; or
~b~teYer the. m?d.e, whether progressive and regular, or by sudden expansion,
its mcrease will mvolve no corresponding extension in the number or strength
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of the fortifications, because these must be adequate to their object of them.
selves, and must consequently be, with some exceptions, as numerous and astrong while the navy ·is small, as when the navy shall have attained its IIlllximum. A considerable enlargement of the naval force might build up new nay~
establishments, thereby, in raising the importance of certain positions, callin~
for stronger defences.
The growth of the country in wealth and numbers will convert certain place..
now presenting no inducements . to the enterprise of an enemy, into rich an,:
populous cities. But, with the exception of these cases, and such as these, i:
may be assumed that a good system of fortifications applied now to the maritime
frontier will be equal to its object in all future times.
Conceiving it unnecessary to enlarge further on this part of the subject, a
few remarks will be offered on the correlative influence of.fortifications and i11·
terior communications.
The most important of these communications, in reference to a sys(~Jll~f defence, are, first, such as serve to sustain, in all its activity, that port1on of domestic commerce which, without their aid, would be interrupted by a state o'.
war ; and second, such as serve, besides their great original purposes, to conduc:
from the interior to the theatre of war necessary supplies and timely relie1.
The first, which are among the most important national concerns ot this nature
lie parallel to, and not far from, the coast; the second, which, when they crot:
the great natural partition-wall between the east and the west, are equally im:
portant, lie more remote from the coast, and sometimes nearly or quite parall,1
to it, but generally fall, nearly at right angles to the line of the seaboard, int·
the great estuaries, where, iu some cases, their products are arrested, or whenct
in others, they flow or mingle with those of the first. To fulfil the object r,:
the first-mentioned lines of communication, it is obviously necessary to preveD"
an enemy from reaching them through any of the numerous inlets from the s_r:
which they traverse, including, of course, the great inlets wherein these um
with the communications coming from the interior. The security of the coast·
~vise line, therefore, involves the security of the other, and is, in a great measur,,
mdispensable to it. From such considerations as have been already presenta
it is inferred that, for the security here required, we must, as in the. case r:
cities, harbors, naval establishments, &c., look to fortifications. But it fortu·
nately happens, as will appear in the sequel, that wherever both objects es.!=''
the works necessary for the one may often, if not always, be made to acco~1
both. In reference to a system of defence for the protection of these line~ L
communication, it must be observed that, from the facility with which they may
be bro~en up, and the serious evils consequent thereon, they offer to th~ en~m..
great mducements to enterprises of that nature. An aqueduct, an rnchnb
plane, a tide-lock, a dam, an embankment blown up, is the work of an hour,
and yet would interrupt the navigation perhaps for months.
Th~ necessity of a regular army, even in tµne of peace, is a princi~l_e_we~
~st~bh heel by our legislation. The importance of a well-organized m1htrn ·mc1dent to the nature of our institutions, well understood by the peop!e, ~uly
appreciated by the government, and finely illustrated in our histor~. _1 othlll-_
therefore, need be said on these subjects, considered as general prmc1ples. I
may, however, in a succeeding part of this communication, be deemed pr?per_ ·
hazard a conjecture or two touching the expediency of a peculiar orgamzanr . .
of the latter.
Before going further, it is proper to be more explicit as to the sense in whi ·
the tenn "navy " and "fortifications" have been employed.
.
By the term nary, only that portion of our military marine which is ca_pnl:.
of moving in , afcty u1JOn the ocean, and transferring itself speedily to di,t•.
point , i meant. Floating batteries, gunboats, steam batteries, &c., these ~n
mdeed, all other modes of defence which are restricted in their sphere of act. :::
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tied down to local defence, and are produced chiefly in cases where the loca~ities '
deny to fortifications their best action, are regarded as auxiliary to fortificat10ns,
2nd as falling within the same category. Under the term "fortification_s," used
as expressive of security afforded thereby to the seaboard, have been mcluded
J>ermanent and temporary fortifications, the auxiliaries just mentioned, and both
-.fixed and floating obstructions to channels.
'l'he circumstances which must govern in framing a system of fortifications
arelst. The importance of the objects to be defended. Great naval establishments, great cities, &c., invite to greater preparation on the part of an eneP1y,
and demand corresponding means of resistance.
..
..
2d. The natural advantage,s or disadvantages of the position to be fortified.
It will often happen· that the defence of a position of great consequence can be
effected with smaller works, and at less expense, than a place of much less
value. It will not follow, therefore, that the expense of fortifications will be
proportionate to the importance of the object, though it is indispensable that the
strength should be.
.
3d. The species of attack to which the place is liable. Some places will be
exposed only to capture by assault; others by siege; others · to reduction by
cannonade, bombardment, or blockade ; and some to a combination of any or-all
these modes. If the enemy against which we fortify be unprovided with artillery, the mode of fortifying becomes peculiar.
4th. ,Vhatever may be the circumstances, it is of vital importance tbat all the
works should be fully adequate to the object, and that they should, even with a
small garrison, be perfectly safe from a coup de main.
Proceeding now to a concise description of the maritime frontier, considered
as a whole, the several sections will be afterwards separately examined, applying as we go to the several positions the works already projected, and pointing
out as far as practicable such as remain to be planned. 'l'he sea-coast of the
United States is comprised within the 24th and 46th degrees of north latitude,
and spreads over 27 degrees of longitude. '.I.1he. general direction of that part
which lies on the Atlantic, north of the peninsula of Florida, is N.NE. and
S.SW. This peninsula stretches out from the continent in a direction a little
east of south; while that part which lies on the Gulf of Mexico corresponds
nearly with the 30th parallel of north latitude.
Without estimating any of its indentations not properly belonging to its. outline, and carrying our measure from point to point wherever the breaks are at
all abrupt, the line of coast may be stated to be 3,300 miles in length.
Nearly parallel with the Atlaptic coast extends a chain of mountains separating the sources of rivers flowing, on the one hand, directly into the ocean
from those which run into the Gulf of St. Lawrence or the Gulf of Mexico.
Even in the most lohy portion of this chain numerous gaps afford facilities for
crossing by roads or railways.
Occasional expansions, at high elevations, present sufficient surface to afford
the water required for crossing by canals ; and, in other places, the rivers themselves have severed the chain, leaving no impediments to communications of
either kind. On both sides of these mountains the country offers numerous
natural means of intercommunication, and facilities and inducements for the
creation of artificial ones in endless combination.
l!'rom this general description it may be deduced that, notwithstanding the
great extent of our seaboard, the safety of each section of it is a matter not
devoid of interest to every portion of the people, however remote geographically,
at least so long as the nation shall continue her commercial relations with the
rest of the world ; and, indeed, until she t1hall find it her interest to interdict the
circulation of domestic commerce through the avenues which nature or art may

~8

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

have created-a commerce of inestimable value at all times, and becoming more
necessary, as well as more valuable, on every interruption of foreign traffic.
As lying closely connected with the coast, it will be convenient to describe
briefly in this place that line of interior communication on which, in time 0
war, reliance must be placed as a substitute, in part, for the exterior coasting
navigation of peace.
Beginning in the great bay to the north of Cape Cod, it passes overland
either into N arraganset roads or Buzzard's bay; thence through Long Island
sound to the harbor of New York; thence up the Raritan, overland to the Delaware, down this river some distance, overland to the Chesapeake, down the
Chesapeake, up Hampton roads and Elizabeth river, through the Dismal swamp
to Albemarle sound; thence through the low lands, swamps, or sounds of the
Carolinas and Georgia to the head of the peninsula of Florida; thence overland
to the Gulf of Mexico ; thence through the interior sounds and bays 1o New
Orleans, and thence through low lands, swamps, and bayous to the western
boundary. Some of the few and brief natural interruptions of this extensiw
line have already been removed; some are rapidly disappearing before the
energy of local or State enterprise, and to the residue the public attention is
directed with an earnestness which leaves no reason to fear that they will not
in due time be overcome. In all cases where this line becomes much exposed
to an enemy from the difficulty of fortifying broad waters, communications more
inland are even now afforded, or are in progress by canals or railroads, which
will be perfectly safe.
Proceeding now to a more minute examination of the coast, it will be comenient to divide it into four distinct parts, namely: the northeastern, extending
from the English province of New Brunswick to Cape Cod; the middle, from
Cape Cod to Cape Hatteras; the southern, from Cape Hatteras to Cape Sable;
and the Gulf of Mexico frontier from Cape Sable to the Mexican borders.
They will be taken up in the order in which they stand above.
THE NORTHEASTERN SECTION OF THE COAST.

The northeastern section is characterized by its ·serrated outline and its
numerous harbors ; and, though differing in these respects entirely from the
other sections, is not less distinguished in its climate than by the prevalence,. at
certain seasons, of dense and lasting fogs. 'I1he extent of this section, meas~g
from point to point wherever the breaks of the coast are abrupt, is about fi,e
hundred miles, while a straight line from Cape Cod to Quoddy Head is hardly
half that distance. The eastern half of this coast is singularly indented by
deep bays, the shores being universally rocky, and having numerous islands
surrounded by deep water, which not only add to the number of harbors, but,
afford, besides, an interior navigation well understood by the hardy coasters ot
this section, and measurably secured by its intricacies and the other dangers of
this foggy and boisterous region from interruption by an enemy. The western
half, though it has two very prominent capes and a few deep bays, is much le.:- 5
broken in its outline than the eastern. It is covered by few islands, in comparison, but contains, nevertheless, several excellent harbors.
The eastern harbors of Maine are exposed in a peculiar manner. They are
not only on the flank of our line, but they are also quite near to public establishments of the greatest maritime powers ; they are, moreover, as yet, backed
by a parse population only, and are consequently both weak and exposed. The
time cannot be very di tant, however, when, becoming wealthy and popnlou~.
they will be the objects of a full portion of the public solicitude. "\York:s ckFigned for the e harbors must therefore be calculated for the future-must l e
founded on the principle that they are to defend places much more irnport~uthan any now existing there ; that, being very near the possessions of a foreio-n
power, they will be, in a particular manner, liable to sudden and to repeated
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attacks ; and that, lying at the extremity of the coast, they can be only tardily
succored. The works erected on this part of the coast should be so strong as
to resist escalade, and to hold out long enough for the arrival of relief. Feebler
works than these might be more injurious than beneficial; their weakness wo_uld,
in the first place, invite attack, and it being a great advantage t_o occupy fortified
places in an adversary's territory, the enemy would prepare himself to remedy
the military deficiencies of these forts by adding temporary works, by the force
of his garrisons and the aid of his vessels.
.
No surveys have been made of these harbors and no plans formed for then·
defence. It may be well to observe here, once for all, that much confidence is
not asked for the mere conjectures presented below as to the number and cost of
the works assigned for the protection of the harbors which have not yet been
surveyed. In some cases there will be mistakes as to the number of for_ts
needed, and in others the errors will be in the estimated cost, but the errors will
probably as often lie on one side as on the other, so that the sum total may be a
sufficient approximation to the truth.
'l'his is the place to state, also, that the early estimates furnished for the _pr~j ected works require considerable augmentation. The explanation of this 1s
easy. In preparing those estimates the board of engineers obtained lists of
prices from different sections of the country, and adopted them as accurate.
Whether the lists thus furnished referred to materials and workmanship of inferior quality, or because they were drawn up at a period of unusually low
prices, it has been found by experience that these prices were almost all too low.
The board calculated with great care and labor, and with perfect honesty of purpose, applying the prices just mentioned to all the quantities susceptible of measurement and calculation; and they applied themselves with no less diligence
and good faith to the estimate of expenses of a contingent nature, and, for the
greater part, not to be foreseen with accuracy, either as to amount or kind.
Having no experience in large constructions, these last were at least but conjectures ; and, as the history of constructions on several parts of the coast has since
shown, they were much too small. In consideration of these defici~ncies, of the
present great elevation of prices, and of the liability to great increase of cost
from occasional interruptions of progress and breaking up of systems of operations, it is thought that about fifty per centum shoula be added to the amounts
given in the estimates.
Eastport and Macliias may be brought forward as places that will unquestionably be thougJ1t to need defensive works by the time, in the order of relative
importance, the execution of them can be undertaken by the government. There
a:e several small towns e~stward of Mount Desert island that may, at that period, deserve equal attent10n. At present, ho~vever, the places named above will
be the only ones estimated for, and $100,000 will be assumed as the cost of
each.
Mount Desert island, situated a little east of Penobscot bay, and centrally as
regards the Kennebec and St. Croix rivers, having a capacious and safe roadstead, affording anch~rage for the highest class of vessel~, and easily accessible
from sea, offers a stat10n for the navy of an enemy supenor to any other on this
por~ion of the c_oas~. From this point his cruis~rs might act with great effect
agamst the nav1gat10n of the eastern coast, especially that of Maine and his enterpr~ses of every kind could
cor_iducted with great rapidity agai~st any point
he IDight select. These cons1derat10ns, added to the advantages which would
result _in certain politi~al events from our occupying so advanced a station, whence
we m1ght act offensively, together with the propriety of providing places of
suc~or ~n a part of the ~o_ast where vessels are so frequently perplexed in their
nav1gat10n by the preva1lmg fogs, lead to the conclusion that the fortification, in
a strong manner, of this roadstead, is highly necessary. A survey of this island
was begun many years ago, but the party being called off to other duties, it was
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never completed; the project of defensive works has not been formed. The
entire cost may be, as assumed by the engineer department, $500,000.
Castine.-It would seem to be impossible on this coast to deprive an enem,1
enjoying naval superiority, of harbors, or to prevent his using them as statio~.
during the war, insular situations, which his vessels would render unapproachable, being so numerous ; but it seems proper that those positions of this nature,
which are at the same time the sites of towns, should be secured against hi,
visitations. During the last war the English held the position of Castine for
some time, and left it at their own pleasure. It is probable that a work costin11
about $50 ,000 would deter an enemy from again making choice of this position.
Penobscot bay.-Upon this bay, and upon the river of the same name flowing
into it, are several :flourishing towns and villages. Of the many bays which intersect this coast, the Penobscot is the one which presents the greatest number
of safe and capacious anchorages. As before observed, a large portion of these
harbors must, for the present, be left without defences, but the valuable commerce of the bay and river must be covered, and to afford a secure retreat for
such vessels as may be unable to place themselves under protection of the works
to the east or west of the bay, the passage ,of the river must be defended. The
lowest point at which this can be done, without great expense, is at the narro'1s
opposite Buck.sport. A project has been given in for a fort at that position, now
estimated at $160,000.
•
West of the Penobscot comes St. George's bay, Broad hay, Damariscotta,
and Slieepscot, all deep indentations, and leading to towns, villages, and variom
establishments of industry and enterprise of greater or less present value and
future promise. 'l1hese have not been surveyed, and, of course, no plans ha'1e
been formed for their defence; $400,000 are assigned to the fortification of these
waters. 'l1he Sheepscot is an excellent harbor of refuge for vessels of every
class.
l(ennebec river.-This river, one of the largest in the eastern States,. enters
the sea nearly midway between Cape Cod and the mouth of the St. Cro1x. It
rises near the source of the Chaudierre, a tributary of the St. Lawrence, and
has once served as a line of operations against Quebec. The situation and extent of this river, the value of its products, and the active commerce of several
very flourishing towns upon its banks, together with the excellence of the h~rbor within its mouth, will not permit its defence to be neglected. Surveys mcomplete-estimated cost of defences, as formed by the engineer department,
$300,000.
.
Portland liarbor.-A little to the northwest of Cape Elizabeth is the ha1:bor
of Portland. 'rhe protection of the town, of the merchantmen, and of the sh1p~of-war that may be stationed there to guard the coast or that may enter for
shelter, all of them important objects, may be secured, as an inspection of the
map of the town and harbor will show, by occupying Fort Preble Point, Hou~e
island, Hog Island ledge, and Fish Point. At the same time, if the two channel~
to the west and east of Hog Island ledge can be obstructed at small expen~ 1'which is hardly a matter of doubt, although some final surveys are necessary
to cl<'cide this point, there will be no necessity for a battery on the ledge; and
}-,i~h Point need be occupied only by such works as may be thrown up in time
of war. 'I he expense, as now estimated, of the works plannecl for the defence-not iucludiug the defence of Hog If:land channel, of which the mode ha$ not
been settled-will be . '155,000 for Fort Preble, and $48,000 for House i:-:lanJ.
]for Hog I. land channel, i:;ay $135,000.
The moutlts of the Saco, Ifonnebunk, and York.-Comparatively small workwill, it i, thought, adequately cover these places, and $75,000 is a::;:4umed •::
their aggl'(•gate co t.
Portsmoutlt Ifarbor.-Thc only gord road. toad, or good harbor, between a
Elizabeth ancl Cape Ann, i::; Portsmouth harbor, within the mouth of Piscat:H1u 3
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river. Line-of-battle ships can ascend this river ~s hi~h as Fox Po~nt, sev:en
m iles above the town of Portsmouth. Between tlns pomt a?d Shootmg ~ou~t
is a branch of the river communicating with Great bay. 'I.1his branch, which IS
one-third of a mile wide, presents, for two miles in length, an excellent cover
for all sorts of vessels. 'I1his situation, sufficiently commodious for a secondary
depot, designed to repair vessels of war seeking an asylum in this river, is too
near the sea for a great naval depot; and, in other respects, does not poss~ss the
advantages of Boston, as was shown in the report of th~ board of ~n~·11;1-ee:s,
1820. Still, as Portsmouth is an excellent harbor and station, and as it is mdispensable that some, at least, of these stations be provided with the necessary
establishments for repairs, the depot in this river should be maintained. It is _to
be regretted that the bay to the south of Fox Point was not chosen as the site
of the navy yard instead of Fernal's island. Being where it is, it will be ~ecessary, in time of war, to make some particular dispositions for the protection of
the yard from an attack from the north shore of the river.
'I'he position of Fort Constitution must certainly, and that of Fort McCleary
may possibly, be occupied by these defences; though the works themselves,
especially the first named, must give place to such as will better fulfil the object. The other positions for forts are Gerrish's Point, - - island, and Clark's
island; some, if not all, of which must be occupied. Some final surveys must
be made before the necessary works can be accurately determined on, and before estimates can be made; but there is reason for believing that the entire expense of fortifying this harbor will not fall short of $500,000.
Newburyport harbor.-This is the next port south of Portsmouth. The
l\Ierrimack river, the mouth of which forms this harbor, is obstructed at its junction with the sea by a bar, on which there was formerly but six or seven feet of
·water at low tide. This entrance has since, however, been thought to be essentially important, and, at any rate, it leads to a beautiful, prosperous, and wealthy
city. The points forming the mouth of the river are continually changing their
form and position ; near the middle of the present channel is said to be the spot
once occupied by a fort. Under such circumstances, it seems advisable to rely,
for the defence of this harbor, on forts to be thrown up on the approach of war,
unless the works of harbor improvement now in progress shall be found to give
stability to the points in question. It is thought that $100,000 would defend
this entrance adequately.
Gloucester lwrbor.-The position of this harbor, near the extremity of Cape
Ann, places it in close relation with the navigation of all Massachusetts bay,
and gives it an importance beyond what would be assigned to it on account of
its local interests. No surveys have yet been made, but'it is believed that sufficient defences may be provided for $200,000.
B everly liarbor.-This harbor will be defended chiefly by a portion of the
works designed for Salem; $50,000, in addition, will secure it.
_Salem liarbor.-The port of Salem is distant from Marblehead two miles,
be1_n g separated therefrom by a J?eninsnla. 1:he o~cupation of the extremity of
Wmter ISland, (where are the rums of Fort Pickermg,) on one side, and of :N"augus H ead on the other, will effectually secure this harbor. Projects have been
presented for this defence, now estimated at $225,000.
JYiarblehcad ltarbor.-Besides covering, in some measure, the establishment
at Bos_ton, the harbors of Marblehead and Salem possess an important commerce
of thell' own, and also afford shelter for vessels prevented by certain winds from
entering Boston or pursuing their course eastward . 'l~he mode of defending
~Iarblehead h~rbor, pro.Posed by_ the board of engineers, consists in occupying,
o~ the north side, the hillock which commands the present l!.,ort Sewall, (which
,v1ll be superseded by the new work,) and on the south, the position of Jack's
Point. 'l'he two works will cost $318,000.
Boston harbor.-We come now to the most important harbor in the eastern
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section of the coast, and, considering its relation to general commerce and the
interests of the navy, one of the most important in the Union. After a careful
examination of all the necessary conditions of such a problem, the board of
naval officers and engineers, in their joint report of 1820, gave this harbor a
preference over all other positions to the east, and, inclusive of New York bay
and the Hudson, as the seat of the great northern naval depot. For reasons, at
large, for this selection, reference is made to the report of 1820. But, even
should the recommendation therein contained remain unsanctioned, still Boston
is a city of great wealth; possesses an extensive and active commerce, and contains already within its harbor an establishment on which great reliance i~
placed to give growth and energy to our navy. The present forts in Boet-0n
harbor defend merely the interior basin from attacks by water, but as it often
happens that vessels enter N antasket roads with a wind too scant to pass the
narrows, or are detained in President roads by light winds or an adverse tide;
as the former, especially, is a very convenient anchorage, from whence to proceed to sea; and above all, as N antasket roads afford the best possible station
for a blockading squadron, it was deemed indispensable to place permanent defences at the mouth of the harbor. The project of the defence regards the existing works, with the neces::,ary repairs and modifications, as constituting a second . ·barrier ; contemplates placing a permanent fort on George's island!
another at N antasket Head, having two advanced works on the head and one on
Hog island ; reducing the latitude of Gallop island, in order to destroy its command over George's island; and filling up the Btoad Sound channel, so a to
leave no passage, in that direction, for ships-of-war. rrhese are estimated to
cost $2,337,000. · Besides the works of a permanent character, it will be newsary, in the beginning of a war, to erect several temporary works in the lower
part of the harbor, in order to make that defence more perfect, and also on certain lateral approaches to the navy yard.
Plymouth, and Provincetown harbors.-These are the only harbors on the
northeastern section of the coast south of Boston. They have a commerce of
some consequence of their own; but they are particularly interesting in reference to the port of Boston, and to the transition from the middle to the eastern
section of the coast, in which respect they would become still more important
should the proposed canal from Buzzard's to Barnstable bay ever be executed.
While these harbors are undefended, an enemy's squadron blockading M:ass~chusetts bay will have ports of refuge under his lee of which he would not fail
to avail himself to maintain his blockade, even throughout the most stormy seasons, knowing that the wind which would compel him to seek shelter would _be
adverse to outward-bound, and fatal, should they venture near the cape, tomward-bound vessels. While in possession of, these harbors, an enemy would
have constantly under his eye the harbor of Boston, the passage round C~pe
Cod, and that through the canal. 'l'o these considerations, going to estahli;;h
the necessity of securing these harbors by proper defences, it must be added
that, being thus deprived of the shelter afforded by these ports, an enemy would
be unable to enforce a rigorous investment. In the first place, he would be often
deterred from taking a station near the land, lest he should be caught embayecl
by the violent easterly winds prevailing at certain seasons; in the next place, he
would always take a good offing on every distinct indication of these wind:3,
!hereby l~aving a clear coast to be profited of by our own vessels at the fir~~nstant ?f a ch,~nge of weather. Our own vessels, corning in from sea, and :fin~mg au cuemy rnterpo ed between them and Boston, or being turned from thcu
coun;c by aclver e wind , would, in case of the defence of 1he,:;e harbors, find to
th· :'~Jntl~ of B?ston a shelter equivalen t to that provided to the north by the
fort1fieat10ns of )Iarblehcad, S uem, GlouccstC'r, and Portsmouth.
'l'hc .-urvey;· of the ·c harbors have not Leen haudcd iu, and no plan::: ha,-e
been 'urmecl for their ctefouce. Plymouth harbor may be suitably defend d · -
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is thought, by the occupation of Gurnet Point, a1:d at no great expense; while
it is thought that, to fortify Provincetown ha:hor m sue~ a way as to cover vessels taking shelter therein, and at the same time to depnve an enemy ?fall safe
anchorages, will involve considerable expense, pro_bably no nearer estu~1ate can
be formed at present than that offered by the engmeer department, which gave
$100,000 to Plymouth and $600,000 to Provincetown.
Should the canal above mentioned be executed, it will be necessary to place a
small work at each of its outlets, to prevent the destruction of th~ means by
which the transit of vessels in and out of the canal must be accomplished.
MIDDLE SECTION OF THE COAST.

The coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras differs from the northeastern
section in possessing fewer harbors, in having but little rocky and a great portion of sandy shore, wherein it resembles the southern section; in its milder climate and its clearer atmosphere; and it differs from all the other portions in the
depth and magnitude of its interior seas and sounds, and in the distance to
which deep tide navigation extends up its numero1,1.s large rivers.
The circuit of the coast, not including the shores of the g-reat bays, measures
650 miles, while a straight line from one of the above-named capes to the other
measures about 520 miles.
Ma1·tka's Vineyard sound.-rr'o the south of Cape Cod lie the islands of°Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, which with several smaller islands on the south,
and the proje"ction of Cape Malabar on the e_ast, enclose Martha's Vineyard
sound. r.rhe channels through· this sound being sufficient for merchant vessels,
and one of them allowing the passage even of small frigates, are not only the
constant track of coasting vessels, but owing to the relative situation of Long
I sland sound and Narraganset roads, and to the existence of two tolerably safe
harbors at convenient distances east of Gayhead, namely, rr'arpaulin sound and
H olmes's Hole, the sound is generally aimed at by all eastern vessels arriving
from foreign voyages in the tempestuous months. rr'here are certain.,difficulties,
however, attending the navigation of this sound, arising from the want of a harbor near the eastern extremity, which have suggested the project of an artificial
harbor at the northeast point of Nantucket island. Besides these harbors on
the direct route through the sound, there are the harbors of Nantucket, Edgartown, and Falmouth.
In addition to the many thousand vessels which pass this water annually, of
which there are sometimes forty or fifty, a portion containing the most valuable
cargoes, to be seen in the harbors awaiting a change of wind, there is supposed
to be at least 40,000 tons of shipping owned in the towns of this sound, and
employed in the whale fishery. If this portion of the coast is to be defended
at all, it must be by fortifications, for there is no population SC'lrcely, except that
of the towns, and this is believed to be entirely without military organization.
A privateer might run into either of these harbors and capture, destroy, or levy
contributions at pleasure; $250,000 may perhaps suffice for the defence of all
these places against the kind of enterprises to which they are exposed.
·
Buzzard's bay.-Interposed between the island of Martha's Vineyard and
the main are the Elizabeth islands, bounding Buzzard's bay on the south. '.rhis
bay, although of importance as leading to the proposed can.al to Barnstable bay,
as covering the flourishing town of New Bedford, and as being one of the natural harbors to be used by an enemy in forcing the blockade of N arraganset
roads, cannot be defended by fortifications, owing to its great breadth.
N ew B edford and Fairhaven liarbor.-No survey has been made of this harbor, which covers two of the most flourishing towns. It is certainly defensible,
and probably for the amount assumed by the engin~er department, namely,
~300,000.
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Narraganset bay.-The properties of this great roadstead will be here adverted to very briefly; more minute information may be obtained by reference
to reports of 1820 and 1821.
It is the only harbor on the coast accessible with a northwest wind, which i3
the most common and violent of the most inclement season; and as winds from
N.NW. to S.SW. round by the east serve for entering both Boston and Xew
York harbors, while this harbor can be entered with all winds from northwest
to east round by the w0st, it follows that, while we possess this harbor, vessels
may be certain of making shelter on this part of the coast with any wind that
can blow, exeepting only between N.NW. and NW. From this station the
navigation of Long Island sound, and especially the communication between that
sound and Buzzard's bay or Martha's vineyard sound, may be well protected.
The blockade of the excellent harbor and naval station of New London will be
rendered difficult. From this station the navy will command southwardly, as from
Hampton roads northwardly, the great inward curve of the coast between Cape
Cod and Cape Hatteras; the influence of which commq,nd over the blockading
operations of an enemy will be apparent, when it is considered that the only
harbors of refuge he can have will be the Delaware, Gardiner's, and Buzzard's
bays, and that it is far from certain that improvements in the auxiliaries of fortifications may not dep.r ive him of these also.
If N arraganset bay were without defence, an enemy would occupy it without
difficulty, and, by the aid of naval superiority, form a lodgement in Rhode Island
for the war. Occupying the island alone, or connecting therewith the position
of Tiverton H eights, opposite the northern extremity of the island, a position
which is of narrow front, easy to secure, and impossible to turn, he might defy
all the forces of the eastern States, drive the United States to vast expense of
blood and treasure, and while this position of his troops would keep in alarm
and motion all the population of the east, feigned expeditions against New York,
through Long Island sound, or against more southern cities, would equally alarm
the country in that direction; and thus, although he might do no more than
menace, it is difficult to estimate the embarrassment and expense into which he
would drive the government.
Of old forts, some of which were never finished, Fort Wolcott and Fort
Green are the only ones retained in the projected system of defence.
The project of defence proposed by the board of engineers contemplates ~or
the middle channel, on Brenton's Point, a strong fort, (now well advanced,) with
outworks; another strong fort and outworks on the Dumplings; a smaller fort
on Rose island, and the repair and modification of :Fort Wolcott and Fort
Green. The eastern passage is already shut by the permanent bridge at Rowland's Ferry. As to the western passage, three modes present themselves: 1st,
reducing the depth of water by an artificial ledge, so as, while the passage shall
be as free as now for merchant vessels, to prevent the passage of ships-of-war ;
2d, relying on fortifications alone to· close the channel; or, 3d, resortiug in p_art
to one and in part to the other mode just mentioned. Being the least expensn-e
and most certain, the estimate was founded on the first.
The total cost of the N arraganset defences are estimated at $2,050,000.
Gardiner'~ bay.-This most valuable harbor to an enemy investing this part
of the coast 1s probably not defensible by fortifications alone. It has not b_een
surveyed, however, and at no distant day it will be an interesting que~t1on,
wLether by steam batteries, or _some similar means, under the protection of and
aid~d
fort~fications ,_ its defence may not be accomplished. The neces...ity for
forufymg tlns bay will be more evident, should the railroad through Long
11:l1anc1, in contrmplation, (perhaps in progress,) be constructed.
The engineer department has assumed the probable cost of the works a·

?Y

$400,000.

Sag Harbor, lt. .ew York, and Etonington, Connecticut.-N either of these have
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been. surveyed with reference to defence. The first is possessed of a consider~ble tonnage; and the second, besides being largely engaged in commerce, IS
about to be the termination of a railroad from Boston. $100,000 may be assigned to the first, and $200,000 to the other.
·
New .London harbor is very important to the commerce of Long Island sou_nd;
and as a port of easy access, having great depth of water, very rarely fr~ezmg,
and being easily defended, it is an excellent station for the navy. It IS also
valuable as a shelter for vessels bound out or home, and desirous of avoiding a
blockading squadron off Sandy Hook. In the plan of defence, the present
Forts 'l'rumbull and Griswold give place to more efficient works, whereof the
expense is estimated at $314,515.
Mouth of Connecticut river.-This river has been shown to be subject to the
expeditions of an enemy. It has not been surveyed in order to deterrµine on
the mode of defending it; and $100,000 is introduced here as the conjectural
cost.
New Haven harbor.-It is proposed to defend this harbor by improving and
enlarging Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slig·ht redoubt erected
during the last war, called Fort Wooster. 'rhe expense of both may be stated
at $90,000.
There are several towns between New Haven and New York, on both sides
of the sound; none of them are very large as yet, though most, if not all, are
prosperous and rapidly increasing. Although, in their present condition, considering their local situation, it might not be deemed necessary to apply auy
money to permanent defences, yet, as part of the present object is to ascertain,
as near as may be, the ultimate cost of completely fortifying the coast, it seems
proper to look forward to the time, perhaps not remote, when some of these
towns may become objects of considerable predatory enterprise. Bearing in
mind the increase of population in the mean time, and the manner in which the
places generally are situated, it is thought that $200,000 will be enough to defend them all.
New York harbor.-The object, of the projected works for the vicinity of
New York are to cover the city against an attack by land or sea; to protect its
numerous shipping; to prevent, as much as possible, the blockade of this great
port, which will have progressively added to the immense wealth of its
own rivers, greater and greater amounts of the productions of the boundless
regions on the lakes ; and to cover the interior communication uniting· the Raritan with the Delaware. In the present .condition of the defences of this harbor an enemy would encounter no great opposition, whether his attack was
made by land or water. Coming by the sound, he might land within ten miles
of the city, upon the main, upon Long Island, or upon both; and, coming into
the lower harbor, he might, while the works on Staten Island are in their
present condition, risk forciJ?,g the passage of the Narrows, as well as the upper
works, anchoring in the Hudson or in the East river; or he might land in
Gravesend bay, eight miles from the city, and march directly to Brooklyn,
where he would find the navy yard lying at his mercy, and whence·he might
levy a contribi1tion or destroy half the city. The only mode of resistance
would be the expensive, harassing, and uncertain one of arraying a large body
of milit~a upon Harlaem and Brooklyn H eights, and this could be resorted to
on1y in the event, by no means certain, of receiving timely intelligence of his
design.
If we fortify Throg' s Ner.k and Wilkin' s Point, on the East river, and if we
complete the works at the Narrows, making them all too strong to be carried by a coup de main, we shall secure the means of transferring the neighboring militia upon the flanks and rear of an enemy should he march upon
Brooklyn; while we shall secure the same advantage should he pmsue the-
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route by Harlaem, besides increasing the length of his march to twenty miles
through an intersected country.
'This arrangement of defensive works, necessary as it is, still leaves the lower
harbor open to an enemy's vessels; in which harbor, safe at all seasons, he
could enforce the strictest blockade; cut off the lines of interior communication
by the Raritan, and avail himself at any moment of a landing place in dangerous proximity to the city and navy yard. In view of these considerations, the
board of engineers projected additional works: one for the East Bank, and
another for the Middle Ground, which would perfect tlie defences of the harbor:
compelling an enemy attacking on this side to land upon a dangerous coast, near
thirty miles from his object, and to enforce his blockade by riding on the open sea,
with a dangerous coast on either hand. Before determining on the works last
mentioned, the board went into much research in order to ascertain whetherthe
sand banks mentioned were unchangeable; and it was thought to have been
very fully proved that there had been no material change in more than sixty
years. 'rhis apparent stability of the shoals encouraged them to de,ise the
projects referred to.
Recent surveys, it has been said, have discovered a new channel. If this be
so, it may not be prudent to resort to the project, and it may become necessary
to devise other means; but whatever they may be, they must, from the nature
of the case, be very expensive; and there will be no great error, probably, in
~king the estimated cost of the projected batteries as the cost of such mode
of defence as may be finally resolved on. The cost of the complete defence of
New York remaining to be incurred is, according to the estimates, $5,369,824.
Delaware bay and city ef P Jii'ladelphia.-The coast, from the mouth of the
Hudson to the Chesapeake, as well as that on the south side of Long Island, is
low, sandy, covered by numerous sandy islands lying near and parallel to the coast,
and having, besides the Delaware, many inlets and interior basins, but none,
excepting the one named, affording water enough for sea-going vessels. The
Delaware bay itself, being wide and full of shoals, having an intricate channel, and
being much obstructed by ice at certain seasons, affords no very good natural harbor within a reasonable distance of the sea. The artificial harbor now in course
of construction near Cape Henlopen will, it is hoped, fully realize the expec·
tations of its projectors, in which event it must be securely fortified. No plans
have, however, as yet been made with that object; and as to the probable co~t,
nothing better can now be done than to assume the conjectural estimate of the
engineer department, namely, $600,000.
The lowest point at which Philadelphia is defensible is at Pea Patch island,
about forty-five miles below that city. A fort on that island, to replace the one
destroyed by fire; a fort opposite the Pea Patch, on the Delaware shore ;
a temporary work on the Jersey shore, to be thrown up at the commencement
of war. and floating obstructions placed in the channel, under the fire of the~e
works, will effectually cover Philadelphia, the other important places on the
river, and the outlet of the canal connecting the Delaware and Chesapeake
bays. The plans and estimates for a fort to replace Fort Delaware are not
completed. Taking the expense thereof at $600,000, the expense of the Y5•
tern, inclusive of temporary works, will be $1,121,000.
.
Cltesapeal(,e bay.-The board of naval officers and engineers intrusted m
the election of sites for great northern and southern naval depots, recommended,
in their joint reports of 1819 and 1820, Burwell's bay, on James river, for the
one, and Charle town, near Boston, for the other. 'rl1ey also recommenderL
Bo ton harbor and Narraganset bay, at the north, and Hampton road' , at th
outh, a chief naval rendezvous. In those reports the commission entered a·
at large into the con ideration of all the matters of these important object ; an·
r fer nee i. now made to those reports for many very interesting detail .
Hampton, roads, James river, and Noifolk.-'rhe works projected for h
defence of these are, 1st, a fort and advanced lunette at Old Point Comfort· :J •
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a casemated battery on the Rip Rap shoals; and 3d, a line of floating obstructions extending across the channel, between these works. In the even! of a
great naval depot being fixed on James river, it might ulti1:1~tely be desITab~e
to provide additional strength, by adding works on the pos1t10ns of Newport s
News, Nasaway shoals, and Craney Island fiats. Exclusive of these, the cost
of completing the works is estimated at $723,188.
.
The existing fort, viz : Fort Norfolk, will aid in the defence of the city of
Norfolk and of the navy yard. It is a small and inefficient work, but may
be made useful as an accessory to the general defensive operations.
Harbor ef St. Mary's.-The central situation, as regards the Chesapeake,
of this fine basin; its relation to the Potomac; its depth of water, and the facility with which it may be defended, indicates its fitness as a harbor of reft~ge
for the commerce of the bay, and as an occasional if not constant station dt~nng
war, for a portion of the naval force. A survey has been made, but no proJects
have been formed. The engineer department has conjectured that the cost
may be $300,000.
Patuxent ri·v er.-The more effectually to protect the city of Washington
from a sudden attack by troops landed at the head of navigation of the Patuxent, and to provide an additional shelter for vessels, a fort has been planned to
occupy Point Patience, and another to occupy 'l'homas's Point, both about six
miles from the Chesapeake. rrheir expense will be $505,000.
Annapolis liarbor.-No surveys or plans of defence have been made. The
existing works are very inefficient. '11he estimate made by the engineer department, viz : $250,000, is adopted.
Harbor ef Baltimore.-'l'he proximity of Baltimore to the bay places that
city in a dangerous situation. In the present ,.state of things, an enemy, in a
few hours' march, after an easy landing, without being exposed to a separation
from his fleet, can make himself master of that great commercial emporium.
Baltimore requires for its security two forts in the Patapsco: one at Haw kin's
Point, and the other at the extreme end of the flat, off Sollers's Point. Besides
the advantages whieh will result of obliging the enemy to land at a greater
distance, thereby delaying his march, gaining time for the arrival of militia, and
preventing his turning the defensive positions our troops might occupy, it will
be impossible for him to endanger the ·city or its shippi.ng by a direct attack by
water. The present Fort McHenry, Redoubt Wood, and Covington battery,
should be retained as a second barrier. Allowing $150,000 for putting these
in a more efficient state, the expense will be $1,517,000.
Mouth, ef Elk river.-The completion of the line of communication from the
Delaware to the waters of the Chesapeake makes it necessary to place a fort
somewhere near the mouth of the Elk, in order to prevent an enemy from
destroying, by a sudden enterprise, the works connecting these communications
with the river. 'l'here have been no surveys made with a view to establish such
protection, but the engineer department estimates the cost of a suitable fort at
$300,000 .
City qf lVasliington, Georgetown, and Alexandria.-Fort Washington covers
these cities from any attack by water, and will oblige an enemy to land at some
£.~teen or eighteen mile_s from Alexandria, should. that city be his object. It
w:11 ~l~o se~e the_ very 1m.portant purpose of covermg the troops crossing from
V1rgm1a, with a view to fall on the flanks of an enemy moving against the
capital. All these objects would have been bAtter fulfilled had the work been
placed at lower Cedar Point. As it is, however, the forts in the Patuxent being
constructed, and the militia of the surrounding country in a due state of preparation, an enterprise against these cities would be one of great hazard. Still, a
work on Cedar Point should on no account be omitted. rl'he department estimates its cost at $300,000.
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From the mouth of the Chesapeake to Cape Hatteras there occurs no in1
navigable by sea-going vessels.
SOUTHERN SECTION OF THE ATLAN'rIC COAST.

'rhis coast is invariably low, and, for the greater part, sandy, much resemb!inz
the coast from Cape Hatteras to Montaug Point. A ridge of sand, here anQ
there interrupted by the alluvion of the rivers, extends through its whole length
this ridge, in certain portions, lies on the main land, while in others it is divided
therefrom by basins or sounds of various , width and depth, and is cut up ino
islands by numerous channels of greater or less depth, connecting these interior
waters with the sea. Wherever this sand ridge is broken, its place is occupied
by low and marshy grounds, bordering the principal and the many lesser outle ~
of the rivers.
The nature of the country through which the rivers of this coast fl.ow, after
leaving the mountains, is such that the banks being easily abraded by the current, the waters are always turbid, and are continually transporting new supplies
for the formation of alluvion and the maintenance of extensive submarine bank5,
shoals, and bars ; that these do not rapidly increase is owing to the force of the
current, the action of the sea, and the mobility of the particles of matter. l;
is to the same cause, namely, the wearing away of the shores of the rivers.
that is to be attributed the want, on this coast, of harbors unobstructed by bm.
and which, as a coast, particularly distinguish this and the Gulf of Mexico
frontier (where similar operations have been going on) from the more northern
and eastern portions.
Ocracock inlet.-The shallowness of the water on the bars at Ocracock
effectually excludes all vessels-of-war from the harbor within. But as this i5
now an outlet of an extensive commerce, and through this opening attempt~
might be made in small vessels, or in boats, to interrupt the line of interior
communication, whereon so much might depend in time of war, timely preparation must be made of temporary works equal to defence of it against all such
minor enterprises.
Beaefort harbor, North Carolina.-W ork completed.
Mouth ef Cape Fear river.-The defence of the main channel of Cape Fear
river requires, in addition to the work nearly completed on Oak island, another
fort on Baldhead, and the defence of the smaller channel will require a redoub:
o~ Federal Point. ,..rhe battery, magazine, block-house, quarters, &c., at Smithville, should remain as accessories. 'I'he cost is set down at $258,000.
. Ge~rgetown harbor.-'.rhe first inlet of any consequence south of Ca~e F~
nver is at the united mouths of the Waccamaw, Pedee, and Black rivers, forIIl.lilf
G~orgetown harbor, which is a commodious and capacious bay, having sntficient water within and upon the bar, near the mouth, for merchant vessel anl
small vessels-of-war. A survey of this harbor, begun many years a_go, haE
never been completed, and no projects of defence have been made. It 1s pr~b.able that a work placed near Moscheto creek or on Winyaw Point would grn:
adequate strength, at the cost of about $250,0 00.
Santee river and Bull's bay.-About ten miles south from Geo:getown
~ntrance are the mouths of the Santee, the largest river in South Ca1:olina. · I:
1 not known whether the bars at the mouths of this river have sufficient wa~a
for ea-:-roing vessels; the same uncertainty exists as to the depth into B ·
bay. It may be well, however, to consider them, and the other inlets betvee
G org town _and Charleston, as calling for small works capable of re:::is · ~
oa~ enter~n es! and to assign to them $100,000. Should they prove to
nav1gable for pnvateer, they will need a larger expenditnre.
'll~rleston! Sout!i Carolina.-The city, ituated at the junction of ,he:and oopcr nvers, is about five miles, in a direct line, from the sea. Betw~

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES

39

it and the ocean is a wide and safe roadstead for vessels of any draught. Upon
the bar, lying three or four miles outside of the harbor, there is, however, only
water enough for the smaller frigates and for large slooJ>s-of-war. On the sou_thwest side of the harbor is J ames's island, through which are several serpentme
passages, more or less navigable for boats and barges; some of them communicate directly with the sea and Stono river. Whappoo cut, the most northerly
passage from Stono to Charleston harbor, enters ~shl_ey riv~r opposite the
middle of the city. Interior natural water commumcations exist also to the
southwest of Stono river, connecting this with North Edisto river, the latter
with South Edisto and St. Helena's sound; this again with Brnad river, and,
finally, this last with Savannah river. On the north ~ide of the harbor ~f
Charleston lies Sullivan's island, separated from the mam by a channel navigable to small craft. 'ro the northeast of Sullivan's island an interior water
communication extends to Bull's bay, and even beyond, to the harbor of Georgetown.
From this sketch, it is apparent that it will not do to restrict the defences to
the principal entrance to the harbor. The lateral avenues must also be shut.
A.nd it is probable that accurate surveys of all these avenues will show that the
best mode of defending the latter will be by works at or near the mouths of the
inlets, as the enemy will be kept thereby at a greater distance from the city;
the lesser harbors formed by these inlets will be secured, and the line of interior
communication will be inaccessible from the sea.
No position for the defence of the principal entrance to Charleston harbor can
be found nearer to the ocean than the western extremity of Sullivan's island.
This is at present occupied by Fort Moultrie, a work of some strength, but by
no means adequate to its object, its battery being weak, and the scarp so low as
to oppose no serious obstacle to escalade. How far this work, by modification
of its plan and relief, may be made to contribute to a better defence of the harbor,
cannot now be determined.
On a shoal nearly opposite Fort Moultrie the foundation of a fort has been
begun, which will have a powerful cross-fire with Fort Moultrie. It is presumed
that about $800;000 would put these works in a complete state.
Stono, Nortlz Edisto, and Soutli Edisto.-A.ll these must be fortified, at least
in such a manner as to secure them from enterprises .in boats or small vessels.
To that end $50,000 may be assigned to each.
St. H elena sound.-The proper defences cannot be pointed out till this sound
shall have been surveyed.
Although there is supposed to be no great depth of water on the bar, it is
known to be navigable by the smaller class of merchantmen, and to have a navi~
gabl~ coi:nmunic~tio~ with the head of Broad river, or Port Royal_, intersecting
the mtenor nav1gat10n between Charleston and Savannah. 'I1lus sound will
require defence, even should it not be of much use as a harbor of refuge for exterior commerce. $150,000 may be the cost of the defences.
Broad River or Port Royal roads.-'I1he value of this capacious road.stead,
as a harbor of refuge, depends on the depth which can be carried over the bar,
on the distance of this bar outside of the line of coast, and on the means which
may be applicable of lessening the danger of crossing it. This is supposed to
be the deepest bar of the southern coast. Should there prove to be water
enough for frigates, and by light-houses on the shore, and lights, or other distinct
guides, on the bar, should it be practicable to make the passage of the bar safe
and easy, this road, situated within sixty miles of Charleston and twenty of
Savannah river, intersecting the interior navigation between these great cities,
thereby securing the arrival of supplies of every kind, would possess a very high
degree of importance, not only as a harbor of refuge, but as a naval station also.
The survey of the exterior shoals, constituting the bar, should be made with
the greatest care, and all possible minuteness. It is only when this shall have
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been done that the true relation of this inlet to the rest of the coast can be known.
and on this relation the position and mag·nitude of the required defences vi
depend. ]tor the present, the estimate made by the engineer department i:
adopted, namely, $300,000.
Savannah and moutli ef Savannali river.-Mention has been made of th•
natural interior water communication along the coast of South Carolina. .A siJn.
ilar communication extends south from the Savannah river, as far as St. John'in East Florida. Owing to these passages, the city of Savannah, like Charle~
ton, is liable to be approached by other avenues than the harbor or river; ana
its defences must consequently have relation to these lesser as well as the principal channels.
'l'he distance from the mouth of W assaw sound, or even Ossabaw sound, (both
to the southwest of Savannah river,) to the city, is not much greater than from
the mouth of the river; and an enterprise may be conducted the whole distance
by water, or part of the way by water and part by land, from either or both.
As in the case of like channels in the neighborhood of Charleston, it cannot now
be determined where they can be defended most advantageously. It is to be
hoped, however, that the localities will permit the defences to be placed near the
outlets of the sounds; because the defences thus placed will serve the ~oub!e
purpose of guarding the city of Savannah and covering these harbors, which, m
time of war, cannot but be very useful.
The defence of Savannah river is by no means difficult. A fort on Oockspnr
island, lying just within the mouth, and perhaps, for additional security'. anot~er
on Tybee island, which forms the southern cape at the junction of the mer with
the ocean, would effectually prevent the passage of vessels up the c~a~nel, and
cover the anchorage lying between Tybee and Cockspur. The ~xis\mg Fort
Jackson, standing about four miles below the city, should be mamta~ned as a
second barrier, both as respects the main channel and the passages which come
into the river from the south; which last would not at all be controlled byworb
on Cockspur or rl'ybee. A fort projected for Cockspur island is estimated at
$470,000. To defend Tybee island may require $150,000, and $50,000 would
put Fort Jackson in an efficient state, making a total of $670,000. South of the
Savannah are Wassaw sound, Ossabaw sound, !St. Catharine's sound, at the
mouth of the Medway river; Sapelo sound, Doby inlet, Altamaha sound, at the.
mouth of the great river Gf the same name; St. Simond' s sound, at the mout~ of
Buffalo creek; St. Andrew's sound, at the united mouths of the Scilla and Santilla
rivers; and Cumberland sound, at the mouth of the St. Mary's river.. All t~eEe
communications with the ocean are highly important, as regards the lme of mterior navigation, and several of them as affording acces~ to excellent harbo~.
The last, especially, is known to be navigable by the largest sloops-o~-war _and
merchantmen; and two or three of the others are believed to be but little, if at
all inferior, ~ither a:s regards depth of bar or safety of anchorage.,
,·
All these mlets are yet to be surveyed. Some of them are probably eatily
defeu ible by forts, and others may require the aid of floating defences. .An
important principle in relation to the defensive system of the whole southern coa~r.
namely, that, on a coast possessing a few harbors, it is at the same time th~ more
necessary to preserve them all for our own use, and the more easy to depnve an
enemy of that shelter which is nearly indispensable to a continuous and clo~e
blockade. This principle is enforced as touching this particular part of t~~
southern coast by the two following weighty considerations: its remoten.e::::
fr?m tl~e nearest naval rendezvous, the Chesapeake, which is ?n a ~ ean o~O
miles di tant, and to leeward, both as to wind and cmrent; and its bemg cl~e
upon the larboard hand, as they enter the Atlantic, of the great concour e ct
ve. el passing at all seasons through the Florida channel.
"While, thm efore, this part of the coast from the concentration of vessels here
is in great need of protection of some sort, naval aid can be extended to it only
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with difficulty, and at the risk of being cut off from all retreat by a superior
enemy.
.
Accurate and minute surveys which will enable our vessels, whether dr1ven
by an enemy or by stress of weather, to shun the dangers which beset the navigation of these harbors. and properly arranged defences to co-~er them when
arrived, seem to be indispensable. It is worthy of remark, besides, that when
these harbors shall be fortified the operation of investing·the coast and watching the great outlet of commerce through Florida passage will be a difficult and
hazardous one to an enemy, on whose part no perseverance or sk~ll can avail ~o
maintain an uninterrupted blockade, or to avoid the occasional shipwreck of his
cruisers; while on the part of our small vessels-of-war and privateers the same
sort of supervision will at all times be easy and safe.
Nothing better can be now done than to assume $200,000 as the average cost
of defending each of the nine entrances, giving a total of $1,800,000.
The board of engineers have not examined the coast from the mouth of the
St. Mary's to Pensacola, but in order that the chain of defence for the coast
may be here exhibited unbroken, the estimates of the engineer department for
the places and positions intermediate between Cumberland sound and Pensacola
will be inserted. St. Augustine, $50,000; Key West and Tortugas, $3,000,000;
Charlotte harbor, Espiritu Santa bay, Apalachicola, Apalache bay, St. Joseph's
bay, St. Rosa bay, together, $1,000,000.
GULF OF MEXICO FRONTIER.

The resemblance of this part of the coast to that which we have denominated
the southern section is striking. We may, indeed, refer to the description herein
given of the principal features of the latter as a true delineation of this. In
respect to the relation of the coast to the interior, there is, however, the greatest
difference between these two portions of the maritime frontier; for while about
eight-tenths of the whole territory of the United States is in one sense tributary
to a part only' of the Gulf of Mexico portion, in the southern section of the
coast not more than one-tenth is connected with the seaboard by any natural
ties. This fact, which shows the very deep interest which a large portion of
the people and the government have in the security of this portion, is related to
other facts which hardly leave an alternative as to the mode of attaining that
security.
From the relative geographical position of this part of the coast, and the
country interested in its safety; from the unhealthiness of the climate, nature
of the adjacent country, and mixed character of the inhabitants, it will be some
time before that portion, within supporting distance, whose welfare may be endangered by an enemy will, from peculiar circumstances, be competent of itself
to sustain the assaults of an exterior foe. Upon the Atlantic seaboard the
Alleghanies crowd the people upon the coast, and surround every alarm post of
the frontier with a more and more dense population i' and the ocean and the
interior parallel communication transmit rapid aid to the right and left, while
the coast of the Gulf, weak in itself and remote from succor from behind, is
almost inaccessible to lateral assistance.
'l'hose reasons, therefore, which tend to establish the necessity of an organized,
a permanent, and a. timely system of defence for the whole seaboard of the
United States (some of which were advanced in the commencement of this communication) will apply to this part of it with a peculiar force so long as any
portion of its system of defence is incomplete.
It has already been observed that the board of engineers have made no examination between Cumberland sound, in Georgia, and Pensacola. Thel'e are,
however, along that shore and in the Florida reef several very important harbors which must be accurately surveyed.
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Pensacola bay.-The upper arms of this considerable bay receive th0 Yellowwater or Pea river, Middle river, and Escambia river; and while the tributaries
of the last, interlocking with branches of the Alabama and the 0hattahoochie,
seem to mark the courses whereby, at some future day, canals will convey a
part of the products of these rivers to Pensacola, the face of the whole re~on
is remarkably adapted to the application of railroads.
Santa Rosa sound extends eastward from the lower part of this bay into
Santa Rosa bay. On the west the lagoons of Pensacola, Perdido, and Mobile
bays, respectively, interlock in such a manner as to require but a few miles of
cutting to complete a navigable channel from the first to the last-named bay,
and thence through an existing interior water communication to the city of Kew
Orleans.
Pensacola bay has rare properties as a harbor. It is accessible to the largest
class of sloops-of-war and to small frigates, and under favorable circumstances
will admit even large frigates ; and there is reason to hope that the bar may be
permanently deepened.
The bar is near the coast, and the channel through it is straight and easily hit.
The harbor is perfectly land-locked, and the roadstead very capacious. There
are excellent positions within it for repairing, building, and launching vessels,
and for docks and dock-yards, in healthy situations. The supply of good water
is abundant. It is perfectly defensible. These properties, in connexion with
the position of the harbor as regards the coast, have induced the government t-0
fix upon it as a naval station and place of rendezvous and repairs.
An excellent survey has been made of the bay of Pensacola, sufficing. to
form the scheme of defence, while no other objects were sought than the secu11ty
of the town and harbor. Regarded, however, as a naval station and place of
rendezvous and repairs, further surveys, extending a greater distance from the
shores, delineating· accurately the face of the country and showing the se~eral
avenues by land and water are found to be necessary.
The defences of the water passage, as projected, are nearly completed, $210,000
being asked to finish them. A further water defence at the position of the
Barrancas, and the works that are indispensable to cover the navy yard from a
lateral attack through the western bays-the latter requiring the further surveys
above mentioned-are not yet planned. The Barrancas work may be taken at
$100,000, and the others at $300,000, making a total for Pensacola of $610,0~0.
P erdido bay.-This bay is intimately related to Pensacola and to Mobile
bays, both as regards security and intercommunication, and should be carefully
surveyed, with a view to these objects. It must be fortified, and the cost may
be $200,000.
~Ylobile _bay.-The plan of defence for this bay comprised a fort at Mobile
Pomt, which has been finished; another on Dauphin island, and a tower at the
Pass au Heron. The estimates for the two last named amount to $905,000.
New (!rl~ans and the delta ef the Mississippi.-The most northern water
comm~mcat1on between the Mississippi and the Gulf is by the passage c~lled
the R1golets, connecting Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. The next IB by
the pass of Che~ Menteur, also connecting these lakes. Through these pas~ages
an enemy entermg Lake Pontchartrain would, at the same time that he mtercepted all water communication with Mobile and Pensacola, be able to reach
New Orlean from the southern shore of the lake, or might continue onward
through Lake Maurepas, Amite river, and Iberville river, thereby reaching th~
Mis i, ippi at the head of the delta; or, landing within the mouths of Chef
Mentcur, he might move against the city along the ridge of the Gentilly road.
To the outhwe t of Chef l\Ienteur, and at the head of Lake Borgne, is Bayou
Bienvenu, a navigable channel, (the one pursued by the English army in the
la t war,) not running into the Mis is ippi, but possessing shores of such a na~ure
a to enable troops to march from the point of debarkation to the city. A little
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to the south of this is Bayon Dupre, also affording easy access to the city. rrhe
avenues just named are defended by a fort at the Rigolets ; another at Chef
Menteur; another at Bayou Bienvenu, and a tower aJ Bayou Dupre.
..
The defences of the river are placed at the Plaquemme turn, the lowest pos1t~~n
which can be occupied. Fort Jackson is ·on the right shore, and Fort St. Ph1hp
a little lower down, on the left: this last work must be repaired or renewed.
The expense is estimated at $117,000.
. . . . .
The only permanent work required at present, west of the M1ss1ss1pp1, 1s a
fort to occupy Grand Terre island, for the purp?se of defending_ the entranc~ to
Barrataria bay, an excellent harbor for a fl.oatmg force guar_dmg the coa~t1~g
trade on that side, and whence there are several r,assages leadmg to the M1ss1ssippi, near New Orleans. The estimate for this work is $400,000.
Before leaving this part of the subject, it is necessary to advert to the
important uses which may be made of movable floating defences in aid of
fortifications.
The applications of this auxiliary force along the coast of the United States
may be very numerous, and, as has been before remarked, would, in certain
cases, be requisite to attain full security for all the objects needing protection.
In the case we have just been considering, for example, fortifications will enable
us to protect New Orleans, even from the most serious and determined efforts of
an enemy; but, owing to the great width of the passages, we cannot, by fortifications alone, deprive an enemy of good exterior anchorages, especially the very
excellent one west of Ohandeleur island, nor entirely cover the interior water
communications between the Rigolets and Mobile. We must, therefore, either
quietly submit to all the annoyance and injury which an enemy in possession of
these passages may inflict, or avert them by the timely preparation of a floating
force, adapted to their peculiar navigation, and capable, under the favorable
shelter of the forts, of being always on the alert, and of assuming an offensive
or defensive attitude, according to the designs, conduct, or situation of the enemy.
As these means of defence are, however, secondary to fortifications, in every
sense ; as the extent to which they may be needed must depend on the relation
of our naval force to that of other powers-a relation continually varying· as the
shapes which these auxiliaries are to assume-the materials of which they are
to be formed, the weapons they are to use, the agent which is to give them
power, are points on which every ten years of this age of rapid improvement in
the aTts may effect complete revolutions, it is considered premature to go into
details, and premature to go into expense.
From the preceding sketch of the system projected for the defence of the
seaboard of the United States, it appears that all the fortifications proposed are
not of the same pressing necessity, nor of like importance. Some are required
immediately, while the commencement of others may be postponed. In proceeding to class them, it must be observed that the works of the first class are
those destined to prevent an enemy from forming a permanent or even a
momentary establishment in the country, those which will defend the great
naval arsenals, and those which will cover the chief cities and towns.
In the second class will be placed the works which are to defend those naval
stations and those cities of a secondary rank, which, either from natural or
artificial defences, existing works, &c., are not entirely without protection, and
may, therefore, wait until the more important points are secured against a first
attack_; and in the third class will we anayed the works which complete the
defensive system in all its parts, but of which the construction may, without
great danger, be deferred until the frontier shall have received all the successive
degrees of strength resulting from a gradual erection of the forts of the first and
second classes. A fourth class is added,_containing such works as will be
necessary only conditionally.
T able A, joined to this report, contains the first class, and shows that the
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works of this class will cost $11,609,444; will require 2,585 men to garrison
them in time of peace, and 30,966 in case of siege.
Table B contains the works of the second class, showing that they will cos
$5,873,000; will require 975 men to garrison them in time of peace, and 10,680
in case of siege.
Table O contains-works belonging to the third class, showing that their cost
will be $14,078,824; that their garrisons in time of peace will amount to 2,3 0
men, and in time of siege to 21, 7 45 men; showing, also, that the total future
expense of fortifying the maritime frontier will amount to $31,561,268; the
troops necessary to guard these fortifications in time of peace to 5,940 men, and
63,391 men in time of war, supposing them all (which cannot happen) besieged
at once.
r_{'he time required to construct the whole system must depend upon the annual
appropriation which the nation may grant to this branch of the public service.
All that need be said on the subject is, that in an undertaking necessarily involving so much time, and of such vital importance to the safety, prosperity, and
greatness of the Union, there should be no relaxation of effort and perseverance. An undertaking of such magnitude must, with every effort, be the work
of years. But it may be too much hurried as well as too much delayed. There
is a rate of progress at which it will be executed in the best manner and at the
minimum cost. If more hurried, it will be defective in quality and more costly
if delayed.
France was, at least, fifty years completing her maritime and interior defen~es.
Some remarks will now be offered on the subject of the expense of erectmg
a system of defensive works, and garrisoning them for war, comp~ring_it with
the expense. of defending· the coast without fortifications. To simplify the
proposition, the defence of Portsmouth, Boston, Narraganset roads, New York,
Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans, only,
will be taken.
Supposing an enemy had concentrated 20,000 men at Halifax or_ B~rrnuda;
the government must,· on hearing of this force, at once prepare to resist i~ at all
the points mentioned above As it will be impossible to foresee on which the
first blow will be struck, it will be necessary to have troops encamped at each;
and to meet the attack with a force not less numerically than that of the
assailant, the troops kept constantly under arms must, at least, equal one-half of
the hostile expedition, w bile as many more, ready for instant service, must be
within call. r_{'hese points are so immediately accessible in some cases, and so
remote from succor in others, that, after the point of attack is announced by
the appearance of the enemy before it, there will be no time for re-enforcements
to come from the interior.
By manceuvring in front of any of these places the enemy would induce us
to concentrate forces there; when, suddenly profiting of a favorable breeze, h_e
would sail to another, which he would reach in a few hours, and would not fail
to seize if a force were not stationed there likewise, at least, equal to his own.
No re-enforcement can, in this case, arrive from the interior in time, for all _the
tro_ops under march would have taken up a direction upon the point he has JU~t
quitted.
Our whole coast from Maine to Louisiana would thus be kept in alarm by a
single expedition; and such is the extent and exposure of the seaboard that an
enemy might ruin us by a war of mere threatenings. If the cities and other
~Teat establi hill:ents are not garrisoned, they will become a prey at o~ce; and
if they are gaITisoned, the trea ury will be gradually emptied; the credit of the
gover~rn~nt exhausted; the weary and starving militia will desert to theis homes;
nor ,rill 1t be ea y to avert the consummation of tribute, pillage, and conflagration.
The table E, joined to this report, shows that, to be in readiness on each of
the e vulnerable points, it will be requisite to maintain 107,000 men encamped
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and under arms at the ten places mentioned, and 93,000 men ready to march
and within call.
This number is, in fact, below that which would be required; for these points
being, according to our hypothesis, exposed to an attack from 20,000 regular
and disciplined troops, 20,000 militia would not be able to r~pel t~em unless
aided by entrenchments, requiring a time to construct them, whi?h might n~t be
allowed, and iavolving expenses which are not included in the estnnate. Besides,
to have 20,000 men, especially new levies, .under arms, it will be n~cessa:-y,
considering the epidemics that always assail such troops, to carry the formation
of these corps to at least 25,000 men.
The State of Louisiana, being remote from succor, requires a larg~r force
under arms than the other points; this force is fixed at 17,000, supposmg that
the State may supply 3,000 within call.
All expenses being reckoned, 1,000 regular troops, including officers, cost
$300,000 per annum, or $150 per man, for a campaign of six months. 1,000
militia, including officers, cost $400,000 per annum, or $200 per man, for a six
months' campaign. But, taking into consideration the diseases which invariably
attack men unaccustomed to military life, and the consequent expense of
hospital establishments; the frequent movement of detachments from the camp
to their homes, and from the interior to the camp; and the cost of camping
furniture, utensils, accoutrements, &c., which is the same for a short campaign
as for a year; regarding all these things, the cost of militiamen cannot be
reckoned at less than $250 per man for six months.
The 107,000 militiamen necessary to guard the above-mentioned points, the
maritime frontier being without defence, will therefore cost, in a campaign of
six months, $26,750,000. In strict justice there should be added to this expense,
which is believed to be much understated. amongst other things, the loss of time,
and the diminution of valuable products resulting from drawing off so considerable a portion of efficient labor from its most profitable pursuits. This, besides
being a heavy tax on individuals, is a real loss to the .nation.
It would be utterly vain to attempt an estimate of the loss to the nation from
the dreadful mortality which rages in the camps of men suddenly exposed to the
fatigues and privations of a military life.
rrhe total expense of constructing the fortifications at the ten places before
mentioned will amount to $21, 767,656.-(See table E.)
The garrisons of these fortifications may consist of the same number of regular troops in time of war as in time of peace ; the remainder being furnished by
the militia held in readiness to throw themselves into the forts on the first
appearance of an enemy. By this arrangement 3,010 regulars and 32,076
militia, either within the works or in small corps on advantageous positions,
making iu all 35,086 men, would suffice; 64,914 men being kept in readiness to
march when called upon.
We should, therefore, have only 35,086 to pay and support instead of 107,000,
and the expense would be $8,430,500 instead of $26,750,000. rrhe difference,
namely, $18,319,500, being only $3,448,156 less than the whole cost of these
defences. It follows that the expense of their erection would be nearly compens~ted by the saving they would cause in a single campaign of six months.
It 1s proper to add that, although the expense of these works will be great,
that expense is never to be renewed ; while with troops, on the contrary, the
expense is annually repeated, if not increased, until the end of the war. Besides,
the disbursements for fortifications are made in time of peace, slowly and to an
extent exactly correspondent with the financial resources of the country.
Armies are most wanted, and must be paid, in periods of the greatest emergency, when the ordinary sources of revenue are dried up, and when the treasury can only be supplied by a resort to means the most burdensome and disagreeable to the people.
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'I1he defence of the maritime frontier by permanent fortifications, and the cfu.
bursements for their ~onstru.?tion, will thus tend to a real and_ positive economy.
The vulnerable pomts bemg reduced to a small number, mstead of waiting
an attack on every point, and holding ourselves everywhere in readiness to
repel it, we shall force an enemy to direct his assaults against those few which,
being well understood by us, will, of course, have received timely preparation,
There can be no doubt that such a state of things will make an adversary more
reluctant to risk his expeditions; and, therefore, that we shall not only be better
able to resist, but also less frequently called on to do so.
Some prominent military writers have opposed the principle of fortifying an
extensive land frontier, but none have ever disputed the necessity of fortifying
a maritime border; the practice of every nation, ancient and modern, has been
the same in this respect. On a land frontier a good, experienced, and numerous
infantry may, in some cases, dispense with fortifications, but though disciplined
troops may cover a frontier without the aid of fortifications, undisciplined troops
cannot. On a maritime frontier, however, no description of troops can supply
the place of strong batteries disposed upon the vulnerable points. The uncertainty of the point on which an enemy may direct his attack, the suddennes
with which he may reach it, and the powerful masses which he can concentrate
at a distance out of our reach and knowledge, or suddenly, and at the ve7
moment of attack require that every important post be prepared to repel his
attempt, or retard it until re-enforcements can arrive and adequate means of resistance be organized. By land we are acquainted with the motions of an enemy,
but the ocean is a vast plain, without obstacle, where his movements are made
out of our sight, where no trace is left of his path, and where we know nothing
of his approach until he is within reach of the eye. In a word, unless the vulnerable points of a seaboard are covered by fortifications their only chance of
safety must depend on the issue of a battle, always uncertain, even when the
best disciplined, most experienced, and best appointed troops have made all
possible preparation for the combat.
As for the garrisons which these forts will require in time of war, a small
portion, about equal in number to the peace garrisons, should be of regular
troops, the remainder of militia, practiced in the manreuvres and drill of great
guns; it being indispensable that the greatest part of the troops required for the
defence and service· of the sea-coast fortifications should be of artillery.
This brings us to a suggestion or two in relation to the organization of t~e
militia forces. Instead of the present small proportion of artillery allowed m
the militia organization, the States might, with great advantage, increase the
proportion of that force in the vicinity of each of the exposed parts of th~ co~st ,
so as to be equivalent to the exigencies and armament of the works; substJtut~nO'
for the usual field exercises as infantry actual drill and practice in the battene5•
The number of militia artillery in each case would be determined by the number
of guns applied to the defence of that particular place. As soon as a m~vement
on the part of the enemy should threaten the frontier of the State this fo:ce
should throw itself into the forts, and there remain so long as the precise pomt
of ~ttack should be undetermined. In most parts of the seaboard it would_ be
adn able to have also a considerable body of militia horse artillery, as _bemO'
a Y?ry u ~ful arm in all cases, and as affording a defence always applicable
agam ·t mmor and predatory enterprises. This force might, in part, be drawn
from th~ ordinary proportion of cavalry.
.
If, with our general system of permanent fortifications and naval estabh~hment , we connect a system of interior communication by land and water, adapted
both to the d fence and to the commercial relations of the country; if t? t~e~e
we aclcl a well con tituted regular army, and a militia perfect in its orgamzatJO~the nation will not only secure its territory from invasion and in ult, but w
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preserve its institutions from those violent shocks and revolutions which have so
frequently, in every age and in every country, been incident to a state of war.
Tables A, B, C, and D, following, contain the works constituting the proposed
defensive system for the maritime frontier, arranged in four classes: .
Table E exhibits a comparison of the cost of defending certam Important
parts of the coast without fortifications, and with the aid of the projected works.
Table F shows a possible concentration of militia forces in eleven days at
Boston, Newport, R. I., New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, S. C., Savannah, Geor,gia, and New Orleans.
NORTHERN FRONTIER.

Not having been the subject of particular care and study, it is with diffidence
that a few words are thrown out on the subject of the defence of the frontier
which separates the United States from the English possessions.
The first questions that arise are these: Is the political condition of the country lying on the other side . of the country in question, viz : the condition of
colonies of a trans-Atlantic power to remain altered 7 Or are these colonies to
become independent nations 7 Or is any other important change to be wrought
in their political relations 7 These questions bear directly upon the matter in
hand. A generation hence and there may be no more room for jealousy and
watchfulness along that line than there now is along the imaginary lines which
separate our contiguous States. ·within the same period the Canadas may have
assumed the attitude of independent and separate States; and, although the
United States may recognize in these northern neighbors a youth of much
promise and vigor, the period when the relative increase shall have been such
as to make their proximity a source of much precaution and solicitude will not,
probably, be near at hand. But though it may be possible that the colonial
relations may be thrown off within the period for which .it is our duty now to
provide; and although in any other relation the United States might rely for
security, at any moment, on the greater power which she might at any moment
develop, can it be distinctly foreseen that the existing political connexion is to
be soon dissolved 7 If not, if there be uncertainty on this point, does it become
the duty of the United States to proceed at once to the task of securing herself
on this frontier, regarding it as separating her from one of the most powerful empires of the earth 7 Or, finally, may she wait and watch, relying on her sagacity
t? give due notice of impending danger, and on her resomces to supply her, in
time, with appropriate armor 7 If it be, indeed, possible to apply, within a brief
state of time, all the defences that can be needed on this frontier, the course last
suggested would appear to be the best. What, therefore, is like to be the nature of the danger, and what the nature of the defence 7
Along the St. Croix river only local establishments could require to be covere~, as the~e ar~ no objects of consequence to be reached by an enemy penetratmg our mtenor from that border. Then comes the disputed territory and
the great unsettled regions along the northern margins of New Hampshire and
Vermont.
Upon all this extent of frontier the exact location of future establishments, of
cons~q_uence, cannot be foreseen with the certainty warranting their being now
provided for by permanent defensive works. This region is to become populous
and wealthy ; the natural means of communication are to be improved, and num~rous artificial means of communication are to be opened by roads, canals, and
railways; but while this growth in wealth may invite aggression, the growth in
numbers, . and the increas e4 facilities of intercommunication, the increased power
of rendering mutual succor, and of drawing aid from the interior, would, in a still
greater degree, make aggression difficult and improbable.
Lake Champlain penetrates the territory in such a way that an enemy, having
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the naval mastery, might make a deep inroad and greatly harass the count!'I'
along the shores, although no enterprise, even in the present state of populatio~
could be carried far into the interior. Were it only to relieve a long line of frontier from predatory incursions, access to this lake from the north should be denied. But there are other very strong reasons for this exclusion. By closing
the lake at its northern extremity, an expensive and uncertain strife for naral
superiority on this lake would be avoided, and the whole lake would remain in
our possession, serving as the best possible military line of communication, in
case the United States should assume offensive operations against the weake1:
point of the Canadian frontier.
From the northern end of this lake the forces of the United States should
march into Canada and intercept the communication by the St. Lawrence, either
at or near the mouth of the Richelieu river, at Montreal island, at some point
where the ship channel of the river could be commanded, intermediate between
these places, or at any two or at all these places, according to circumstancea.
Maintaining any or all these positions would limit the defence in the province
above to the consumption of the means then in store, and would completely par·
alyze its offensive power. Although no other object were in view than the defence of the frontier upon the upper lakes, no effort necessary to secure and
maintain this position should be spared, because it is only thus that the contest
for naval superiority on the lakes, which, if once suffered to begin, is both exhausting and interminable, can be avoided.
Without aid from abroad, Canada cannot contest such a question with the
United States; and, so long as the United States possess that superiority, the
defence of the upper portion of the frontier will be complete.
. . .
l!''rom being the most _expensive of all modes of defence, naval supenonty m
our hands may thus become the cheapest; two or three small armed vesseb on
each lake, employed as convoys to the ordinary navigation, and to the transporti
bearing troops and munitions being all that would be needed.
.
Military enterprises would, in this way, be warded off from the numerous rich
and populous cities and towns now embellishing our border, which it woul_d not
be easy to protect from · the calamities of war by mere military works, without
running into great expense, were the enemy's naval means to allow his approaching them at his pleasure.
..
In the case of the offensive movement supposed above, the fortified positi~n
of Isle Aux N oix, and any other upon the Richelieu, should be at first left m
rear, being reached or mastered by suitable bodies of troops, and should be sub·
jected to immediate investment and vigorous attack, so as to be speedily reduced.
and to open the navigable water communication within twenty miles of Montreal.
If the preceding remarks be well founded, it would appear that the peace and
safety of the parts of the frontier extending along the river St. Lawrence, LakeOntario, Eric, Huron, and Superior, mio-ht
be made to fl.ow from military op~ra·
0
tions carried on against Canada, by the line of Lake Champlain and the n nr
Richelieu; and in order to this military operation being always practi~al, and t
be taken up at pleasure, nothing more is necessary than the fortification of th~
outlet of Lake Champlain. It might have been before remarked that the offensive movement in question is not deemed to be difficult or hazardous, nor wouJ..
it b~ nece., ~rily re tricted to holding positions on the St. Lawrence; acti:·e op·
eration agamst Quebec, to which this is the most convenient roa<l., followmg aa matter of course upon these first successes.
..
The ecurity, therefore, that may be obtained for the upper frontier by mi!:·
tary operations on the lower, may at least justify these upper portions in w,u·ing the proo-rc of event .
,
The une.·ampled increa e of population upon these very borders, the hundrect
n w way alr acly fini -heel or in hand, of connecting these borders with the_bl':lr.
of the country, may ·o elevate the military re .. ources of the region that, m the
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event of war, it will matter little in which of the political conditions first.
supposed the opposite territory may be found-a resistless torrent sweeping it
from end to end; and, although it might not be prudent to rely in such a matter·
on the mere spread of wealth and numbers, we may be certain that there will
exist ample resources to create all such artificial military aids as the circum~
stances may call for, and we may infer that the application of these aids would
now be premature.
'l'he military consequences of the occupation of the outlet of Lak,e Champlain
a re so obvious that it must not be supposed they are not perfectly understood by our neighbor across the border. As it would consequently be a great,
object with him to avert the consequences alluded to, he would, in the event of ·
war, (often breaking out suddenly,) be first, if possible, in taking such a position
as would prevent our commanding the issue of the lake; and hence it is that, in
the preparation of the only permanent military work now recommended for the
northern frontier, it seems advisable to admit no unnecessary delay.
A position for closing the lake, selected during the last war, and of which the
fortification was begun soon after the peace, was found, after some progress had
been made, not to lie within our territory, and was abandoned. 'l'here is, however, a position equally good close at hand, and in all respects admirably adapted
to the obj ect in view.
The fortification of this outlet will probably cost about $600,000.
All of which is respectfully submitted.

H. Ex. Doc. 92--,!

TABLE A.-FIRST

b-t

CLASS,

0

Comprising works first to he exec·uted, as covering partially or entirely great cities and important towns, naval establisliments, roads
rendezvous, places and ltarbors that an enemy miglit occupy, outlets ef valuable commerce, ~-,· arranged in geograpliical order.

ef

Garrison.
Designation of works.

Guns, &c.
(1)

Cost to complete.

~

~

<l)

~

rJ.i

<l)

H

~

~

1-<l

THESE WORKS ARE IN PROGRESS.

Fort Independence, Boston harbm.· ................................... · .. ·
Fort ,V arren, Boston harbor ........................................... .
Fort Adams, N arraganset roads .......................... - - ............• Fort Schuyler, New York harbor ....................................... .
Fort Columbus, New York harbor ....................................... .
Fort Delaware, D elaware bay .......................................... .
Fort l\Ionroe, Hampton roads ........................................... .
Fort Calhoun, Hampton 1·oads ............. . ............................ .
Fort Caswell, Cape Fear river .................................... . ..... .
},ort in Charleston harbor, South Carolina ........................... - .... .
Fort Pulaski, Savannah river ........................................... .
Fort Pickens, Pensacola harbor .............................. - .......... .
Fort on Foster's bank, Pensacola harbor .... .... ............... - ....... - - .

50
100
100
100
100
1001
500
50
50
100
50
100
50

395
1,500
2,440
1,250
535
1, 2501
2,450
1,160
450
l,500
860
1,260
720

79
3001
468
2501
207
2501
350
232
90
300
172
252
144

$202,852
695,414
350,000
510,178
20,000
1600,000
210,000
531,000
60,000
500,000
246,000
50,000
160,000

Maine.
l•'orl al 1h<'

1\111TOWR

of Penobscot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - · · · · ·

l 1'i1rt 111 tl1(' 111ollth ol' tl1P l(l·n1wlwc, not projl'<'L('(l .. - . . . . . . . . · · .. · - · · · · · - · · · ·

F .. 1 I 11 11

\,\, .

1•.,,

1\11111\ ' " " ' " ' "

~
H
t"i

50
50?
!, ()

I

500

500?
:100

I

145

l!>O?
H"''

I

150,000
?300,000
I

r,r;.

()0()

~
0

~

<l

:,,..
t"i

0

t_rj
1-,:j
t_rj

zC

t_rj

00

1.Vcio liampsltire.

Works in Portsmouth harbor, not proj ected .................... , .• ......... )

1501

I

1, 500 1

I

3001

I

1500,000

Massacliusetts.

50
50
300?
1501

250
250
1, 5001
7501

50
10
50?
501

Fort Pickerin g·, Salem harbor ............................................
Fort Winthrop, repairs, &c., Boston harbor ................................
Works at Provincetown, not projected ....................................
Works at New Bedford, not projected .....................................

174,000
50,000
?600,000
1300,000

~
t-t
1-3
H
H

P>

Rliode Island.

~

~

96

123,000

Fort Griswold, New London harbor ............. '........................ - I

50

I

~

0

".

Connecticut.

New York.

580

25

Fort on Rose island, N arraganset roads ....... . ...........................

z

l'

830

I

106

198,000

P>
<1
P>
t-t

I

0

l:zj

Fort on Wilkins's Point, New York harbor ................................
Fort Tompkins and dependencies, New York harbor ............ _............

50
50

1,336
970

184
114

686,000
654,000

1-:i:j

l:zj

z0

l:zj

Delaware.

vVork:s to cover the Delaware Breakwater harbor, not projected ...............
:E'ort opposite Fort Delaware, on right bank ................................

?1
1,1251
760

1001
50

2251
112

?600,000
521,000

Maryland.

Fort on Elk river, to cover the debouche of the Chesapeake and Delaware canal
and railroad ..... - .............. - .... - ...............•............ I

50

I

760

I

112

300,000

°'
f-1-

TABLE A.-FmsT CLASS, comprising worlcs.first to be executed, 'Yc.-Continued.

c.:n

t,!)

Garrison.
Designation of works.

Guns, &c.

Cl)

..5

(.)

Of)

-~

Cl.I
<l)

-

~

Cost to complete .

w.

~
t"I

Maryland.

1-i

Fort on Sollers's Point flats, below Baltimore ...... ; ; ... . ..................
Fort on Point Patience, Patuxent riv.er ............ .. ............ _....... _.

1-i

100
50

835
400

159
80

$1,000,000
246,000

West Florida.

~
~

I-<!

~
tj

Works to protect the navy yard at Pensacola from lateral attack. through the
bays, not projected .................. _................. - ...........
Fort at Barrancas, Pensacola, not projected .............. _... _.............

501
50

1,0001
2501

501
501

1300,000
1100, 000

Louisiana.

~

t"I

tj
t_zj

Fort St. Philip, Mississippi river .........................................
Fort at Grand Terre, Barrataria island ....................................
'l'otal ................. ; ... __ . ___________ . __________________
.

-

50
50

400
400

60
60

117, 000

2,585

30,966

5,729

11,609,444

400,000

~

z0

t_,,j

vi

'rABLE B.-SEcoNn Cr.Ass,
Comprising works to be constructed next after tlwse ef tlw first, the works limJing simdar objects to defend as tlwse ef tlte first class, and
being generally suc/1, as are necessary to complete tlie defence begun by tlie works if the.first class; arranged in geographical order.
Garrison .
Designation of works.

Guns, &c.
Cl)

Cl)

Q
~

bl) .

Cost to complete.

~
~

-~

(J.)

~

~

~

(/J.

1-3

~

>-<

Fort Tru

25

260

53

501
25
50
25
100
251

5001
180
280
280
1,550
2501

1007
38
55
60
297
50

100

1,800

386

501
50

3751
460

751
62

~
t:i

0
0
0
0
0

;
t:i

t_rj

~

zC

t_rj

rn

0

0
0

vl

~

TABLE B.-SECOND CLASS, comprising works to be executed next after tliose

ef tliefirst,

(fC.-Continuecl,

O"{

~

Garrison.
Designation of works.

Guns, &c.

Q.)
<:..)

Q.)
be

~

w

ce
Q.)

Cost to complete.

Q.)

~

Maryland.

~

I-(

Fort
Fort
Fort
Fort

on Ilnwkins's Point, below Baltimore ................... _..... - ...... .
Mclleury, Covington battery, Redoubt Wood, repairs, &c., renewals .... .. .
on 'l'homas's Point, Patuxent river .................................. .
on Cedar Point, Potomac river, not projected ......................... .

100
50
25
501

845
500
350
550

121
100
70
1101

$376,000
1150, 000
259,000
1300,000

Soutli Carolina.
Works in Port Royal roads, not proj ectecl ................................ .

1-3

>-

pj
~

z>t:1

z

501

5501

1101 I

1300,000

Georgia.

;:>~

t:1
tz:_j

Fort on '.I.1ybec island, not projected ..................................... .
Repairs on ~.,ort .Jackson, Savannah river, not planned ...................... .
vV orks to command the entrance to Cumberland sound, mouth of St. Mary's river,
Georgia, not projected ............................................. .

1-::,:j

251
251

3001
2001

50?

550?

100?

900

751
301

1150,000
1 50,000

'l'u ta1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - .. - - · - · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

r-------1----I
1O , GS O
9 75

z

a

tz:_j

ri2

110?

?200,000

Alabama.
l!'ort, on Dauphin island, Mobile bay ..................................... .

t,:j

880,000

128
2, 0 3 0

II

~

-"~ -- ......

5,8 7 3 ,VVV

'rABLE 0.-Trnrw
Coniprising tlte defence

ef all towns,

ltarbors, inlets,

CLASS,

ere,, not included in tlw first two classe'tJ;

arranged i'n geographical order.

Garrison.
Guns, &c.

Designation of works.

Q)

ci

0

bO

c"3

Cost to complcte.
~

(l)

(l)

w

P-;

~

~

25
25
50
10

100
............... -25

50
250
250
50
1,000
200
25
125
200
1,000
...... - .... - - ..... - ......... - - .....
30
100

$100,000
100,000
500,000
50,000
400,000
135,000
75,000

~-<
~
t,

z

~t'-i
t,

25
10
25

-- .... - .. --- ......... -- --

...

50
50
...............

R

a

g

p

g

5

--

.....
- ..

250
125
150

50
25
21

100,000
50,000
43,000
210,000
3,00C

625

125

250,00C

250
50

45

80, 00(
20,00(
307, 00(

- - - - .. - .... -- -· -- . - ...
- .. - .. - - - ... ... - - - .... - .. - ..

- .......... - ... - .. - - .. - .. - ..... - ..

8

- ... - - -

t_zj
1-,:_j
t_zj

zC

t_zj

rn

Ot
Ot

1

'l'ABLE C.-1 HIRD CLASS, comprising the defence

ef all towns, harbors, inlets, q-c.-Oontinued.

01
cr;,

Garrison.
Designation of works.

Guns, &c.

Cl)

Cl)
00

0

ce

Cost to complete.

<l)

<l)

w

p.,

~

H

~

H

..... 1
..... 1
. - ... 1
...... 1
- . - . -- .
-. -. -. -

50
25
25
25
100
100

....•• 1
... - .. - ...
-- - - -- ..
nd New
.•.... 1

25
10
10

'

'

'

50

r

8

750
250
225
100
1,760
1,760

150
50
45
14
342
332

2
2

250
220
155

50
30
16

0
0
0

500

100

0

0

0
0
0

>~
>-<

z>t1

~
~

t1

t_rj
,tj
t_rj

z

a

t_rj

a:,

ltt•tlonbL on Vc•c1nnl Point, Cnpc l<'('tn- river~ 1n~oj e ctetl . - - - - - - - - - - - - ·

•....• 1
...... 1

50

-- - - - -. -

550
500

llO

0

100

0

50

450

90

0

~1,[j

;.2 00

50

,1 : 1

)

8outl1, Carolina.

,vorlcs at Georgetown harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ?

"\Yorks ut the mouth of the Santee, at Bull's bay, and other inlets between
Georgetown and Charleston. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
vVork s at Stono iulet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
..Works at North Edisto inlet ... . ........................... ... ........ 1
1Vorks at South Edisto inlet ..................... . . .. ............ . .... 1
Works at St. Helena sound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

50

500

25
10
10
10
50

100

250, 000

250

50

125
125
125
375

25
25
25
75

100,000
50,000
50,000
50,000
150,000

~
H

Georgia.
vVorks at
Works at
Works at
Works at
Works at
Works at
Works at
Works at

W assaw sound. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ossabaw sound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
St. Catharine's sound ............................ ·. . . . . . . . . . . .
Sapelo sound . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Doby inlet ................................................
Altamaha sound. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
St. Simond's sound .........................................
St. Andre·ws's sound ........................................

t'"
1-3

1-(

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1

50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50

500
500
500
500
500
500
500
500

100
100
100
100

100
100
100
100

200,000
200,000
200,000
200,000
200,000
200,000
200,000
200,000

>

~
~

~
t:t

z

>
>
t'"

~

t:t

East and liVest F1orida.

t_zj

"'.l

vVorks at St. Augustine, (estimate of engineer department) ................ - 1
·works at Key West and Tortugas, (estimate of engineer department) . . . . . . . . 1
Works at Charlotte harbor, Espiritu Santa bay, Apalachicola, Apalache bay, St.
Joseph's bay, and St. Rosa bay, (estimate of engineer department) ....... 1

25
500

100
2,500

20
500

50,000
3,000,000

t_zj

z

a

t_zj

r,i

250

1,250

250

1,000,000

Alabama.
Works at Perdido bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Tower at Pass au Heron, projected .................. __ .................. .

50
10

500
60

100
12

200,000
25,000

Total .... ,. .............. _.. __ . ___ .. _._. __ .. _.... __ ._. _____ ._

2,380

21,745

4,283

14,078,824
Ol
-::J

°'

Recapitulation qj Tables A, B, ancl C.

00

Garrison.
Guns, &c.

Designation of works.

<li
Q
~
'l)

·-

P-i

-

<li

Ql)

Cost to complete.

Q)

w

Pin;t clmif4, from table A ................................................
Second class, from table B ..............................................
'l1hirc1 class, from table C ...............................................

2,585
975
2,380

30,966
10,680
21,745

5,729
2,030
4,283

$11,609,444
5,873,000
14,078,824

Total .......................................................

5,940

63,391

12,042

31,561,268

~
H

~

H

~

>~

...::

-----

~tj

z
TABLE

>>~

--1

D.-FOURTH CLASS,

Comprising conditional works, tlie necessity for wliiclt will depend on the creation ef artificial harbors, canals, great na1Jal depots,
arranged in geographical order.
Works on Barnstable bay to cover Cape Cod canal.
Works on Buzzard's bay to cover Cape Coc1 canal.
Works to cover artificial harbor in Martha's Vineyard sound.

g-c./

Works on Newport News, on Craney island, and on Nasaway
shoals, to cover naval depot in Burwell's bay.
Works to cover proposed new outlet of Albemarle sound.

tj

t".J

rrj

zat".J

t".J

~

TABJ.Jg }~,
t /1,(' co8t rf certain projected fortifications Jor tlie sea-coast defence,· tlte .forces nccessar!J to protect tlwn on tlie supposition
tltat tll~·e were no fortifications,· the forces necessary for 1mfect security with tlw aid ef tlic projected defences,- and tlte expense
ef the troops in botli cases.

£ :,dt ibit h, o·

Comparison of th e forces necessary to defend the places
with and without the projected works.

]
0

f5'

~

a)

:a

u5

<+--..::<l
0

Piaces.

...
0

No. of troops necessary without fortifications.

No. of troops required with the projected works.
Within
call.

Under pay.

~ 1::-

bO

Q,

to
bO

<1

Portsmouth . •• ________ _
Boston ____________ . __ _
Narraganset roads . _. __ .
New York ____________ _
Philaddphfa _________ _
Baltimore _ . •. _. ______ _
Norfolk ___________ . __ _
Charleston .. __________ _
Savannah ...•. _•• ____ .
New Orleans _ •• _.• ____ _
Total

?$500, 000
2 123 575
3: 042: 369
6,077,365
1,121,000
1,516,000
3 869 025
, 824-: 426
732,367
961,529

h

cd

i:i..

...

a)

"C
Q

p

~
0

.s
:5l
i

10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
17,000

10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000

101, ooo

I 93, ooo

------1

----------- 1 21,767 , 656

0 (I

;:,

Expenses of the troops kept under
pay with the proposed works.

.

~§
00

o..'°

B,000

~
o:!

a) .....

~~

.... -zl

a)
..c:
..... ..c:
.........

sbO
Q,)

p::.

150
285
275
500
150
250
550

:mo

200
350

~
~

1,500
3,845
5 125
s:206
2,010
2,180
3,610
1,500
] , 360
2,740

~

~

1,650
4,130
5,400
8,706
2,160
2,430
4,160
1, 800
1,560
3,090

~

~

i1

8,350
5,870
4,600
1,294
7,840
7,570
5, 8i0

8,200
8,440
6,910

~

.....

s .al. .

~t

0

(1)

I><! o:!

~ ·@

Q

s

~

$22,500
42,750
41,250
75,000
22,500
37,500
82,500
45,000
30,000
52,500

$2,500,000
2,500,000
2,500,000
2,500,000
2,500,000
2,500000
2,500,000
2,500,000
2,500,000
4-,250,000

t

-

.... ..c:

S.

~§
~

s

>-:3

Sn~

..C: rn

55
Q

~

i - - - - - - - - - 1 -- - - 1 - - - - 1- - - - 1- - -

3,010

0

~

~

H

~

:;:; ffe
<l)

H

rn

''""C'I

(f)

0 -<!)

-.alQ

i;

...

~,B

0
o:!

o:!o

o:! lC

~

"C

,B ~

,B ~
00
... o

0

0~
0

......

......

JJ :0o:!

:S g

0
0

!l
o:!

...

<l)

"C

'o
d

0 I><!""
~·@

s

~

$375,000
961,250
1,281,250
2,051,500
502,500
505,000
902,500
375,000
340,000
685,000

;g

·s

~
.:l

<l)

i:i..
I><!

~

$397,500
1,004,000
1,322,500
2,126,500
525,000
542,500
985,000
420,000
370,000
737,500

>
i?j ·
~

~
t:1

z

>
>
~

<j

t:1
t_rj

>,tj

t_rj

z0

t_rj

rp.

I

----- - -,- - - - - I 8,430,500
451,500
I 32,076 I 35,086 I 64,914 I 26,750,000
7,9i9,ooo

Total number of troops n eceseary without fortifications------------------------------------ 200,000
Total number of troops required with the projected works ••.• - -- - - -- - - -- - - -- - - - - - - -- - - . -- • 100, OCO
;;~ Supposing all to be militia, serving six months, and costing in the average $250 per man.
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MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

'l'ABLE E, exliibiting tlie cost ef certain projectedfortifications, 'fC,-Oontinu ~
Expense of defending the above-mentioned points during a campaign of six months without fortifications ................ _ $26,750, 011
With the projected forts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8, 430, 5,
Difference ..................................... .
Total cost of the projected works .................. .
Difference . _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................. .

18, 319, 5C
21, 767, 65(

3, 44 , }.:if

- ----

N. B.-In one campaign of six months the difference of expense between tht
two systems will amount to within $3,448,156 of the whole cost of the projected
works. The expense of the troops as above supposes the regular soldier to co~t
$300 per annum, and the militia soldiei:$500, officers included in both. No estimate can be made of the enormous contingent expenses in assembling, organizing, and providing militia forces, of hospitals, waste of property, loss of time, &c.
This estimate is undoubtedly below the truth. The forces under pay nece~m:
for defence, with the proposed works, consist of peace garrisons, increased by a
proportion of militja, the residue of militia under pay being stationed upon the
line of approach of the enemy.

'rABLE Ji',

E xltibitiug th e mnount r!f militia force th at may be concentrated at Boston, Newport, New York, P ltilculelpltia, N oljo' llc, Baltimore,
Charleston, Savannalt, and N ew Orleans, successively , Jrom tlw 1st to tlte ll tlt day ; eaclt day's niarcli being coniputed at fift een
mi"les; founded on tlw census ef 1830.
·

H
~
00

>-.

~

q

1 ......
2 ......
3 ......

4 ......
5 ......
6 ......
7 ......
8 ......
9 ......

10 ......
11. .....

d

0
rn

0

~

5,422
28,351
34,138
39,561
49,127
59,893
81,867
97,697
111,655
125,326
144,076

-

~
::-,
0

::-,
0

P-<

1,397
2,373
12,340
17,143
33,221
42,,807
61,335
65,583
83, 111
109,268
130,824

""O

Q.)

:-;::::
,..q

z

z

~

~

:::

~

Q.)

-~

,..q

20,218
28,131
44,123
57,925
59,438
81,252
104,180
137,048
152,841
164, 116
191,353

~

~

26,132
26,521
35,450
69,101
70,806
127,666
154,036
167,703
195,265
219,983
221,603

.-0
~

>

~
~
::-,
0

z
1,864
2,880
4, 416
7,608
11, 101
14, 511
20,699
28,039
32,562
36,446
45, 549

~
oS
::-,
0

....,s

•.-<

~
~

10,046
18,042
21,266
27,916
31,897
49,648
65,382
77,543
78,164
87,520
101,970

0
ui

d

£rn

0
..cl'
c:i

~

fJ

~

Q.)

,..q

0

2,513
7,160
9,475
14,601
18,443
22,490
24,393
2.9, 416
40,835
45,582
59,701

~

~
w

1,173
3,960
5,948
6,588
9,263
19,725
21,903
25,220
36,630
41,345
60,422

u.i

§
Q.)

~

0

~

Q.)

z

3,032
7,836
8,716
12,499
14,474
17,339
17,906
22,561
26,433
28,140
31~647

~
H
t"i
H
1-3

>
~

>-<

ztj>

z

~t"i
tj
t_tj
1-,:_j
t_tj

zQ

t_tj
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MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

ORDNANCE OFFICE, Wasliington, Marek 8, 1836.
Sm: The resolution of the Senate referred, on the 25th ultimo, to this office.
has been duly considered, and, in answer, I have the honor to transmit the following report :

1. IN RELATION TO ARMORIES.

}..,or reasons fully set forth in the letter to you from this office of December
28, 1832, (and as will also appear on reference to the report of Hon. R. ~I.Johnson, chairman of the military committee, of March 18, 1834,) it is the opinion of
this department that, with a view to keep pace in some measure with the rapid
increase of the militia, and the consequent demand for arms, there should bf
established at least one additional armory, to be located at the most eligible
point west of the Alleghany mountains.
In a country like the United States, where the population is spread over a
territory of great extent, the delay necessarily attending the transportation of
arms to distant sections may at times materially affect the public interest; it i~
therefore suggested that, if two additional armories are deemed necessary to
meet the exigencies of the country, one should be provided in the west and one
in the south Atlantic States. Including those now at Springfield and Harper's
Ferry, there would then be four national armories, two for the Atlantic States
and two for the west; that is, if Harper's Ferry may be considered sufficiently
near the western States to furnish their supplies by means of the proposed
·
extension of the Chesapeake and Ohio canal.
Two additional armories are therefore estimated for, at $525,000 each$1,0.50, 000.
This estimate is based on the report of the commissioners, dated January 12,
1825, who were appointed under the authority of an act of Congress, passed
March 3, 1823, entitled "An act to establish a national armory on the western
waters," and directed to explore tlie western country with a view to the selection of a suitable site.
·
2.

IN RELATION TO ARSENALS.

It has been urged upon the department by many whose opinions demand co~sideration, that every State should have an arsenal or depot of arms and mu_mtions within its territorial limits. Should this opinion prevail, and be earned
into effect by legislative authority, it would be necessary to construct fourt.een
arsenals or depots, including the one proposed for the State of North Carolina .
for which a bill has been reported by the military committee of the House nt
Representatives.
A_pro1;0inent advantage to the p11blic interest in the establir.:hing of these depotconsists m their use for the safe-k eeping of arms issued to the States, ~~~er,,tb~
law of Congress, passed in 1808, "for arming the whole body of the militia, 1."
be_ held subject to_ the orders of their several governors, which would insure tbeJT
bemg always available in any emergency.
S01:1-e additio_ns may be required, from time to time, at the arsenal. a:ready
csfabh. hed, which, with the cost of the fourteen above mentioned, are estmrnted
at $1,746,000.
Thi. stimatc is founded on the supposition that the new arsenal::; are to ·
on an average, of a medium extent, when considered in relation to those already
e, tabli.., hed, which are divided into four classes, as may be seen by reference t'l a
tabula~· exhibit presented herewith. It would be proper to arrange enry Ill'~
d pot m , uch manner as to admit of its increa. e or extension in ca. e the puhhe
rvice .:hould rcquir it. It could then be passed from one cla s to a higher by
the addition of uch buildings, tools, or machinery as the case might demand.
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IN RELATION TO FIELD ARTILLERY.

It is estimated that an adequate supply of :field artillery for arming the militia
and for troops in service, to be provided within ten years, will amount to 926
pieces, which, with their carriages, implements, and equipments, will cost about
$576,175.
This estimate is basecl on the principle stated in the report before mentioned,
and contemplates a supply proportionate to the ratio of the increase of the militia,
one piece of artillery being allotted to every 2,000 men.
4.

IN RELATION TO ORDNANCE AND ORDNANCE STORES REQUIRED FOR ARMING
THE FORTIFICATIONS.

Agreeably to data derived from two statements received from the engineer
department on the 11th of January and 27th of February last, it is estimated
that the expense of procuring the necessary ordnance and ordnance stores for
the full and entire armament of the forts which are erected, together with those
now building, and others which are contemplated to be built hereafter, embracing·
cannon, carriages, implements, and equipments complete, and ammunition, after
deducting therefrom the quantity of similar munitions now on hand, will amount
to about $17,840,249.
This estimate is founded on the supposition that 12,116 pieces of cannon, with
200 rounds of ammunition for each gun, will be ultimately required when all the
forts projected shall have been completed.
It should be stated, however, that this sum may be considered partly conjectural, the plans for the defence of many of the harbors being not yet matured by
the board of engineers, as it appears by a letter from the chief of that department, dated February 27 last. There are likewise many other points along the
coast which may require defences, the cost of the armament for which has not
been embraced in this estimate, nor does it co11tain any item for the defence of
the Mexican frontier.
5.

IN RELATION TO SMALL ARMS.

To progress with the arming of the militia to a reasonable extent, in accordance with the settled policy of the country and its civil institutions, a considerable addition should be made to the number of arms on hand. Having reference
to the annual increase of citizens who may be called to bear arms, there will be
required for the next ten years an expenditure of $7,721,233 for muskets, rifles,
and pistoli!, and $321,880 for swords-total, $8,043,113.
This last sum is found by allotting :five swords to every one hundred muskets,
or their equivalent in other fire-arms.
6.

IN RELATION TO ACCOUTREMENTS FOR SMALL ARMS.

Fifty thousand sets of accoutrements would cost $200,000.
This number distributed among the several arsenals would afford an adequate
s~pply for any emergency ; and being in some degree perishable, it is not considered advisable to provide a greater quantity, as they can be made at short
notice, or as occasion may require.
7. IN

RELATION TO FIELD AivIMUNITIO~ OF ALL KINDS.

The expense of providing a supply of gunpowder, cartridge paper, and other
mate1ials for field service, is estimated at $200,000.
. 'l1his amount would afford at all times a supply of ammunition for 30,000 men
in each of the principal divisions of the country.
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The foregoing statements comprise all the estimates for the ordnance department, except for a national foundery. 'The amount required for such an establishment will not exceed $300,000, which sum includes the cost of materials to
be consumed in casting guns during the first year after commencing operations.
The period of ten years is taken as a suitable time within which the foregoing
expenditures may be completed.
The disbursements for the various objects embraced in the resolution which
pertain to the ordnance department are now, annually, little short of $1,000,000.
If a period of fifteen years is assumed for the acco_mplishment of these purposes,
the annual expenditure will be only double what it is at present, and it is believed
that such an increase could be made with much advantage to the service. Indeed,
that portion of expense which pertains to the manufacture of cannon and projectiles could annually be more than quadrupled with safety and a due regard to
economy.
Recapitulation.
2 national armories ..................................... .
14 arsenals ........................................... .
926 pieces of field artillery, with caniages, &c .............. .

Ordnance and ordnance stores, and ammunition for fortifications.
Small arms and accoutrements ............ __............... .
Ammunition for field service ............ ................. .
A national foundery .................................... .

$1,050, 000
1,746,000
576,175
17,840, 249
8,243,113
200,000
300,000
29,955,537

--------The resolution of the Senate is returned herewith.
I have the honor to be, sir, &c.,
GEO. BOMFORD, Colonel of Ordnana.
Hon. LEWIS CASS, Secretary ef War.

:-<111t1·111tn l '!l tlt1· ('()s/ r!,/'.frmr c/((ssrs

ef arsenals,

rxclusire

ef c{dcrior 1w11s,fenccs, gales, roads, tools, macltinery, wharves, (fC.

FfRST CLASS-DEPOT, S IMPLY.

~

Names.

trj

!'<
t;

~

1
<:.J1

Size.

120 by 40 feet, and 47 feet high ....... ___ ._ .
2
To contain from 2,500 to 3,000 bbls. powder ..
Great magazine ................ " . . . . . . . . . . .
1
43 by 40 feet, and 40 feet high ............. .
Officers' quarters ................... - - - - - - - 1
100, by 36 feet, and 35 feet high ............ .
1
B arracks ........................ - ....... 105 by 30 feet, and 10 feet high ............ .
Gun-carriage shed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
40 by 20 feet, and 29 feet high ............. .
Office............ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
30 by 20 feet, and 14 feet high ...... ' ....... .
Small magazine for fixed ammunition. . . . . . . . . .
1
Connecting· walls ..... __ ~ ... ___ .. ____ .. _.......... . .. .. .... . .. - - ... - . - .. --· - ......... - .......... - - ..... - ....... . .
Land-~5 acres at least.-(See note 1) .............. . . Estimated at $40 per acre ...•...... _...... .
Graduating and levelling the site proper, making
drains, culverts, &c.. . . . . . . ............... ,....... .

g Arsenals .............. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · · · /

l-..:)

No. 0f
buildings.

Cost of each.

Total.

$20,000
12,000
8,000
13,000

$40,000
12,000
8,000
13,000

3,050

3,050

2,430
·756

2,430
756
1,000
1,000
1,000

~
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SECOND CLASS-DEPOT AND PLACE OF REPAIR.

Nam es

---~--

No. of
buildings.

Size.

Cost of each.]

•

Total.

-----

Ar:::rnal _ - . _. ___ __. ___ .. _. ____ . _. _. ___ . __ _
2
(hrat nrngnzinr ______________________ _____ .
1
Officrrs' qun.rters ______ . ________ . __________ .
1
lfarracks - _- - . __________ . _______________ . _
1
Gnn-carringe shed __________ . _.. ___ ____ _ ___ _
1
Smiths' shop _... ____ . __ . __ .. ___ . __ . __ . __ .
1
Office . _.. __ ......... __ ...... __ . _... _. . . . .
1
1
Carriage-makers' shop .. _. _. _.. _ . _..... _. . . .
1
Armorers' and turners' shop ......... _.. _. __ ..
Painters' shop . __ .. _. _... _..... ___ . ______ . .
1
Lnboratory, viz :
~-ri~in~ and :filling shop - _........... _. ___ . . .
1
:U 1111i-\hrng room.;_._ ... _... __ ..... _... _....
1
Small magazine for fixed ammunition. . . . . . . . . .
1
Connecting· wall . _.... _.. _.. __ ... _....... - . - .. - - - .
Lnncl-25 acres a.t lrn.st.-(Sec note) ...... _. - ... - ... - .
Gmdnnting and levellin g the site proper, making
drains, culverts, &c ............ .......... , ....... -

120 by 40 feet, and 4 7 feet high .. ...... _. _. .
'ro contain from 2,500 to 3,000 bbls. powder .. .
43 by 40 feet, and 40 feet high . . ........... .
100 by 36 feet, and 35 feet high_ ... _.. _. __ ..
105 by 30 feet, and 10 feet high .... _....... .
25 by 30 feet, and 14 feet high ............. .
40 by 20 feet, and 29 feet high ............. .
25 by 30 feet, and 14 feet high ......... __ . _.
50 by 30 feet, and 14 feet high ............. .
20 by 14 feet, and 14 feet hig·h ... : .... _ .... _

$20,000
12,000
8,000
13,000

. 25 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high ...... _.... _._
25 by ;25 feet, and 14 feet high . ..... .... . ..
30 by 20 feet, and 14 feet high .. _.......... .

787
787
756

•

-

-

~

......... •

............. •

.. -

•

•

.. -

................... •

•

•

.. •

•

•

- r .... •

$40, 000
12,000
8,000
13,000
3,050
~)45
2,430
945
1,890

3,050

945
2,430
945
1,890
3,52

•

•

...... •

352

787
787
756
1,200
1,000

..

Estimated at $40 per acre .......... _. _..... , . __ ... - .. .
• • •

•

• •

•

• • •

.. • •

.. •

•

• •• •

.... • •"' •

•,. •

•

.. • • , . • • • • . , . ' " ' • I • • • . , • " " , . • • " '

_ _ _

___

I

I

1,200

88,342
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,' talcmenl rj ' the r·ost 1ffcur c7ass('S rif arsenals, ..yr·.-Oontinuccl.
THIRD CLA SS-DEPOT AND PLA CE OF CONSTR UCTION AND REPAITI, WITHOUT WATER OR STEAM POWER.

Na.mes.

Arsenal ................................. .
Great magazine ........................... .
Officen,' quarters .......................... .
Barrack:s ................................ .
Gun-carriage sheds ........................ .
Smiths' shop ....................· ......... .
Timber sheds ............................ .
Office ................................... .
Carpenters' and carriage-makl:rs' shop ......... .
Armorers' and turners' shop ................. .
Tinners' and casting shop .................. .
Painters' shop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ _.... .
Saddlers' shop .................... _.. _.. _..
Laboratory, viz:
Driving and filling· shop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Finishing room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Small magazine for fixed ammunition..........
Guard room ... - - .... - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

No. of
buildings.

1

120 by 40 feet, and 47 feet high ............ .
To contain from 2, 500 to 3, 000 bbls. powder ..
43 by 40 feet, and 40 feet high ............. .
100 by 36 feet, and 35 feet high ............ .
100 by 30 feet, and 10 feet high ..........•..
80 by 35 feet, and 14 feet high ............. .
105 by 30 feet, and 10 feet high ............ .
40 by 20 feet, and 29 feet high ............. .
80 by 35 feet, and 14 feet high ....... ., ..... .
50 by 30 feet, and 14 feet high ............. .
40 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high ............. .
30 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high ............. .
30 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high ............. .

1
1
1
1

25
25
30
30

2

1
3

1
2

1
2
1
1
1
1
1

1

$20,000
12,000
8,000
13,000
3,050
3,528
2,250
2,430
3,558
1,890
1,260
945
945

~t $40. p~1: ~~1:e·:::::::::::::::::: I: : : ::: ::: :

~~: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : /: : : : : : : : /: : : : : ~ : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : I: :: : :: ::: :

1,350
1,000

25 feet, and 14 feet
25 feet, and 14 feet
20 feet, and 14 feet
25 feet, and 14 feet

high ............. .
high .............. .
high ............. .
high ............. .

787
787
756
945

$40,000
12,000
24,000
13,000
6,100
3,528
4,500
2,430
3,558
1,890
1,260
945
945
787
787
756
945
1,350
1,000

by
by
by
by

£~~~ec~~g~::~l ~t- ie~~t.~(S~~ ~-ot~)-:::::::::: : : : : : : : : · E~ti~~t~~l
Graduating and levelling the site proper, making
Oo~~t~~s:~ ~v_e~·~~' ·

Cost of each. I . Total.

Size.

122,101

~
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FOURTH C'LASS-IH<; POT AND PLACE OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR, WITH WATER OR STEAM POWER.

Names.

No. of
buildings.

Size.

Cost of each.

Arsenal ........ ... . ..................... .
2
120 by 40 feet, and 47 feet high ............ . $20,000
Great magazine ........................... .
1
~ro contain from 2,500 to 3,000 bbls. powder .. .
12,000
Officers' quarters .......................... .
3
43 by 40 feet, and 40 feet high ............. .
8,000
Barracks ..... ... ................... _.. _. _
1
100 by 36 feet, and 35 feet high ............ .
13,000
Gun-carriage sheds ........................ .
3
100 by 30 feet, and 10 feet hig·h ........... ~.
3,050
Smiths' shop ............................. .
1
80 by 35 feet, and 1 4 feet high ............. .
3,528
Timber sheds ............................. .
3
105 by 30 feet, and 10 feet high ............ .
2,250
Office .................................. :.
1
40 by 20 feet, and 29 feet high ............. .
2,430
Carpenters' and carriage-makers' shop ......... .
1
80 by 35 feet, and 14 feet high ............. .
3,528
Steam engine, or horse for "'1-ater power ....... .
1
100 by 40 feet, and 18 feet high ............ .
6,480
Armorers' shop ........................... .
1
50 by 30 feet, and 14 feet high ............. .
1,890
'l'inners' and casting shop ...................·
1
40 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high ............. .
1,260
Painters' shop ............................ .
1
30 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high ............. .
945
Saddlers' shop ............................. .
1
30 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high ............. .
945
Laboratory, viz:
1
25 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
787
Driving and filling shop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
}.,inishing room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
25 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
787
Small magazine for fixed ammunition..........
1
30 by 20 feet, and 14 feet high..............
756
Guard r?om. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
30 by 25 feet, and 14 feet high. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
945
Connecting ,valls ..................................................................................... .
Lancl-25 acres at least.-( See note.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Estimated at $40 per acre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ .
Grncluatinp; and levelling the site proper, making

01;~\t>::H~-~l~~~-~s: _~~---_-_·_·_·_·_ ~ ~: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~:: ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ::::::::~::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: J:::::::: :I
I

I

Total.

$40,000
12,000
24,000
13,000
9,150
3,528
6,750
2,430
3,528
6,480
1,890
1,260
945
945
787
787
756
945
1 ,45 0
1,000
r-o

i'. ~go
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NoTE 1. Twenty-five ncrcR of land, at least, are necessary at each class of the arsenals, in order to be enabled to prove powder; wliich operation rcq11ircs a space of 3;50 to 400 yards.
2. It is perceived that the expense of the first class may be reduced $20,000, if only one arsenal building be required in that class. ~rhe same remark
applies to the other classes.
~ 'l here are times when several companies of troops may ue required, temporarily at least, at each class of the arsenals. 'l'be barracks a.re therefore, made of the same size at efl.ch of the classes, and large enough to accommodate the companies as well as the troops of the ordn:rnce proper. ' There
has always been a deficiency at the arsenals in barracks, when they have been occupied by troops.
4. The above includes everything connected with the buildings and site proper, nothing more. The expenses of the apparatus and tools, utemils,
engines, &c , which may be neces-ary to put the severitl classes into operation, am not included.
5. The extent of the site occupied by each of the classes may be the same; and thus any one class may be enlarged into its next adjacent class, without
other expense than is required by the additional buildings.
6. Tne estimated expenditures in these statements are founded on the prices paid iu the vicinity of Philadelphia, and are sufficiently near the truth,
it is believed, for all positions which are not in Florida, Louisiana, or Alabama.

ORDNANCE OFFICE,

Wasllington, Marcli 8, 1836.
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MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

REPORT FROM THE NAVY DEPAR'l'MEN'r.
NAVY DEPARTMENT, March 31, 1836.
Sm : In answer to so much of the resolutions of the Senate of the United
States, of the 18th ultimo, as required information as to the probable amount of
appropriations that may be necessary to supply the United States with ordnance, arms, and munitions of war, which a proper regard to self-defence would
require to be always on hand, and the probable amount that would be necessary
to place the naval defences of the United States (including the increase of the
navy, navy yards, dock yards, and steam or :floating batteries) upon the footing
of strength and respectability which is due to the security and welfare of the
Union, I have the honor to lay before you a report of the board of navy commissioners, of the 2d instant, which contains the best information upon the subjects referred to in possession of this department, which is respectfully submitted.

The

PRESIDENT

ef tlie

rn

MARLON DICKERSON".
United States.

THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES.

January 21, 1836,
The following resolutions were ordered to be postponed to Monday next:
Resolved, That so much of the revenue of the United States, and the dindends of stock receivable from the Bank of the United States, as may be necessary for the purpose, oug·ht to be set apart and applied to the general defence
and permanent security of the country.
Resolved, 'I,hat the President be requested to cause the Senate to be informe~:
1. 'I,he probable amount that would be necessary for fortifying the lake, m3:11·
time, and Gulf frontier of the United States, and such points of the land fronner
as may require permanent fortifications.
2. 'l1h e probable amount that would be necessary to construct an adequate
number of armories and arsenals in the United States, and to supply the State~
with field artillery (especially brass field pieces) for their militia, and with sidearms and pistols for their cavalry.
3. The probable amount that would be necessary to supply the United Stat
with the ordnance, arms, and munitions of war, which a proper regard to seltdefence would require to be always on hand.
4. The probable amount that would be necessary to place the naval defenceof the United States (including the increase of the navy, navy yards, dock
ya!~s, and_ ste~m or floating batteries) upon the footing of strength and respect·
ability winch 1s due to the security and to the welfare of the Union.
Passed February 18, 1836.

NAVY COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE, Jiarcli 2, l 36.
SIR: The board of navy commissioners have the honor to acknowledge h.
receipt of your letter of the 26th ultimo, requesting a "report on the probab!t:
amount that would be neces..,ary to upply the United States with the ordnanc ·
arm , and_ munitions of war ( ·o far as may be wanted for the purpo..,e~ of th
navy) which a proper r gard to self-defence would require to be always on hand:
and on the probable amount that would be necessary to place the naval defenc ·:
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of the United States (including the increase of the navy, navy yards, dock y~r~ls,
and steam or floating batteries) upon the footing of strength and respectability
which is due to the security and welfare of the Union."
.
In conformity to these instructions the board respectfully state, with respect
to the ordnance for the navy, that after a careful examination of the subject,
taking into consideration the ordnance and ordnance stores now on hand, and
the extent of force for which it may be expedient to make early provision, they
are of opinion that the sum of one million eight hundred thousand two ~1:mdred
and fifty dollars will be required to supply the ordnance, arms, and mumt10ns of
war which may be wanted for the use of the navy, and which a proper regard
to self-defence would require to have prepared ready for use.-(See paper A
annexed for the detail.)
The board beg leave- respectfully to observe, that for the vessels _which ~re
now built, or have been specially authorized, armaments may be provided, with
some partial exceptions, from the cannon and carronades already provided, and
the deficient ordnance, arms, and other ordnance stores will be principally
required for the vessels which are yet to be authorized or built. It is therefore
respectfully recommended that any appropriation for this purpose, instead of
being special or separate, should be included in an appropriation for "building
and Tepairing vessels, and for the purchase of materials and stores for the navy."
The second object of inquiry, as to "the probable amount that would be necessary to place the naval defences of the United States (including the increase of
the navy, navy yards, dock yards, and steam or floating batteries) upon the
footing of strength and respectability which is due to the security and welfare
of the Union," embraces a wide range, requires an examination of several sub. jects of great importance, and the expression of opinions upon which differences
of opinion may and probably will exist. Before any estimate can be formed of
the probable amount that would be necessary for the purposes proposed an
examination must be had, and an opinion formed of the nature and extent of the
naval force which is "necessary to place the naval defences of the United States
upon the footing of strength and respectability which is clue to the security ancl
welfare of the Union," and the time within which it ought to be, or might be,
advantageously prepared.
.
Taking into view the geographical position of the United States, with reference
to other nations with whom we are most likely to be brought into future collision;
the great extent of our maritime frontier, and the extreme importance of securing
the communications of the whole valley of the Mississippi, though the Gulf of
)Iexico, and the intercourse between all parts of the coast; the efficient protection
of our widely extended and extremely valuable commerce, under all circumstances;
and the great naval and fiscal resources of the country, the board consider the
proper limit for the extent of the naval force to be that which can be properly
manned when the country may be involved in a maritime war.
In estimating this extent it is assumed that about ninety thousand seamen
are employed in the foreign and coasting trade and fisheries. As the navigation
has been generally increasing, there is little reason to apprehend any immediate
diminution during peace. In any war which would require the employment of
all our naval force, it is believed that such interruptions would occur to our
commerce as would enable the navy to obtain without difficulty at least thirty
thousand seamen and ordinary seamen; and if it should continue long, it is proba~le that a larger number might be engaged. The number of thirty thousand,
with the landsmen who may be safely combined with them, will therefore be
assumed as the number for which vessels ought to be prepared for the commencement of a state of hostilities.
With respect to the nature of the force which it would be most advantageous
to prepare, there will undoubtedly be differences of opinion. The materials for
the larger vessels, as ships of the line and frigates, would be obtained with great
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difficulty, under circumstances which would interfere with our coasting trade.
whilst sloops of war and smaller vessels could be built with greater comparatin:
facility under such circumstances.
The preparation of a considerable number of steam vessels, ready to defend
our great estuaries, to aid in the operations of our other naval force, and in the
concentration or . movements of the military force, as circumstances might require, is believed to demand serious and early attention.
Having due regard to these and other considerations, the board propose that
the force to be prepared, ready for use when circumstances may require it, shall
consist of 15 ships of the line, 25 frigates, 25 sloops of war, 25 steamers, and
25 smaller vessels, and that the frames and other timber, the copper, ordnance,
tanks, and chain cables shall also be prepared for 10 ships of the line and 10
frigates.
'The force proposed to be prepared, ready for use, will employ and can be
manned by the 30,000 seamen and others which have been considered available
in a state of war. The materials for the ten ships of the line and ten frigates
will constitute a necessary reserve for increasing the number of those vessels,
should they be required, or for supplying losses from decay or caeualties.
'To estimate the amount necessary to prepare this force it is proposed to as-,
certain the whole probable cost, including ordnance, by the average cost ol
similar vessels already built, (steam vessels excepted,) and of materials already
procured, and then to deduct the value of the present force, and all other pre,.,<>.ent
available means.
Total cost of 15 ships of the line ......................... . $8,250,000
25 frigates ........................... - - - - - - 8,750,000
3,125, 000
25 sloops ................................. .
5,625,000
25 steamers ........................... - . - - 1,250,000
'"r25 smaller vessels ..................... - .. - - Total for vessels .................................... - - - For the proposed materials, as a reserve ................... .

27, 000, 000
3,315,000

Total amount required ............................ - - - - · - · 30,315, 000
D educt from this sum the value of the present force and available means, as follows :
In vessels afloat, valued at llo of original value,
about ................................... . $4,440,000
In vessels building, at actual cost ............. . $2,455,000
In materials collected for building do ........... . 2,945,000
In treasury for these purposes, October 1, 1835 .. . 1,215,000
For three years' appropriation, "gradual improvement," when due . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 500, 000
Total of present value and available means ................. .

12,555,000

Leaves still to be provided for vessrls ................. - ... -

---

17,760,00C

In presenting any estimate for the amounts which may be necessary to placP
the different navy yards in a proper situation, the board can do no more tha~
give very general opinionf4, as the objects of expenditure are foreign to therr
own pro±e ional pur uits, and they have no civil engineer to whom they can
r fer for the nece._;4ary detailed mformation.
} rom a knowledge of the co t of works hitherto completed or in pro~·:"·
and of the want at the re pective yard for the proper preservation of mat_en~i-.
and for extending the means for building, pre c1Ting, repairing, and eqmppm-=
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vessels, they are satisfied, however, that. the public interests would be _gr~atly
promoted, and, in fact, absolutely require an average annual expenditure of
$ 500,000 for years to come upon the different yards.
.
In New York the necessity for a dry dock is severely felt ~lrea~y, ~nd its
importance will increase with any increase of the navy. '.rhis, wi!h its dependencies, will require nearly a million of dollars. ~t Pensa~ola, which nat~re
has designated as one of the naval keys ~f !h~ G~lf of Mexico, a_nd of th_e 1111mense commerce of the valley of the Mississippi, large expenditures will be
necessary to secure adequate means for repairing a_nd su?sisting a naval force
upon that station, and thus prevent the many evils wluch would be s~vcrely
felt in a state of war, if the vessels were obliged to resort to the Atlantic ~orts
for ordinary repairs or supplies of any kind. In other yards there are objects
of great and urgent importance.
.
.
Generally the proposed arrangements for the preservation of all matenals
and vessels should precede their collection or construction. Whilst, therefore,
the board propose $500,~00 as the ave~ge annual appropriation, until ~he_ yards
should be placed in proper order, they would also state that appropnat10ns of
$700,000, annually, for the next four or five years, and a less sum than $500,000
afterwards, would, in their opinion, be most judicious.
The next subject for consideration is the nature and extent of force proper to
be kept employed in a time of peace for the protection of our commercial interests, and to prepare the officers and others for the efficient management of the
force proposed for a state of war.
Our commerce is spread over every ocean; our tonnage is second only to that
of Great Britain, and the value of articles embarked is believed by many to be
fully equal to those transported by the ships of that nation. In the safety and
prosperity of this commerce all the other interests of the United States are
deeply interested. It is liable to be disturbed and injured in various modes,
unless the power of the country, exerted through its naval force, is ready to
protect it. It is therefore proposed that small squadrons should be employed
upon different stations, subject at all times, however, to such modifications as
circumstances may require.
.
Of these squadrons, one might be employed in the Mediterranean, and attend
to our interests on the west coasts of Spain and Portugal, and southward to the
western coast of Morocco and Madeira.
One in the Indian ocean to visit, successively, the most important commercial
points east of the Cape of Good Hope, to China, then to cross the Pacific, visit
the northern whaling stations and islands, cruise some time upon the west coast
of America, and return by way of Cape Horn, the coast of Brazil, and the
Windward West India islands.
One in the Pacific ocean to attend to our interests upon the west coast of
America; keeping one or more vessels at or near the Sandwich and other islands
which are frequented by our whale ships and other vessels, and, in succession,
cross the Pacific, visiting the islands and southern whaling stations, China, and
otheT commercial places, and return, by the way of the Cape of Good Hope, to
the United States.
A squadron upon the coast ef Brazil, or east coast of South America, might
be charged with attention to our interests on the whole of that coast, and upon
the north coast so far as to include the Orinoco. If a ship of the line should
be employed on this station, it might be occasionally sent round to the Pacific.
A squadron in the West Indies and Gulf ef Mexico will be necessary for,
and may be charged with, attention to the protection of our commerce amongst
the West India islands and along the coast of South America, from the Orinoco
round to the Gulf of Mexico.
A small_coast squadron upon our Atlantic coast might be very advantageously
employed m making our officers familia1·ly and thoroughly acquainted with all
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our ports and harbors, which would be very useful in a state of war. The ve~
sels would also be ready for any unexpected service, either to transmit informa
tion or orders ; to reinforce other squadrons, or to visit our eastern fisheries.
Besides this cruising force, it is recommended that a ship of the line be kept in
a state of readiness for service, men excepted, at Boston, New York, and Koifolk
and used as receiving ships for the recruits as they are collected; this would
give the means of furnishing a considerable increase of force with a very small
addition to the current expense.
For the nature and distribution of this force, the following is proposed:
Line.

Mediterranean ...........
1
Indian ocean ............ .. .. .. .. .
Pacific ................. - - . --Brazil ................. _
1
West Indies - .. - .. - - - - .. - .... - - . - -Home .................. *3
Total - - ....

-·. - - - ... --

5

Frigates.

Sloops

2
1
1
1

2
2
3
2
4
2

8

15

2

-i

ISteamern

Smal!e,. 1Total.

... - ........

..........
..

-- .......

- .... --·-·
1
3

4

2
1
2
2
2
1

7
4
7
6
8

10

1~1---;-

,:; As receiving ships.

Considering this force with reference to its power of giving experience to the
officers, and qualifying them for the management of the force proposed. for war,
it appears that for the force proposed to be actually employed at sea, m peace
and in war, the peace force will require and employ about two-thirds the number
of commanders of squadrons; about one-third of the captains and forty one-hundredths of the commanders and lieutenants and masters, which the proposed war
force would demand, and midshipmen sufficient to supply the additional number
of theRe last classes which a change to a state of war would require.
. .
Supposing the foregoing force to be that which is to be kept in com~ission,
the next question is, what force will be necessary to keep afloat, to provide ~he
necessary reliefs ? The board believe that this force should be the least which
will answer the object proposed, as every vessel when launched is ex~osed t~ a
decay which is much more rapid than when left under the cover of a tight hiphouse.
We have already six ships of the line afloat, which will be fu11y equal to our
present wants, when they are repaired. A reserve of three frigates _may be required, but only to be launched when the necessity for it shall anse; for the
sloops-of-war and smaller vessels, it will probably be sufficient to merely keep
u~ the cruising force as proposed, except some extraordinary demand "ho_ulJ
anJe. 'I,he force of steam vessels proposed, when distributed at Boston, 1 ew
York, Norfolk, and Pensacola, would probably meet all the demands of a tat
of peace, and furnish useful schools for officers, to prepare them for the proper
rnanag ment of others, when they are required. The force to be kept afloat.
then, will be a . umccl at six ships of the line, eleven fr:ig·ates, fifteen .Joop~-otwar, four t amer , and ten smaller vessels. The annual amount necesflary t
keep thi, force in a state of repair, and to supply the wear and tear of ,tore;:, i
crni:inO' ve:;: L, is e timated at ·950,000.
'lh . timat d expense of the force which is proposed to be kept in commi~. i n, :x:clusive of the r pair a above tated, and for the pay of officers at ua.y
yard , r nd ·zvou", rec iYinO' ve .., 1 , of , uperintendent., and ciYil offic r.-._at all
the shore e tabli ... hment ·, and at the pre ent cost of tho e e ·tablishment,, 1.:::
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For pay of officers and seamen in commission, superintendents and
civil officers, and all others, at all the establishments, about .... $2, 500, 000
For provisions .................... ·.......................
750,000
For medicines and hospital stores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
60, 000
For oi·dnance stores, powder, &c.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
120, 000
For contingencies of all kinds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
390, 000
Total for the navy branch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3, 850, 000
=-::::-~----_-_-_--

If the marines are continued as a part of the naval establishment, instead of
substituting ordinary seamen and landsmen for them in Yessels, and watchmen
in navy yardB, and transferring the marines to the army as artillery, as has
sometimes been suggested, the sum of about $400,000 annually will be required
for that corps.
To determine the annual amount which it may be necessary to appropriate to
prepare the vessels and reserve frames and other 'materials which have been
proposed, some time must be assumed within which they shall be prepared.
Believing that reference to the ability of the treasury to meet the probable demands upon it, for all the purposes of the government, must necessarily be considered in determining what amount may be allotted to the navy, the board have
examined the reports of the Secretary of the Treasury, and respectfully propose
to establish the ordinary annual appropriation for the navy, including the ordnance, at seven millions of dollars.
The operation of such annual appropriations may be seen by the following
recapitulation of the proposed heads of expenditure :
For the force in commission and its dependencies, as before stated $3, 850, 000
'l1he average appropriation for navy yards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
500, 000
For the rnpairs and wear and tear of vessels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
950, 000
For building vessels and purchase of materials.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 300, 000
Total for the navy proper ............................ .
For the marine corps ............ ·.................... .

6,600,000
400,000
7,000,000

By tbe adoption of this gross sum for the navy and its dependencies, and the
other items as proposed, $1,300,000 would be annually applied to increasing the
number of our V'essels and the purchase of materials; and, with this annual expenditure, the deficiency of $ 17,760,000 would not be supplied sooner than
between thirteen and fourteen years, or at about the year 1850. The board
consider this as the most remote period at which the proposed force ought to be
ready, and are of opinion that it might be prepared much sooner, should Congress deem it necessary or advisable to make larger appropriations than have
been suggested.
The board have expressed the opinion that no more vessels should be launched
than are absolutely necessary to meet the demands for the force to be kept in
com.~ission; but, as a necessary consequence, they recommend that the other
add1t1on~l force shoul~ be in such a state of readiness that it may be launched
and eqmpped by the time that men could be obtained for it . . This arrangement
renders an early attention to the completion of all the building-slips, ship-houBes,
and launching ways at the different yards, so that the ships may be built, and
that our docks, wharves, workshops, and storehouses should be finished; that
our ships may be equipped with the greatest economy and despatch whenever
they may be required.
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Before concluding this report, the board would respectfully offer some remarks upon the form of the appropriations, and suggest some attention to existing acts of Congress.
By the separate acts for the gradual increase of the navy; for the gradual
improvement of the navy; for building and rebuilding different vessels, altogether seven in number; each appropriation is rendered separate and distinct,
although the general object is the same, and requires the use of the same kinds
of materials. It is necessary, in conformity to the law of the 3d of March,
1809, that the vouchers, receipts, expenditures, and accounts of each should be
kept separately; and, in strictness, no article purchased for one can be applied
to the use of another, however desirable or economical such use may be.
It is suggested, therefore, for consideration, whether it might not be very advantageous for Congress to determine, by some general act or resolution, the
number and classes of vessels which the President might be authorized to ha-re
built, or for which materials might be procured, and then appropriate specially
the amounts which might be devoted to those objects, and for keeping the force
afloat in repair, under the general head of "For building and repairing vessels,
and for purchase of materials and stores.''
The adoption of some such plan, and removing the special restrictions which
now exist, and requiring, as at present, detailed estimates for the current repairs
and reports of proceedings in building vessels and for purchase of materials,
would, it is believed, greatly simplify and diminish the number of accounts at
the r.rreasury Department and in all the navy yards, without infringing in any
degree the principle of special appropriations; would furnish to Congress
all the information they now receive, and would enable us at all times to use
those materials which are best prepared and most appropriate for the different
objects for which they might be wanted.
.
The board beg leave, also, respectfully to state their opinion of the necessity
for th~ services of a competent civil engineer for the navy to furnish pla_ne and
estimates for all hydraulic and civil objects, and to have a general supermt~ndence of their construction under the direction of the department. The particular character of these works requires the supervision of such a person, not l~ss
from motives of economy in the ordinary expenditures than from the more nnportant consideration of their proper arrangement, solidity of construction, and
durability.
All which is respectfully submitted.
JNO. RODGERS.
Hon. M. DICKERSON, Secretary if tlie Navy.

A.
Upon the supposition that, the naval force to be so prepared that it might be
equipped for sea at short notice shall consist of 15 ships of the line, 25 frigate:::,
25 sloops-of-war, 25 steamers, and 25 smaller vessels; and that the frames and
other durable materials shall be provided for 10 ships of the line and 10 frigates
a a re ·erve. The following statement shows the total number and character of
the armaments which the whole force will require, the number which can be
furni, hed from the ordnance on hand, and the number which will be still required:
For sLips of line.

Frigates.

Sloops.

Steamers.

,-.

Total number required. __ ....... 25
n hand for ................... ll

35

25

25

25

22

16

00

1:2

Deficient ............... - . 14

13

9

25

13
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Besides the bomb-cannon, guns, and carronades for these armaments, there
would be required shot, shells, small arms, pistols, and cutlasses, and a supply
of powder sufficient for equipping a strong force in case of a sudden emergency.
The cost of these objects may be estimated as follows:
Armaments
Armaments
Armaments
Armaments
Armaments

for
for
for
for
for

14 ships of the line, at $45,000 each ........... .
13 frigates, at $16,500 each ................... .
9 sloops, at $6,000 each ...... ~ .............. .
25 steamers, at $3,000 each ................... .
13 smaller vessels, at $1,500 each .............. .

$630,000
214,500
54,000 .
75,000
19,500
993,000

Fo~ guns, bomb-cannon, and ca1Tonades, 100 shot to each gun, and
200 shells to each bomb-cannon, and shells for guns ......... .
8,000 muskets ........................................... .
3,500 pairs of pistols ..................................... .
8,000 cutlasses .......................................... ,
9,000 barrels of powder ................................... .

427,000
100,000
43, 75,0
34,000
202,500
1,800,250
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IIO. REPS., EX. DOC. No. 206, 26th CONGRESS, 1st SESSION,

LETTER
FROM

THE SECRETARY OF WAR,
TRANSMI'l'TING,

ef the CJtlt ultirno, a system, of national
defence and the establishment ef national founderies.

ln compliance witli the resolution

MAY

15, 184-0,.:_So much as rcla 1;es to national founderies referred to a select committee
on the subject, and the residue to the Committee on Military Affairs.

WAR DEPARTMENT, May 12, 1840.
Sm: In reply to so much of the resolution of the House of Representatives
of the 9th ultimo, req nesting the Department bf War "to lay before this House,
as soon as practicable, a report of a full and connected system of national defence, embracing steam and other vessels of war, and ':floating batteries' for
coast and harbor defence, and national founderies, and the internal means, auxiliary to these, for transportation and other warlike uses, by land, and that he
be requested to furnish this House with the reports submitted to his department
at any time by Major General Edmund P. Gaines, or other person or persons
of professional experience, of their 'plans of defence,' if any such have been
submitted, with the views of the Secretary of War thereon; and that the
S ecretary furnish an estimate of the expenses of his own and other plans he
may report, distinguishing such parts of plans as ought to be immediat~ly
adopted and prosecuted, with the probable cost and time of their prosecution
and completion :" I have the honor to transmit the accompanying reports of a
board of officers, assembled to examine the subject, and to present a connected
plan of defence for the maritime and inland frontiers of the United States.
On submitting these reports, I should have considered my duty discharged,
had not the resolution required me to give an opinion with regard to the several
plans of national defence presented to the department, and to furnish a comparative statement of the cost of each. 'l'he plan presented to Congress by Major
General Gaines, which will be found in the accompanyiug printed document,
and that now submitted from the board of officers, are the only ones that have
h 'en brou 0 ·ht to the notice of the department. On the subject of the former, I
beg 1 a:ve to state that, with every respect for the experience of the gallant
author, I am con, trained to differ from him when he proposes to abandon the
ooJ• tern of pcrmanrnt defences as obsolete, and to r ely entirely upou the expedient: of Ya. t floating bn.tterie. and extensive lines of railroad" . 'l'he accom1mnyin0' report of the board of navy commissioners and the chief topographical
en()'inecr exhibit the prolmble cost of carrying out the general' plan:-:, which
far ·xcrcd:-: that of con~trnctin°· permanent work. of defence, without being iu
any mumcr ·o well calculatcc.l to protect the country.
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After a careful and anxious investigation of a subject involving in so high a
degree the safety and honor of the country, I fully concur in the opinions expressed by the board of the superiority of permanent works of defence ov~r a~l
other expedients that have yet been devised, and of their a?solute ne~essity if
we would avoid the danger of defeat and disgrace-a necessity rather mcreased
than diminished by the introduction of steam batteries and _the use ~f hollow
shot. It would, in my opinion, prove a most fatal error to dispense with them,
and to rely upolil. our navy alone, aided by the number, strength, and valoi: of
the people to protect the country against the attacks of an enem_y P?ssessmg
great naval means. To defend a line of coast of three thousand m1les m extent,
and effectually to guard all the avenues to our great commercial cities an~ important naval depots, the navy of the United States must be very snper10r to
the means of attack of the most powerful naval power in the world, wh~ch will
occasion an annual expense this country is not now able to bear; and this large
naval armament, instead of perfoi·ming its proper function as the sword of the state
in time of war, and sweeping the enemy's commerce from the seas, must be
chained to the coast or kept within the harbors.
It has been clearly demonstrated that the expense of employing a sufficient
body of troops, either regulars or militia, for a period of even six months, for the
purpose of defending the coast against attacks and feints that might be made by
an enemy's fleet, would exceed the cost of erecting all the permanent works deemed
necessary for the defence of the coast. One hundred thousand men divided
into four columns, would not be more than sufficient to guard the vulnerable
points of our maritime frontier, if not covered by fortifications. An amount of
force against an expedition of 20,000 men, which, if composed of regulars would
cost the nation $30,000,000 per annum, and if militia, about $40,000,000; and,
supposing only one-half the force to be required to defend the coast with the
aid of forts properly situated and judiciously constructed, the difference of expense for six months would enable the government to erect all the most necessary works. This calculation is independent of the loss to the nation by abstracting so large an amount of labor from the productive industry of the country, and the fearful waste of life likely to result from such a costly, hazardous,
and harassing system of defence.
It must be recollected, too, that we are not called upon to try a new system,
but to persevere in the execution of one that has been adopted after mature deliberation, and that is still practiced in Europe on a much more extensive scale
than is deemed necessary here; so much more so, that there exist there single
fortresses, each of which comprises more extensive and stronger works than is
here proposed for the whole line of our maritime frontier. We must bear in
mind, also, thaL the destruction of some of the important points on that frontier
would alone cost more to the nation than the expense of fortifying the whole
line would amount- to, while the temporary occupation of others would drive us
into expenses far surpassing those of the projected works of defence.
The organization of permanent defences proposed by the board for our frontiers is not upon military and naval considerations alone, but is calculated to
protect th~ internal navigation of the country. 'The fortifications proposed, at
the same time that they protect our coast from the danger of invasion, and defend the principal commercial avenues and naval establishments, cover the
whole line of internal navigation, which, in time of war, will contribute in so
e3senti8:l a manner to the def~nce of the country by furnishing prompt and
economical means of transportat10n; so that, while the main arteries which con~uct our produce to the ocean are defended at their outlets, the interior navigat1011, parallel to the coast, is protected, and a free communication kept up between every part of the Union.
.
Although this department is folly aware of the importance of affording permanent and as perfect protection as may be possible to the whole coast, it
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regards that section embraced by the shores of the Gulf of Mexico as the most
exposed and the most important. It is true that the coast to the eastward of
Cape H atteras possesses points that may attract the attention of an enemy, arid
that, in the present state of things, the chances of success would justify a hostile
enterprise, and are much greater than a wise provision would allow to exiRt. It
is equally so, that, however. difficult of access the coast may be from Cape Hatteras to Florida, the nature of a part of its population, and the facility afforded
to an enemy by its present neglected condition to blockade and annoy the principal outlets of the valuable exports of that important portion of our country,
require our early attention; still, the means of defence from Maine to Florida
may be united together, and the parts may afford mutual succor to each other.
But the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, on the contrary, is insulated and apart, and
must depend altogether upon its own resources. It coristitutes the maritime
frontier not only of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and of West Florida, but
of Arkan sas, 'I1ennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Missouri, Indiana, and Illinois, and
the T erritories of Wisconsin and Io,va, embracing nearly three-fourths of the
territory of the United States ; and it must be borne in mind that the enls
which would result from the temporary occupation of the delta of the Mississippi, or from a successful blockade of the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, would
not only injure the prosperity of these States, but would deeply affect the interests of the whole Union; and no reasonable expense, therefore, ought to be
spared to guard against such a casualty.
Although it ·would appear, on a superficial view, to be a gigantic and almost
impracticable project to fortify such an immense extent of coast as that of the
U nitcd States, and difficult, if not impossible, to provide a sufficient force to
garrison and defend the works necessary for that purpose, yet the statements
contained in the reports of the board remove these objections entir_ely. 1:he
coast of the United States throug·hout its vast extent has but few pomt~ which
require to be defended against a regular and powerful attack. A considerable
portion of it is inaccessible to large vessels, and only exposed to the depredations of parties in boats and small vessels-of-war; against which inferi_o7· ?or~s
and the combination of the same means and a well-organized local militia will
afford sufficient protection. The only portions which require to be defended ?Y
permanent works of some strength are the avenues to the great c?mmercrnl
cities and naval and military establishments, the destruction of which w~uld
prove a serious loss to the country, and be regarded by an enemy as an eqm,alent for the expense of a great armament. It is shown, also, that the number
of men required, on the largest scale, for the defence of these forts, wl~en_compared with the movable force that would be necessary without them, 1s 1~consfrlerable. The local militia, aided by a few regulars, and directed by _engme~r
and artillery officers, may, with previous training, be safely intrusted w1th their
defence in time of war.
It ca~not be too earnestly urged that a much smaller number _of tr~ops will
be reqmred to defend a fortified frontier than to cover one that 1s entirely unprotected, and that such a system will enable us, according to the spirit of our
imititution,·, to employ the militia effectually for the defence of the country. It
i. no reproach to this description of force, and no imputation on their courage, to
tatc what the experience of two wars has demonstrated-that they cannot
stand the steady charge of regular forces, and are disordered by their manrelH"TC~
in the open field; whereas, their :fire is more deadly from behind rampart-:.
The principlrs of defence recommended by the board for the maritime fronti r of the United State:-; arc applicable to the northern or lake frontier an_cl to
that of thew ·..:t. Some few sites arc recommended to be occupied by fortdica-
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tions, both to afford protection to places fast growing up into important cities, and
to furnish a refuge and rallying point for our naval and land forces.
Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
J. R. POINSETT.
Hon. R. M. rr. HUNTER,
Speaker ef the House ef Representatives.
WASHINGTON, May 10, 1840.
Sm : The board of officers to whom the subject of the military defences of
the country was committed have the honor to submit the following report, viz:
1st. Report on the defence of the Atlantic frontier, from Passamaquoddy to
the Sabine. T'his is divided into two distinct portions, viz: the coast from Passamaquoddy to Cape Florida, and the coast from Cape Florida to the Sabine bay.
2d. Report on the defence of the northern frontier, from Lake Superior to
Passamaquoddy bay.
3d. Report on the western frontier, from the Sabine bay to Lake Superior.
Connected with these reports are tabular statements, showing the "permanent
defence commenced, completed, projected, or deemed necessary;" with conjectural estimates of "the probable expense of constructing or completing such works
as may not yet have been completed or commenced."
4th. Reports " on the armories, arsenals, magazines, and founderies, either
constructea or deemed necessary; with a conjectural estimate of the expense of
constructing such of said establishments as may not yet be completed or commenced, but which may be deemed necessary."
Hon. J. R. POINSETT,
Secretary ef War.
REPORT ON THE DEFENCE m"' THE ATLANTIC FRONTIER,
FROM PASSAMAQUODDY TO T'HE SABINE.
So entirely does this board concur in the views presented on several occasions, within the last twenty years, by joint commissions of naval and military
officers, by the board of engineers for fortifications, and by individual officers
who have at various times been called on to treat the same subject, that in quoting
their opinions we should, for the greater part, express our own. But though
these reports are, some of them, comprehensive and elaborate, we suppose that
au explicit statement of our views, at least as to the great principles on which
the system of defence should be erected, is expected from us, especially as the
system now in progress has been the subject of a criticism which, considering
the high official source whence it emanated, may be supposed to have disturbed
the confidence of the public therein.
The nature and source of that criticism, attacking as it does fundamental
p1~ciples, and inculcating doctrines which we believe to be highly dangerous,
will lead us at times into amplifications that we fear may prove tedious. This,
however, we must risk, trusting to the importance of the subject for excuse, if
not for justification.
The princiJ:>al errors, as we conceive, in the document* referred to are1. rrhat for the defence of the coast the chief reliance should be on the navy.
2. That, in preference to fortifications, floating batteries should be introduced
wherever they can be used.
0

See Senate document No. 293, vol. 4, p. 1, 24th Congress, 1st session.

H. Ex. Doc. 92--6
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3. That we are not in danger from large expeditions; and, consequently,
4. That the system of the board of engineers comprises works which are
unnecessarily large for the purpose~ they have to fulfil.
On these topics, tog·ether with other errors of the same nature, we shall feel
constrained to enlarge.
The first question that presents itself is this : T,Vhat, in general terms, sliall
be tlie means ef defence ?
We have a seacoast line of more than three thousand miles in extent, alon"
which lie scattered all the great cities, all the depots of commerce, all the estabblishments of naval construction, outfit, and repair, and towns, villages, and
establishments of private enterprise without number. From this line of seacoast
navigable bays, estuaries, and rivers, the shores of which are similarly occupied, penetrate deep into the heart of the country.
How are the important points along this extended line to be secured from
hostile expeditions, especially since one of the prominent causes of the prosperity
of these various establishments, namely, facility of access from the ocean, is, as
regards danger from an enemy, the chief cause of weakness ?
S liall the d~fence be by a navy exclusively ?
The opinion that the navy is tlie true defence ef the country is so acceptable
and popular, and is sustained by such high authority, that it demands a careful
examination.
Before going into this examination we will premise that by the term "nary"
is here meant, we suppose, line-of-battle ships, frigates, smaller ~ailing vessels,
and armed steamships, omitting vessels constructed for local uses merely, , uch
as :floating batteries.
For the purpose of first considering this proposition in its simplest terms, ,~e
will begin by supposing the nation to possess but a single seaport, and that this
is to be defended by a fleet alone.
By remaining constantly within this port our fleet would be certain of meeting the enemy, should he assail it. But if inferior to the enemy, there would
be no reason to look for a successful defence ; and as there could be no escape
for the defeated vessels, the presence of the fleet, instead of averting the issue,
would only render it the more calamitous.
Should our fleet be equal to the enemy's, the defence might be complete, and
it probably would be so. Still, hazard-some of the many mishaps liable to
attend contests of this nature-mig11t decide against us; and, in that even!, _the
consequences would be even more disastrous than on the preceding suppos1t10u.
In this case the chances of victory to the two parties would be equal, but the
consequences very unequal. It might be the enemy's fate to lose his whole
fleet, but he could lose nothing more; while we, in a similar attempt, would lo:-:e
not only the whole fleet, but also the object that the fleet was designed. to
protect.
If superior to the enemy, the defence of the port would in all respects l)f
complete. But, instead of making an attack, the enemy would, in such ca.-<',
employ himself in cutting up our commerce on the ocean; and nothing could
be don to protect this commerce without leaving the port in a condition to te
ucce sfully as ailed.
In ith r of the above cases the fleet might await the enemy in front of th
harbor, in. teall of lying within. But no advantage is apparent from uch an
arran r rnent, and there would be upcradded the risk of being injured by temp ·, ts, and th ·r ,by di qualified for the duty of defence, or of being driven off
th con thy gal·, of wind; thus, for a time, removino· all oppo ition.
In th ;amc ·a~ . , al..:o, c. p cially when equal or , uperior to the enemy, our
fl t, d p •ndin..,. on having cone t and timely notice a to the po 'ition and :3tat
of pr parntion of th n ·my'· force·, might think proper to meet him at t_b
utl ·t of hi::i own port, or interc pt him on the way, in tead of awaiting him
1
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within or off our own harbor. Here it · must be noticed that the enemy, like
omselves, is supposed to possess a single harbor only; but ha:ing prote_cted it
by other means, that his navy is disposable for offensive operat10ns. If it ':ere
attempted thus to shut him within his own port, he, in any case but tha~ of decided
inferiority, would not hesitate to come out and risk a battle; because, 1f defeated,
he could retire, under shelter of his defences, to refit, and, if successful, he could
proceed with a small portion of his force-even a single vessel would suffice- to
the capture of our port, now defenceless; while, with the remainder, he would
follow up his advantage over our defeated vessels, not failing to pursue them
into their harbor, should they return thither.
.
Actual superiority on our part would keep the_ e~emy from :olunt_een~1g a
battle; but it would be indispensable that the supenonty be steadily mamtamed,
and that the superior fleet be constantly present. If driven off by tempests, or
absent from any other cause, the blockaded fleet would escape, when it would
be necessary for our fleet to fly back to the defence of its own port. Experience
abundantly proves, moreover, that it is in vain to attempt to shut a hostile
squadron in port for any length of time. It seems, then, that whether we defend by remaining at home, or by shutting the enemy's fleet within his own
harbor, actual superiority in vessels is indispensable to the security of our port.
With this superiority the defence will be complete, provided our fleet remain
within its harbor. But then all the commerce of the country upon the ocean
must be left to its fate ; and no attempt can be made to react offensively upon
the foe, unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy's fleet within
his port, and the still more uncertain chance of keeping him there; the escape
of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the loss of our harbor.
Let us next see what will be the state of the question on the supposition of
numerous important ports on either side, instead of a single one ; relying, on our
part, still, exclusively on a navy.
In order to examine this question, we will suppose our adversary to be fortified in all his harbors, and possessed of available naval means equal to our own.
This is certainly a fair supposition; because what is assumed as regards his
harbors is true of all maritime nations, except the United States ; and as regards naval means, it is elevating our own strength considerably above its present measure, and above that it is likely to attain for years.
Being thus relatively situated, the first difference that strikes us is that the
enemy, believing all his ports to be safe, without the presence of his vessels,
sets at once about making our seas and shores the theatre of operations, while
we are left without choice in the matter ; fo.r if he think proper to come, and
we are not present, he attains his object without resistance.
The next difference is, that while the enemy (saving only the opposition of
Providence) is certain to fall upon the single point, or the many points he may
have selected, there will exist no previous indications of his particular choice,
and, consequently, no reason for preparing our defence on one point rather than
another; so that the chances of not being present and ready on his arrival are
directly in proportion to the number of our ports, that is to say, the greater the
number of ports the greater the chances that he will meet no opposition whatever.
Another difference is, that the enemy can choose the mode of warfare, as well
a~ the plan of operations, leaving as little option to us in the one case as in the
other. It will be necessary for us to act, in the first instance, on the supposition
that an assault will be made with his entire fleet ; because, should we act otherwise, his coming in that array would involve both fleet and coast in inevitable
defeat and ruin. Being in this state of concentration, then, should the enemy
have any apprehensions as to the result of a general engagement ; should he be
unwilling to put any thing at hazard ; or should he, for any other reason, prefer
acting by detachments, he can, on approaching the coast, disperse his force into
~mall quadrons and single ships, and make simultaneous attacks on numerous
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points. 'These enterprises would be speedily consummated; because, a the
single point occupied by our fleet would be avoided, all the detachments would
be unopposed ; and after a few hours devoted to burning shipping, or public
establishments, and taking in spoil, the several expeditions would leave the
coast for some convenient rendezvous, whence they might return, either in fleet
or in detachments, to visit other portions with the scourge.
Is it insisted that our fleet might, notwithstanding, be so arranged as to meet
these enterprises?
As it cannot be denied that the enemy may select his point of attack out of
the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can indicate the spot?
And if it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity to be imparted that shall always place our f:leet in the path of the advancing foe? Suppose we attempt to
cover the coast by cruising in front of it, shall we sweep its whole length 1a distance scarcely less than that which the enemy must traverse in passing from
his coast to ours. Must the Gulf of Mexico be swept, as well as the Atlantic?
or shall we give up the Gulf to the enemy? Shall we cover the southern cities,
or give them up also? We must, unquestionably, do one of two things: either
relinquish a great extent of coast, confining our cruisers to a small portion only,
or include so much that the chances of intercepting an enemy would seem to be
out of the question.
On the practicability of covering even a small extent of coast by cruising in
front of it-or, in other words, the possibility of anticipating an enemy's operations; discovering the object of movements of which we get no glimpse, and
hear uo tidings; and seeing the impress of his footsteps on the surface of the
ocean-it may be well to consult experience.
The rroulon fleet, in 1798, consisting of about twenty sail of line-of-battle
ships and frigates, about twenty smaller vessels-of-war, and nearly two hun~red
transports, conveying the army of Egypt, slipped out of port and surpnsed
Malta. It was followed by Nelson, who, thinking correctly that they were
bound for Egypt, shaped his course direct for Alexandria.
The French, steering towards Candia, took the more circuitous passage, so
that Nelson arrived at Alexandria before them; and, not finding them there, returned, by the way of Caramania and Candia, to Sicily, missing his adversary
in both passages. Sailing again for Alexandria, he found the French fl_eet at
anchor in Aboukir bay; and, attacking them, achieved the memorable victory
of the Nile.
When we consider the narrowness of this sea ; the very numerous vessels in
the French fleet ; the actual crossing of the two fleets on a certain night; and
that _Nelson, notwithstanding, could see nothing of the enemy himself, ~~ hear
nothmg of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of the probability of
wa7,laying our adversary on the broad Atlantic.
.
.
lh e:--capeof another Toulon fleet in 1805; the long search for them m th~ l\Iedit. rrancan_ by the same able officer; the pursuit in the 1Vest Indies ; then· en1011 of 1nm among·st the islands ; the return to Europe ; his vain effort .,,sub~cqucntly, along the coast of Portugal, in the Bay of Biscay, and off the EnO'b:-h
·ham~ ·l; and the meeting at last at Trafalgar-brought about only becau e t_he
~omlnn cl fl ·ctF-, ~rusting to the superiority that the accession of sev_eral remfo.rccm nt · had g1v n, were willing to try the is ue of battle : thei-e arc mstanc ' ,
?f many that might be cited, to F-how how small is the probability of en~ow1termcr, on tl_1. oc au, an enemy who desires to avoid a meeting; and how little t~
mo ·t. untmng z<'al, the mo;5t rcstlr s activity, the mo:'lt exalted profe~ ional ~kill
ancl Jndrrmcnt, can do to lc:--:--cn the adverse chance:::. For more than a Y ar
..1.
I. on mo1-t cloflcly watchecl hi: n •my, who sc ms to have got out of po~t '
, 0011 a: h' wa.· fully pr pnrcd to clo ,.o, and without attracting the notic oi an:of th• hl?ckaclincr :--quadron. "\Yh n out, r".. el on, p rfoctly in the dark~: to th
c ur,_ · V1llen 'UY had tak n, .:oucrht for him in vain on the coast of Ecryp ·
T
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Scattered by tempests, the French fleet again took refuge in ':I.1oulon ; whence it
again put to sea, when refitted and ready, joining the Spanish fleet at Cadiz.
On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment acceded on all hands to belong,
in a pre-eminent degree, to the naval profession in this country, this system of
defence relies to accomplish, against a string of chances, objects of importance
so great that not a doubt or misgiving as to the result is admissible. It dema1;1-ds
of the navy to do perfectly, and without fail, that which to do at all seems u~possible. The navy is required to know the secret purposes of the enemy, m
spite of distance and the broken intercourse of a state of war, even before these
purposes are known to the leader who is to execute them; nay, more, before the
purpose itself is formed. On an element where man is but the sport of storms,
the navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exact spot and moment, in
spite of weather and seasons; to see him in spite of fogs and darkness. Finally,
after all the devices and reliances of the system are satisfactorily accomplished,
and all difficulties subdued, it submits to the issue of a single battle, on equal
terms, the fate of the war, having no resource or hope beyond.
It may here be alleged that the term navy, as applied to the defence of the
country, means more than the sea-going vessels we have enumerated; that it
means, also, gunboats, floating batteries, and steam batteries; and that the true
sy stem of defence for the coast requires us to provide all our harbors with some
or all of these vessels, according to local circumstances; leaving to the sea-going
vessels the duty of destroying the enemy's commerce, carrying the war into the
enemy's seas, and contending for the mastery of the ocean.
But such a proposition is totally distinct from that we have been considering.
'I1 his is one that we regard as, in part, perfectly so-q.nd; as containing, though
not true throughout, the great principle on which the present glory of the navy
proper has been built, and its future glory will depend.
We are aware that some of our ships have been blockaded within our harbors,
but we .are not aware that any of the high distinction achieved by that service
has been gained in these blockaded ships.
On the other hand, we know that, instead of lying in harbor and contenting
themselves with keeping a few more of the enemy's vessels in watch over them
than their own number-instead of leaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed
enjoyment of the sea, and our own commerce without countenance or aid-they
scattered themselves over the wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to the most
remote seas, everywhere acting with the most brilliant success against the enemy's navigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the amount of enemy's
property thus destroyed, of American property protected or recovered, and in
the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered vessels-ships,
evaded if superior, and beaten if equal-they rendered benefits a thousand fold
greater, to say nothing of the glory they acquired for the nation and the character they imparted to it, than any that would have resulted fron.1 a state of
passiveness within the harbors.
Confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the navy
proper, we doubt not that it will, in the future, be acted on as it has been in the
past, and that the results, as regards both honor and advantage, will be expanded
commensurately with its own enlargement.
In order, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that active
and energetic deportment in offensive operations, which is at the same time so
consistent with its functions and so consonant with its ·spirit, we have shown
that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence.
But if the navy is to be relieved from this home duty some other Teliance
mu t be substituted ; the navy itself Tequiring, for its own establishments, not
le · than the towns and haTbors, that the defence be complete. And this bTings
u to consider whether the floating defences mentioned above, namely, gunboats, floating batteries, and steam batteries, constitute the best reliance.
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After considering these defensive means, we will examine the propertie' of
forts and land batteries, these being the only other well-tried resort; and, that a
comparison may be instituted, we will confine ourselves to cases where the latter
are properly applicable.
There are, doubtless, situations where it may be necessary for us to present a
defensive array, at the same time that to do so by fortifications alone would be impracticable; and it is not, therefore, prejudging the question we are about to
examine; it is neither underrating fortifications, nor overrating these :floating
defences, to say that these last are, some or all of them, indispensable in such
positions.
Any very broad water, where deep soundings may be carried at a distance
from the shores greater than effective gun range, and where no insular spot,
natural or artificial, can be found or formed nearer the track of shipti, will present such a situation; and we may take some of our great bays as examples.
Broad sounds and wide roadsteads, affording secure anchorage beyond good
gun rang·e from the shores, will afford examples of another sort; and harbor
with very wide entrances and large surface exhibit examples of still another
kind.
As, in all such cases, fortifications alone will be ineffectual, and, nevertheless,
recourse to defences of some sort may be unavoidable, it has not failed to be a
recommendation in the several reports on the defence of the coast, since l 1 ,
that there should be a suitable and timely provision of appropriate :floating defences. And until the invention of man shall have caused an entire revolution
in the nature of maritime attack and defence, these or kindred means must be
resorted to; not, however, because they are means intrinsically good, or suitable
under other circumstances, but because they are the only means applicable.
In the circumstances just referred to there is no alternative, and therefore no
point to be discussed. The remaining question is, whether these floating defences arc to be relied on in cases that admit of defence by fortifications.
And, first, as to gunboats. Although of undoubted use in peculiar circu~stances, it will hardly be contended that gunboats afford a safe reliance m
harbors that can be entered by vessels of magnitude. Ships becalmed or
aground might be sorely har::tssed, if not destroyed, by a spirited attack from
this force, and there are other situations wherein it would be Yery effective.
But harbors defended by gunboats will not be attacked in calms nor with adverse winds; and it is not easy to believe that any probable array of these craft
would impede or hinder for a moment the advance of a hostile fleet. Nelson,
at _Trafalgar, bore down in two divisions upon the combined fleet, each division
bemg exposed to a raking fire; and, although suffering considerably fr?m that
~r , he wa: able, notwithstanding·, to break the hostile line and defeat hi ?Pe·
nor aclv r:-:ary. vVhat, comparatively with the raking· fire of the combmed
fleet, ·would br the fire of a fleet of gunboats? Opposiug no effectual obstacle
to approach or entrance, these small vessels, scattered and driven upon the
shoal::-, wonld be kept, by the broadside of a few active vessels, at too great a
cli:-tancr to produce auy erious effect upon the main attack by their desultory
fire.
Alth~ngh thry might afford useful means of annoyance during a protracted
oecupahon by the enemy of harbors that contained exten ive shoal grounds and
, hallo)V ha;-' and inletR, thry would be nearly useless in resisting the fir t _a-.;,;ault, and m pr Yentino- the hrief operation of levying contributions, or burnmgor :poilincr na6onal e:-:tabli:-hm nti-.
Th· tru · r a. on of thi._ f, ·hlr def nee mu t not, however, be mi 'lmdcr ·tood.
It i.- not that th hoatR do not C'arry guns nouo·h or men nouo·h
for the obje ·
0
l ut it i. h cau:e, from th comparativ w akn , of tl1e ve, ... 1·, th gun· and
th men cannot be kept in an rff ctfre position.
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There are, moreover, many harbors requiring defence in which there are no
shoals whereon these boats could take refuge, and in such their capture or destruction would be inevitable should there be, at the same time, no river up
which they might fly, or lateral issue through which they could escape to a safe
distance.
Floating batteries, of which good use might be sometimes made in peculiar
situations, would, we suppose, differ from gunboats, in being larger, containing
many guns, and in being stronger-that is to say, having thicker sides or bulwarks ; and it has sometimes even been proposed to construct them with ball
proof parapets, and with platforms open above, like, in these respects, batteries
upon the shore. But, in whatever way formed, it is necessarily a part of the
idea that they be strong and massive; and, consequently, that they be unwieldy,
incapable of sudden change of place, and incapacitated either to advance upon
a defeated foe or to evade a victorious one. We are not, of course, now speaking of batteries moved by steam.
Being denied the power of locomotion, at least for any purpose of manreuvering in face of the enemy, we are to consider these batteries as moored in position
and awaiting his advance. Should the batteries be large, requiring deep water
to float them, or should they be placed across or near the channel for the sake
of proximity to the track of ships, the enemy would engage them at close
quarters. All advantages of mobility-of concentrating his whole fleet upon
one or two points, to which, under these circumstances, no relief can be sent-of
greater elevation and command, would be on the side of the assailant ; with no
countervailing advantage to the batteries, but greater thickness of bulkwarks.
Whether this excess of thickness should be considered a material advantage,
~ince the introduction of large bomb-cannon into .the armament of ships, is a
doubtful matter. The batteries, if anchored across the channel, would have the
further advantage of a raking fire : but we have seen that the raking fire of one
squadron of ships upon another advancing is by no means decisive. The power
of throwing the whole assailing force upon one or two points, of pouring upon
the decks of the batteries a greatly superior force of boarders, would, of themselves, seem to leave little room to doubt as to the issue.
If now we suppose these floating batteries to be smaller, so that, having a
lighter draught, they might be placed near the shores or upon the shoals, they
might certainly be thereby saved from the kind of attack which would prove so
fatal if anchored more boldly in deep water; but they would, at the same time,
lose much of their efficiency from their remoteness ; and positions wherein they
would be secure from being laid alongside, while they would be in a proper attitude to contribute materially to the defence of the harbor, are afforded but rarely.
It is doubtful whether, as a general rule, these smaller floating batteries, notwithstanding their greater capability of endurance, would afford a better defence,
gun for gun, than gunboats ; or, in other words, whether this capability of endurance in the one would be more than a compensation for the power of locomotion in the other.
But whether near the shore or in the channel, whether large or small, this
description of defence, owing to its fixedness, connected with the destructibility
of the material of which it must be made, will be exposed to attacks analogous
to those made by gunboats on ships aground. The enemy, knowing of what
the ~efensive arrangements consist, will come provided with the requisite number
of sa1lmg or steam vessels, armed with bomb-cannon, against which the thicker
bulwarks of the floating batteries would avail nothing. He would, besides,
hardly fail to provide himself with bomb-ketches armed with heavy sea-mortars;
and, a. there could be no guarding against the effects of the long ranges of these,
a few such Ycssels would, with great certainty, constrain the floating batteries
to quit their position, abandoning every disposition approaching to a concentrated array. Not to mention other modes of attack which would seem to leave
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the chances of success with the enemy, it will be noticed that this kind of defence, whether by gunboats or floating batteries, has the same intrinsic faL'
that an inactive defence by the navy proper has; that is to say, the enemy h ·
it in his power to bring to the attack a force of the same nature, and at lea~t as
efficacious, as that relied on for defence; hence the necessity not of me
equality, but of superiority, on the part of the defence at every point liahlet
be attacked; and hence, also, the necessity of having an aggregate force ·
many times larg·er than that disposable by the enemy as we have importan•
places to guard. Should we, for example, have ten such places, and the enen:~
threaten us with twenty ships of the line, we must have in all these place an
aggregate of gunboats and floating batteries more than equivalent to two hundred ships of the line ; for it will hardly be contended that these defence can
be transported from one place to another as they may be respectively in danger.
But what will be the relative state of the parties if, instead of gunboat ' or
floating batteries, we resort to steam batteries ? Although much has been said
of late of the great advantage that defence is to derive from this description of
force, we have not been able to discover the ad vantages ; nor do we see that
sea-coast defence has been benefited in any particular by the recent improvement
in steam vessels, except that, in the case before adverted to, where, from the
breadth of the waters, defence from the shore would be unavailing, a more acti,e
and formidable floating defence than by gunboats and floating batteries is provided. It must be remembered that by far the greatest improvement in steam
vessels consists in having adapted them to ocean navigation; and one inevitable
consequence of this improvement will be that, if the defence of harbors by
steam batteries be regarded as securing them from the attacks of ships ?f the
line and frigates, or, at least, of placing· the defence quite above that kmd of
attack, they will no longer be attacked by sailing vessels, but by steam vesseb,
similar in all warlike properties to those relied on for defence.
·
Not only is there no impediment to transferring these vessels acros~ _the
ocean, but the rapidity and certainty of these transfers are such as to enJOID a
state of the most perfect readiness everywhere and at all times, and also a complete independence of arrangement at each particular point; both the state of
preparation and the independence of arrangement being much more impor!ant
than when the enemy's motions were governed by the uncertain favor of wmd 5
and weather.
It is not easy to conceive of any important properties belonging t_o ste~
batteries acting defensively that the attacking steam vessels may not brmg ,nth
them, or, at least, may not have imparted to them on their arrival upon_th
coast, unless it should be thought proper to give to the former a greater thickness of bulwark than would be admissible in sea-going vessels.
.
.But the peculiar advantage conferred by steam lies in the facility of mo,,ng
with promptitude and rapidity; and any attempts to strengthen the harbor Yf.;·
sel. .~Y thickening their bulwarks considerably would unavoidably lessen their
D;1obil~ty! thereby partially neutralizing the advantage sought. At the ::,am
tIT?-e, it 1_ extremely doubtful whether any benefit would be derived from th
thicker s1cl • It is probable that the best kind of bulwark for these ve:;.;i•l,
and all oth r i that which will be just proof ag·ainst grape and canister sho
fired from moderate distances; because, with such bulwarb, a shell fired from
a Lomb-cannon_ within a reasonable di tance would pierce both ide ; tha! i:- •
:ay, would go m on on~ . icle of the ship and out at the opposite, producm~ :.
gr at r fli ·ct than a solid shot of the ame calibre while with thickened :iI L'
cvr.r • :,;h ·11 wm~lcl lo~ge in the ~ill1:bers, and produc~ terrible ravages by bu~:-~n!!.
In th • prachc~ w1tl~ these rm. ·1lc. in this country it ha. been found difficult
to lod<rr, a :,;h ·11 m thm targ tti, ven when the load of the o·un wa so reduced
a.- to in r a.· · ~ate_rially t~1c uncertainty of aim. A, it i 1Jrobable, therefore
that the 1n·otect1on from ,·ohcl :,;hot afforded by ma iv bulwark would be mo
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than counterbalanced by the greater injury horizontal shells would inflict ~y
means of these bulwarks, we may conclude that the harbor steam battery will
not differ in this respect materially from the attacking steamships, and, if they
do differ in having more solid and impervious bulwarks, that no advantage over
the enemy will result therefrom. We come, therefore, to the same result as
when considering the application of the other kinds of floating force to the defence of harbors; and this result is, that there is no way of placing the coast in
a condition of reasonable security but by having at any point the enemy may
happen to select a force in perfect readiness which shall be superior to that
brought to the attack.
The reason of this coincidence of result is, that no peculiarity in form or details can disguise the difficulties or essentially modify the conditions inseparable
from the nature of a floating force.
Buoyancy is a condition necessary to every variety of the force, and to observe this condition a common material must be used in each-a material that is
combustible, weak, and penetrable to missiles. If the weakness and penetrability be in part remedied by an increase of the quantity of the material, it
must be at the sacrifice of buoyancy, activity, and speed-properties of great
value. If a small draught of water be desired, it can only be obtained at the
expense of that concentration of power which is a great and almost characteristic quality of naval armament.
It might not be strictly true to say that as much would be lost in one respect
as would be gained in another ; but, though modifications of this floating force,
made with a view to adapt it to peculiar services, will somewhat disturb the
equilibrium of the several kinds, there will still be no great disparity when
acting in their appropriate way, and a little superadded force to the weaker
party will restore the balance. None of these modifications, it should be observed, touch, on the one hand, the means whereby injury is inflicted, nor, on
the other, the susceEtibility to injury. All are still timber structures, carrying
a common armament.
The necessity of having at each point a force at least equal to the attacking
force will require large preparations on any supposition. With the navy proper,
however, with gunboats and floating batteries, something has already been
done; the existing navy will be an important contribution. Small 'vessels supplied by commerce would afford tolerable substitutes for gunboats, and from
the class of merchant ships many vessels might be drawn for service as floating
batteries ; still there will remain great efforts to be made and great amounts to
be expended, to complete the defensive array. But a reliance on steam batteries
would lead to expenditure vastly greater, because with them all has yet to be
provided. Having at present no force of this kind on hand, (or next to none,)
the preparation by the enemy of (say) twenty steam frigates would require the
c?nstruction of two hundred of equal force on our part, supposing that we design to cover but ten of our principal harbors, leaving all others at his mercy.
Having shown that steam batteries cannot be substituted for shore defences,
~e will here add that they will, on the other ~iand, in certain cases necessarily
mcrease the number of these defences, and m other cases augment their force.
Channels which admitted only small vessels-of-war would, in peculiar positions,
need no defence; in other positions their defence might be safely trusted to
work of moderate force. The introduction of these vessels of small draught
and great power requires, however, that these passages should be defended and
defended adequately.
We_ hould not have gon~ so much at length into a branch of our subject
wherem the general conclus10ns appear to be so obvious ancl incontrovertible,
b~t for the prevalence of ~pinions which we consider not erroneous merely, but
highly dangerous, and which, we think, must give way before a full exhibition
of the truth. We do not anticipate any formidable objections to the positions
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assumed nor to the illustrations; but even should all these, in the form we have
presented them, be objected to, we may still challenge opposition to the following broad propositions, namely :
1st. If the sea-coast is to be defended by naval means exclusively, the defensive force at each point deemed worthy of protection must be at lea t equal
in power to the attacking force.
2d. As, from the nature of the case, there can be no reason for expecting an
attack on one of these points rather than on another, and no time for transferring
our state of preparation from one to another after an attack has been declared,
each of them must have assigned to it the requisite means ; and,
3d. Consequently this system demands a power in the defence as many times
greater than that in the attack as there are points to be covered.
Believing that a well-digested system of fortifications will save the country
from the danger attending every form of defence by naval means, and the intolerable expense of a full provision of those means, we will now endeavor to
show that such a system is worthy of all reliance.
There has been but one practice among nations as to the defence of ports and
harbors ; and that has been a resort to fortifications . All the experience that
history exhibits is on one side only; it is the opposition of forts, or other works
comprehended by the term fortification, to attacks by vessels ; and although
history affords some instances wherein this defence has not availed, we see that
the resort is still the same. No .nation omits covering the exposed points upon
her seaboard with fortifications, nor hesitates in confiding in them.
In opposition to this mode of defence much stress is laid on certain successful
attacks that have been made by ships on works deemed strong. VJ e have no
doubt that all such results might be accounted for by circumstances independent
of the naked question of relative streng·th; but at any rate, when carefully considered, how little do these results prove, in comparison with numeroua other
instances, in which there was an immense disparity of force in favor of vesse!E
that have been signally defeated. These latter instances are those that should
be received as a test of the actual relation between the two kinds of force; not
certainly because they were successful, but because the smaller the work, itarmament, its garrison, the less the probability that any extraneous i~~uence
has been in operation. A single gun behind a parapet, provided its pos1t10D; be
a fair one, and the parapet be proof, need, as regards its contest with ship~.
owe nothing else to the art of fortification ; and its effect will be the same
whether the battery were fresh from the hands of the ablest engineer of the age,
or were erected at the dawn of the art. The gun is in a position to be used
with effect; the men are as fully protected by the parapet as the service of the
gun will allow; they are brave and skilful, and there iti nothing to prevent
their doing their duty to the utmost. These are all conditions easily fulfill!~·
and therefore likely to be so. The state of things is not less just and fair
toward the vessel; she chooses her time and opportunity; the battery goe no
to the ship, but the ship to the battery; taking the wind, the tide, the ea-all,
a. sh would have them ; her condition and discipline are perfect, and her crew
~our~geous ancl adroit. Nothing, under such circumstances, can prevent. the
JU.'t 1s,"ue of battle but some extraordinary accident-possible, indeed, to either
party, but ea. ily recognized wl1cn occurring.
The: contc ·t b_etween larger works and heavy . quadrons may be much more
complicated affa1rs, the cau e of di. a. ter to the former being often traceable t
potent, though not alway obviou,, influences. The fortification may ha,
be 11 absurdly plan11 cl originally or badly executed, for there ha at all time~
b ·n in thi.: profession, a. in oth rs, much scope given to quackery; they may
have be 11 ·r t d at a timr when th hip. -of-war, again .. t which they we
~rovid d, w r v ry differ nt thino- from th lofty line-of-battle hip of modem
tim , · a long p ace or long impunity may have left them in a tate wholly un-
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p repared for the sudden use of their strength ; the command may have been
intrusted to persons ignorant alike of the amount of power in their hands and
of the mode of exercising it; the garrison may have been undisciplined or mutinous- the populace discontented or disloyal; the clamor of frightened citizens
may have caused a premature surrender : all these, or any of them, may have
produced the issue, leaving the question of relative power untouched.
While there can be no doubt that these and other deteriorating influences
niay have occasionally operated to the prejudice of fortifications, and that these
-were likely to be more numerous and more controlling as the works were more
extensive, it is certain that there can be no influence acting in a reverse direction
1.1pon them; that is to say, none making them stronger and more efficient than
they ought to be. There can be no favorable influence of such a nature, for
example, as to make the simple one-gun battery before mentioned equivalent to
a battery (say) ten times as large.
It must not be supposed, from what we have said in relation to larger fortifications, that their magnitude necessarily involves imperfection or ·weakness ;
nor, because we have considered sma:ll and simple works as affording the best
solution to the question of relative force, must it be inferred that small works
are suited to all circumstances. We speak here in reference merely to the
judgment we are entitled to form of the relative power of these antagonist
forces from their contests as exhibited in history. In instances of the latter
sort, there cannot, from the nature of the case, be any important influence operating of which we are ignorant, or for which we cannot make due allowances;
-while, in examples of the former kind, we may be in the dark as to many vital
matters.
These observations have been deemed necessary, because, in judging of this
matter, it might not be so obvious that certain brilliant and striking results
should not be adopted as affording the true test of relative power. It would be
more natural to turn to Copenhag·en and Algiers, as indicating where the power
lies, than to Charleston and Stonington ; and yet these latter, as indices, would
be true, and the former false.
We will now turn to certain examples:
"The name of Martello tower was adopted in consequence of the good defence made by a small round tower in the Bay of Martello, in Corsica, in the
year 1794, which, although armed with one heavy gun only, beat off one or two
British ships-of-war without sustaining any material injury from their fire. But
this circumstance ought merely to have proved the superiority which guns on
shore must always, in certain situations, possess over those of shipping, no matter whether the former are mounted on a tower or not. '!'hat this is a just decision will perhaps be readily allowed by all who are acquainted with the following equally remarkable, but less generally known fact, which occurred about
twelve years afterwards in the same part of the world."*
. "Sir Sidney S~ith, in the Pompee, an eighty-gun ship, the Hydra, of thirtymght guns, Captam Manby, and another frigate, anchored about eight hundred
yards from a battery of two guns, situated on the extremity of Cape Licosa, and
protected from assault by a tower in which were five and twenty French soldiers,
commanded by a lieutenant.
"The line-of-battle ship and the frigates fired successive broadsides till their
ammunition was nearly expended; the battery continually replying with a slow
but destru~tive effect. The Pompee, at which ship alone it directed its fire, had
forty shot m her hull; her mizen topmast carried away; a lieutenant, midship~ ' and five m~n. killedi and thirty men wounded. At length force proving
meffectnal, negotiat10n was resorted to, and after some hours' parley, the officer,
t.:,
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a Corsican, and relative of Napoleon, capitulated. It then appeared that t
carriage of one of the two guns had failed on the second shot, and the gun
subsequently been fired lying on the sill of the embrazure; so that in fact :Ii,
attack of an eighty-gun ship and two frigates had been resisted by a ~in~'
piece of ordnance."-(Jomnal of Sieges, by Colonel John T. Jones.)
" The Corsican tower above mentioned, which had, in like manner, completdy
baffled a naval cannonade, was very soon found to surrender when attacked by
land; not, however, before a small battery had been made [erected] to redu
it."-(Pasley's Cou,rse, vol. iii.)
Here are two examples :
1st. A single heavy gun, mounted on a tower, beat off one or two British ship,
2d. A barbette battery, containing two guns, beat off a British eighty-gun shi1
supported by two frigates.
·
It would seem that no exception can possibly be taken to either instance, i'..'
trials of relative power. There is no complication of circumstances on one cid,
or the other; nothing to confuse or mislead; all is perfectly simple and plain.
A small body of artillery, judiciously posted on the shore, is attacked by armed
vessels bearing forty or :fifty times as. many guns; and the ships, unable to pr;,.
duce any effect in consequence, are beaten off with loss.
The cases present no peculiar advantage on the side of the batteries either a'.
regards position or quality; for both works were immediately reduced by alan~
attack; that which the eighty-gun ship and two frigates were unable to effec.
being immediately accomplished by landing two field-pieces, with a very mall
portion of the crew of one of the vessels.
On the other hand, there was no peculiar disadvantage on the part of thE
ships, as the time and mode of attack were of their own choice.
In order that there might be no unjust disparagement of the vessel_s, in t~
manner of representing the affairs, the language of British military writers (tht
ships being British) has been exactly quoted.- (See Pasley's Course of Elementary Fortifications, vol. ii., and Journal of Sieges, by Colonel John T. Jones.
Had the representation of these actions been taken from the victoriol~S part~.
the result would have appeared still more to the disadvantage of the sl:1ps. .,
The circumstances attending the attack and defence of Copenhagen, m Apru
1801, seem to have been the following:
_On the northeast side of the city (the only side exposed to attack from hem::
ships) there lies a shoal spreading outward from the walls, about three-quarttr·
of a mile in the narrowest part. Through this shoal there runs, in a northe:i-:
and by north direction, a narrow channel connecting the basin, in the heart 0
the city, with deep water. Were it not for this shoal, vessels might appr?3:even to the walls of the city, on a length of about one and a half mile;_ a· 1~ ,_
they can &'et no nearer, in any place, than about three-quarters of a ~1le, "'1 th·
out followmg the channel just mentioned. As the edge of the shoal he nearl;
nort_h and south, and the channel passes through it in a northeast-by_-north di·
rection, the great mass of the shoal is to the southward, or on the nght ban
..ide of the channel. · We will call this the southern shoal. The " Three-cro
battery" is situated upon this southern shoal and near the channel.
'l'he Dani. h defences cousistedbt. f the fortifications on this side of the city, including the 'l'hree-cro
b~ttcry; N cl.-011 e timated the batteries supporting the Danish vessels at a
nm ty guns.
2d. Of four sail of the line, mountino- 282 guns and one fribo-ate and two ;:;loo .
'
mountmo76 gun. ; making 35 guns.b All these
vessel' lying in the cbann
before mcntionccl, and some of them near its mouth; they constituted the le
!h Dani:-h floating d fence .. , and were thus posted to defend the entrance to
um r harbor or ba,:in.
3d. f a line of floating d fence,_ , of various kinds, moored near the edge f ·
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southern shoal. They were eighteen in number, as follows, cot~nting from the
right or southern extremity: 1st, a block-shjp of 56 guns; 2d, a block-ship of
48 guns; 3d, a praam of 20 guns ; 4th, a praam of 20 guns; 5th, a block-ship of
48 guns ; 6th, a raft of 20 guns; 7th, a block-ship of 22 guns ; 8th, a raft of 20
guns ; 9th, a block-ship of 62 guns ; 10th, a sma~ vessel o~ 6 guns; 11th, a raft
of 24 guns; 12th, a praam of 20 g·uns; 13th, a ship of the hne of 7 4 guns; 14th,
a block-ship of 26 guns; 15th, a raft of 18 guns; 16th, a ship of the line of 60
guns; 17th, a block-ship of 64 guns ; 18th, a "frigate" of 20 guns; total in
this line 628 guns. These vessels were moored in a line extending south from
a point outside and a little to the southward of the Three-crown battery ; and
the part of the line nearest the walls was not less than three-quarters of a mile
di tant.
Lord Nelson carried to the attack the Elephant, 74 guns; Defiance, 74 ;
)fonarch, 7 4; Bellona, 74; Edgar, 7 4; Russell, 7 4 ; Ganges, 7 4; Glutton, 54;
Isis, 50; Agamemnon, 64; Polyphemus, 7 4; Ardent, 64; Amazon, 38 ; Desiree, 38 ; Blanche, 36; Alcmene, 32; Dart, 30; Arrow, 18; Cruiser, 18 ;
Harpy, 18; Zephyr, 14; Otter, 14; Discovery, 16; Sulphur, 10; Hecla, 10;
Explosion, 8; Zebra, 16; Terror, 10; Volcano, 8; making a total of 1,074.
guns, besides a few in gunboats. The Agamemnon did not get into action;
which reduces the force employed to 1,010 guns. The Bellona and Russell
gTOunded; but Lord Nelson says, "although not in the situation assigned them,
yet they were so placed as to be of good service."
With this force Lord Nelson engaged the line of floating defences that was
moored near the edge of the southern shoal. He approached from the south,
with a fair wind ; and as his leading vessel got abreast of the most southern of
the Danish line she anchored by the stern. The second English vessel passed
on until she had reached the next position, when she anchored, also, in the same
way; and thus, inverting his line as he extended it, he brought his whole force
against the outer and southern part of the Danish force. His line did not reach
as far northward as the Three-crown battery, and mouth of the channel; for, he
ays, in speaking of the grounding of the Bellona, Russell, and Agamemnon:
"'rhese accidents prevented the extension of our line by the three ships before
mentioned, who would, I am confident, have silenced the Crown islands, ('J111reecrown battery,) the outer ships in the harbor's mouth, and prevented the heavy
loss in the Defiance and Monarch."
Concentrating, as he dicl, the force of 1,010 guns upon a portion of the Danish
array, not only inferior to him by 382 guns, but so situated as to be beyond the
scope of succor, and without a chance of escape, Lord Nelson had no reason to
doubt that signal success would crown his able arrangement. Every vessel in
this outer Danish line was taken or destroyed, except one or two smaller vessels,
which cut and ran in under shelter of the fortifications.
The vessels lying in the narrow channel could participate in no material
degree in the action, because the British line did not reach abreast of them; and
because, not being advanced beyond the general _direction of the Danish line,
but, on the contrary, retired behind it, they could not act upon any of the
Briti h vessels, except, perhaps, obliquely upon two or three of the most northern
ships. But had all the Danish vessels that were lying in the narrow channel
been mingled, from the first, with the line that was destroyed, the result would
probably have been still more to the advantage of the assailants; that is to say,
these vessels, also, would have been captured or destroyed; because, not only
would the aggregate Danish force of 986 guns have been inferior to the 1,010
guns of the Bi-itish, but it would also have been without the ability to counteract the_power of concentration possessed by the latter, whereby the whole force
would have acted on parts of the Danish line in succession.
For the same reason that the squadron which lay in the narrow channel could
not materially aid in resisting the attack made on the line of floating defences
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anchored along the edge of the shoal, the action of the Three-crown battm,an
the guns on the shore must have been greatly restricted. Situated up~il 1
shoal, the Three-crown battery was behind the Danish line, which conseqU(·n ly
masked it, and also the shore batteries, from a view of the English line. (nd
such circumstances it is not conceivable that the batteries could be used wi
effect; and the commander of the Danish forces says expressly that the Thn:.-crown battery " did not come at all into action;" and a chronicler of the tim
states that the fortifications of the town "were ef no service wliile tlie actii1
lasted; they began to fire when tlze enemy took possession ef the abandoned sliip
but it was at tlie same time that the parley appeared." In proportion a: t!:
Danish vessels passed into the hands of the Eng·lish, as some were burnt, arr
others blown up, the scope of the batteries would enlarge, and their power ~
felt; but just as all impediment of this sort had been removed, Lord Xebt,J
1
himself proposed the cessation of hostilities, and the action ceased. It might
profitable to discuss the probable consequences of a continuance of the action
to inquire why it was that Lord Nelson, after he had conquered two-th.irch .
the 986 floating guns opposed to him, did not pursue his advantage, and concentrate his 1,010 guns upon the 358 guns, which were all that remained of the
:floating defences of the Danes, especially as the wind was in favor of such a
manreuvre. But having already devoted too much space to this particular contest, we will suppose some dictate of policy, perhaps of humanity, induced him
to close the contest, relying on the severe blow he had already inflicted, and !h•
commanding tone it enabled him to assume for such a termination of the pendin~
negotiation as the interest or policy of Great Britain demanded.
It is important, however, yet to notice that, as soon as the negotiation opene~.
Lord Nelson's vessels passed out of the reach of the Three-crown battery as far
as they could be withdrawn. Lord Nelson himself states that this battery wa:
not silenced.
A British writer, speaking of this crisis, says: "It must not, however, be C"Il·
cealed that Lord Nelson, at the time he dictated this note to the Dane, "~
placed in rather awkward and difficult circumstances; the principal batterie~, ~
well as the ships which were stationed at the mouth of the harbor, were~
unconquered; two of his own vessels were aground~ and exposed to a hea::
fire; others, if the battle continued, might be exposed to a similar fate; whil
he found it would be scarcely practicable to bring off the prizes under the?
of the batteries. These considerations, undoubtedly, influenced him in resolnng
to endeavor to put a stop to hostilities, in addition to the instructions he ha~.
Rpare the Danes, and the respect he might have felt for their brave defence. (Campbell's Naval History, vol. vii, p. 203.)
The circumstances above detailed show clearly:
1st. That the battle of Copenhagen was fought between an English fl
mounting 1,010 guns, and a Danish line of :floating defences, mounting 628 111••
and that all the latter were conquered.
.
2d. That the Danish line was attacked in such a manner that none ot h
fixed ba~teries in the system· of defence could participate in the contest, whir
wa earned on up to the surrender of the Danish line, almost exclusively betw
vcs. 1:-. It appears that a few of the smaller vessels, under Captain Ri,
ccupying the northern extremity of the English line, were under the :fire of
'l'hr -crown battery. The lo s being very severe, he was obliged to retreat.
3cl. That a oon a. th battcrie were unmasked and began to act the b
wa' clo. c1, by Lord ,.. 1 on opening a parley.
4th. 'I hat, con cqucntly, it wa in no . cnsc a contest between ship::- •
batt ·rie , or a triumph of ship ov r batteric'° , and afford no ground for judginof th ir r lativ pow r.
5th. That it illu trat s, trikinO'ly, th advantage that a fleet po se..,:-:e~ -v
a , tationary lin of floatir1g defonc . Lord el on wa ..,uperior to the whoi
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his adversary's floating force; but not being disposed to run any unnecessary
hazaTd he directed all his force upon a part of the Danish line, which was, of
course, defeated; and had there been no other than a floating force present, so
of course would have been the remainder, had it been of twice the strength it
"3S. This example fully confirms what we have before urged on this topic.
In estimating the respective forces above, we have set down the vessels of
both parties at their rate: that is to say, a ship called a seventy-four we have
reckoned at 7 4 guns.
We now proceed to examine a great instance of naval success, in which there
is no room to doubt the extent to which fortifications were engaged; this instance
is the attack on AlgieTS in 181G.
The attack was made by the combined English and Dutch fleets, mounting
about one thousand guns, under the command of Lord Ex.mouth.
In the fortifications that looked towards the water, there are enumerated in a
plan, supposed to be authentic, 320 guns; but not more than 200 of these could
act upon the fleet as it lay. 'J..1he ratio of the forces . engaged, therefore, as expres ed by the number of guns, (saying nothing of the calibres, of which we
know nothing,) was about as 5 to 2. '.rhe action continued from a quarter before
three until nine, without intermission, and did not cease altogether until halfpast eleven.
It is very certain that the effects of the fire upon the Algerine shipping and
town were very severe, because we know that all the shipping was destroyed,
excepting some small vessels; and we know also that Lord Exmouth dictated
the terms of the treaty that followed.
Honorable as this result was to the combined fleets, and happy as it was for
the cause of humanity, there are, nevertheless, technical circumstances connected
with it that excite doubts as to how much of the final result was due to physical chastisement, to moral effect, to inherent defects in the defences, and to
ignorance in the use of these defences, such as they ,vere. That the loss in
killed and wounded in the city and works was great is probable, because we
are informed that a very great addition had been made to the garrison, in pre:paration for the attack, under some impression, no doubt, that a landing would
be attempted. For the service of the guns there were needed but 3,000 or 4,000
men, at the utmost. An accumulation beyond that number would add nothing
to the vigor of defence, while, by causing an increase of the casualties, it would
heighten the terrors of the combat. 'rl1e depressing effect of this loss of life in
the batteries, and of the burning of buildings within the town and about the
mole, was of course increased by the .entire destruction of the Algerine fleet, anchored within the mole.
We have no means of judging of the actual condition of the works ; nor of
their fitness for the task of contending with the heavy ships of modern times.
The forts and batteries on the shore were probably too elevated to be commanded even by the largest of the assailing ships; and, provided these guns
were covered with a proof parapet, they may be regarded as being well situated.
But more than half of the guns engaged were in the Mole-head battery; and
the mode of attack adopted, especially by the Queen Charlotte, of 110 guns, was
calculated to test, in the severest manner, the principles on which this work had
been planned. She so placed herself within "fifty yards" of the extremity of
this battery, that she could either rake or take in reverse every part of it. If
,.he, at the same time, commanded the battery-that is to say, if, from her spar
deck, she could look down upon its platform-then she must at once, with her
grape and canister, have driven the garrison from that platform, leaving only
the lower and covered tier of guns, if there were such a tier, for service. With
om· imperfect knowledge of the fortifications, all this mus~, however, be left to
conjectuTe.
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But there are matters connected with the service of the batteries which 'lr
not conjecture. Not a shot was fired until the Queen Charlotte had anchor· a.
What a different vessel, when she anchored, might not this ship hm lJee
if the Mole-head battery had employed its fire of more than 100 guns in rakin_
her, from the time she arrived within a mile and a half until she had ancho
within fifty yards 1 How different might have been the condition of the flee.
generally, if they had been subjected, during the approach, and while assumii.
their stations, to the raking fire of all the 200 guns ?
It does not appear that a single hot shot was fired from the batteries.
We might almost rest on this fact, and assert that a defence which had failed
to provide itself with this auxiliary means, must have been carried on in disregard, if not in violation, of all rules, all knowledge, and all experience; that i•
was probably without plan or combination, and, not less probable, withOU'
preparation in other particulars of importance, scarcely inferior.
Before leaving this example it may be well to inquire what, after all, "ll-a" thr
effect of these batteries upon the ships, compared with the effect of ships upon
ships.
In the battle of the Nile, the French fleet, rated at 1,190 guns, caused a lo-in Nelson's fleet of 895 killed and wounded; which is in the proportion of ten
French guns to less than eight Englishmen killed and wounded. In the battle
of Trafalgar the French fleet carried not less than 3,000 guns, and they cau~ed
a loss to the English of 1,587 killed and wounded ; which is in the proporti,J
of ten guns to less than six killed ancl wounded. In this_ affair of Algiers, "i
a force not exceeding 200 guns, the batteries caused a loss of 883 killed ~nd
wounded, being in the proportion of 1 0 guns to 44 men; and, if we take mm
account every gun that was pointed upon the bay, (say 350 guns,) the proportion will be 10 guns to 25 men; being an effect more than three times as great
as that produced by the French ships at the battle of the Nile, and more than
four times as great as that produced by the ·ships of the same nation at Tra·
falgar.
.
.
While reflecting on the circumstances of this battle the mind is not sah~fied
with any reasons that present themselves for the withdrawal of Lord Exmou!h·
the moment the land wind enabled him to do so. On the supposition of e~M
success on his part, it is not understood why he should feel the great anx1et?"
he states himself to have been under that this wind should spring up. "Pr~ncl~nce at this interval," (be~ween 10 and 11 at night,) "gave to m~ anxi ·
wishes the usual land wind, common in this bay ; and my expectat10ns wer
completed. We were all hands employed warping and towing off, and, by, th
help of the light air, the whole were under sail, and came to anchor out oft~
reach of shells about two in the morning, after twelve hoTirs of incessant labor.
Now, if anything had been decided by the action, it must have been one
two things : either the ships were victorious, or the batteries were so. If th
ships were completely victorious, it would seem to have been judicious for th ID
to remain where they were, in order, if there was to be any more fightinO': to
ready to press their advantage; and, especially, in order to maint~m t
a. ccndeucy, by preventing the remounting of guns, repairing of batter1e::. nn
re. npplyi1w them munitions, &c. ·
Had the people possessed the inflexibility report ascribed to the D_ey, ~ud h _
they ,.ct zealously about the work of preparation for a new contest, 1t might n
have be u caHy for Lord Exmouth, in the condition to which hi:-3 ,hipii , 1 ·
· knowlcc1gcc1, by authentic accounts, to have been reduced, to enforce hi;-; dem, n _Jti.· not undcrRtood, ther fore, why, if he had been so succes:-ful a'-' to he
that hiH end wa. attained, he should be so anxious to <TCt out of gunshot. ·
by :o cloino-, he involv cl the i ue in more or less doubt and hazard.
II relied on the ffi ct produced on the people by his dreadful cannon
and the re.. , ult proves that he was right; but his anxiety to clear the v " -
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from the contest shows that there was a power still unconquered, ·which he
thought it better to leave to be restrained by the suffering population of the city,
than keep in a state of exasperation and activity by his presence. What was
this power but an unsubdued energy in the batteries 1
The true solution of the question is, then, not so much the amount of injury
done on the one side or the other-particularly as there was, on the one side, a
city to suffer, as well as the batteries--as the relative efficiency of the parties
when the battle closed at about eleven o'clock. _All political agitation and popular clamor aside, what would have been the result had the fight been continued,
or e\'en had Lord Exmouth renewed it next morning 1
These are questions that can be answenid only on conjecture; but the manner
the battle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts whether, had the subsequent demands of LOTd Exmouth been rejected, he had it in his power to enforce
them by his ships: whether, indeed, if he had renewed the fight, he would not
have been signally defeated.
On the whole, we do not think that this battle, although it stands preeminent
as an example of naval success over batteries, presents any arguments to ~hake
the confidence which fortifications, well situated, well planned, and well fought,
deserve, as the defences of a seaboard.
GIBRALTAR.

rr'he attack on the water batteries of Gibraltar in September, 1782, by the
French and Spanish _floating batteries, is a well known instance of the power of
guns on shore.
rr'hese floating batteries had been rendered, as was supposed, shot-proof and
shell-proof, by several additional thicknesses of timber to the sides, and by
coveTing the decks with a roof of sloping timbers.
They mounted 142 guns on the engaged side, with 70 in reserve to replace
any that might be dismounted. r.rhey were anchored at the distance of about
1,000 yards from the walls, and were opposed by about 85 guns.
After ~ protracted cannonade, nine of the floating batteries were burnt by hot
shot from the shore, and the tenth, having been taken possession of by the victors,
was set on fire by them.
·
No material injury was done to the works of the town by their fire; and only
eighty-five men and officers were killed and wounded by the fire from these
vessels, together with a very violent cannonade and bombardment from the
siege batteries.
BATTLE OF ALGESIRAS .

On the 6th July, 1801, the French Admiral L enois was lying at anchor off
the town of Algesiras with two ships of SO guns, one of 7 4 guns, and one frigate.
To the south of him, on a small island, was a battery called the Green Island
battery, mounting seven 18 and 24-pounders; and to the north of him, on the
main, another battery called St. J aques's battery, mounting five IS-pounders.
There were, besides, fourteen Spanish gunboats anchored near, making a total
of 306 guns afloat and 12 guns in battery-altogether, 318 guns.
Sir James Saumarez, hearing that Lenois was in this position, advanced
against him from Cadiz with two ships of SO guns, fout of 74 guns, one frigate, .
and a lugger-in all, 502 guus. On his approach, L enois, who was anchored in
a line nearly north ancl south, at some distance from the shote, cut his cables
and ran into sh oal water, to prevent being doubled upon by·the British line;
thi manceuvre, at the same time, entirely unmasked the fire of the batteries.
The Hannibal, one of the British 74's, in.attempting to close with the French
admiral, touched the ground and could not be floated off. She, however, conH. Ex. Doc. 92--7
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tinned the fight with great obstinacy, even for a considerable time after ~he ~
deserted by her consorts. Not being able to double upon the French line, an
attempt was made to assault the Green Isle battery, which, being badly ~en-ed
by the Spaniards, l1ad nearly ceased firing. But this attempt was anticipated
by the arrival at the island of a party sent from the French frigate lying near.
and the assault was defeated, with the loss to the English of one boat sunk and
another taken, the Frenchmen renewing with vigor the fire of the battery. },:
the north end of the line the French admiral was aided by seven gunboatwhich took so active a part in the fight that five of them were sunk or rendered
unserviceable. The St. Jaques battery being, however, served sluggishly by
the Spaniards, the French sent a party from tl1e Dessaix to impart greattr
activity and effect.
After the combat had continued about six hours, the British squadron drew
off greatly damaged, leaving the Hannibal 7 4 alone and aground; mild she, after
suffering great loss, was obliged to strike. The French insist that the Pomptt.
an English ship of 80 guns, had struck her colors, but, as they could not take
J)ossession, she drifted off and was then towed away; it is believed she wa~
entirely dismasted.
·we do not know the loss in the J!'rench squadron, but the killed, wounded,
and missing in the English fleet amounted to 375 men, being more than tweh-e
men for every ten guns against them, and being twice as great, in proportion, a~
the English loss in the battle of 'l\·afalgar.
In this battle of Algesiras there were 502 English guns afloat, acting again~t
306 French guns afloat. As the English chose their own time for the attack.
and had the wind, it is only reasonable to suppose that 306 of the English gun~
were a match for the 306 guns in the French vessels. This will leave 196
E11glish guns afloat opposea to the 12 guns in the batteries, or, reckoning one
side only of each ship, it shows 98 guns in the British fleet to have been overmatched by the twelve guns in the batteries.
.
There never was a more signal and complete discomfiture; and it will ad~
of no other explanation than that just given, namely, that the two small battenef.
one of 5 and the other of 7 guns, partly 18 and partly 24-pounders, more than
compensated for the difference in favor of the British fleet of 196 guns.
.
'l,he Hannibal got aground, it is true, but she continued to use her gun~ m~
the best effect until she surrendered; and, even on the supposition that th1 ~hip
was useless after she grounded, the British had still an excess of 122 guns o-n:r
the French fleet and batteries. ·
'1.1hese batteries were well placed, and probably well planned and constructed.
but there was nothing extraordinary about them; their condition before the fighi
was complained of by Admiral Lenois; and they were badly fought in the e~rly
part of the action; still the 12 guns on shore were found to be more than ccp1Jn1•
lent for two seventy-fours and one frigate.
BATTLE OF FUENTERABIA.

'

Thi.· recent affair introduces steam batteries to our notice.
n tlw 11th July, 1 36, six armed steamers, together with two Briti;-:h an
, ·Yeral ~ 'pani:--h rrunboats, attacked the little town of Ituenterabia. The pla
i~ m-rou:1ded only by an old wall; ancl two guns of small calibre, to which. on
th · CY nmg of the attack, a third o-un of laro·er calibre wa added, formed t
eutir · o.f it:- artillery. 'l'he s~1uadron cannonaded this pla.ce during a whol d, Y
aucl ,ft •ckd ab,_.olutcly notlmi 0 • beyond unroofin<>· and dcrnoli:-ihing a few
r
ancl paltr • hon.;c;5, not ""·orth pc·rlrnp the ammunition wa ted in the attack.
Yhat max have be nth mnnucr of' •·un.., and weio·ht of metal which the a" ·1.
a.\t. Lrou,rht i unknown; though the uperiority~ independent of the ..:u1 ri
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weight of metal, must have been at least ten to one; but not the slig·htest military
result was obtained.-(See United Service Journal, August, 1836, page 531.)
We will now turn to affairs of a similar character on our own coast.
In June, 1776, Sir Peter Parker, commanding a squadron of two ships of 50
guns, four of 28 guns, two of 20 guns, and a bomb-ketch-in all (according to
their rate) 252 guns-attacked Fort Moultrie, in , Charleston harbor, South
Carolina.
It is stated that the fort mounted "about thirty pieces of heavy artillery."
Three of the smaller vessels were aground for a time during the action; and one
of them could. not be floated off, and was in consequence burnt by the English.
Deducting this vessel as not contributing to the attack, and supposing that the
other two were engaged but half the time, the English force may be estimated
at 200 guns ; or, reckoning one broadside only, at 100 guns against 30 guns.
rrhe English were defeated with great loss o.f life, and injury to the vessels ;
while the fort suffered in no material degree, and lost but 30 men. The killed
and wounded in the squadron were reported by the commodore to be 205; being·
for every ten guns employed against them more than 68 men killed and wounded;
a loss more than eleven times as great, in proportion to the opposing force, as
the loss at the battle of Trafalgar.
In September, 1814, a squadron of small vessels, consisting of two ships and
two brigs, mounting about 90 guns, attacked Fort Boyer, at the mouth of Mobile bay. A false attack was at the same time made by a party of marines,
artillery, and Indians, on the land side. The fort was very small, and could
not have mounted more than twenty guns on all sides, nor more than fifteen guns
on the water fronts. The action continued between two and three hours, when
one of the ships being so injured as to be unmanageable, drifted ashore under
the guns, and ·was abandonecl and burnt by the English; the other vessels retreated after suffering severely. There were ten men killed and wounded in the
fort ; the loss on the other part is not known.
The affair of Stonington during the last war affords another instance of sue-- ~
cessful defence by a battery. In this case there were only two guns, (eighteenpounders,) in a battery which was only three feet high and without embrasures ..
'fhe battery, being manned exclusively by citizen volunteers from the town,
repelled a persevering attack of a sloop-of-war, causing serious loss and damage,
but suffering none.
.
'rhe only other instance we will adduce is that of the late attack on the castle
of St. Juan de Ulloa. Having before us a plan of this work, made on the spot
after the surrender, by a l!-,rench engineer officer who was one of the expedition;
having also his official account of the affair, as well as narratives by several eyewitne::ises, we can fully understand the circumstances attending the operations, .
ancl are liable to no material errors.
On the 27th of November, 1838, Admiral Baudin anchored at the distance of
about seven-eighths of a mile in a northeast direction from the castle, with the
frigate ~ La ~ereide, of 52 _gun~, La ~loire, of 52 ~t~ns, ancl L'Iphigenie, of 60 guns,
~nd, after bemg a short time m act10n, he was JOmed by La Creole, of 24 guns;:
1n all, 188 gun~, according to the rate of the ships. In a position nearly north
from the castle, and at a distance of more than a mile, two bomb-ketches, carrying each two large mortars, were anchored. The wind being adverse, all the
vessels were towed into position by two armed steamboats belonging to the
squadron. "It was lucky for us," says the reporter, "that the Mexicans did
not di, turb this operation, which lasted near two hours, and that they permitted
u::; to commence the fire." H e further-says: "We were exposed to the fire of
one 24-pounder, five 16-pounders, seven 12-pounders, one 8-pounder, and five
IS-pounder carronades-in all, 19 pieces only." In order the better to judge of
of these batteries, we will convert them, in proportion to the weight of balls, into
24-pounders ; and we find these 19 guns equivalent to less than 12 guns of that
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calibre. But we must remark, that, although this simplifies the expression of
force, it presents it greatly exaggerated; it represents, for example, three
8-pounders as equivalent to one 24-pounder; whereas, at the distance the parties
were engaged, (an efficient distance for a 24-pounder,) the 8-pounders would be
nearly harmless. It represents also the 18-pounder carronades as posse ing
each three-fourths the power of a long 24-pounder; whereas at that distance
they would not be better than the 8-pounders, if so good. Although the above
estimate of the force of the batteries is too great by full one-third, we will,
nevertheless, let it stand as representing that force.
'.rhere were, then, twelve 24-pounclers engaged against 94 guns (estimating
for one broadside only of each ship) and 4 sea-mortars. During the action a
shell caused the magazine in the cavalier to explode, whereby three of the nineteen guns were destroyed, reducing the force to about ten 24-pounders.
Considering the manner in which this work was defended, it would not have
been surprising if the ships had prevailed by mere dint of their guns; but our
author states, expressly, that though the accid~nt just mentioned completely extinguished the fire of the cavalier, still "the greater part of the other piece"
which could see the ships, to the number of sixteen, continued to fire till the
end of the action." They were not dismounted, therefore, and the loss of life
at them could not have been great. vVhat; then, was the cause of the surrender
of the castle ?
Much h~1s been said of the great use made by the ships of horizontal she11E,
or shells fired at low angles from large guns; and it is a prevailing idea that the
work was torn to pieces, or greatly dilapidated by these missiles. This en~ineer
,officer states that, on visiting the castle after the cannonade, he found "1t h~d
been more injured by the Frend1 balls' and shells than he had expected; still
• .the casemates in the curtains, serving as barracks for the troops, were intact."
"Of 187 guns found in the fort, 102 were still serviceable; 29 only had been
dismounted by the French fire. The heaviest injury was sustained by the
.cavalier" (where a magazine exploded) "in bastion No. 2; in battery No. 5,"
(where another magazine was blown up,) "and the officers' quarters." rrhe!
found in the castle twenty-five men whose wounds were too severe to perIIllt
.their removal with the rest of the garrison. ,
Of the twenty-nine guns dismounted, five were thrown down with the cavalier; the remaining twenty-four guns were no doubt situated in parts of the work
opposite to the attack, being· pointed in other directions, and were s!ruck by
shots or shells that had passed over the walls facing the ships 'rhere 1s reason
to suppose that of the remaining sixteen guns pointed at the French, none were
-dismounted; ancl we know that most of them continued to fire till the end of
the actjon.
The two explosions may certainly have been caused by shells fired at low
angles from Paixhan guns. But it is much more likely they were caused by
• hells from the sea-mortars, because these last were much -larger, and therefore
more likely to break through the masonry; because, being fired at high angleE,
th 'Y would. fall vertically upoIJ. the magazines, which were less protected on
the top than on the . iues; and. because there were more of the:;e large shellE
fired. than of the o.omall ones, in the ratio of 302 to 117.
But, con iderin°· ~hat the cannonade and. Lombardment lasted about six hour5.
and that ,250 hot and shells were fired. by the :F'rench, it is extraordinary
!h_at th r were no more than two explo;;ions of magazines and that no 0 Teat_'f
lllJury wa done the fort, . iuce it is certain that there were no le~' than ,ix
-Other . imilar mao-azinc, ·ituat d on the rampart, jn different part of the work.
not one f wl11ch wa . hell-proof. The : urrender, after these explosion~ w.1-=
~ v r · natural ,y 'nt, with a gov rnor and. garrison who ecm to have known a
httl abou the proper pr paration for uch conte ts a about the mode of conducting them. The econ<l. explo::;ion mu ·t have satisfied them, if the fin;t di
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not, tha t they had introduced within their own precincts much more formidable
means of de;::;truction than any it was in the power of the French to seud from
gun or mortar.
,
'The important points to be noticed in this contest are these:
1. The French took such a position that their 94 guns were opposed by the
equivalent of 10 or 12 guns only.
.
2. In proof of the inefficiency of the Mexican guns generally, 1t may be
stated that although the three French frigates were struck in their hulls about
three hundred times, they lost but thirty-three men in killed and woun§ed.
The Iphio·enie was hulled 160 times, and yet had but thirtee11 men hurt. Very
few, ther~fore, of these 160 balls could have passed through her sides.
3. It appears that very few, if any, of the guns exposed to the direct action
of the French broadsides were dismounted or silenced by their fire.
4. The narratives of the day contain exaggerated statements of injury inflicted
on the walls by shells fired from guns ; the professional report, above quoted,
of the chief engineer of the expedition, neither speaks of nor alludes to any
such inj nry. After deducting from the parts of the work said to be most
injured-the cavalier and also battery No. 5, in each of which a magazine
exploded-there remain, as having suffered most, the quarters of the officers and
bas tion No. 2. As to the first, if it was elevated above the walls, as is probable,
it would of course suffer severely, because the walls of mere barracks or quarters are never made of a thickness to resist shot or shells of any kind; and if
not elevated above the walls, but covered by them, the injury resulted, most
probably , from shells fired at high angles from the sea-mortars, and not from
shells fired nearly horizontally from the Paixhan guns. Whether tlie injury
sustained by bastion No. 2 was the effect of shot and shells upon the face of
the walls, or of shells falling vertically within the basfrm, is not stated. It was
probably due in part to both. If there had been any extraordinary damage
done by the horizontal shells, we rnay reasonably suppose special mention
would h ave been made of it, because it was the first time that this missile had
been tried, in a large way, in actual warfare. 'l'hat anything like a breach
could have been effected with solid shot, at that distance and in that time, we
know to be impossible; but it is neither unreasonable to suppose, nor unlikely,
that many of the heavy vertical shells may have fallen in the bastion and
caused much injury. ·whatever may have been the cause of the damage, or
its amount, it did not, we have reason to believe, extinguish the fire of any of
the five 16-pounders that were pointed from the bastion against the ships.
5. So far as effects were produced by the direct action of the French armament, wheth er guns, bomb-cannon, or sea-mortars, it does not appear that there,
was th e slightest reason for the submission of the fort. '.rhere is little doubt
that the 8,25 0 shot and shells fired at the castle must have greatly marred the
surface of the walls, and it is not unlikely that three or four striking near each
other may have made deep indentations, especially as the stone is soft, beyond
any mater ial applied to building in any part of the United States. But these
arc not injuries of material consequence, however they may appear to the inexperienced eye, and we should risk little in asserting that, abstracting the effects
of the cxplo, ion, the castle was as inaccessible to assault after the cannonade
as before it; that, so far as regards the levelling of obstacles lying in the way
of a sword in hand attack, the 8,250 shot and shells might as well have been
fired in th e oppo::iite direction.
~- T!ie explosion, however, of two deposits of powder in the castle, one of
which 1::; reported to have buried sixty men in its ruins, showed the defenders
that, although they might evade the vertical fire, and their works might cover
them from the horizontal fire of the ]Trench, there was no protection against, no
evasion of, the dreadful ravage::; of exploding magazines. With this min around
them , and a sixfold greater ruin likely, at every moment, to burst upon their
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heads, it is not surprising that a garrison, found in circumstances so unmilitary.
doubted their power of protracted resistance.
7. It must be borne in mind that these explosions have nothing to do either
with the question of relative strength or with the peculiarities of the French
attack. No defences, with such management, can be eflective, ancl no attack
can fail. 'The l!..,rench, not dreaming·. of such culpable, such inconceinLle
n egligence on a point always receiving the most careful attention, entered upon
the cannonade with no other purpose, as is avowed, than that of somewhat
weakening the defences and dispiriting and fatiguing the garrison, before proceeding to an assault, which was to have followed at night, and for which all
preparations had been made. Had the :Mexicans thrown all the powder of
these eight magazines into the sea, or had they transported it to their barrack:'.
and every man, making a pillow of a keg, slept through the whole cannonade.
as might have been done safely, in their quarters in the curtain casematee, the
castle of St. Juan de Ulloa would, we doubt not, have been as competent to
resist the projected assault as it was when the French :first arrived before it. .
8. 'I'he number of killed and wounded in the French vessels, in proportion
to the guns acting against them was, for ten guns, more than twenty -"e':en
men, being upwards of four times as great as the loss sustained by _the Engfuh
at the battle of Trafalgar.
In concluding thiB reference to facts in military Mstory, we will add that 1\'C'
do not see how it is possible to avoid making the following deduction, nam~ly:
that fix ed batteries upon the shore are capable of resisting the attacks of ship~.
even when the armament of the latter is by far the most numerous and ~e~,YThcre are several reasons for this capacity in batteries, of which the prmcipal
may be thus stated; and these rc:asons apply to vessels of every siz? a~d every
sort, to small or large, to vessels moved by wind or steam. The slup 1s everywhere equally vulnerable, and, large as is her bull, the men and the guns are
Yery much concentrated within her; on the other hand, in the properly constructed battery it is ouly the gun itself, a small part of the carriage, and no~
and then a h ead or an arm raised above the parapet that can be hurt, the .:"at10
of the exposed surfaces being not less than fifteen or twenty to one. ); ext.
there is always more or less motion in the water, so that the ship-gun, although
it may have been pointed accurately at one moment, at the next wil: be thrown
entirely away from the object, even when the motion in the vessel 1::1 t?o sm.a~
1
to be otherwise noticed; whereas, in the battery the gun wi11 be fired JU:t
is pointed, and the motion of the ship ·will merely vary to the extent of ~ fr""
inches, or at most two or three feet, the spot in which the shot is to be receJY_eJ.
In_ the ship there are, besides, many points expoRecl that may Le called v~ al
pomt.' ; · by losing her rudder, or portions of her rigging, or of her Fpars. ~be
may become unmanageable and unable to use her strength; she mar recenshots under water and be liable to sink; she may receive hot shot am! he fet n
fir ; and these damages are in addition to those of haYing her guns d1~m )~nt
and her people killed by the shot which pierce her sides ancl scatter :-pli_nrer,
from h er timbers, ·while the risks of the battery arc confined to tliosc mentioned
ahoYe, namely, the ri.k that the gun, the carriage, or the men may be ..:trnck.
That the magazines should be exposed, as were thoi;e of the ca..:tle 't. Juan d
"Glloa, must never be anticipated as posRible.
"\Vhil on thi part of our ,·uLject, it is proper to nclvert to thf' uf:e of h ·
zoutal hell., or hollow ,·hot, or I>aixhau'::, flhcll , (as they arc varion..:l: taH.
it liaving been aro-uccl that the intro<luc-tion of tlH·K, mis ile is scriou:e:ly t 1 ·
pair the ntility of fortification.· a~ a c1cfrnce of thr :-ca-coast.
"\Y fully b ·licve tliat the fr c use of th<'. c shell:-; will have an influ nc
ornc importance on th r ·lativ · fore of ·liip aud Lattery, but tl1Ht _iufln
rnn:-t he the ycry r •vcrr- · of . uch prcdic-tion~. IIow ar the batten '
affected Ly them? It can Le but in two ways : fict, the hip-gun ba,1ng
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pointed so as to strike a vital point-that is to s~y, a gu~ or a carri~ge-the
shell may explode at the instant of contact. This explos10n may possibly happen thus opportunely, but it would happen against all chances_, and if. happening, would probably do no more than add a few men to the hst of killed and
wounded. For reasons that will soon appear, it is to be doubted whether the
probability of dismounting the gun would be so great as if the missile w_e1·? a
solid 32-pounder shot. Secondly, if it be not by dismounting the guns or lnlh~1g
the garrisoi1, the effects anticipated from these missiles must result from the mjury they do the battery itself. Now, we are perfectly informed by military experience as to the effects of these shells upon forts and batteries, for the shells
are not new, although the guns may be so-the 8-inch and the 10-inch shells
having always been supplied in abundance to evel'y siege-train, and being perfectly understood, both as to their effects and the mode of using them.
Were it a thing easily done, the blowing away of the parapets of a work, (a
very desirable result to the attacking party,) would be a common incident in the
attacks of fortifications; but the history of attacks by land or water affords no
such instance. The only practicable way yet discovered of demolishing a fortification being by attaching a miner to the foot of the wall, or by dint of solid
shot and heavy charges fired unremittingly during a long succession of hours
upon the same part of the wall, in order not only to break through it, but to
brt.ak through it in such a manner that the weight and pressure of the incumbent mass may throw large portions of the wall prostrate. This, the shortest
and best way of breaching a wall, requires, in the first place, perfect accuracy
of direction, because the same number of shots that, being distributed over the
expanse of a walt, would merely peel off the face, would, if concentrated in a
single deep cut, cause the wall to fall; and it requires, moreover, great power of
penetration in the missile--the charge of a breachfog-gun being for that reason
one-third greater than the common service charges. Now, the requisite precision of firing for this effect is wholly unattainable in vessels, whether the shot
be solid or hollow; and if it were attainable, hollow shot would be entirely useless for the purpose, because every one ef tliem would break to pieces against
tlie wall, even when fired with a charge much less than the common service charge.
1'1)-is is no newly-discovered fact; it is neither new nor doubtful. Every hollow
shot thrown agRinst the wall of fort or battery, if fired with a velocity affording any penetration, will unquestionably be broken into fragments by the shock.
After so much had been said about the effect of. these shells upon the castle
of St. Juan de Ulloa, it was deemed advisable, although the result of European
experiments were perfectly well known, to repeat in our own service some trials
touching this point. A target was therefore constructed, having one-third part
of the length formed of granite, one-third of bricks, and the remaining third of
freestone. This was fired at by a Paixhan gun and by a 32-pouncler from the
distancr of half a mile, and the anticipated results were obtained, namely:
1st. 'Whether it was the granite, the brick, or the freestone that was struck,
the soliJ. 32-pounder shot penetrated much deeper into the wall, and did much
more damage than the 8-inch hollow shot; and2d. rrhcse last broke against the wall in every instance that the charge of the
.
gun was sufficient to give them any penetration.
_The rupture of the shell may often cause the explosion of the powder it contam~, because the shell, the burning fuse, and the powder are a.ll crushed up
together; but the shell having no penetration, no greater injury will be clone to
the wall by the explosion than would be caused by the bursting of a shell that
had been placed against it.
From all this it appears, incontrovertibly, that, as re()'ards the effects to be
produced upon ~atteries by ships, solid shot are decidedly preferable to hollow
Fhot; and the ship that, contemplating the destruction of batteries,· should change
any of her long 24 or 32-pounder guns for Paixhan guns .would certainly
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weaken her armament. Her best missiles, at ordinary distances, are solid shot;
and, if she can get near, grape shot to fire into the embrasures and onr the
walls. 'I'he best shells ag·ainst batteries are the sea-mortar shells, :fired at high
elevations; which, being of great weight and falling from a great height, penetrate deeply, and containing a considerable quantity of powder cause material
ravage by their explosion. Such shells, however, can only be :fired by T"essels
appropriately fitted.
'The use of these same hollow shot by batteries against vessels is, howe,er,
an affair of different character. 'I'he shells do not break against timber, but
p enetrating the bulwarks they, in the first place, would do greater damage than
hollow shot, by making a larger hole and dispersing more splinters; and having.
as shot, effected all this injury, they would then augment it many fold by exploding.
+
In all cases of close action between ship and battery, the shells will pass
through the nearer side, and if not arrested by some object on the deck, will
probably lodge and explode in the further side; causing, by the explo:iion, a
much greater loss among the crew, and greater injury to the vessel, than by their
mer e transit across the vessel. As before suggested, the vessel would suffer
less injury were her sides made so thin as not to retain the shell, permitting it
to p ass through both sides, unless fired with a small velocity. It is not irnpos::ible that an extensive use of these horizontal shells may lead to a reduction in
the thickness of ships' bulwarks.
In the facts quoted above, there is no illustration of the effects of hot shot.
except in the case of Gibraltar. In that attack the floating batteries were made
proof against cold shot, and, as was thought by the coustructor, proof agaimt
hot shot also; and so, indeed, for a time, it seemed. It was conceived that the
hot shot, when buried deep in the closely-jointed timbers,: would scarcely c.ommunicate flame; aud that it would not be difficult, by the use of the fire-engme:3
provided, to subdue so stifled a combustion.
By making these floating batteries impenetrable to shot, it was supposed they
had been rendered equnl, in perfectly smooth water, to land batterie~, gun for
gun; and so they might then have b~en, nearly, had the incombustibility of, the
latter been imparted to them. But now resistance to £re would not mffice:
these floating batteries must either repel these horizontal shells from their~ bul:warks, or, if that be impossible, permit them to pat1s through both sides. ~othmg can be better calculated to exhibit the tremem1ous effects of, the~e :-hell~
than a vessel so thick-sided as to stop every shell, allowing it to burst TI"heu
surrounded by several feet of timber; and thexe can be no greate.r mistake than
supposing that by thickcnino· the bulwarks of vessels-of-war, or :fitting up .-:team
bat_teries with shot-proof sides, the effects of land batteries are to be annulled.
or m any material degree modified .
. We will sum up this branch of our s~1bject with the remark that the fact:-_~h1.:tory, and the practice of all warlike nations, are in perfect ascordance m ~
thr _concln:::;ion~ of theory. 'I'he results that reason anticipated have occnrr ·
ao-mn and agmn. And so long as, on the one side, batteries are form ed of earth
and • tone; an~, on the other, shiJJS are liable to be swallowed up_ hy the
el ·m ·nt on which they float, or to be deprived of the means by which they
mrwr; so long as th y can Le penetrated by solid shot, set on fire or hlown u
lJy hot i::hot, or torn piecemeal by shells, the same results must, inevitahly.
rcpca trd at ach uccecding trial.
But, after all, it n~ay_ be urgec1 that th e general principle l1ercin cont<~1~,l ·d r.
munch·, th .. npcnonty of battcricf:I in a contcut with , hip:-:, m1_!:'ht
ac1mitt ,d; and . till it would remain to . how thnt battcr:ct1 con:-:titute tl · kincl ·
cl ·fi•ncc Le;o;t adapted to our peculiar want ·. '1'11i:- i:-; true ; and we 11·ill 110 l- I
ccrc1 to con:--ic1 r, ,.CY rally, the ca~e to which dcfrnc mu:,:t be applied.
It ma • be well, however, nr...,t to r call the g ncral i::-cop of the pr~
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argument. It has been contended that floating defences should not be relied
on, not because they are actually incompetent to the duty, but because they
cannot fulfil this duty unless provided in inordinate numbers, and at a boundless
expense ; and we have endeavored to show that this remark is g~nerally t1~ue,
whether the defensive fleet be made up of sea-going vessels, of floatrng batteries,
or of steam batteries. We have next urged the point that properly planned and
constructed batteries are an overmatch for vessels-of-war, even when greatly
inferior to them in armament-sustaining our opinion by many striking· examples, and explaining satisfactorily the only instances that have cast any doubt
on such contests. If the facts and reasonings we have presented do not convey
the same strong convictions that sway our own minds, it must be because we
have obscured rather than illustrated them; for it would seem to be impossible
that facts could be more unexceptionable, or reasons more beyond the reach of
cavil. However that may be, we now leave them to candid and dispassionate
revisal, and proceed to examine the mode of applying these defences to our own
coast.
I t may be well to divide these into several distinct classes:
1. '_rhere will be all the smaller towns upon the coast, constituting a very
numerous class.
At the same time that no one of these, of itself, would provoke an enterprise of
magnitude, it is still necessary to guard each and all against the lesser attacks.
A small vessel might suffice to guard against single vessels that would otherwise be tempted by facility to burn the shipping and exact a contribution; but
something more than this is necessary, since the amount of temptation held out
by a number of these towns would be apt to induce operations on a larger scale.
It might often happen, moreover, that our own vessels-of-war would be constrained to take refoge in these harbors, and they should find cover from the
pursuer.
.
Although the harbors of which we now speak afford every variety of form
and dimension, there are few, or none, wherein one or two small forts and
batteries cannot be so placed as to command all the water that a ship-of-war
can lie in, as well as the channel by which she must enter. While the circumstances of no two of them are so nearly alike as not to modify the defences to
be applied to them severally, all should fulfil certain common conditions, namely:
the passage into the harbors should be strongly commanded ; the enemy should
find no place, after passing, wherein he would be safe from shot and shells ; and
the works should be inaccessible to sudden escalade-that is to say, a small
garrison should be able to repel such an assault. With works answering to
these conditions, and of degrees of strength in accordance with the value of
their respective trusts, this class of harbors may be regarded as secure. We
cannot, however, here avoid asking what would be the mode of defence, if
purely naval, of these harbors 1 Suppose the circumstances are deemed to
require the presence of a frigate, or a st.earn frigate, or an equivalent in gunboats : would not two hostile frigates, or two steam frigates, infallibly arrive in
quest 1 Could there be devised a system more certain to result in the capture
of our vessels, and the submission of our towns 1
2. Another clas s will consist of great establishments, such as large cities,
naval depots, &c., situated in harbors not of too great extent to admit of good
defence at the entrance, and also at every successive point; so that an enemy
could find no spot within in which he could safely prepare for operations ulterior to the mere forcing an entrance.
In thi' cla s are to be found obir.cts that are, in every sense, of the hi ghest
value. On the one hand, accumulations of military and naval material, and
structUTes for naval accommodation, that could not be replaced during a war,
which are of indi,.pensable necessity, and of great cost; and, on the other hand,
the untold wealth of great cities. As these objects must be great in the eyes of
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the enemy-great for him to gain, and for us to lose-corresponding effort. on
his part must be looked for and guarded against. If he come at all, it will be
in power; and the preparations on our part must be commensurate.
'l'he entrance to the harbor, and all the narrow passes within it, must be
occupied with heavy batteries; and if nature does not afford all the po. itions
deemed requisite, some must,- if practicable, be formed artificially. Batterie"
should succeed each other along· the channel, so that the enemy may nowhere
find shelter from effective range of shot and shells while within the harbor, even
should he succeed in passing the first batteries.
Provided the shores admit this disposition, and the defences be supplied with
an armament, numerous, heavy, and selected with reference to the effects on
shipping, the facts we have quoted from history show that these defence may
be relied on.
If the mere passing under sail, with a leading wind and tide, one, or even
two sets of batteries, and then carrying on operations out of the reach of these,
or any other, were all, the enemy might perhaps accomplish it; but our present
supposition is, that with this class his ulterior proceedings, and finally his return,
are to be subject to the incessant action of the defences.
3. ':I1his brings us to consider a third class, consisting of establishments of
importance situated at a distance up some river or bay, there being intermediate
space too wide to be commanded from the shores. In such cases the defence
must be concentrated upon the narrow passes, and must, of course, be apportioned in armament to the value of the objects covered. When the value is not
very great, a stout array of batteries at the best positions would deter an enemy
from an attempt to force the passage, since his advantage, in case of success,
would not be commensurate with any imminent risk. But with the more valuable establishments it might be otherwise; the consequence of success might
justify all the risk to be encountered in rapidly passing in face of batteries,
however powerful. This condition of things requires peculiar precautions,
under any system of defence. If, after having occupied the shores, in the narrow places, in the best manner, with batteries, we are of opinion that the temp·
tation may induce the enemy, notwithstanding, to run the gauntlet, the obstruction of the passage must be resorted to. By this is not meant the penna~ent
obstruction of the passage; such a resort, besides the great expen ·e, m1ght
entail the ruin of the channel. The obstruction is ·meant to be the temporary
closing by heavy floating masses.
.
'11 here is no doubt that a double line of rafts, each raft being of large size
and anchored with strong chains, would make it impossible to pass wit~out
first removing some of the obstructions, and it might clearly be made impossible
to effect this removal under the fire of the batteries. Such obstructionfl need
not Le re orted to until the breaking out of a war, as they could then be 8peedily
formed, should the preparation of the enemy be of a threatening nature.
_
Ther would be nothing in these obstructions inconsistent with our u:::c ot
part of the channel, since two or three of the rafts might be kept out of line.
reacly to move into their places at on hour's notice.
The greatest danger to which these obstructions would be exposed would he
from xplo ion vessel ; and from thfse they mio·ht be protected by a boom, or
a line of .:maller raft, in front.
b
.From ·what ha_ ju t been said, it will be perceived that, when the induceme~ ar ,:uch a · to Lrmg the en my forward in great power, and efficient batt ·n can b e ·taLli lied only at certain point,, we arc not then to rely on tlH·m ex~lu. _iv ·ly. In ·uch a ca ~e, _the enemy houlcl be topped by ome p_h,pic:al ~mp dun nt. ; and the batt ne mu. t be strong enough to prevent his rcmonn!!
th :- imp ·dim nt::i, and al ·o to prevail in a cannonade, hould the enemy und · ·
tak to ·ilence the work .

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

107

rhe conditions these obstructions have to fulfil are these:
1st. They must be of a nature 1J) be fixed readidy, and to be speedily removed when there is no longer occasion for them; and, to this end, they must
be afloat.
·
(
2d. They must have adequate inertia to resist, or ~ather not to be destroyed
or displaced by, the shock of the heaviest ship; and, in order to this, they must
be held by the heaviest and strongest cables and anchors.
3d. They must be secure from the effects of explosive vessels; and, if in
..
danger from this source, must be covered as ab0ve menti~ned.
We do not say what are the exact circumstances in which all these cond1t10ns
will be fulfilled, though we think the idea long ago presented by the board of
engineers will, with modifications, embrace them all.
The idea is this: Suppose a line (extending across the channel) of rafts, separated from each other by a space less than the breadth of a ship-of-war, each
raft being about 90 feet long, 30 feet wide, and 6 feet deep, formed of strong
timbers, crossed and braced in all directions, and fastened together in the strongest
manner. A long-scope chain cable is to proceed from each of the four corners,
two obliquely up stream and two obliquely down stream, to very heavy anchors;
and there should also be a very strong chain cable passing from one raft to
another. Suppose a ship, striking one of the rafts, to break the chains leading
down the stream: in doing this, she must lose much of her mqmentum. She
has, then, "under her fore foot," the raft connected by a strong chain with the
rafts to the right and left; on being tightened, this chain will throw the strain
upon the down stream cable of that adjoining raft towards which the ship hJtppens to tend. If we suppose it possible for these chains also to be parted by
the power still remaining in the ship, or by impulses received from succeeding
vessels, there will be other chains still to break in the same way. After the
down stream chains are all parted, the rafts will "bring up" in a new position,
(higher up the channel,) by the anchors that, in the first instance, were pointed
up stream. Here a resistance, precisely like that first overcome, is to be encountered by vessels that have lost most of their force in breaking th e successive
chains, and in pushing these great masses of timber before them through the
water. Should there exist a doubt as to the sufficiency of these remaining
anchors and chains, or should it be deemed most prudent to leave nothing uncertain, a second similar line may be placed a short distance above the first.
The best proportions and dimensions of the rafts remain to be determined ;
but as there is scarcely a limit to the strength that may be given to the rafts
themselves, and to the · means by which they are to be held to their positions,
and to each other, the success of a well arranged obstruction of this sort can
harclly be doubted.
rrhe expense would not be great in the first instance, and all the materials
would be available for other purposes, when no longer needed for this.
It may be repeated here, that such expedients need not be resorted to, except
to cover objects of the highest importance and value, such as would induce an
enemy to risk a large expedition. For objects of less importance, batteries
would afford ample protection. It will be remembered that this last power is,
when once established in any position, a constant quantity; and, although it
should be incompetent to effect decisive results when diffused over a large fleet, ,
may be an overmatch for any small force upon which it should be concentrated.
At the same time, therefore, that there is the less liability to heavy attacks,
there will be, in the batteries, the greater capacity of resistance to others.
It must not be urged, as a reproach to fortifications, that, in the case we are
coni:,.idering, they are obligeu to call in aid from other sources, so long as these
aids are cheap, efficient, and of easy resort. By the mode we h ave suggested,
the defence will undoubtedly be complete, every chance of success being on the
side of the defence; that is to say, if any confidence is to be placed in the les-
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sons of experience. How, on the other hand, will the same security be attained
by naval means 1 Only, as before shown,. by keeping within the harbor a flrC:
or squadron, or whatever it may be, which shall be at all times superior to the
enemy.
In a naval defence there wm be no advantage in obstructions of any sort, for
there can be no lessening of the array of guns in consequence of such ob._tructions; because, if these obstructions are under the fire of the floating defencr,.
the enemy will first subdue that fire, and then remove the obstructions at bileisurc. If this fire prove too powerful for the enemy, the obstruction will
have been unnecessary) and will serve only to shut up our own fleet, preventing
the prompt pursuit of a beaten foe.
4. '11 here is a fourth class, consisting of harbors, or rather bays or estuarie,.
of such expanse that batteries cannot be made to control the passage. The-e
have been before spoken of. If the occupation of, or passage through
these must be defended, it must be by other means than batteries upon the
shore. rrhe reliance must, from the nature of the case, be a floating defence, of
magnitude at least equal to the force the enemy may bring. The complete defence of each of these bays would, therefore, involve very great expe11se; certainly, in most cases, greater than the advantages gained. 'The Chesapeake
bay cannot, for instance, be shut against a fleet by fortifications; and if the entrance of the enemy is to be interdicted, it must be by the presence of a no
inferior fleet of our own. Instead of such a system, it will be better to give up
the bay to the enemy, confining our defences to the more important harbo1 and
riv~rs that discharge into the bay. By this system, not only will these barbor:i
be secure, but the defences will react upon the bay itself, and, at any rate, ~ecure it from predatory incursions; because, while Hampton roads and the na:y
yard at Norfolk are well protected, no enemy woulcl proceed up the bay mth
any less force than that which coulcl be sent out from the navy yard.
In certain cases of broad waters, wherein an enemy's cruisers might desire to
rendezvous in order to prosecute a blockade, or as a shelter in tempe tnou~
weather, there may be positions from which sea-mortars can reach the whole
anchorage, although nothing could be done with guns. A battery of sea-mortari:;, well secured from escalade, would, in such a case, afford a good defence.
because no fleet will lie at anchor within the range of shells.
In thus distributing the various exposed points of the sea-coast into general
clai:; 'C8, according to the most appropriate modes of defence, we do not fin_d tl1at
anything· can be substituted for fortifications, where fortifications are applicable,
and we find them applicable in all the classes but the last; ancl in the la:;t we
Rhall fin cl them indispensable as auxiliaries. In this la t class there are, _no
doubt, some cases where naval means must con tituto the active ancl operative
fore•; and it is probable that steam batteries may, of all floating defence:-, be
th most , uitable.
It must not be forgotten, however, that the very qualities which recommend
this particular kind of force will equally characterize the steam ves el of th
n rn r; nor mu t it be forgotten that, whether steam vessels or sailing ve;,:: · ~.
or ~oth, arc relied on, unless there are well-secured point on the _hor~, u~? ·'"
wl11th thc-y can take refuge, they will them elves constitute an oLJect mntm;:thc ·npcrior fore of an enemy.
If for _c.·am_ple, we were to deem one of the open harbor of such import:m
a. tu a:_~1,~11 ewht or ten steam battrri<" for its protection, we sbonlcl the
plae • w1tl11n r a ·h of th enemy an obj ·ct worthy of the efforts of a squad
r t" ·Ive or fifte n ves:els of the . ame cle:.;cription. Even, therefor , in
< ··<,,_ wltr·rc n:n-al mean
must be re~ort •cl to for c1efcnc upon th watC'r. th_
,.houl<l h · work up n th shor b •hincl which, jf ovcrpow r cl, tbev can n:n
t ha b ·en bcfor r mark cl that the .·team batteric ar .· in no wa, mo
rmi<laLl · to :hor batterie:.; than ·ailing v r-._el ar : armed with Paixhan "'U -
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they would be less so. And they ·would be less for~iclable, also, on accoun~ of
their comparatively small number of guns; for there 1s no reaso1: w~1Y: the. fi:·mg
should be more accurate than from ships; and the chances of mfhctmg mJury
would be in proportion to the nu1:1ber of I1;1issiles. .
. .
The only material effect the mtroduc~10n ?f th~s descr1pt1?n of ,vess?l can
have upon a system of defence by fortifications 1s, that owmg to t?ell' les_s
draught of water, it will be necessary to secure channels that, not bemg nav1gabl~ by vessels of the line and frigates, might otherwise be left ung·uarded.
Some of these channels may have the draught of water lessened by an a~tificial
ridge of stones, so as to be impracticable even to steam vessels ; and tlus may
often be clone at small expense, and without detriment to the harbors; others
will need additional fortifications. But the instances are not numerous where
any such shallow channels exist.
.
.
In O})position to an opinion not uncommon, that modern improvements m
steam vessels will tend to lessen the necessity for fortifications, we here see that
the tendency is rather to increase their number.
Throughout this whole discussion the argument has turned on the relative
efficiency of fixed and floating defences. The great relative economy of the
former, we suppose, will be conceded. If not, we would ask, as conclusive, or
at least as leading to calculation entirely satisfactory, that the following infor- ·
mation be obtained from authentic sources, namely: the first cost, when complete in all respects, of the frigates United States, Constitution, and Congress,
and also the entire expense of each of said vessels up to this time; specifying,
as to each, the year of the several expenditures and the amounts thereof, under
the heads, as far as practicable, of first cost, repairs or rebuilding, and improvements and alterations,· and distinguishing-1st. rrhe expense bestowed upon
the hull. 2d. The expense bestowed upon the masts, spars, sails, anchors,
cables and rigging. 3d. The expense bestowed upon the armament; and 4th.
The expense bestowed upon all other matters, (as boats, ballast, tanks, paint,
&c.,) necessarily connected with the preservation, or the ordinary service of the
vessel.
Before we proceed to describe the several positions on the coast requiring fortifications, we have something still to say on the general subject, though on
another branch. We now refer to the kind of fortifications, or rather to their
magnitude and strength. That this particular topic should be embraced by our
remarks is the more necessary since views hostile to the system of works now
in progress have been urged from a high source.
'l'hc present system is founded on this principle, to wit : that the fortifications
shonlJ be strong in proportion to the value of the objects to be secured. The
principle will not, we suppose, be controverted, but only the mode of applying it.
·
There will hardly be a difference of opinion as to the mode of guarding the
le.:., important points. 'l'here being no great attraction to an enemy, works
simple in their features, requirin g small garrisons only,. containing a moderate
armament, but at the same time inaccessible to the dashing enterprises that
ship, can so easily land, and which can be persevered in for a few hours with
much vigor, will suffice. Oircunistances must, however, materially modify the
properties of these w~rks, even when t~c. points to be guarded are of equal
value. !n one, the disadvantage of pos1t1on must be compensated by greater
power; m another, natural strength may need little aid from art; in another,
grc·ater width in the guarded channel may demand a larger f.l.rmament; and in
a fourth, peculiar exposure to land attack may exact more than usual inaccessibility. But all these varieties lie within limits that will probably be conceded.
At- to the larger objects, it has been contended that there has been exaggeration in devising works to cover these, the works having been calculated for more
formidable attacks than they will be exposed to. It is easy to utter vague
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criticisms of this nature, and it is not easy to rebut them without going into an
examination as minute as if the criticism were ever so precise and pertinent.
But let us look a little at the material facts. What is the object of an enemy 1
What are his means 1 What should be the nature of our defences 1
The object may be to lay a great city under contribution, or to de troy one
of our naval depots, or to take possession of one of our great harbor~,
&c. It was estimated that in the great fire in the city of New York, in the
year 1835, the property destroyed within a few hours was worth upward' of
seventeen millions of dollars, although the fire was confined to a very smJl
part of the city, and did not touch the shipping. Is it easy, then, to estimate
the loss that would accrue from the :fires that a victorious enemy could kindle
upon the circuit of that great city when no friendly band could be rai"ed to
extinguish them 1 or is it easy to overrate the tribute such a city would pay for
exemption from that calamity 1 Can we value too highly the pecuniary losse~
that the destruction of one of the great navy yards would involve, and the los5,
beyond all pecuniary value, of stores and accommodations indispensable in a
state of war, and that a state of war can hardly replace 1
But what are the enemy's means 1 They consist of his whole sea-going force.
which he concentrates for the sake of inflicting the blow. In the language C1f
the critic : " From the nature of maritime operations, such a fleet could bring
its whole strength to bear upon any particular position, and, by threatening or
aesai.ling various portions of the coast, either anticipate the tardy movements ~
troops upon land, and effect the object bdore their concentration, or render 1
necessary to keep in service a force far superior to that of the enemy, but ~o
divided as to be inferior to it on any one point."
We have, then, objects of sufficient magnitude, and the means of the enemy
consi:t in the concentration of his whole force upon one of these objects.
·with the highest notion of the efficiency of fortifications against shipping,
these are not cases where any stint in the defensive means are admissible.
Having, therefore, under a full sense of the imminent danger to which the grea
objects upon the coast are exposed, applied to the approaches by water an array
of obstacles worthy of confidence, we must carefully explore all the avem:e' l'.y
land, in order to guard against approaches that might be made on that s1~e. :.:i
order to evade or to capture the works guarding the channels. But before dec1dm?
on the defences necessary to resist these land attacks, it will be proper to emmate more particularly the means that an enemy may be expected to bring forward with a view to such land operations.
History fui·nishes many examplee; and the expedition to Flushing, commonly
called the ""\Valcheren expedition, may be cited as peculiarly instructive. . .
] roman early clay Napoleon had applied himself to the creation of a m:mum
force iu the Scheldt, and, 'in 1809, he had provided extensive dock yar?s ":.
naval arsenals at ],lushing and at Antwerp. On his invasion of Au tI:a t ..,,
year, he had drawn off the mass of his troops that had before kept Jeal U5
watch over the, e naval preparations, relying now on forts and batterie .. , anJ on
the fortifications of Flushing and Antwerp, for the protection of the naval e:::tti lislnuf'11t:4, and of a fleet containing several line-of-battle ships and frigate:; and
a uumcrou · flotilla of smaller vessels.
'l he great naval e tabli hment at .Flushing, near the mouth of the .'ch ·I ·.
and of . \..utwcrp, some sixty or scv •nty miles up the river, with the ,. " ·
afloat on the river or in progr , in the yards, presented an object to Engl
worth of on of her gr at :£fort .
'l'h · troop~ mbark cl on this xpcdition con, i tcd of upward of 33.000 · fan try, :J,000 avalry, more than 3,000 artillery, and ·ome hundred ' of , : p '
and min 'r"- onf<titutino- an army of about 40,000 m •n. 'l'he naval J rri
·011,..i tc·d of 35 , ail of the Jin ', 23 fri 0 ·at s, 33 loop -of-war, 2 gun. m
and bomb v :-.' 1. , 36 .. mall r v '.~cl , and 2 O'unboats ; makinu a tot. I
hip and oth r armed ve el and 2 gunboat . The gun , mortru , ~ -l, ••
T
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vided for such bombardments and sieges as the troops might have to conduct.
amounted to 158 pieces, with the suitable supplies of ammunition and stores of
every kind.
rrhe idea of sailing right up to their object, in spite of the forts and batteries,
seems not to have found favor, notwithstanding the power of the fleet. The
plan of operations, therefore, contemplated the ~anding ~ por~ion of t~e army on
the island of vValche-ren, to carry on the siege of 1! lushmg, while another
portion proceeded up the Scheldt as high as Fort Bartz, which :vas to be. taken,
after which the army would push on by land about twenty miles furt~er, a~d
lay siege to Antwerp; all which, it was thought, might be accomplished m
eighteen or twenty days from the first landing.
The execution did not accord with the design. Flushing, it is true, was
reduced within fifteen days, and in less than a week from the debarcation (which
was on the 31st of July) .Fort Bartz was in possession of the English, having
been abandoned by the garrison. But it was twenty-five days before the main
body, with all necessary supplies for a siege, were assembled at this point and
ready to take up the line of march against Antwerp. Since the first descent of
the British matters had, however, greatly changed. rrhe French were now in
force ; they had put their remaining defences in good condition ; they had
spread inundations over the face of the country; and not only would there be
little chance of further success, but the safety of the expedition, formidable as
it was, might have been compromised by a further advance. It was therefore
decided in council to abandon the movement against Antwerp. The troops accordingly returned to the island of Walcheren, which they did not finally leave
till the end of December.
The failure in the ultimate object of the expedition is to be ascribed to the
omission to seize, in the first instance, the south shore of the river, and capture
the batteries there, as was originally designed, and which was prevented by the
difficulty of landing enoii.gh troops at any one debarcation, in the bad weather
then prevailing. The capture of these batteries would have enabled the expedition to have reached Fort Bartz during the first week; and, in the then unprepared state of the French, the issue of a dash upon Antwerp can hardly be
doubted .
The dreadful mortality that assailed the British army is wholly unconnected
with the plans, conduct, or issue of the enterprise, as a military movement; unless, indeed, it may have frustrated a scheme for occupying the island of Walcheren as a position during the war.
Possession was held of the island for five months; and it was finally abandoned
from no pressure upon it by the French, although, after the first six weeks, the
British force consisted, in the aggregate, of less than 17,000 men; of which, for
the greater part of the time, more than half were sick-effectives being often
reduced below 6,000 men.
"\Ve see, therefore, that an effective force of less than 10,000 men maintained
possession of the island, in the face of, and in close proximity to, the most formidable military power in Europe, for more than three months; and no reason
can be perceived why it might not have remained an indefinite period, while
possessed of naval superiority.
T~e. proximity of Englan~ undoubtedly lessened the expense of the expedition,
but 1t m~uenced the result m no other way material to the argument .
. We will allu_de to no other instances of large expeditions sent by the English to
distant countnes, than the two expeditions, each of about 10,000 men, sent in
the year 1814 against this country: one by the way of Canada, the other to the
Gulf of )1exico. United in a single force of 20,000 men against our sea-coast,
the expen e would have been less, and the results more certain.
The French, notwithstanding their constant naval inferiority, have found
opportunities to embark in great undertakings of the same nature. In 1802,
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Leclerc proceeded to St. Domingo with 34_line-of-battle ships and large friga ~.
more than 20 small frigates and sloops, and upwards of 20,000 men.
We learn from these points in history what constitutes an object worth, u
vast preparations; and it is impossible to resist the fact, that our own coast,.and
rivers, and bays, possess many establishments not less inviting to an enemy than
Flushing and Antwerp.
,
We are taught, moreover, what constitutes a great expedition; in other wor~.
what is the amount of force we must prepare to meet; and, more than all, we are
taught· that such an expedition, seizing a favorable moment, when the military
arrangements of a country are incomplete-when the armies are absent, or imperfect in their organization or discipline-does not hesitate to land in the face
of the most populous districts, and, availing of the local peculiarities, and covered
and supplied by a fleet, to undertake operations which penetrate deep into the
country, and consume considerable time.
It seems, therefore, that whenever the object we are to cover possesses a value
likely to provoke the cupidity of an enemy, or to stimulate his desire to inflict a
serious blow, it is not enough that the approaches by water are guarded agains
his ships; it will be indispensable to place safeguards against attack' by
land also. A force considerable enough for very vigorous attacks agaim;t the
land side of the fortifications may be thrown upon the shore; and if these yield,
a way is opened for the ships, and the enemy carries his object.
In certai!l positions, the local circumstances would favor the land operatiom
of an enemy ; permitting him, while operating against the fortifications, to be
aided by the fleet, and covered from the reaction of the general force of the
country. In other positions, the extreme thinness of the population in t~e
neighborhood would require the forts to rely, for a considerable time, on their
own strength. In all such cases a much greater power of resistance would be
requisite than in circumstances of an opposite nature. In all such circum,Jance~
the works should be of a strength adequate to resist an attack, although persevered in vigorously for several days. But when these land operations lead away
from the shipping, or when the surrounding population is considerable, ?r ~e
enemy is unable to shelter his movements by local peculiarities, then it "\\"1ll
suffice if the works be competent to resist attacks, vigorous also, of a few hour~
only.
..
'l'he magnitude and strength of the works will depend, therefore, on the _J?lil'
influence of the value of the object covered, the natural strength of the posinon.
and the succor to be drawn from the neighborhood. We may introduce, ~
instances, New York. and Pensacola. The former is as attackable as the latter:
that is to say, it equally requires artificial defences; and, owing to its cap~cin~
harbor and easy entrance, it is not easy to place it in a satisfactory conchnon ~
to the approaches by water. But while an enemy, in approaching any of th
principal works by land, could not well cover himself from the at~ac~s of, th
concentrated population of the vicinity, the rapid means of commumcation fro
tho interior would daily bring great accessions to the defence. A land attac
ao-ain:.;t the city must, consequently, be restricted to a few days; and the -work=
will fulfil th ir object, if impregnable to a coup de main.
.
. l'rn:-:acola, an object, in many respects, of the highest importance, ancl !!TOWI_D;:;
m cou:-e()_uencc every day, i capable of being defended as perfectly a the cny
~n;-;t mP11tioned. The principal defence lie on a long andy i land, which cl • •
m th· liarbor from the sea. A.n enemy landed on this i land ( anta Ro--a} wo
b in unint rruptcd communication with his fleet· could, owing to the :,;par::: n ~of th · population, lrnv nothino- to apprehend, for' ome time, from any re- n ·
ment..: arrivino- at the })lac ; and would b well protected, by po.ition, fr m
_ft<.·
of thi.: ·uc r, wh 'n it , hould arriv . ·while in po, e ·ion of 11aYal -u r10nty, h m1 ht, therefore not unrea onaLly calculate on b inO' aule to pre-icgc f many day of the work which occupie the extremity of th i::land.
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o-nards the entrance to the harbor. And even before coming into possession of
this work his gun and mortar batteries, on the same island, would destroy every
thing not bomb-proof and incombustible at the na:y yard. An attack -not less
persevering, and with equal chances of success, might be made from the other
side of the harbor also.
If, therefore, the power to resist a coup de main be all that is conferred on
the works at Pensacola, their object will be obtained only through the forbearance of the enemy; it being obviously indispensable that the principal of these
works be competent to resist a short siege. If this liability resulted from tl~e
thinness of the neighboring population, it would still be many years before th~s
state of thiugs would be materially altered. But it does not depend on tlus
alone; the peculiar topographical features will continue tEis liability in spite of
increasing numbers, and ever so easy and rapid communication with the interior;
it having been proved that a fleet may lie broad off this shore and hold daily
communication therewith during the most tempestuous season. The English
fleet of men-of-war and transports lay, during the last war, from the 7th of
February to the 15th March, 1814, anchored abreast of Dauphin island. and
Mobile Point, where the exposure is the same as that off Pensacola.
Between the cases cited, which may be regarded as of the class of extreme·
cases, (a class comprising, however, many important positions,) almost every
conceivable modification of the defence will be called for, to suit the various.
conditions of the several points.
'l'he fortifications of the coast must therefore be competent to the double task
of interdicting the passage of ships and resisting land attacks-two distinct and
independent qualities. The first demands merely an array in suitable numbers.
and in proper proportions of heavy guns, covered by parapets proof against shot
and shells; the second demands inaccessibility. As there is nothing in the
first quality necessarily involving the last, it has often happened, either from the
little value of the position, or from the supposed improbability of a land attack,.
or from the want of time to construct proper works, that this property of inaccessibility has been neglected.
Whenever we have an object of sufficient value to be covered by a battery,
we should bear in mind that the enemy will know the value of the object as
well as ourselves. That it is a very easy thing for him to land a party of men
for an expedition of an hour or two ; and, unless we take the necessary preventive measures, his party will be sure to take the battery first; after which,
nothing will prevent his vessels consummating the design it was the purpose of
the battery to prevent.
In general, the same fortifications that guard· the water approaches will pro-·
tect the avenues by land also, but in certain cases a force may be so lande<l as
to evade the channel defences, reaching the object by a route entirely inland.
Of course this danger must be guarded against by suitable works.
After the preceding exposition of our views on the general subject of the defences of the coast, it may not be out of place here to indicate the mode by
which the system of fortifications on which we would rely can be manned and
Hervcd without an augmentation for that particular purpose of the regular army.
~he force that should be employed for this service in time of war is the militia,
(~smg the term in~ comprehensive sense;) the probability being that, in most
of_the defended pou1;ts on the seabord, the uniformed and volunteer companies
will FZupply the garrisons needed. And it may be shown that it is a service to
which militia are better adapted than any other.
~'l~e prominent defect of a militia force results from the impossibility of so
tr_amnw the men to field m~vements in the brief period of their service as to
~1,e them an_y confidence m themselves as manceuvrers in the face of regular
troops ; the little they learn merely suffices to show them that it is but little;.
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every attempt of the kind proving, by the disorder that they know not how to
avoid, how much greater would be the disorder if in face of an enemy and under
fire.
vVi~l:~ut the knowleclg·e to _be obtained ~nly by long and laborious practice,
the militiaman knows that he 1s no match 111 the field for the reo-ular soldier.
and it is not surprising that he should desire to avoid an encounte~. But there
is no such difficulty in the service of fixed batteries. The militiaman has to 1e
taught merely the service of a single gun, than which nothing can be more
simple. He must learn to use the rammer and the sponge, the handspike and
the linstock, to load, and to run to battery, to trail and· to fire; these are all.
Each of these operations is of the utmost simplicity, depending· on individual
action and not on concert, and they may all be taught in a very short time.
There is no ma11reuvring, no marching, no wheeling. 'I1he squad of one gun
may be marched to another, but the service of both is the same. Even the art
-0f pointing cannon is, to an American militiaman, an art of easy attainment,
from the skill that all our countrymen :;icquire in the use of fire-arms-" drawing
-sight, or aiming," being the same art, modified only by the difference in the gun.
'rhe mode of applying this force may be illustrated by the case of any of our
-cities on the seaboard. 'I'he forts and batteries, being put in perfect condition.
·s hould be garrisoned (at least the more important ones) by a small body ot
Teg·ular artillery, such as our present military force could supply, and sufficient
for the preservation of the public property, and to afford indispensable daily
guards; to these should be added two or three men of the ordnance departmen ,
especially charged with the condition of the armament and ammunition, and
tw0 or three engineer soldiers, whose sole duty it would be to attend to the con·d iti0n of the fortifications; keeping every part in a state of perfect repair. In
certain important works, however, that would be exposed to siege, or to analogous operations, it would be prudent, especially in the beginning of a war. r
keep up a more consi<lerable body of regular troops.
The volunteer force of the city should then be divided into detachment:,
without disturbing their company organization, and should be assigned to ~"
-several works, according to the war g·arrisons required at each; from folll' to~u
men, according to cfrcumstances, being allowed to each gun.
.
rrhe larger works might require ten, fifteen, or even twenty comparues; th
smaller, one, two, three, or more companies; and, in some cases, even a platoc·~
.might suffice. Being thus assigned, each portion of the city force w?uld _ha',
its definite alarm-post, and should be often taken to it, and there exerc1 ed m
the duties of its garrison, and more especially in the service of its batterie _a~
in its defence ag·ainst assault. The multiplicity of steamboats in all the c1_nr
·would enable the volunteers to reach even the most distant alarm-po t ma
short time.
In order that all these troops may become expert in their duty, one of _tu
-works most convenient to the city, besides being the alarm-post of some parhLu·
lar portion of the volunteers, should, during· peace, b~ the ordinary school_ ·
drill for all; and in this the detachments should, in turn, assemble and exerciB e ides the mere manual of the gun and battery, there should be frequen·
targ t practice, as being not only necessary to the proper use of th battery.
but a imparting interest and excitement to the service.
t mi<>'ht be n cc sn.ry for a time to submit the volunteers to the drill ot
com pet nt officer or non-commi ioned officer of the regular artillery; and. ·
particular, to conduct th practice with f"hot and shell under uch instrncti n.
Th portion of the military ,force of the city not tationed in the :fix cl
t ri would con. titut , uncl r an imp ncling attack, a re ~ervc, po.Jed eith ·
on or ·ev ral bodi R, accordin to circum tancc , ready to cover exp f1 cl poin·:
to co- perate in offi n ive mo:v mcnt , or to relieve exhau..:tcd gani.::Olk :
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portion having connected with it the mounted force, the field artillery, and the
heavy movable guns.
.
.
.
'I1his appropriation of the volunteer force to the 1mmed1ate defence ?f the city
would operate in the most favorable way upon that force, superaddrng to t~e
impulses of patriotism every feeling connected with_ family,_ property, _and so~rnl
and civil relations, and, while making military service the first of duties, relieving it of hardship and privation. It would be a peculiar feature in this kind
of service that the governing motive in the choice of officers would be favorable
to the condition of the troops, every man feeling that the safety of his dearest
concerns depended on the efficiency and courage of his officers. The same
motive would prompt him, moreover, to desire, and contribute to, the highest
state of efficiency in the corps.
The organization of volunteer force here contemplated may comprehend the
whole maritime frontier; and be applicable, also, at the more populous points
upon the inland borders.
This arrangement, while it might be an enduring one, would be the least expensive by far of any that would be efficient.
'11 he days· of exercise, drill, and encampment should be fixed and invariable,
in order that they may the less interfere with the private occupations of the
volunteers. During an impending attack, greater or less portions should. be
-constantly at these posts; but still the service would comprise but a very small
portion of the year.
According to the value of the interest -to be defended, and the extent of the
works to be occupied, would be the rank of the chief command ; which should
be intrusted to an officer of the regular army, whose control might often be extended, advantageously, over a certain extent of seaboard to the right and left,
constituting a maritime department.
In the tables to be presented at the end of this report, we shall give the
whole number of men required for the complete defence of each of the works.
"\Ve now proceed to examine the coast in detail; and, in order to conform to
the Senate's resolution, we shall divide the whole sea-coast of the United States
into two great portions: the first portion extending from Passamaquoddy bay
to Cape Florida; the second from Cape Flon'da to tlie moutli ef tlie Sabine.
In our description we shall: without any other than this general aclmowledgment, quote largely from a report presented to Congress in April, 1836, ancl to·
be found in the Senate clocuments of the 1st session 24th Congress, No. 203,
vol. 4. This report contains an argument on the general subject, embodying
many important consiclerations, which we have thought best not to repeat in this
lengthened report, but to refer to as worthy of perusal.
·we will conduct the examination geographically, beginning at the northeastern
extremity, ancl referring in every case to accompanying tables which exhibit
the several works in the order of relative importance as to time.
COAST FROM PASSAMAQUODDY BAY TO CAPE FLORIDA.

The extreme northeastern section of this coast, extending from Quoddy Head
to Cape Cod, is characterized by its serrated outline and its numerous harbors,
and, at certain seasons, by its foggy atmosphere. 'I.1he extent of this section,
measuring from point to point wherever the breaks of the coast are abrupt, is
about 500 miles; while a straight line from one of the above-mentioned capes to
the other is hardly half that di::itance. The eastern half is singularly indented
?Y deep bays; the coast being universally rocky and possessing numerous
ll!land ·urrounded by d ep water, which islands not only increase the number
of harbors, but cover, besides, an interior navigation well understood by the
hardy coa ter and measurably secured by its intricacies, and the other dangers
of this boisterous and foggy region, from interruption by an enemy. •'l'he western
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half is much less broken; it is covered by few islands in comparison, but contains several excellent harbors.
The eastern harbors of l\faine are exposed in a peculiar manner. They arrnot only on the flank of our line, but they are also quite near the public estal lishments of the greatest maritime power. 'l1hey are, moreover, as yet backed
by only a thin population; and are, consequently, weak as well as exposed.
The time may not, however, be very distant when, becoming wealthy and
populous, they will be objects of a full portion of the national solicitude. Work~
desigll(•d for these harbors must therefore be i:alculated for the future; must lJ!'
founded on the principle that they mu?t defend places much more important than
any now existing there-; that, being near the possessions of a foreign powei.
they will be in a particular manner liable to sudden and repeated attacks; and
that, lying at the extremity of the coast, they are liable to be tardily succored.
The works must consequently be competent to resist escalade, and to hold out
for a few days. Feebler works might be more injurious than beneficial: their
weakness would in the first place invite attack; and it being often a great advantage to occupy fortified. places in an adversary's territory, the enemy c~uld
prepare himself to remedy the deficiencies of the forts after they should fall rnto
his hamls, by adding temporary works, by providing strong garrisons, and by
aiding the defence with his vessels.
. .
:No surveys have been made of these harbors, and no plans formed for the~r
drfcnce. It may be well to observe here, once for all, that. much confidence 1~
not asked for the mere conjectures presented below, as to the number and cost
of the works assigned for the protection of the harbors which have not yet been
surveyed : in some cases there may be mistakes as to the number of forts and
batteries needed; in others, errors will exist in the estimated cost.
Eastport and 1Vlaclzias may be mentioned as places that
unquest~ona?lY
be thought to need defensive works by the time, in the order of relative unportance, the execution of them can be undertaken by the government. There
are several small towns eastward of Mount Desert island that may, at that
p eriod, deserve equal attention ; at present, however, the places mentioned will
be the only ones estimated for; and $100,000 will be assumed as the cost at
each.-(Statemen~ 1, table F.)
Mount, Desert i'sland, situated a little east of Penobscot bay, having a capacious and close harbor, affording anchorag,e for the higJ1est class of vessel~, and
easily accessible from sea, offers a station for the navy of an enemy superior_to
any other on this part of the coast. From this point his cruisers might act ,~·1th
great effect against the navigation of the eastern coast, especially that of ~Jame:
ai~cl his euterpriscs could be conducted with great rapidity against any J?Olllt:' ~c
1mght.sclect. These considerations, added to the very great advantage m certam
IJ~litical events, of our occupying a naval station thus advanced, whence we
m1g t act offensively, together with the expediency of providing placr . of ~u~cor _on ~ part of the coast wl1crc vessels are so frequently perple:xe_cl m_ the.rr
uay1gat1011 Ly the prevailing fogs, lead to the conclusion that the fort1-ficat10n. m
a ,_-tr?11g manner, of this roaclstead may before long be neces ary. A f\UHey of
tl11~ 1:-:l:nHl wa:-; hrgun many years ago; but the JHwty being called off to other
clut1c, It wa:-; 1wvcr completed. 'l'he project of defensive works ha:- not L ·r.
uuHlr.. The entire cof1t may be, as a:-::-:umecl by the engineer department ~om
year;-; a~o, , 500,000.-(Statcm('])t 1, table F.)
Castme.-It would H<' m to lie impo;;~il,lc, on this coa t, to dcp1ive an new:
njoyincr naval superiority of lrnrhor~, or prevent lii ui-ing th rn , :'- ::-ta io during: war-in ·ular ,.ituation:, wl1ich l1i.· YC~i-cl~ woulcl render u1111ppn t ·h, lilc, lwin~ :-o mnnerou, ; lrnt it ;<•pm:-; 1n·oper tlwt i-uc:h of tlie.-e po:--ifr,u,-,',
th ' i-itP.' of town;; :-J10u1<l be .'<'turPd.
l11'ing the lai-t war the Eno·]i:-h Jwl' ih
110~ition of a ·tine for om time, aucl left it at their 1ilcasurc. It i:, probabl 3
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woTk costing about $50,000 would deter an enemy from again making choice
of this position.-(Statement 1, table F.)
.
•
1
Penobscot bay.-Upon this bay, and upon the nvcr of tne
same name flow~ng
into it, are several flourishing towns and villages. Of the many bays which
intersect the coast the Penobscot is the one which presents the greatest number
of safe and capacious anchorages. As before observed a la.rge portion of these
harbors must, for the present, be left without defences, but the valuable commerce of the bay and Tiver must be covered; and to afford a secure retreat for
such vessels as may be unable to place themselves under the protection of the
works to the east or west of the bay, the passage of the river must be defended.
The lowest point at which this can be done without great expense is opposite
Buck sport, at the "narrows." A project has been given in for a fort at that
position estimated at $150,000.-(Statement 1, table D.)
St. George's bay, Broad bay, Damariscotta, and Slwepscu,t.-West of the
Penobscot occur the above-mentioned bays, all being deep indentations leading
to towns, villages, and various establishments of industry and enterprise. The
bays have not been surveyed, and of course no plans have been formed for their
defence. $400,000 are assigned to the defence of these waters. 'l'he Sheepscut is an excellent harbor of refuge for vessels of every size.-(Statcment 1,
table F.)
Kennebeck river.-This river (one of the largest in the eastern States) enters
the sea nearly midway between Cape Cod and the mouth of the St. Croix. It
rises near the source of the Chaudiere, which is a tributary of the St. Lawrence,
and has once served as a line of operations against Quebec. The situation and
extent of this river, the value of its products, and the active commerce of several
very flourishing towns upon its banks, together with the excellence of the
harbor within its mouth, will not permit its defence to be neglected. 'l'he
smveys begun many years ago were never finished. The estimated cost of
defences, as formerly reported by the engineer department, was $300,000. Positions near the mouth will permit a secure defence.-(Statement 1, table D.)
Portland lwrbor.-Tbe protection of the town, of the merchantmen belonging to it, and of the ships-of-war that may be stationed in this harbor to watch
over this part of the coast, or that may enter for shelter, (all of them important
objects,) may be secured, as an inspection of the map of the harbor will show,
by occupying Fort Preble Point, House island, Hog Island ledge, and Fish
Point.
If the two channels to the west and east of Hog island can be obstructed at
small expense (to decide which some surveys are yet necessary) there will be
no necessity for a battery on th~ ledge, and Fish Point need be occupied only
by.' uch works as may be thrown up in time of war. rrhe expense, as now
estimated, of the works planned for this defence, will be $155,000 for ::b"'ort
PreLle, and $48,000 for House island; for Hog I sland channel say, $135,000. (Sta~em(mt 1, t_ables A, D, E, and F.) In addition there must be repairs im·
.
mechately apphed to the old works at an expense of $G,600.
Saco, Kennebunk, ancl York.-Small works comparatively will cover these
places; $75,000 is assumed as the aggregate cost.-(Statement, 1, table F.)
Port.rnnoutli ltarbor and navy yard.-The only good roadstead or hai·bor
beb1:een Cape Elizabeth and Cape Ann is Portsmouth harbor, within the mouth
of_Pi1:1cataqua river. Line-of-battle ships can ascend as high as Fox Point, seven
mtles above the town. This situation, sufficiently commodious for a secondary
naval depot designed to repair vessels of war, should be maintained; but it is
t? be :egrcttcd that the bay to the south of Fox Point was not chosen as the
~ite of the navy yard instead of Fernald's island. Being where it is, it will be
n~ces.;ary, in time of war, to make some particular dispositions for the protection
of the navy yard from an attack from the north shore of the Tiver.
The po ·ition of Fort Constitution will certainly, and that of Fort McCleary
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will probably, be occupied by the defences, though the works themselves should
give place to those that will better fulfil the object. The other positions for
forts or batteries are Gerrishe's Point, Fishing island, and Clark's island, some,
if not all, of which must be occupied. Surveys are required before the projectE
can be formed, or before estimates can be made; but there is reason for believing
that the entire cost of fortifying this harbor will not fall short of $300;000.( Statement 1, table D.)
Newburyport harbor.-11he points forming the mouth of the harbor are
continually changing, and it seems necessary, therefore, to rely, for the defence
of the harbor, on works to be thrown up during a war. There is only a shoal
draught of water. It is thought $100,000 will defend this harbor adequately.(Statement 1, table F.)
Gloucester liarbor.-'rhe position of this harbor, near the extremity of Cape
Ann, places it in close relation with the navigation of all Massachusetts bay,
and imparts to it considerable imp0rtance. No surveys have yet been made.
but it is believed that sufficient defence may be provided for $200,000.-(Statement 1, table E.) Should there be any occasion for defensive works before the
proposed new works can be commenced, an expenditure of $10,000 in repairs of
th e old fort will be required.-(Table A.)
Beverly liarbor.-'I1his harbor will be defended chiefly by a portion of the
works designed for Salem. $50,000 in addition will secure it.-(Statement 1,
table F.)
Salem lwrbor.-The port of Salem is distant from Marblehead two miles, and
separated therefrom by a peninsula. The occupation of the extremity of Wint er island (where are the ruins of l!...,01-t Pickering) on one side, and Kangu~
Head on the other, will effectually secure this harbor. Projects have been pre:
sented for this defence, estimated to cost $225,000.-(Statement 1, tables D anu
F.) On a sudden emergency, old Fort Lee may be put in an effective state for
$2,000.-(Table A.)
.
Jl!Iarblehead liarbor.-Besides covering, in some measure, the harbor of Bo~ton, Salem and Marblehead harbors possess an important commerce of the1r
own, and also afford shelter for vessels prevented, by certain winds, from enter·
ing· Boston, or pursuing their course eastward. The proposed mode of d~fending Marblehead harbor consists in occupying, on the north side, the hillock
which commands the present Fort Sewall, (which will be superseded by the ne_w
work,) and, on the south, the position of Jack's Point. The two works "'ill
cost 318,000.-(Statements 1, tables D and .I!,.)
To repair old l!...,ort Sewall, which may be necessary, if the new works arc not
, oon begun, will require $10,000.-(Table A.).
Boston harbor.-We come now to the most important harbor in the ca. tern
ection of the coast; and, considering the relation to genern1 commerce, and thP
intere, t of the navy, one of the most important in the whole Union.
After a careful examination of all the necessary conditions of such a problc~.
the hoard of naYal officers and engineers, in their joint report of 1820, ga,e thi::l1arhor a prcfi rcnce over all other positions to the ea t, and inclusive, of ~.,.cw
York bay m1d thr Iluc1 on, a the scat of the great northern naval deJ)Ot · aud
the o-ov mm nt, by the g-reat addition and improvements that have from). ar
to y ar been inc made to the navy yard on the Ohade town side, lu1-e ,~rroall - ,·anctionecl the recommendation of the board. But, independent ot h ·
rnff · Yard, B ~ton it a city of great ·wealth, :md po e e an xten fre and actiY cmmn 1cc.
1 b old w rk defi nclrc1 rnpr l - tlic interfor bm,in from attacks b, w. r :
lmt a:- it oft n bappem, that VP:-:. Ji,; nt r .,. anfa1-1ket road1-1 with a wi11d ·too c. u
to ti k tlwm to th ·it ' r ar d •tain d in l)rr1'-ic1Pnt road:- by Jight wind, r
a ,cr1- tic1 · a. th form r, specially i:; a vrry conv nicnt an homz wh
1 pr c
d to ·ea; ancl abov all, a· ... .,.anta.,,k t road afford th b ~t I o"·
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station for a blockading squadron,, it was deemed inc~ispensable to place permanent defences at the mouth of the harbor. The proJect of defence regard s the
existing works, with the necessary repairs and modifications, as constituting a
second barrier.
Besides a permanent work, now well advanced, on George's island, it contemplates perm~rnent works on N antasket Head ; filling up the Broad Sound chanuel, so a" to leave no passage in that direction for ships-of-war.
Until the best draught for steam vessels of war shall be well ascertained, it
will not be safe to say to , vhat depth the Broad Sound ~hannel_ s~ould be restricted; nor, indeed, can it be positively asserte~ that this descr1pt10n of vessel
can be conveniently excluded by such means. Other vessels can, however, be
thus excluded ; and steam vessels passing this channel would still have to pass
the inner barrier. The estimated cost of the works for this harbor is $2,040,000.
Besides the works of a permanent character, it will be necessary, in the beginning of a war, to erect several temporary works on certain positions in the
harbor, and on the lateral approaches to the navy yard.-(Statement 1, tables
A, E, and F.)
Plyrnouth, and Provincetown liarbors.-These harbors have a commerce of
some consequence of their own, but they are particularly interesting in reference
to the port of Boston. ·while these are undefended, an enemy's squadron blo~kading Massachusetts bay 'will have ports of refuge under his lea, which woul<l.
enable him to maintain his blockade, even throughout the most stormy seasonsknowing that the winds whiGh would force him to seek shelter would be adverse to
outward-bound, and fatal to such inward vessels as should venture near the Cape.
"\Vere the enemy deprived of these harbors, he would be unable to enforce a
rigorous investment, as he would be constrained to take an offing on every approach of foul weather. Our own vessels coming in from sea, and finding an
enemy interposed between them and Boston, or, being turned from their course
by adverse winds, would, in case of the defence of these ports, find to the south
of Boston shelters equivalent to those provided in the east, at Marblehead, Salem, Gloucester, and Portsmouth. Plymouth harbor has not been fully surveyed. Provincetown harbor has been surveyed, but the projects of defence
have not been formed. The former, it is thought, may be suitably covered by
a work of no great cost on Garnett Point; while, to fortify Provincetown harbor
in such a way as to cover vessels taking shelter therein, and at the same time
deprive an enemy of safe anchorages, will involve considerable expense. Probably no nearer estimate can be formed at present, than that offered by the ·engineer department some years ago, which gave $100,000 for Plymouth, and
S600,000 for Provincetown.-(Statement 1, tables D and E.)
'l'he coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras differs from the northeastern
section in po,_sessing fewer harbors, in having but little rocky and a great portion of sandy shore, in its milder climate and clearer atmosphere; and it differs
from all the other portions in the <lop.th and magnitude of its interior seas and
sounds, and in the distance to which deep tide navigation extends up its numerous large rivers. The circuit of the coast, not including the shores of the great
bays, measures 650 miles, while a straight line from one of the above-named
cape~ to the other measures about 520 miles.
ll[artlw' s Vineyard sound.-'l'o the south of Cape Cod lie the islands of Nantuck et and l\Iartha's Vineyard 1 which, with several smaller islands on the south,
and the proj ection of Cape Malabar on the east, enclose the above-named sound.
The ch annels through this sound, being sufficient for merchant vessels, and one
of th e channels permitting the passage even of small frigates, are not only the
~omtant track of coasting vessels, but also of large numbers of vessels arriving
m the t empe tuou. months from foreign voyages. There are within the sound
the harbor of Tarpaulzn Cove, Fiolnies's .Hole, Edgartown, Fal7nouth, Hyannis, arid Santucket, besides small anchorages.
0
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In addition to the many thousand vessels passing this water annually, (of
which there are sometimes forty or fifty,) a portion, containing very valuable
cargoes, to be seen in the harbors awaiting a change of wind, there is supposed
to be at least 40,000 tons of whaling vessels owned in the tow;ns of this sound.
If the harbors just named are to be defended at a;ll, it .must be by fortifications. There is little or no population except in the towns, and even this is believed to be entirely without military organization. A privateer rnig·ht run into
either of these h arbors, and capture, destroy, or levy contributions at pleasure.
11.'he use of the sound itself, as an anchorage for vessels of war, cannot be preprevcmted by fortifications alone. $250,000 may, perhaps, suffice for the defence
of all the harbors against the kind of enterprise to which they are exposed.(Statement 1, table :E'.)
New Bedford and Ti'airliaven lwrbor.-N o survey has been made of this
harbor, on which lie two of the most flourishing towns. It is easily defensible,
and the amount formerly assumed by the engineer department
probably
suffice, namely, $3 00,000.-(Statement 1, table D.)
Bu.zzard's bay.-Interposed between the main and the island of JUartha'i\
Vineyard, are the Elizabeth islands, which bound Buzzard's bay on the eouth.
This bay covers the harbor of New Bedford, and might be nsed as an anchorage by an enemy's fleet ; but it is too wide to be defended by fortifications.
Xarraganset bay.-The properties of this great roadstead will be here briefly
adverted to . More minute information may be obtained by reference to report:\
of 1820 and 1821.
As a harbor, this is acknowledged by all to be the best on the whole coas~ of
the United States; and it i~ the only close man-of-war harbor that is accessible
with a northwest wind, the prevailing· and most violent winc1 of the inclement
season. Nnmcrous boards and commission:s, sometimes compo1<ecl of naval
officers, sometimes of army officers, sometimes of officers of both services, have.
at different tim es, had the subject of this roadstead under consideration; and all_
have concurred in recommending·, in strong terms, that it be made a P:ace ot
naval rendezvous and repair, if not a great naval depot; one or more of these
commissions preferring it, for the latter purpose, to all other positions. 'l'hese
recommendations haYe not been acted on; but it is next to certain that a war
would force their adoption upon the government.
·with the opening of this anchorage properly defended, hardly a ve~sel-ofwar would come, either singly or in small squadrons, upon the coaet, m ~hr·
boisterous season, without aiming at this port, on account of the comparat1w
certainty of an immediate entrance. And this would be particul arly the ca:-:r
with vessels injured by h eavy wea,ther, or in conflict with an enemy; with vc::-seh! bringing in prizes, or pursued by a superior force.
This use of the J:>Ort would almost neces:=;arily bring with it the demand for
the mean: of repairing ancl r efittin g ; and the concentration of the~c upon :-omc
euitable spot would be the b eginning of a p ermanent dock yard.
For th same r eason that ships-of-war would collect h re, it would b~ a
favorite point of r endezvous for privateers and their prizes, and a common plac ·
of rr.fuge for merchantmen.
From this , a. a na;val station, th e naviO"fltion of Long I sland sound, and th
communication h •twc n thi.· antl llfartba'~ Yin eyarcl ,_ound, or Buzzard'~ l1ay.
mi,rht lJc W<'ll protectN1; .r T cw Loll don h arbor would be covered ; the 1uivy }-arl
wonH commmHl ·outhwarclly, a, from Hampton 1wtd · northwan:ly, the !!T"a·
iuwarcl cmTe of th· coa~t bet"· ·c·n Cape 'ocl and 'np e IIattera;-;; the inf!u ·nc
of which comman d OYC'r th blockaclinp: opc·ration :-; of :m enemy will LP app:u·m.
wh f'u it i:- c011:-irl r·rc 1 that t]1e only l1arbcm, of n·fop;c left to liim wiil be the
<·l:nnm• 'anlincr':'I, and Buzzard:-- J,ay;4, :,ncl ::\Iartlia':'I Yin cyarcl .:nund .
'l he hays fir:t mcntimwcl IH'long- to tl;e ·l a::-, IH'f;>re allndc(l to, which. b ·in~
too wid for complete def ·ncc Lv batteri -4, um.·~ call in :uch auxiliary ddc.1c ,
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as the navy may supply; and, in reference to ~heix_ defence by these means,
nothing can be more important than the fort1fica~10n o~ N arraganset roads,
because all but the first of the bays J11st named (mcludmg an anchorage for
ship.;-of-war under Block island) would be commanded by a single squadron of those floating defences lying in these roads. 'ro a squadron of steam
batteries, for instance, lying under the fortifications, it would be a matter
of little consequence into which of the above anchorages a~ ~nc1:1y should
go- all being within reach in three or four hours, and some w1tlun sight. We
will here observe, by the way, that this use of floating defences is in accordance
with th e ptinciple before insisted on; they are not expected to close the entrance
into these several bays, that would require a squadron for each at least equal ~o
the enemy's ; but as the enemy goes in merely for rest or shelter, and there 1s
no object that he can injure, he may be permitted to enter, and our squadron
will assail him only ·when the circumstances of wind, weather, &c., give all the
advantages to the attack. 'rlie fortification of Narraganset roads is therefore,
in effect, a most important contribution toward the defence of all the neighboring anchorages.
But the same properties that make N arraganset roads so precious to us, would
recommend them to the enemy also ; and their natural advantages will be
enhanced in his eyes by the value of all the objects these advantages may have
accumulated therein.
If this roadstead were without defence an enemy could occupy it without opposition, and, by the aid of naval superiority, form a lodgment on the island of
Rhode Island for the war. Occupying this island with his troops, and with his
fleets the channels on either side, he might defy all the forces of the eastern
States ; and while, from this position, his troops would keep in alarm and motion
the population of the east, feigned expeditions against New York, or against
more southern cities, would equally alarm the country in that direction; and
thus, though he might do no more than menace, it is difficult to estimate the
embarrassment and expense into which he would drive the government.
It has been alleged that similar consequences would flow from the occupation
of other positions, (such, for instance, as arc afforded in the bays just mentioned,)
and that, therefore, the defence in a strong manner of N arraganset roads is useless.
Even allowing that there are other advantageous and inaccessible positions
whereon an enemy might place himself, is it a reason because the foe can in
spite of us, possess himself of comparatively unsafe and open lmrbors, that we
should not apply to our own uses, but yield up to him the very best harbor on
the coast; that we should submit to capture and destruction the valuable objects
that accumulate in consequence of the properti€s of the harbor 1
But it is believed that none of the outer and wider harbors wm answer for
such an establishment as we have supposed, nor for any other purpose than an
occa~ional anchorage of ships-of-war; and for these reasons, amongst others :
that although ships-of-war might possibly ride in these broad waters at all
seasons, it would seem to be a measure of great temerity for transports to
attempt it, except in the mildest seasons; and there can be little doubt that a
hostile expedition would resort to no harbor as a place of rendezvous, unless it
afforded sure protection to its transports ; these being the only means by which
ulterior pmposes could be executed, or final retreat from the country effected. If, moreover, N arraganset roads be fortified and become a naval station, or at
least the f- tation of a floating force designed to act against these outer waters,
such an ,,stabli~hment by any enemy ·would at once be put upon the defensive,
and r,·qnire the constant pre ence of a superior fleet; thus measurably losing
the ohject of the establishment.
Independent of the q_ualities of the hm·bor, however, none of these bays would
an:::wer our IJUrpose : l::it. Because they cannot be securely defended ; and, 2d.
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Because they are difficult of access from the main-the communication with them
being liable to interruption by bad weather, and liable to be cut off by the enemy.
The defence adopted for N arraganset roads must be formidable on the important points, because they will be exposed to powerful expeditions. .Although
the possession of this harbor, the destruc6on of the naval establislunent, the
. capture of the :floating defences, and the possession of the island as a place of
debarkation and refreshment, should not be considered as constituting, of them·
selves, objects worthy a great expedition, they mig·ht very well be the preliminary steps of such expedition; and defences weak in their character might
tempt, rather than deter it; for, althoug·h unable to resist his enterpri,e, they
might be fully competent, after being captured and strengthened by such means
as he would have at hand, to protect him from offensive demonstrations on our
part.
'There are, besides, in the local circumstances, some reasons why the works
should be strong. The channel on the eastern side of the island, being peimanently closed by a solid bridge, requires no defensive works; but this bridge
being at the upper end of the island, the channel is open to an enemy all along
the eastern shore of the island. Works erected for the defence of the channel
on the west side of the island cannot, therefore, prevent, nor even oppos~, a
landing on the eastern side. The enemy, consequently, may take possession,
and bend his whole force to the reduction of the forts on the island, which cannot be relieved until a force has been organized, brought from a cli_stance, ~onveyed by water to the points attacked, and landed in the face of h1s battenes;
all this obviously requiring several days, during which the forts should be capa·
ble of holding out. 'ro do this aganist an expedition of 10,000 or 20,000 men,
demands something more than the strength to resist a single asrnult.
Unless the main works be competent to withstand a seige of a few days, they
will not therefore fulfil their trust, and will be worse than useless.
It must here be noticed that, although the works do not prevent the landing
of an enemy on Rhode Island, they will. if capable of resisting bis ~fforts ~or a
few days, make his residence ·on the island for any length of time IIDpossible;
since forces in any number may be brought from the main and landed under
the cover of the fire of the works.
To come now to the particular defences proposed for this roadstead. It must
be stated that there are three entrances into Narraganset roads:
.
1. 'I1he eastern channel, which passes up on the east side of the 1sland of
Rhode I land. This, as before stated, being shut by a solid bridge, need~ no
defence by fortifications, other than a field-work or two, which may be thrown
up at the opening of a war.
2d. The central channel, which enters from sea Ly passing between Rhode
I sland and Canonicut island. 'rhis is by far the best entrance, andlead~
t? the be t anchorage; and this it is proposed to defend by a fort on th ca~t
Bid · of the entrance, designed to be the principal work in the ~ystem. Thi-:
1vork, called Fort Adams, is nearly completed. On the west side of the en·
!ranee it ~- proposed to place another work; and on an i land, cal~ cd Ro~c
i.lancl, facmo- the entrance, a third work. It i also proposed to rep:ur _the _old
£ rt on Goat i8land, ju::;t within the mouth· and al. o old l"'ort Green, which b a
littl ' hi()"h r up, and on the i.-land of Rhode Island.
3~1. A. to th westcm pa ag ,, thr .e rnodefl pre, ent thcmselve : first : rcdntmO" th' c1 pth of wat •r by an artificial ledo· , o a while the pa.._~ap;e --hall
b • a fr· a. it i now for th • coa. tin()" trade, it shall be hut a to the v •,,-cl, t
war includin"' .-t am-Y :-:.· ·l~; ccon<l, Ly r ,] ·ino- on fortication alone to cl '
th · c·hrum ·l · r, thirc1 b · r<'~orting- in part to one and in l)art to th oth r rn
ju.:t m ntion d. Eith r i. prati ·ah!·· hut, L ing the 1 ast xpen..iYe and II ,·
·rt-tin, the .timat • ar £ und ·cl on th • fir~t.
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The total cost of the Narraganset defences is estimated at $1,817,482.(Statement 1, tables A, B, n, E, and F.)
.
Gardiner's bay.-It is uncertain whether this harhor, wJnch WOl~ld be a verr
valuable one to an enemy investing this part of the coast, 1s defens1ble by fortifications alone. After it shall have been surveyed, it may appear that from one
or more positions, the whole anchorage may be controlled by he~vy sea mortars.
In such a case, the defensive works would not be costly. If 1t be found expedient to fortify some particular portion of the bay, as an anchorge for steam
batteries, (which, however, is not anticipated,) the expense would probably_ be
as great as was anticipated some years since by the engineer department, viz:
$400,000,-(Statement 1, table F.)
Sag Harbor, New York, and Stonington, Connecticut.-Neither of these harbors has been surveyed with reference to defence. The first ii:; possessed of conconsiderable tonnage ; and the second, besides being engaged in commerce, is
the terminous of a railroad from Boston. $100,000 may be assigned to the
first, and $200,000 to the other.-(Statement 1, tables E and F.)
New London harbor is very important to the commerce of Long Island sound ;
and, as a port of easy access, having great depth of water, rarely freezing, and
being easily defended, it is an excellent station for the navy. It is also valuable as a shelter for vessels bound out or home, and desirous of avoiding a blockading squadron off Sandy Hook.
In the plan of defence, the present forts (Trumbull and Griswold) give place
to more efficient works, whereof the expense is estimated at $441,000.-(Statement 1, tables C and F.)
1\lloutk ef Connecticut river.-'.rhis river has been shown to be subject to the
expeditions of an enemy. No survey has been made with a view to its defences; $100,000 is introduced here as the conjectural cost.-(Statement 1,
table F.)
New Haven liarbor.-It is proposed to defend this harbor by improving and
enlarging Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slight redoubt erected
during the last war, called Fort Wooster. The expense of both may be set
down at $90,000, exclusive of $5,000 for immediate repairs of old Fort Hale.(Statement 1, table F.)
There are several towns between New Haven and New York, on both sides
of the sound; none of them are very large as yet, still, most, if not all, are prosperous and increasing. Although, in their present condition, it might not be
deemed necessary to apply any money to permanent defences, yet, as part of
the present object is to ascertain, as near as may be, the ultimate cost of completely fortifying the coast, it seems proper to look forward to the time when
some of these towns may become objects of predatory enterprises of some magnitude. Bearing in mind the probabl.e increase of population in the mean
time, and the situation of the places generally, it is thought that $200,000 will
be enough to provide defences for all.-(Statement 1, table F.)
Kew Yorlc liarbor.-1.1 he objects of the projected works for- the security of
New York arc to cover the city from an attack by land or sea; to protect its
numerous shipping; to prevent, as far as possible, the blockade of this great
port ; and to cover the interior communication uniting this harbor with the Delaware. In the present condition of the defences an enemy would encounter no
great oppo ition, whether his attack were made by land or water.
r.rhcre are two avenues to the city, namely: one by the main channel, direct
from , ea, and one by the sound. If an enemy come by the way of the sound,
he may now land his forces on the Ncw York side, at Hell Gate, within less than
ten mile;-; of New York, ancl the next day, at the latest, be in the city; or he
may land on the Long Island side at the same distance, and in the same time be
master of the navy yard and of Brooklyn heights, whence the city of New York
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is perfectly comm.anded ; · or he may divide his forces and reach both objects a
the same moment.
The projected system of defence closes this avenue at the greatest distance
possible from the city, namely, at 'Throg's Point. The occupation of this poin
will force the enemy to land more than twenty miles from the city on one ~ide,
and still further from the navy yard on the other. A work now in progress at Throg's Point will probably prevent any attempt
to force this passage. It will, as we have seen, oblige an enemy to land at a
considerable distance from the object; and, as he will then be unable to turn the
strong position afforded by Harlem river, the cover on the New York side 11ill
be sufficient.
But should he land on the Long island side he might, by leaving parties on
suitable positions with a view to prevent our crossing the river and falling on
his rear, make a dash at the navy yard, having no obstacle in his front. To
prevent this effectually, and also to accomplish other objects, a work should be
erected on Wilkins's Point, opposite Throg's Point. 'I1his work, besides completing the defence of the channel, would involve a march against the navy yard
from this quarter in great danger; since all the forces that could be collected on
the New York shore might, under cover of this work, be crossed over to Long
island, and fall on the rear of the enemy, cutting off his communication with the
fleet. · 'l'he two works on Throg's and Wilkins's Points may, therefore, be regarded as perfectly protecting, on that side, the city and navy yard.
Again st an attack by the main channel there arelst. 'I'he works in the vicinity of the city, which would act upon an enemy'"
squadron only after its arrival before the place. 'They consist of Fort Columbus, Castle Williams, and South Battery, on Governor's island; Fort Wood, on
Bedlow's island; and Fort Gibson, on Ellis's island.
It is necessary that these works be maintained, because, in the event of the
lower barrier being forced, these would still afford a resource.
is ~ cli~advantage of their positions, however, that the destruction of the city might he
going on simultaneously with the contest between these fort~ and the ~eet.
They cannot, however, be dispensed with, until the outer barriers are entll'ely
completed, if even then.
2d. At the Narrows, about seven miles below the city, the psssagc become~
so contracted as to permit good disposition to be macle for defence. On the Lon(7
islanr1 side of the Narrows is Fort Lafayette, which is a strong water-b'.1tte:y
standing on a reef at some distance from the shore; and immediately bchmd it,
on the top of the bank, is a small but strong work, called Fort Hamilton. ome
repairs being applied to these works, this position may be regarded a~ well
occupied.
n the west side, or Staten island side of the narrows, are the following work,
belonging to the State of New York, viz: Fort Riclnnond, which i ' a waterbattery; Battery Hudson, which is at some height above the water; Batt:'!/
JJl~rtOJ~, which is a mall battery on the top of the hill; and Fort Tomkw ·
wluch 1. aL:,o on the top of the hill, and is the principal work. All the:-1c need
great re1mir,: ; but, being once in proper order, would afford a very importau·
contrilJntion to the defence of th passage; nothino- further, indeed, bein(l' contempl. tPd for thi: po ition, except the con, truction of a i:@all redoubt on a <.: ID·
m:rncling hill, a little to the i--outhwC' t. The repair, of these works cannot t 0
0011 1, · taken in hand; ancl it is hoped ome arrangement may oou he mad
with th· :·tat authoriti(·.' to that end.
Yith th·~ Tarrow,.. thn:-i c1c·frndc(}, and the work. 1war th city in pcifl'd order.
.,.. ·w ~ork might L r garcled as 1n· tty well protected a<raini-t au attack l1y w. t r
through thi: pa:-1~ag .
13ut th ·r · li1·, h ·low th narrow,· < capa ·ion:; hay, affordinO' O'ooc1 anehor.,...
for any number of v · ·cl -of-war and trau ]>OrL·. An enemy'. i-1uadron h ·u __
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in that bay into which entrance is very easy, would set a seal upon this outlet
of the harbor. Not a vessel could enter or depart at any season of the ~ear .
.And it would also intercept the water communication, by the way of the Rantan,
between New York and Philadelphia.
The same squadron could land a force on the beach of Gravesend baJ:, (the
place of the landing of the British, which brought on th~ battle of Long 1sla1;1d
in the revolutionary war,) within seven miles of the city of Brooklyn, of its
commanding height, and of the navy yard, with no intervening obstacle of any
sort.
This danger is imminent, and it would not fail, in the event of war, to ~e. as
fully r ealized as it was during the last war, when, on the rumor of an exped1t~on
being in preparation in England, 27,000 militia were assembled to cover the city
from an attack of this sort. It is apparent that the defences near the city, and
those at the Narrows, indispensable as they are for other purposes, cannot_ be
made to prevent this enterprise, which can be thoroughly guarded agamst
only by3d. An outer barrier at the very mouth of the harbor. This would accomplish two objects of great consequence, namely, rendering a close blockade of
the harbor impossible; and obliging an enemy, who should design to move
troops against the navy yard, to land at a distance of more than twenty miles
from his object, upon a dangerous beach; leaving, during the absence of the
troops, the transports at anchor in the ocean, and entirely without shelter. The
hazards of such a land expedition would, moreover, be greatly enhanced by the
fact that our own troops, by passing over to Long island under cover of the fort
at Wilkins's Point, could cut off the return of the enemy to his fleet, which must
lie at or somewhere near Rockaway; time, distance, and the direction of the
respective marches, would make, very naturally, such a manreuvre a part of the
plan of defence. .Against an enemy landing in Gravesend bay, no such manamvre
could be effectual, on account of the shortness of his line of march, as well as of
its direction.
In view of these ·considerations, the board of engineers projected additional
works-one for the east bank and another for the middle ground,· these positions being on shoals on either hand of the bar, outside of Sandy Hook. Before
determining on the works last mentioned, the board went into much research in
order to ascertain whether these shoals were unchangeable, and it was thought
to have been fully proved that there had been no material alteration in more
than sixty years. This apparent stability of the shoals encouraged the board
to devise the project referred to.
·
Recent surveys have, however, discovered a new or rather another channel.
If it 1e indeed a new channel, it shows a want of stabiHty in the shoals that
forbids any such structures as the contemplated batteries, and it may be necessary to resort to other means. Suitable means exist, unquestionably, though it
may not be best to decide on them until all doubt as to the fixed or changing
nature of the channel shall be removed, especially as it must necessarily be
some time before the completion of more indispensable works will allow the
commencement of these. 'l'his may, however, be said with certainty, namely:
that, all other means failing, works may be erected on Sandy Hook which will
have a good action upon the channel, and under cover of which bomb ketches
o_r steam bat~~ries, or both, may lie. With such an arrangement there would be
little probability of the lo,ver bay being occupied as a blockading station.
To recapitulate : The security of the city of ~ew York and the navy yard
rr·r1nirc;4, fir:-lt, defences on the passage from the sound; namely, the completion
<if :Fort Schuyler on 'l'hrog's Point, and the erection of a fort on ·Wilkins's
~oint- cost of both, $ 976,000; eecond, the repair of works on Governor's
i:-land, on Bcdloe's i,.;land, and on Eilis's island-estimated cost, $170,897;
third, the repair of the works at the Narrows, including the works belonging to
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tlie State-cost, $475,000 ; and, fourth, the erection of outer defences on or
near Sandy Hook-estimated by the board of eng'ineers to cost $3,362,824.
'l'he total cost, exclusive of these last, will therefore be $1,621,897, or, including these, $-!,984, 721.-(Statement 1, tables A, 0, and F.)
Delaware bay, Fort Delaware, Fort Mifflin, Delaware brcakwater.-The
coast from the mouth of"the Hudson to the Chesapeake, as well as that on the
south side of Long island, is low and sandy, and is penetrated by several inlet;
but not one besides the Delawa1~e is navigable by sea-going vessels. 'rhe Delaware bay itself, being wide and full of shoals, having an intricate channel, and
being much obstructed by ice in the winter, affords no very good natural harbor
within a reasonable distance of the sea.
The artificial harbor now in course of construction near Cape Henlopen will,
it is hoped, fully supply this need, in which event it must be securely fortified.
No plans have, however, as yet been made with that object, and as to the probable cost, nothing better can now be done than to assume the conjectural e~timate made some years since in the engineer department, namely, $600,000.( Statement 1, table F.)
The lowest point at which the bay is defensible is at Pea Patch island, about
forty-five miles below the city of Philadelphia. A fort on that island, to replace the one destroyed by fire; a fort opposite the Pea Patch, on the Delaware
shore, to assist in commanding the Delaware channel, and at the same time protect the mouth of the Delaware and Ohesapeak~ canal; a temporary wor~ ~n
the Jersey shore, to be thrown up at the commencement of a war, to a. s1 t lil
closing the channel on that side; together with floating obstructions, to be ~ut
down in moments of peril, will effectually cover all above this position-Ill·
eluding Philadelphia and its navy yard, Wilmington, Newcastle, the canal before mentioned, and the Philadelphia and Baltimore railroad.
The commencement of the rebuilding of Fort Delaware being del~ye~ b!
difficulties attending the settlement of new claims to the island on wh1c~ it IE,
to stand, Fort Mifilin, which is an old work about seven miles below the city ot
Philadelphia, has been put in good order. 'l1his work i::, ready to receive it;:
armament and its garrison.
·
'l'he expense of the work on Fort Delaware may be estimated at $491,000.
and of the fort opposite, $521,000.-(Statement 1, tables O and F.)
.
Cltesapeake bay.-The board of naval officers and engineers intrusted with
the selection of sites for a great northern ·and a great southern naval depot,
recommended in their joint reports of 1819 and 1820 Burwell's bay, on Jame::
river, for the one, and Charlestown, in Boston harbor, for the other. They abo
recommended Boston harbor and N arragansct bay, at the north, and Hampt?n
roads, at the south, as chief naval rendezvous. In those reports the coIDIDI::ioners entered at hrge into the consideration of all the matters relating to the::e
im1)ortant objects, and reference is now made to those reports for many intereH·
ing details .
. Ham1:ton roads, ,Tames river, N01:follc, and tlie navy yard.-Tbe work pr~J cted for the defence of these are, 1st, a fort at Old Point Comfort-this 1::
call cl Fort ::.\fonroe; 2d, a casemated battery, called Fort Calhoun, on the Rip
Rap hoal , oppo ite Old Point Comfort; and, 3d, a line of floating ob::truction: •xt ucling acro._s the channel from one of the e work to the other. Iwa: th opinion of the commis. ion above m ution ·cl that, in the event of a !!TC,·
nav~~ J p t b ing fix cl on _J amc. river, it might ultimately be prop r to pron
add1t10nal tr no-th by placmo- work· on the po ition of .1. ewport ... Tew, 1' ,.
1
, aw ;-;hoal , ~nd ran y I laud flat .
ud1 an c:xpan ion ha , however: , iuce
th ,n
!1 giv n t . ~he p~· , nt navy yard at o:-iport, (oppo ite ... 01folk.) ~ th re i.· httl probability of any oth r po ·ition on the e waters being occup1
fi r .· u ·h purp •
rl'he great importance of r taining Hampton roads during a war, and of co,er-
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ing the navy yard, is conceded on all hands. The bearing of this harbor upon
the general defence of the Chesapeake bay is, perhaps, equally well understood,
it being very evident that a small hostile force would reluctantly venture up the
bay, or into York river, or the Rappahannock, or any of the upper harbors,
leaving behind them a great naval . station, and the common rendezvous of the
southern coast-a station seldom in time of war without the presence of a number of vessels just ready for, or just returned from, sea.
A very important bearing upon the security of Norfolk and the navy yard,
independent of the closing the channel to those places, is, however, not generally
understood, and has been entirely overlooked in the officfal animadversions
(before mentioned) on the system of defence of the board of engineers.
If we suppose no defences at the mouth of the roadstead, or only such as can
be disregarded or easily silenced, an enemy might debark his troops in Linnhaven bay, and despatch them against Norfolk, while his fleet would pass up
the harbor to the vicinity of the town, not only covering the flank of his troops,
but landing· parties to turn any position that might be taken by the army attempting to defend the place; or, insteai of landing in the bay, he might at his
option land the main body quite near to Norfolk; and, having possession of
James river, he would prevent the arrival of any succor in steamboats or otherwise by that channel.
There are two or three defiles on the route from Lynnhaven bay to Norfolk,
caused by the interlocking of streams, that, with the aid of field-works, would
possess great strength; and being occ11pied in succe~sion, would undoubtedly
delay, if not repulse, an enemy assailing them in front. Since the naval depot
seems fixed at Gosport, these must, indeed, be chiefly relied on for its security
from land attacks; and timely attention must be given, on the breaking out of a
war, to the occupying of these defiles with appropriate defences. These positions possess no value whatever if they can be turned, and without adequate
fortifications at the outlet of Hampton roads; there would seem to be no security
for Norfolk or the navy yard, except in the presence of a large military force.
On the completion of the projected defences, the circumstances will be very
different. 'Then, thuse defiles must be attacked in front, because no part of the
enemy's force can be landed above the mouth of the roads. But this is not all.
'l'he moment an enemy advances towards Norfolk from this point of debarkation, his communication with his fleet will be jeoparded, because, as the defiles
do not require a large body to defend them against an attack in front, the greater
part of the reinforcements arriving from above, by way of the river, may be
landed upon his flanks, or in his rear. An offensive land movement by the
enemy, under such circumstances, could be justified only in the case of his
finding an entire want of preparation, caused by the unexpected commencement
o~ hostilities. In connexion-with this disposition for defe11ce, it may be expedient on the opening of a war, to throw up a field work on the shore onposite
the position of Fort Calhoun, which would, besides, contribute to the ex~lusion
from the roadstead of vessels of small draught.
The above remarks show that the fortifications in progress are not less necessary to the security of the navy yard and the city of Norfolk from a land attack, than from an attack by water, and that both these important functions are
superadded to the task of defending the only good roadstead of the southern
coa ·t, and of contributing, in a very important degree, towards the defence of
the Chesapeake bay.
A in the case of Narraganset roads, it has been objected to this system of
def~nce, that, although it may shut up this anchorage, it leaves others ~n this
region open. May we suppose, then, that if there were no other than th1s harbor, it defence would be justifiable 1 If so, it would seem that the obj ection
rest on the principle that in proportion as nature has been bountiful to us, we
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must be niggard to ourselves; that, having little, we may cherish it, but, having
much, we must throw all away.
The same criticism complains of the unreasonable magnitude of one of thM
works, (Fort Monroe,) and we concede that there is justice in the criticium.
But it has long been too late to remedy the evil. It may not, however, be improper to avail of this opportunity to remove from the country the professional
. reproach attached to this error. 1Vhen the system of coast defence was about
to be taken up, it was thought best by the government and Congress, to call
from abroad a portion of that skill and science which a long course of active
warfare was supposed to have supplied. Fort Monroe is one of the result of
that determination, It was not easy, probably, to come down from the exaggerated scale of warfare to which Europe was then accustomed; nor for those
who had been brought up where wars were often produced, and always magnified Ly juxtaposition or proximity, to realize to what degree remoteness fi·om
belHgerent nations would diminish military means and qualify military objects.
Certain it is, that this experiment, costly as it was in the case of Fort l\Ionroe,
would have been much more so but for the opposition of some whose more
moderate opinions had been moulded by no other circumstances than those peculiar to our own country.
'l~he mistake is one relating to magnitude, however, not to strength. :Magnituae in f9rtification is often a measure of strength; but not always, nor in thi'
instance. Fort Monroe might have been as strong as it is now against a water
attack, or an assault, or a siege, with one-third its present capacity, and perhaps at not more than half its cost. We do not think this work too strong for
its position, nor too heavily armed; and as the force of the garrison will depend
mainly on the extent of the armament, the error has caused an excess in the
first outlay chiefly, but will not involve much useless expense after comple~o~.
Although the::e is much important work to be done to complete the fort, 1t 1'
even now in a state to contribute largely to the defence of the roadstead, and
there is no doubt that in a very short time all the casemated parts may be perfectly ready to receive the armament.
This work will be found in statement 1, table C; $223,367 being required to
complete it.
l!'ort Calhoun cannot yet be carried forward for want of stability in the foundation. The artificial mass on which it is to stand having been raised out of
the water, the walls of the battery were begun some years since, but it w~s soon
found that their weight caused considerable subsidence. On an inspe~t10n by
engineer officers, it was then decided to keep the f01mdations loaded with more
than the whole weight of the :finished work until all subsidence had cea~ed.
'l'~ie load had hardly been put on, however, before it was injudici?uslY: determmed to take it off and begin to build, although the settling was still gomg on.
Happily a better policy prevailed before the construction was resumed, but not
b fon• the very considerable expense of removiug· the load had been incuned,
ancl the further expense of replacing it rendered necessary. It is hoped the
whol load will be replaced early the present year.-(Statement 1, table -)
R quir ·cl to complete the work $416,000.
It may be expedient, in time of war, by way of providing interior barrier5,
_ to er ·t lmtteric. on Cranry fr,Jand, at the mouth of Elizabeth river, and to put
in concliti n arnl arm old :b~ort K orfoJk, which is ju t below the city .
.~Ir!r1){Jr rf S~. lllary:s.-'l'he c ntral situation (as regard the Uhe~ape~k~). o
tl11:-- fllw ba-.;m, 1t. r lat10n to the l)otornac, it depth of water, and "the facility
with which it may h de£ nd d, iucli ·ate its fitnc s as a harbor of rcfug · for the
·onun re of the he. apeak bay, and a.· an occa;c.;ional, if not con~tm1t ~tation
chll'~ng- war of c portion of th· naval force. A . urwy ha been mad , but_ no
pr~ ·ct Im: be n formed. The ngiuecr department, , ome year ago, conJec1
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tured that the cost of defences in this harbor might amount to $300,000.(Statement 1, table F.)
Annapolis liarbor.-No surveys or plans of defence have been made. The
existino· works are inefficient and quite out of repair. A former estimate made
by the ~ngineer department, amounting to $250,000, is adopted here.-(Statement
1, table :F'.)
Harbor ef Baltimore.-The proximity of the city to Chesapeake bay greatly
endangers the city of Baltimore. In the present state of things, an enemy in a
few hours' march, after an easy landing, and without having his communication
with his fleet seriously endangered, can make himself master of that great emporium of commerce. There are required for its security two forts on the Patapsco-one at Hawkins's Point, and the other opposite that point, at the extreme
end of the flat that runs off from Sollers's Point; these being the lowest positions at which the passage of the Patapsco can be defended. Besides the advantages that will result, of obliging the enemy to land at a greater distancethereby gaining time, by delaying his march, for the arrival of succor, and preventing his turning tbe defensive positions which our troops might occupy-it
will be impossible for him to endanger the. city by a direct attack by water.
The present Fort McHenry, Redoubt W oocl, and Covington battery should be
retained as a second barrier. The first mentioned is now in good condition, and
the repairs required for the others may be applied at the beginning of a war.
The fort on Sollers's Point flats, which should be first commenced, is estimated
to cost $1,000,000.-(Statement 1, table D.)
The fort on Hawkins's Point, (to be found in statement 1, table F,) will cost,
it is supposed, $376,000.
;
Moutli qf Elk river.-The completion of the line of water communication
from the Delaware to the waters of the Chesapeake makes it proper to place a
fort somewhere near the mouth of Elk river, in order to prevent an enemy from
destroying, by a sudden enterprise, the works forming this outlet of the canal.
There. have been no surveys made with a view to establish such protection,
which are estimated at $50,000.-(Statement 1, table F.)
Cities ef Wasliington, Georgetown, and Atexandria.-Fort Washington
covers these cities from any attack by water, and will oblige an enemy to land
at some eight or ten miles below Alexandria, should that city be his object, and
about twice as far below Washington. It will also serve the very important
purpose of covering tr()Ops crossing from Virginia with a view to fall on the
flanks of an enemy moving against the capital from the Patuxent or the Chesa,
peake. To put the necessary repairs on Ji-,ort Washington will cost about
$20,000.-(See statement 1, table A.)
Cedar Point, Potomac ri,ver.-But all these objects would have been better
fulfilled had the work been placed at Lower Cedar Point. As it is, however,
the contemplated works being constructed in the Patuxent, and the militia of
the surrounding country in a clue state of preparation, an enterprise ao·ainst
\\.,.ashington would be a hazardous one.
ti
. A. g~vin~ complete security to the towns in the District, covering more than
sixty 1mles 111 length of the Potomac, and a large tract of country lying between
the Potomac and the Patuxent, the work on Cedar Point should not be omitted.
There have been no surve:ys made of the ground, nor projects of the fort, which,
in a conjectural estimate of the engineer department, was set down at $300,000.(Statement 1, table E.)
Patuxent river.-The more effectually to protect the city of Washington from
a :-udden attack by troops landed at the head of navigation in the P atuxent,
and to provide additional shelter for vessels in the Chesapeake, a fort has been
planned to occupy Point Patience, and another to occupy Thomas's Point, both
a short distance up the river. The work on Thomas's Point is (in statement 1,
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table D) estimated to cost $250,000; and the work on Point Patience, (in ,Jatement 1, table F,) estimated to cost $246,000.
It will be perceived that the system of defence for Washington contemplate._,
first, defending the Potomac on Cedar Point and maintaining a second barrier at
Fort -washington; second, defending the mouth of the Patuxent. This syfstem
is criticised in the document before referred to in a way to induce the suspicion
that it was not understood.
During the last war there was no fort in the Patuxent ; and the consequence
was, that the British approached by that avenue and occupied the whole riYer
as high as Pig Point-nearly fifty miles from its mouth, and less than twenty
miles from the capital; while, in consequence of there being no forts in the Potomac, they occupied that river as high as Alexandria, inclusive; by this latter
occupation perfectly protecting the left flank of the movement during its whole
advance and retreat. Both flanks being safe, the British had nothing to fear
except from a force in front; and that this risk was not great, in the short march
of less than twenty miles from his boats, was proved by the issue.
On the ninth day from that on which the fleet entered the Chesapeake the
English army was in possession of the capital, having penetrated near fifty miles
beyond the point of debarkation. On the twelfth day from the time of landing,
the troops were again on shipboard near the month of the river. This attack,
exceedingly well conceived and very gallantly executed, owed its success entirely to the want of defences, such as are now proposed.
Let us suppose both rivers fortified as recommended, and an enemy landed at
the mouth of the Patuxent. If now he attempt this enterprise his march will
be prolonged by at least four days; that is to say, it will require more than .,ixteen days, during which time he will be out of communication with his fleet, a·
regards supplies and assistance.
The opposition to his invasion wm begin at the landing, because our troops
having now nothing to fear as to their flanks, either from the Potomac or Patuxent, will dispute every foot of territory; and although he should continue to
advance, it must be at a slower rate.
While he is thus pursuing· his route towards Washington, the forces of Yirginia will be crossing the Potomac and concentrating at Port 'J.1obacco, or ome
position between that place and Fort Washington, preparatory to falling on ~ii:fl.ank and rear. This would seem to be conclusive; for it is difficult to conceive
of troops persevering in an expedition when every moment will not only place
them further from succor, but greatly increase their need of it. Railroad reach
from near the crossing places of the Potomac to the very heart of the co1m~
south; and a very few days would bring forward a large force, all of which
would arrive upon the rear of the enemy.
It is said in the criticism that, if shut out of the Patuxent, the enemy might
land between the mouth of that river ancl Annapolis, and thence proceed agains
1Y"a,·hin °'ton. But the same difficulties belong to this project, and a new difficulty i,· added. The Virginia forces arrive, as before, and as.,ail his flank either
L twe<'n the Potomac and Patnxent, or between the Patuxent and the Che::a1wakc; and thcr i ·, beside:-, the Patuxent for the enemy to cross both in goin!!
and retumiuo--it: •Jf a formidable military obi;tacle.
1t i said al~o, that th<> landing mny be made in the Potomac; but thi" only
pron.· that th sy:tcm animaclvnted on had not be n studied, it brino- a func~a_mental p_ri11ci11le of th f-lJ, .tem that such landing mu, t be prev nted by fortif ymg: the nY ·r. a~ low do vn a~ po:-;i-:iLle.
'l Jw • ontlll'rn ·on:-t, ·tr ·tching from Cape Hatteras to the southern 11oiut o
}'lnri<la ii; inv:ll'ialJly low, and for the rrr<'ater pnrt sandy; much r :-embli tlll' c a,-t from th· abovc-m •ntion cl cape to i\Iontank l'oint, on the ea::,t n
Long· I--lan<1.
ri<l<re f ,.and, h re and there interrupt d by the alluvion of the riveTo. x-
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tends through its whole length. This ridge, in certain portions, lies on the
main land, while in others it is divided therefrom by basins or "sounds". of
various width and depth, and is cut up into islands by nun:erous ch~nnel_s ':Inch
connect these interior waters with the sea. Wherever this sand ndge 1s mterru pted, its place is occupied by low and marshy grounds, bordering the principal
and the many lesser outlets of the rivers.
. .
Ocracock inlet, N. C.-The shallowness of the water on the bars at this mlet
effectually excludes all vessels-of-war-at least, all moved by sails. But as
this is an outlet of an extensive commerce, and as, through this opening, attempts
might be made in small vessels, barges, or the smaller class of steam vessels, to
destroy this commerce, or to interrupt the line of interior water communication,
timely preparation must be made of temporary works equal to defence against
all such minor enterprises.
B eaufort liarbor, N. C.-A work called Fort Macon has been erected for the
defence of this harbor, which will require some repairs. Some operations are
also called for to protect the site from the wearing action of the sea. (Statement 1, table A.) Estimate, $10,000.
Moutlis ef Cape Fear river, N. C.-The de.fence of the main channel of
Cape Fear requires, in addition to Fort Caswell, (now nearly completed,) on
Oak island, another fort on Bald Head. And the defence of the smaller channel
will require a redoubt on Federal Point. The battery magazine, block-house,
&c., at Smithville, should remain as accessories. Fort Caswell, Oak island,
(statement 1, table 0,) requires $6,000 to complete it; the fort on Bald Head'
(statement 1, table F) will require $180,000; the redoubt on Federal Point'
(statement 1, table F) will require $18,000; and the battery, &c., called Fort·
Johnston, at Smithville, (statement 1, table A,) $5,000.
Georgetown harbor, S. C.-The first inlet of any consequence south of Cape
Fear river is at the united mouths of the Waccamaw, Pedee, and Black rivers,
forming Georgetown harbor; which is a commodious and capacious bay, having
sufficient water within, and also upon the bar near the mouth, for merchant
vessels and small vessels-of-war. A survey of this harbor was begun many
years ago, but never completed, and no projects for defence have been
made. It is probable that a work placed near Moscheto creek, or on Winyaw
Point, would give adequate strength, at the cost of about $250,000.-(Statement
1, table E.)
Santee river and Bull's bay.-About ten miles south from Georgetown are
the mouths of the Santee, the largest river in South Carolina. It is not known
whether the bars at the mouths of this river have sufficient water for sea-going
ves. els. The same uncertainty exists as to the depth into Bull's bay. It may be
"°ufficient to consider these and the other inlets between Georgetown and Charleston as calling for small works capable of resisting boat enterprises, and to
assign as the cost $100,000. Should they prove to be navigable for privateers.
they will require a larger expenditure.-(Statement 1, table :F.)
Cltarleston, S. C.-This city, situated at the junction of Ashley and Cooper
rivers, is about five miles, in a direct line from the sea. Between it and the
ocean there is a wide and safe roadstead for vessels of any draught. ·upon the bar,
lyiJ.1g three or four miles outside of the harbor, there is, however, only water
enough for smaller frigates and sloops-of-war. On the southwest side of the
harbor is ,James's island, in which are several serpentine passages, more or less
naviga1Jle for boats, barges, and small steam vessels ; some of them communicate <lir<>ctly with the sea and Stono river. Whappoo cut, the most northerly
pa:::. a~· from the Stono to Charleston harbor, enters Ashley river opposite the
middle of the city.
Int 1 ior nc1tnral water communications exist, also, to the southwest of Stono
rin::r, connecting this with North Edisto river; the latter with South Edisto

132

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

and St. Helena sound; this again, with broad river; and, finally, this last with
Savannah river.
On the north side of the harbor of Charleston lies Sullivan's island, separrated from the main by a channel navigable only by small craft. On the northwest side of this island is an interior water communication, which extends to
Bull's bay, and even beyond, to the harbor of Georgetown.
From this sketch it is apparent that it will not do to restrict the defence" to
the principal entrance of the harbor. The lateral avenues must also be shut.
And it is probable that accurate surveys of all these avenues will show that the
best mode of defending them will be by works at or near the mouths of the
inlets, as the enemy will be kept thereby at a greater distance from the city;
the lesser harbors formed by these inlets will be protected, and the line of interior
water communication will be inaccessible from the sea.
No position for the defence of the principal entrance to Charleston harbor
can be found nearer to the ocean than the western extremity of Sullivan's
island. This is, at present, occupied by Fort Moultrie-a work of some strength,
but by no means adequate to its object, its battery being weak, and the scarp
so low as to oppose no serious obstacle to escalade. How far this work, by a
modification of its plan and relief, may be made to contribute to a full defence
of the harbor, has not yet been determined. But so long as it is the only work
at this, the principal point of defence, it must be kept in good condition for service; and no alterations that will disturb this efficiency should be undertaken.
The repairs now indispensable will cost $ 10,000.-(Statement 1, table A.)
On a shoal nearly opposite to Fort Moultrie the foundation of a fort has
:been begun, which will have a powerful cross-fire with Fort Moultrie. This is
,called :Fort Sumter. (Statement 1, table C.) To complete this work will require, it is estimated, $286,000.
In the upper part of the harbor is Castle Pinckney, on Shuter's Folly island.
This requires some repairs, estimated at $_7,000.(-Statement 1, table A.)
Stano, Nortli Edisto, and Soutli Eclisto.-All these must be fortified, at least
in such a manner as to protect these inlets from enterprises in boats or small vesschl. '!10 that end, $50,000 may be assigned to each.-(Statement 1, table F.)
St. 1-Ielena sound.-'I'he proper defences cannot be pointed out till the sound
shall have been surveyed. Although there is supposed to be no great depth of
water on the bar, it is known to be navigable for the smaller class of merchantmen and for steamboats, and to have a navigable communication with the head
of Broacl river, or Port Royal, intersecting the interior navigation between
Charleston and Savannah. 'I'he estimate is $150,000.-(Statement 1, table F.)
Broad river, or Port Royal roads.-The value of this capacious road tead
as n. harbor of refuge depends on the depth that can be carried over the bar; on
th distance of this bar beyond the line of coast, and on the means that may be
applicaulc of le. sening the danger of crossing it. 'I'his is supposed to be t?e
de 1>ct-it bar on the outbern coast. Should there prove to be water enouO'h for
frio·ate,', and ·hou~d it be practicable to make the passage over the bar sa~·e ~nd
ea~y, by the erect10n of li 0 ·ht-houses on the shore and lights, or other dii!hllC
guide' on the bar, thi, harbor, situated within sixty miles of the city of harle·ton and twenty of 'avannah river, interEiecting the interior water communicat~on 1 ·tw ·en the. e citie , thereby securing the arrival of . uppli, . o
very kincl, would po .. CflS a hicrh degree of importance, not only a. a harbor o
r ·fnu , but al o a .a naval tation.
'lh<·. mT y of the .·terior. hoal , con, tituting the bar, houlcl be male 'ili
th 0 T ·ate ·t car· ancl all 1Jo, :ibl minut<·ne s. Only when thi, , hall baxe b
cl nP C'an tlw tnH· r ·lation of thi inl t to the rc;;t of the coa t uc known. an
on tlii. rPlation the· po, i_tion ancl macruitude of the r quir cl clefi n ·cs-wi.11 d n ·
• 11r the Jr :- nt tLe c·--tunate mad , m year:; ao-o by the eno-ineer
d partm nt
0
i adopt cl, mun ~y, , 300,000.- ( tatement 1, table E.)
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Savannalt, and moutlt of Savannalt river, Georgia.-1\fention has been rn~cle
of the natural interior water communication along the coast of South Carolma.
A similar communication extends south from the Savannah river as far as the
St. John's, in Florida. Owing to these passages the city of Savannah, _like
ChaTleston, is liable to be approached by other avenues than the harbor or river,
and accordingly its defences must have relation to these lesser as well as great
channels.
The distance from the mouth of '\Vassaw sound, or even Ossabaw souncl,
(both to the southward of Savannah river,) to the city is not much greater than
from the mouth of the river, and an enterprise may proceed the whole distance
by water, or part of the way by water and part by land, from either inlet or
from both. As in the case of like channels in the neighborhood of Charleston,
it cannot now be determined where they can be defended most advm1tagconsly.
It is hoped, however, that the localities will permit the defences to be placed
near the inlets, because thus placed they will serve the double purpose of guarding the city of Savannah and covering these harbors, which, in time of war,
cannot but be very useful.
The defence of Savannah river is not difficult. A fort on Cock.spur island,
lying just within the mouth, and perhaps for additional security another on
Tybee island, which forms the southern cape at the mouth of the river, woulcl
prevent the passage of vessels up the channel and cover the anchorage between
Tybee and Cock.spur.
Old Fort Jackson, standing about four miles below the city, shoulcl be maintained as a second barrier, both as respects the main channel and the passages
which come into the river from the south, which last would not at all be controlled
by works on Cock.spur or Tybee. Fort Pulaski, on Cock.spur island, is well advanced, and to a certain extent is even now efficient, measures being now in
hand for mounting the lower tier of guns; $215,000 are required to complete
the works and the outworks and appendages.- (Statement 1, table C.) To
fortify Tybee island may require $120,000, (statement 1, table E,) and to repair Fort Jackson $50,000.-( Statement 1, table A.)
TVassaw sound, Ossabaw sound, St. Catliarine' s sound, at tlie moutli of ]lfedway river; Sapelo sound, Dob_y inlet, Altamalia sound, at tlie mouth of Altamalia river; St. Simon's sound, at tlw moutli qj Buffalo creek,· St. Andrew's
sound, at tlie united mouths of tlw Scilla and Santilla ri,vers ,· and Cumberland
sound, at tlie moutli of St. JJdar_y's river.-All these communications with the
ocean are highly important as regards the line of interior navigation, and several
of. them as affording access to excellent harbors. 'rhe last, and one or two
others, are known to be navigable to the largest sloops-of-war and merchantmen, and some of the others are but little inferior, as regards depth of entrance
or safety of anchorage.
A.11 the e openings have yet to be surveyed; some of them are probably easily
defensible by forts and batteries, while others may require the aid of floating ·
defence,.
It is an important principle, bearing peculiarly on the defence of the whole
southern coast, that on a shore possessing few harbors it is at the same time
more neceBsary to preserve them all for our own use, and more easy to deprive
an enemy of that shelter without which a close blockade cannot be maintained.
This principle is enforced in the instance of our southern coast by the two following weighty con. iderations, namely : first, its remoteness from the nearest
naval xenclezvous, the Che1'\apeake, which is on a mean 600 miles distant, and
to leeward both as to wind and current; and second, its being close upon the
larboar<l hand as they enter the Atlantic of the great concourse of vessels passing at all senson. through the ~"lorida channel. ·while, therefore, this part of
the coa:,t, from the concentration of vessels here, is in great need of protection
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of some sort, naval aid can be extended to it only with difficulty, and at the ri~k
of being cut off from all retreat by a superior enemy.
Accurat~ and minute surveys, which will enable our vessels, whether pursued
by an enemy or suffering by stress of weather, to shun the dangers which bee
the navigation of these harbors, and properly arranged defences to cover them
when arrived, seem to be indispensable.
WhGn these harbors shall be fortified, the operation of investing the coast
and watching the great outlet of commerce through the Florida passage will be
a difficult and hazardous one to an enemy, to whom no perseverance or skill can
avail to maintain a continuous blockade, while, on the part of our small ves.ebof-war, steam frigates, and privateers, the same sort of supervision will be at all
times easy and safe.
Nothing· better can now be done than to assume $200,000 as the average cost
of defending each of the nine entrances; giving a total of $1,800,000.-(Statcment 1, tables E and 1!1 .)
St. Augustine, Floricla.-'I'his, the most southern of the harbors on the
Atlantic, and the key to the eastern portion of J!"'lorida, is accessible to the
smaller c1ass of merchantmen, to privateers, and to steam vessels, and require
a certain amount of protection from attacks by war. It is, therefore, proposed
to put that part of the old Spanish fort (Fort l\Iarion) that commands the harbor in a f\erviceable state, which will require $i50,000.-(Statement 1, table A..)
Having now passed along the whole Atlantic coast, from Passamaquoddy to
Cape Florida, pointed out every h:'trbor of any consequence, and specified every
work that a thorough system of defence will require, we will, in order to give a
comprehensive view of the number, cost, armament, and garrisons of the works,
refer to statement 1, accompanying this report. In that statement the work:;
arc divided into tables, showing separately, 1st, (table A,) the old ·works alreauy
repaired aoo those proposed to be repaired and retained in the system of defence; 2d, (table B,) new works completed; 3d, (table 0,) works under construction; 4th, (table D,) works to be first commenced; 5th, (table E,) work,
to be commenced next after those in table D; 6th, (table 1!"',) works to be last
commenced.
'l'he most essential works on the Atlantic coast arc included in the fir t five
tables, and, it appears from the recapitulation, that for these there will Le req uirecl, for garrisons, in time of war, 28,720 men; for the armament, 5,7 4
pircr, of ordnance of every kind; and for the expense yet to be incmreJ,
'9,476,767.
"\V' consider it to be our duty to estimate for the last class of work.:: al~o,
(talile F,) although it must be a long time before permanent work for the::
po:-:ition:-: c:m be commenced. For these there will be required, in addition, t:or
war garrisonB, 25,545 men; for armament, 4,790 pieces of ordnance; and t r
th' c.·1H·11:-:e of erection, '· 14,241,824.
It mu:-t be here -tated that, as to a few of the works in table F, fuller information may require tlH·m to be elevated into ome of the earlier classes.
, EA-COA T FROM CAPE FLORIDA TO THE 1\!OUTH OF THE 'ABIXB.

Th · fir:-:t po:.;ition.~ that pre:-:ent them, elvr , on doublincr around ap Flori
into the Gulf of Icxico, ar' Key Trest and the Dry Tortuo-as.
'1 Jij,, Loarcl concur in th · opinion:-: lier tofore c•xprc. ;:eel in fayor of th , fin
harb ir , ancl tl1 ·y b<''" leaY' to rcfr·r for -very intC'rt':-:ting :--tatcmrnt:::, in r I
to the lattn· harl,or ·:-pc·cially, tn a lctt0r from 'ommodor Roel~ 'r:4 to tl,
r • ary of th· . _ ·avy, ,J nly 3, 1 20, (, 'cnatc• do ·um nt:-, 1:-;t :,;p:,;.-;ion 21,t (.', 1.~. "
-vol. 1, A·>. 1, pa•rc: 2:JG,) aml I ·ttc·r from th<· 'ecretary of the -'- ..,:ff.'-, )far'h :.:.
1 :; (• · ·nat · clotn11w1Jt:, 1.t .·c•;-;. ion -~l:,;t 101wrr.:-::-, -vol. 2, .l. .... o. 111, pa~ 1.)
\. lHlYal fore , d ~ign <l to control th naYigatiou of the Gulf could <l ,ire n
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better position than Key West or the Tortugas. Upon the very wayside of
the only path through the Gulf, it is at the same time well situated as to all the
great points therein. It overlooks Havana, Pensacola, Mobile, ·the mouths of
the Mississippi, and both the inlet and outlet of the Gulf.
The 'rortugas harbors in particular are said to afford perfect shelter for vessels
of CYery class, with the gTeatest facility of ingress and egress. And there can
be no doubt that an adversary in possession of large naval means would, with
great advantage, make these harbors his habitual resort and his point of general rendezvous and concentration for all operations on this sea. "With an
enemy thus posted, the navigation of the Gulf by us would be imminently
hazardous, if not impossible, and nothing but absolute naval superiority lrnulcl
avail anything against him. Mere military means could approach no nearer
than the nearest shore of the continent.
It is believed that, there are no harbors in the Gulf at all comparable with
these that an enemy could resort to with his larger vessels. To deprive him
of these would therefore be interfering materially with any organized system of
naval operations in this sea. 'l'he defence of these harbors would, however, do
much more than this. It would transfer to our own squadron, even should it
be inferior, these most valuable positions, and it would afford a point of refnge
to our navy and our commerce at the very spot where it would be most necesa.ry and useful.
In this report, already too much extended, we forbear to enlarge on this topic,
merely adding that the complete and certain defence will not be difficult. By
occupying two, or at most three, small islands, the harbors of the Dry 'Tortugas
(there being an inner and an outer harbor) may be thoroughly protected. The
works must be adequate to resist escalade, bombardment, and cannonade from
vessels, and to sust,ain a protracted investment; but as they will not be exposed
to any operation resembling a siege, there can be no difficulty in fulfilling the
conditions. They must have capacious store-rooms, be thoroughly bomb-proof,
and be heavily armed.
The fortification of Key West should be of a similar character.
Ko details can be given until all these positions have been minutely surveyed
with reference to defence.
The sum of $3,000,000 was, some years ago, assumed by the engineer department as necessary to provide defences for the Tortugas and for Key vY est,
and this estimate may now be taken as arnple.-(Staternent 2, table F.)
Tuming now to the shore of the Gulf, we :find a portion, namely, from Cape
Florida to Pensacola, that has never been examined with particular reference
to the defence of the harbors. "Within this space there are Cliar1otte liarbor,
Espiritu Santo bay, Apalacliicola hay, Apalacliie bay, St.. Josepli's bay, and
Sarda Rosa bay. Nothing better can now be done than to assume for these
the estimate formerly pre::;ented by the engineer department, viz: $1,000,000
for all.-(Statement 2, table F.)
It may be remarked, as applying to the whole Gulf coast, that, from the
relative geographical position of this part of the seaboard, and the country interested in it· tiafety, from the unhealthiness of the climate, nature of the adjacent
country, and mixed character of the inhabitants, it will be some time before
that portion within supporting distance, whose welfare may be endangered by
an enemy, will Le competent, of itself, to sustain a serious attack from without.
Upon the Atlantic seaboard the Alleghanies crowd the people down upon the
hore, every important point on the coast being surrounded by a population
den;;e now and every day rapidly increasing in numbers, while the ocean and
the interior parallel communications transmit rapid aid to the right and left.
The coa~t of the Gulf, however, is thinly peopled in itself, is remote from succor
from behind, and is almost inaccessible to lateral assistance. Those reasons,
therefore, which tend to establish the necessity of an organized, permanent,
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and timely system of defence for the whole seaboard of the United 8tat~,
apply to this part of it with peculiar force.
We now pass on to the remaining points of defence on the Gulf.
Pensacola bay.-'l'hc upper arms of this considerable bay receive the Yellow
Water or Pea river, Middle river, and Escambia river. The tributaries of the
last, interlocking with the Alabama and the Ohattahoochie, seem to mark the
routes whereby, at some future day, canals will convey a part of the producb
of these rivers to P ensacola, while the qualities and position of the harbor and
the favorable nature of the country have already marked out lines of railroad
communication with a vast interior region.
Santa Rosa sound extends eastward, from .the lower part of the bay, into
Santa Rosa bay. On the west the lagoons of Pensacola, Perdido, and l\Iobile
bays, respectively, interlock in such a manner as to require but a few miles of
cutting· to complete a navigable channel from the first to the last named bay,
and thence, through an existing· interior water communication, to the city of
New Orleans.
·
Pensacola bay has rare properties as a harbor. It is now accessible to
frjgatcs, and there is reason to hope that the bar may be permanen:ly de~pene?·
'l'be bar is near the coast, and the channel across it straight and ea::nly hit.
rn1c harbor is perfectly landlocked, and the roadstead very capacious. 'rhere
arc excellent positions ,vithin for repairing, building, and launching vessels,
and for clocks and dock yards in healthy situations. The supply of good water
is abundant. rrhe harbor is perfectly defensible. These propertie , in connexion with the position of the harbor as regards the coast, have induced . the
government to select it as a naval station and place of rendezvous and rerair.
An excellent survey has been made of the bay of Pensacola, sufficmg to
form the scheme of defence for the town and harbor. Regarded, however, ~s
an important naval station and place of rendezvous and repair, which it. now_ 1~,
further surveys, extending a greater distance back from the shores, delmeatm"'
accurately the face of the country and showing the several avenues by land
and water, are found to be necessary.
The defences of the water passage, as projected, are nearly complete, $22,000
being asked to finish them. A work is just bcguu at the position of the Barrancas. It is indispensable, in connexion with one or two other small works
designed to cover the navy yard from a lateral attack through the we:,tem
bays. The Barrancas work may require $ 100,000, and the others '200,000 ·
making _a total for Pensacola of $322,000.-(Statcment 2, tables A, 0, ~nd F.)_
Perdzdo bay.-This bay is intimately related to l)ensacola and Mobile Lay::
both as regards security and intercommunication, and :,.hould be carefully :iillvcy('d with a view to these objects. It must be fortified, and the cost may be
$200,0~0. -(Statcment 2, table F.)
.
Jlobtle _bay.-The l)lan of defence for this bay cornpri es a fort (no': n~e<lmg
•om, repa11'14) for :Mobile Point. Another fort is projected for Dauplnu 1,la~d
and a tower for the defence of Pass-au-Heron. 'l'hc estimates for all req
,. !H~,000.- ( 'tatcmcnt 2, tables A, E, and F.)
.J.\ <'W (!rle_ans and tlte delta ef the lllisszssippi.-The mo t northern water
com1m_unc:ation L<'twecn the l\Ii:-f-i:,...ip}Ji ancl the Gulf is by the pa ::mer call~
th<' H1g-olc·ti-, c:onnecti1w Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. 'lhe next 1'
th, pa:--. of hc,f Mcntn1r, aLo co1mc•ctincr thei:::e lake1<. 1'hrough these pa:-,,~,
an 1wmy utcring- Lake· Pontchartrain, would, at th e same fan· that h int r'Ppt1·cl all water cornmnnic-ation with )Iouilf' and P 'lld1co1a, be able to r
·w ( rlt·an: from the . onthc·rn . horc if thf' l:1ke · or h micrht continu on •
through Lak · }Iaun·pa~ mite rin·r, a11cl llH'rviiic river, tl1er ·by n·achin!!' h
- [i .. i :-ippi at th· very 1JC•acl of the c1 ·1ta; or, land inn- withi11 the mouth, of th
'}U'f ),{ ·nt ·ur, he micrht lllOV' twain~t tl1 city alou•~ the ridge of the G
·uy
ro; cl.
T
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To the southwest of Chef Menteur, and at the head of Lake Borgne, is Bayou
Bienvenue, a navigable channel, (the one followed by the English army in the
last war,) not running quite to the Mississippi, b~t bounded by. shores of ~uch
a nature as to enable troops to march from the pomt of debarkat10n to the city.
These avenues are defended by Fort Pike at the Rigolets ; by }tort vVood at
Chef l\Ienteur; by a small fort at Bayou Bienvenue, and by a tower at Bayou
Dupre.
The defences of the Mississippi are placed at the Plaquemine turn, about
seventy miles below New Orleans-the lowest position that can be occupied.
Fort J ~ckson is on the right bank, and Fort St. Philip, a little lower down, on
the left .
.All these forts have been abandone~ for several years, and, having received
no attention in the way of timely repairs, now require repairs somewhat extensive, e pecially Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on the Mississippi. The following sums, it is believed, will be required to place all these works in perfect
order, viz : Fort Pike, $5,000 ; Fort Wood, $3,580 ; fort on Bayou Bienvenue,
$2,500 ; Tower Dupre, $400; Fort Jackson, $20,000, and Fort St. Philip,
$3,300.-(Statement 2, table A.)
The most western avenue by which New Orleans is approachable from the
sea passes on the west side of the island of Grande Terre into Barrataria bay,
which is an excellent harbor for a floating force guarding the coasting trade on
that side of the Mississippi. From this bay there are several passages leading
to New Orleans. The estimate for a work which is now about to be begun on
Grande Terre island is $325,000,-(Statement 2, table C.)
Several times in this report we have alluded to circumstances which would
demand the employment of floating defences, in addition to :fixed defences upon
the shore. We have here an instance in which that kind of defence would be
very useful. ],orti:fications will enable us to protect N cw Orleans even from the
most serious and determined efforts of an enemy; but, owing to the great width
of some of the exterior passages, we cannot, by fortification alone, deprive an
enemy of anchorages, (especially that of Ohandeleur island,) nor cover entirely
the exterior water communication between the Rigolets and Mobile. We must,
therefore, either quietly submit to the annoyance and injury that an enemy in
posses .. ion of these passages may inflict, or avert them by a timely preparation
of a floating force adapted to their peculiar navigation, and capable, under the
shelter of the forts, of being always on the alert, and of assuming an offensive
or defensive attitude, according to the designs, conduct, or situation of the
enemy.
Om- examination of the coast from Cape Florida to the Sabine having now
been completed, we will, as in the case of the Atlantic coast, refer, for a comprehensive view of the number, cost, armament, and garrison of the works, to
statement 2, wherein the works are divided into tables similar to those of statement 1.
'I'he more essential works on the Gulf coast, included in the first :five tables,
will rec1uire for garrison, in time of war, 4,420 men; for the armament 794
piece.., of ordnance of every kind ; and for the expense yet to be inc~rred,
.,,;516,7 0.

The works comprised in the last table (F) are generally such as may be postponed ~o a late day. But among them have been placed some (as, for example,
tho for Tortugas and Key West) as to which the examination has not been
,.ufficien~ly minute to decide to what class they really appertain.
In th1s age of great jmprovements in the means of locomotion, it would be
un-wi··e to decide, without pressjng need, on the details of the floating force
rec1uired at certain points on the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts-perhaps
even on the nature of the moving power. Although the probability undoubtedly
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is, that the power will be steam, genius may, in the interim, devise sorncthin,.
still better than steam.
And we may here remark, in relation to the preparation of steam veml or
warlike purposes generally, that wisdom would seem to direct a very cantio
and deliberate progress. Every n ew vessel may be expected to surpass, in important particulars, all that had preceded; and, to surpass the more, as each
succeeding vessel should be the result of careful study and trial of the preceding.
It may be considered unreasonable to expect that steam itself will give way
to some agent still more potent, and at the same time not less safe and manageable. But it certainly is no more than probable that steam vessels now under
construction may be regarded almost as incumbrances within ten years.
A deliberate advance in this branch of naval construction is recommended the
more by our ability to construct these vessels in large numbers when needed,
the timber being collected in the meantime.
Referring now to the tables which accompany this. report:
Statement 1 includes all ·works from Passamaquoddy to Cape Florida; ,Jatement 2, all works from Cape Florida to the mouth of the Sabine; each state·
ment comprising six tables, as before mentioned.
In relation to every work executed, in progress, or merely projected, the
tables show the garrison, the ordnance of every description, the sums already
expended, and the :final cost.
As to works not yet planned, a portion of the same particulars are exhibited,
founded on conjecture merely; of course, without laying claim to accuracy, bu
still as approximations, affording some indication of the final result.
It may be well to give here a summary of all these table.i.
The works which are likely to be erected on the Atlantic, within a rea.,onab!e
time, and which are regarded as necessary to a good system of defence, -will
require war garrisons, amounting· to 28,720 men; and they will require a further
expenditure of $9,176,767. Works called for in like manner upon the Gulf ot
Mexico coast will need 4,420 men to ganison them, and a further expenditure
of $516,78 0. Of the wlwle coast, therefore, the garrisons will amount to
33,140 men, and the expenditures to $9,993,547.
.
.
The remaining works comprised in table F, of both statements, ·will reqmre
30,695 men, and cost $19,521,824.
.
l\Iaking the grand total for the whole sea-coast of the United State~ ID
garrisons for the works 63,835 men, and in cost $29,515,371.
In addition to these statements as to the fortifications, there are two corresponding statements of the cost of the ordnance, of the carriages, and of a ~ertain
supply of powder and shot or shells for each piece, one statement rclatrnc, t_o
the Atlantic coast, and the other to the Gulf of Mexico coast. From thc::;c 1•
appear, that for the works likely to be erected on the Atlantic coast, within a
r a;onable time, (that is to say, for the works comprised in the first :five taL!e~.
A, B, 0, D, and E,) there will be needed 2,483 pieces of ordnance, and -1-,Jll
carriage:, which will cost $2,252,290.
For ::;imilar ·works on the Gulf of Mexico coa t, there will be needed 2
pi ,C, , of or~n~nce, and 495 carriages, at a co, t of $240,720.
.
.
I he r ·mammg work. named in tables F, of both statement , will reqmre in
adclitio~, 5,447 guns and 5,554 carriag , which will co t · 3, 735,330.
) akmcr th crr:md total required for the whole .,ea-coast 8,226 !!TIU an
10,560 carriao-e:-, at a co,_t of ·6,~2 ,340.
'I he tiin rcc1uir d t c n:,;truct and put in order the whole , yr-tern mu;:;t dep n
on th · amount of th annual appropriation. All that necc.l now b ::aid n th
·ulJj<·ct i , that in an undcrtakin<r lH'ce,·,·arily involvincr o much tim , ?n
dl ·h vital imp rtaucc, th re ,·h ulc.l b
no r ,Jaxation of clilicrcnc . "\ 1th
dilig ·nee, many years mu t nee ~ ru·ily be con tuned. But the work m. Y
0

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

139

too much hurried, as well as too much delayed. There is a rate of progress at
which it will be executed in the best manner, and at the minimum cost. If
more hurried it will be defective in quality, and more costly if delayed.
France was at least fifty years completing her maritime and interior defences.
In the report presented by the engineer department, in March, 1836, (Senate
document, 1st session 24th Congress, vol. 4, No. 293,) there is a demonstration
of the actual economy that will resu,t from an efficient system of sea-coast
defence, which is to the following effect, referring to the document itself for
details.
There is first supposed to be an expedition of 20,000 men at Bermuda or
Halifax ready to fall upon the coast. This will make it necessary, if there be
no fortifications, to have ready a force at least equal at each of the following
points, namely: 1st. Portsmouth and navy yard. 2d. Boston and navy yard.
3d. Narraganset roads. 4th. New York and navy yard. 5th. Philadelphia
and navy yard. 6th. Baltimore. 7th. Norfolk and navy yard. 8th. Charleston,
South Carolina. 9th. Savannah; and 10th. New Orleans; to say nothing of
other important places.
.
At each of these places, except the last, 10,000 men drawn from the interior,
and kept under pay, will suffice, the vicinity being relied on to supply the
remainder. At New Orleans, 17,000 men must be drawn from a distance. In
a campaign of six months, the whole force will cost at least $26,750,000.
The garrisons necessary to be kept under pay for the fortifications in these
places will eost for the same time $8,430,500. 'l,he difference ($18,319,500)
will then be only $3,448,156 less than the whole expense of building these
defences, viz: $21,767,656. Whence it follows that the expense of these
erections would be nearly compensated by the saving they would cause in a
single campaign.
All which is respectfully submitted.
For the board:
JOS. G. TOTTEN,
Colonel ef Engineers.
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$10,000
5,000
3,200
3,400
750
3,671
10,000
5,000
2,0UlJ
10,000
230, 000
100,000

$10,000
5,000
*8,286
*3,840
*2, 740
*6,261
*10,000
*5,000
2,000
*10,000
459, 594
100,000

5,000

5,000

5,000
5,000
10,000
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*5, 000

?: !!~:~
f>. ,;1!"i

~•,:wo

5,000

111,000
2,000
•r,. ooo

~

~·1n,01u

t'-i

t:J

t,:j
1-'rj
t,:j

z

a

t,:j

rri

~
~

~

~
~

~

u

~

w

m

w

~
~
~
~
~

$
~

40
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1
2
3
4

tt'ott. Olh:-.on, 1'~111~"~ lshuu1, N. Y ...... .•••.. ..

l•'orl \\' ood, 11,•,llow'>< l~la11<1, N. Y... . . . . . . .

80

:JOO

10

16

• .. • • . . . . ..

26 • • • • ..

. . . . . . . . . . . . .. • .

2 .••.

6 . . •.

2

••• .

8 • • ..

I

2

.... . ....... , • • .

2 .. • . . . . . • .. • • . . • . . ..

10,000
150,000

15 ........... ,
60 .......... ..

10, 000
150,000

:~: /: : :; : // Ut :;: E:: I H///: !! }···;;:;: . . '.'.'.:'.'

1-'ott 1tu·l1111011t1 , ~tnr,•11 island, N, Y . ..... ... . { . . . .
Fo,t Tompld11s, ~tat<'II i_slnllll, N. Y_ •...•.... .
. .... .
1
llnttt,ry L1111bo11,St11t c111s la111l, N. '\'. ..........
1,000
llnttt•ry l\Iorto11, State11 1sla11cl , N. Y. .. . . . . .. . .
. . .. .
:::::~
J,'ort \l11lli11, Uclawal'll river , Penn...... . .•.
200
19
11
20 .... .... 6 .... 7 .... 2
7 .... .•.. .... 2
74
140,tJOO .... ........
tl40,000
f,' 01tMdk11ry, Halti111ore. Md.... • • • • • • • • • • • .
350
1''ort Mntli~on, Annapoli~, Md.... ...... .... .
!:SO
Fort Severn, Annapolis, Md . .................
60
J:<'ortJohn ~ton, Cape Fear river, N. C. .... ....
60
8 ...... ...... .. . . .. ... .
.... 1 .... .... .... ....
9
37,114
7,000
44,114
C11stle Pinckney, l)harleston, S. C .......... .,
50
30 . • • • . . 3
9
6 . • •.
1 . • . . •• •. • • • . •• •• • • • •
54 • • • • • • • • • • • .
10, OilO
10,000
Fort Moultrie, l)harleston, S. O. .... .. •• ......
300
Beaufort battery, S . 0 . . • • . . . . • • . . . . . . • • •• • .
30
i.
::::
::::
::::
::::
::::
::::
::::
Fort Ja ck,;on, :--ava1111ah river, Georgia.......
70
i,~ort Marion, St. Augustine, Fla............ .
30
11
Fort Hamilton, New York harbor, N. Y •••••••
Fort l,afayette, New York harbor, N. Y ...... .
Fort Wa,;;hington, Potomac river, Md ....... ..
Fort Mucon, l:!eaufort, N. C................... 1.••••••. - - t - -1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 168
268
343
5 14 57 34 114 ... 27 64 .•.. . .. .
3
J,097
699,319
1,227,918
1,!!27,237
5,445
1- 1 - - -,- - - - ,- - - -,- - - - - ·- - ·- - ·- - · - ·11-1 1- 1 - 111B.-New works completed.
479 236
479, 236 . . . . . . . . . . . . I
1
800
318~305
:n8,305 ........... .
76
Fort Hamilton, New York harbor, N. Y ..... .
370
24
24
1e . • .. 2
454, 103
80
Fort Lafoyette, New York harbor, N. Y ... ... .
454,103
.
••.
·••
·•••·
7
....
....
2
...
2
........
3 ...
400
.
•
•••
.
.•
•
.
.
.
66
..••.•..
349,500
............
349,506
62
Fort Washington, Poto111uc river, Md ........ .
1
6 .... ..
2 ... ... ..•. 2
.• ....
15 ,- 4 1- 4 1-31 14
_,_
_ ,_ 12
_ , ___
- 1 -1-1 11- -1- 1 - 1 - 1- - ,- - - - 1- - - - ,- - - - -·Fortl\faco11, l.leaufort, N. C ................ .. _ 300
1,601,144
336
1,6011144
99 I 9 I 11 I 14 I 62 I 27 I. . . I 2 I 8 I ... . I 4
5'1
38
-1,870
- -,- -,- -1- - 1 -1- 11- • - • - • -111- 1 -1r- - 1
C . - Works under construction.
940,000
470,000
470,000
336
8
16
30
23
58
137
64
1,478,542
148,482
458
Fort Warren, Georg~'s island, Boston, Mass .. . 1,500
7
1 25
3
7
5
7
21 13 12 83 27
98
l,3~z:ggg
90
59
273,000
243,000
]
79
Fort Adams, Newport, R. I. . ... ............ . 2,~~g
4
1
3
1
8
3
3
3 10
14
14
14
740,000
290,000
450,(100
318
Fort Trumhull, New London, Conn •.•••••••.
5
2 12
2
7
3
6
8 12
6 70 1!)
70
48
48
854,800
491,000
363,800
151
Fort Schuyle:. Throg's Neck, N. Y ........... . 1,250
1
2
....
10
..........
20
54
32
32
750
2,030,284
223,367
1,806,917
371
Fort Oelawan', Delaware river . ............ ..
15
5
3
3
5
7
5
20
10 14 25 12 16
189
42
1,983,726
416,000
1,567, 7i26
224
Fort Monroe, Old Point Comfort, Va ......... . 2.450
.. . ••. ••••
8 20
88
54
54
497,179
6,000
491,179
64
Fort Calhoun, Hampton road~, Va ........... . 1,120
2
2 ...... .. 8 ....
32
20
400
286,000
512,921
226,921
136
Fort Casw1-li, Oak island, N. C .••••••••.•••••
.
9 ...... .. 12
-j,' ' •••
33
41
41
680
900,308
215,000
685,308
150
Fort Sumter, Charleston, S. O.............. ..
2
2
12
4 •••. •• . 4
53
Fort Pulaski, l)ockspur island, Georgia ...... . - -800
- ,••••••
- -,- 65
-,- -,- -1- 1 -1- 1- 1- 1 -1- 1- 1-1-1-1---1- - - - 1-----I.---n, 740 I 354 I 690 I 510 I 52 I 641 33 1234 jl66
12 11s
8 581__:_,_287
1,421,911
2, 788,l:l49 I 10,210,760
- -1- -r- -1- -1- 1 - 1 - · - ·
- ,,- , - • n.-Works to be first commenced.
150,000
150,000
1481 ............ 1
]50 ............
300,000
§300,00U
9116121··"14121211121
50
451
F°'"'
Penobsoouiv«,
... ····
52
4fi
500 ......
500
46 ••••••.••• •
48,000
48,000
Fort
at ""''''"''•
mouth of Kennebec
river, MeMo
......•••
18
17
250 . ....
Fort Scammel, House island, Portland, l\fe •..
t
Belonging to the State of New York.
:j: Repairs completed.
* Garrison and armament will contribute to those of new fort.
§ Not projected; guns, cost, &c , conjectural.
II Included in table B.
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Fort Pr«>blP, Portland harbor, Me.............
300
\Vork~ at Giuuc c,-ter, Ma~s.... . ...... . . . . • • . .
500
Clo~ing llrnud Sound Pass. Boston harbor, Mass •••••.•
\Vork s nt 011riwt Poi nt, Plymouth, Mass .....
500
\Vork ~ at Stnni11gto11 Point, Conn..... . . • • • • • .
375
Fort 0 11 I 't•llar Point, Potomac river, Md......
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1-'ort 011 Jack's f'.,i,n, Marbl chend, Mass ......
WOJ k~ at Provincetown, Cape Cod, :\lass ..••.•
Works at Nf'w Br ilford, Ma~s ................
Port 011 Ho~e island, Naraga11srt roads, R. [ .•.
Port 011 Roller~'s Point flats, Md.... . . • . . ....
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t>?00,000
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t2ci0,000
i:ioo,ooo
~ mu, ooo
l'!00,000
11J. O:t .~,_ 000
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I•'. - /1 01·.<·.,· lo /Je

last t·o 1111n e11r11d.

.. ...... ,........... .

$100,000
100,000
500,000
50,000

§$100,000

400,000

t4oo, ooo

211 ..... ...... .

135,000

+135,000

30 .......... ..

75,000

t75,000

55

100,000
50,000
51,000
174,UOO

tJ00,000
+50,00U
t51, 000
tl74,000

!

334

1,020,000

tt,020,000

l=d

l
1

125

250,000

+250,000

~

403

1,200,000

tt,200,000

tz

307.000
198;000

307,000
fl98,000

100,000
48,000
42,000

poo,ooo
t48,000
f42,000

t::!

12

100

200,000

t:W0,000

150
50
195

400,000
100,000
686,000

t400,000
tl00,000
f686,000

za

250
250
Work~ in Mnrhins hnrhor, Mnino ........... .
1,000
011 1\1011111 Dt•st•rt island , l\lainn . .... ..
a \'Vork~
125
,1 \York ~ at t 'n~ 1i1w, M:1111c .. • • •••••••• • , ..... .
f> \York~ at St. Gcor~e',; hay, Maine .... ..... . .
h \V nrks nt Oamari~cotta, Maior ............. .. } 1,000
7 Works at Broad bny, Maine ....... . ........ ..
8 \Vorkil at :-heepscot bay, Maine ..•••• . ....••.
150
9 Works in llo~ l~land channel, Portland, Me ..
10 \'Y orks at the mouth of Saco river, Maine .. .. . ,~
JI
Works nt the month_ of Kennebunk rivet, Me..
150 , ...... , ......
12 Works at York, Marne .................... ..
250
13 Works nt N!'wburyport, Mass........ . ... ..
125
14 Works at Bevl'rly, Mass....... . . ......... .
180
15 vVorks at Nangns Head, Salem, Mass ..•.•••.
280
16 Works at Fort Sewall, Mnrbleliead, Mass .••.
17 Fort and outworks at Nantasket Head, Boston, Mass ..•••••.... . ...... . ........•.•. 1,700
]8 RPdoubt on Hog isJ:rnd, Boston harbor, Mass •.
19 Works at Nantucket harbor, Mass ........... .
20 Works at Edgartown, Mass ••••••••••.••••••.
625
21 Works at Falmouth, Mass ............... ..
22 Works at Holmes's Hole, Mass ............. ..
23 Works at Tarpaulin cove, Mass .•••..••••.••. J
!M
Works at Canonicut island, R. r ............ . 1,800
25 Closing west passage of Narrliganset roads,
\

\'\'mks in l•!t1~1por1 harbor, Mnino ........... .

50 ........... .

2

26
27
28
29
30
31

32
33
34

35
36
37
38

3!!
40
41
42

200 ••••••••••• .

25 .......... ..
200

50
25
40

••••l•••• I•, ••••••

L~;td~~·; c:'o·~~::: :: :: :: ::

Fo~t bri;,~~1ci; N~~1•• •• 500°
Works at the mouth of Connecticut river,
250
Conn, ... . ............................. ..
125
Fort Hale, New Haven harbor, Conn ....... ..
120
Fort Wooster, New Haven harbor, Conn .. .••.
Works for harbors and towns between New
500
Haven and New York .................... .
Works in Gardiner's b:iy, Long Island sound,
N. Y ...... ............................. ,
750
Works in Sag Harbor, N. Y ......... , .. . . . .. .
250
Fort on Wilkins 's Point, Long island, N, Y .... 1,336
Redoubt in advance of Fort Tompki11s, Staten
800
is;land, N. Y... . ... . . . . . . . .••.......•....
Fort on Middle Ground shoal, Sandy Hook,
N Y. .. .. .... .... . ..... ..... . ........ .••. 1,760
Fort on East Bank shoal, Sandy Hook, N. Y.
1, 760
Fort at Delaware breakwater. . • . • . • . • • • • • . •
1, 125 ...... ..... .
Fort opposite Fort Oelaware, Del,........... .
760 ........... .
Fort on Elk river, Md . .. •• .. .. ... • .. •••• •• ..
169 ......... ..
Fort on Hawkins's Point, Md , •• , • .. .. • .. . ..
800 .......... ..
1
. Works at Annapolis harbor, Md ., ._.., .. - . . . ..
500 1..........
..
Fort on Point Patience, Patuxent nver, Md.. .
400
t Work projected,
• Not projected; guns, cost, &c., conjectural.

1 ........... .

82

50
25 , ........... .

261 .......... ..
332
332
225
112
25
131
JOO
87

t Gun~, cost, &c., conjectural.

poo,ooo

tSOO, 000
t50, 000

52,000

f52,000

1,681,412
1,681,412
600,000
521,000
50,000
376,000
250,000
246,000

fl,681,412
fl,681,412
t600, 000
ffi21, 000
+50, 000
f::l76,000
t250,000
f246,000

§ Guns of Fort Sullivan, No, 1, A,
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1,400
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500
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l

To be provitl~d .•• , •.
1''11rtificntionR to he next constructed -Table 8.

34,300
34,300

Rr(Juired ................
3,800
On hand •• , ••••••••.•.••. . . ··., ... .

Tobe provided •• ,.
he
111c11ccd -'l',,tilc U.

Fnrtificntio11H tn

26,800
26,800
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MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

Estimated cost of ordnance

ef all kinds required for

tlie armament

ef fortifir;a~

tions, gv;.-Oontinued.
COST OF ARMAMENT,

Fortifications.

Ordnance,
Projectiles.

Carriages,

Cannon,

Powder.

Total amount.

---Olil forts and batteries.- RPquired ......... $403,935 00 $361,935 OU $203,340 00 $175,760 00 $1,144,970 00
908, 032 40
338,115 0(, 242,3'75 Ou 151, 782 4(1 175, 760 00
Tallie A.
On hand ........ .

- 51,557
- - -6(J ..........

---

236,937 60

To be provided

65,820 0(

119,560 00

N ew fortifications com- Required .........
pleted. -Table B.
On hand .........

105,065 01
6!l, 105 Ou

105,455 00
55,275 00

47.283 00
28;454 oo

739,590 00
99,025 OU

351,484 0(,
164,284 0(;

640,565 00

187,200 00

451,405 OL
ll90,925 00

411,685 00
6,900 00

39,560 4r

...... .....

60,480 0(,

404,785 00

140,986 61

174, 860 00

889, 111 60

94,260 00

4,203 60

............

680,323 00
27,403 60

98, 129 4(J

94,260 OU

652,919 40

To be provided
Forti fl cations under con- Required .........
struction - ·Table C. On hand ..... . ....

- -OU --~-35,960
- -0( -50,180
18,629 00
1

-816,770
--

Q( ,

502,360

Q( ;

--To be provided 314,410 0(1

Fortifications to he first Required • , •• , , , ..
commenced. - Table On hand ..........
D.
To be provided
Fortifications to he n ex t RequirPd ........ ,
l'Ollstructed.-Table E. On hand . .........
To be provided

ll, 700 OU

231,910 00

228,620 00

R"(Juired from A to 2,020,585 01 I, 858,.985 00
E. .
Fortifications to be la~t Required ..... .... 1,692, 11 0 0( I 1,551,500 00
41 1 700 00
con struccd.-Table F . Ou hand ..........
35,400 0( I

2!l8,963 OU
1641 ~69 OU

29,126 00

-----

134,095 00

323,260 OU 2,231,104 00
765,669 00

············

323,260 00 1,465,435 00

188,547 00

---

174, 860 OU 1,226,497 00
337,3~5 40

---- ------243,410 00 240,329 00 102,333 Ol'
ll,500 OU

41,160 OU
12,0:34 OU

892,987 011 809,300 00 5,581,857 00
746,770 00
11,202 00

----- - ---

677,750 00 4,668,130 00
94,302 00

............

---~ 729,568 Ov 677,750 00 4,573, 8t8 00
- - - - - - - - - ----Grand total req'red 3,712,695 00 .l,410,475 00 1,639, 757 0( 1,487,050 00 10,249,987 00
To be provided 1,656,710 0{ , 1,509, 800 00

I

Grand total on hand 1,247,405 01 I

456,975 00

405,4b6 40

187,794 0 0 2,297,660 40

--

Grand total to be 2,465,290 00 J, 953,510 00 1,234,270 6t: 1,299, 256 00 7,952,3i6 60
provided.
NoTE.-The cost of saltpetre an d brimstone may \Je e$timaterl at one~halfof the cost of gu npowder.
ORDNANCE

OFFICE,

Wnshington, January 16, 1840,

No. 2.-

Ille lhrtijicatious constructed, constructing, or repairing, and ef tlwse proposed to be constructed or repaired for tke defence
if tlie Gulffrontier ,from Cape Florida to tlie Sabine bay.
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A.-Old works repaired and tho•e proposed to be
TCJ)(t1rcil, ,cith th,. amounts expended, and the
amounts required lo put them in a serviceable
1
2

3

B

~

-~
..::

...0

-~~c.
0..0

~·;:

c....

,,,

>--I

0

CJ

~

~-

Fort Barrancas, Pcnsncoln, F la ..... . .........
250 ••••••
Fort St. Philip, l\lis~is~ippi, La. . ... ........ .. .
100 .••••.
Fnrt PickE'ns, P1•nFacola harbor, F la ••• • •••••• .• ..• • •..•.••.

~~~~

11

IO
16

5

3

3

41····1····1

8 I 4 .••••• • •

2

2

~~~~~~i'i:~t:}~;t1;:~i1~t.'.
Fort Wood, Ohcf Mcn tcu r, La ... . • •• • • • • . . .

7

Rattery Rienven11P, La . .. . . ........ . ..... . . . ,

Tower nt Bayou D11p16, La........ .... .. ....
9 I Fort J ackson, Missbs1ppi river, La . • • , , • •. , .
8

i~ I....~:~,~~?

, 100,000
$175,000
3,300
3,300
8,000
*8, 000
1· .. .
10,000
*
l0,
000
. ..... .. . .. .. · .. • • • • · • • • • · · .. • • .. · • • · •• •l •• • • l •••• l •••• l· ••• 1, ... .
5,000
*5, 000
....... , · .. • • · · • ••• • .. • • .. • • .... • • • •
• ••• l ••••••• •I ••••••••• • ••
3 , 51'0
• ... . . .. ·• •• .. · · · • • • ........ • · · • • · · • •·
•• •l ••• •I ..... •••• I •••••• ........
2 , 500
• ••l ••• •l •••• t• •• • l · ••• I• •• • • •• • , ... .. .... .. .... 1 . . . . . . . . . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . •••.. ••• • . , , , · ·, · • • • • · · • ·
400
*IO0
• •• •l·• ••l • •• ·l ••• .. •••• 1 • • • . ......... .
20,
- -,- - , - - ,- -111- 1 - 1-- 111- - 1- 1 - 111- - -,- - - - 1- - -000
- ,- -*20,000
-ll
350 I• • • • ••
261 5I 31 3 I 81 81 .... 1 •• 1 2 1. . .. 1 1 1•••• 1 2
69
227,
- -•- -,- -.- -1- 1-1-1 - 1-1-1- 1- 1- 1 -1- 1- 1- -1- -75,000
- -1- -152,780
-----780
-

~-'a.:::::::::::::: :: :: ::'. '. :: :: :·1·•.. •·1·•.. •·1--·. ,.. ··

g
6

=~~;~g

8.-New works completed.
l
2

:t
4
5

II
7

I Fort Pickens, Prn~ncola, Fla.

• . • •• • • • • •. • • • .
Fort '\1nrgnn, MnbilP Poin1, Aln .... .... •..•..
F'nrt Pikl', llignlt•t•, l.n..... .•. • • . •. .•• • •••••.
l•'11rt \Von,I, C'ht'fMt'lllC'lir. La................
llr11tny lliP11v,•1111P, l.11 .. ... .. .. ...... •• ....
'l'uw1•r 111 ll11y1111 1>1q1n,, l.11 . ..... .. .... • ... • .
l•'u,t Jack Htm, M1nn1n11lp11111vcr, La............
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0

1,260
700
300
300
JOU

6:1
17
14 ......
....
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... .. .....
••••

50 . .. . . .

330

.... .

3,060 --:;::,
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.. • . .

.•• . . •
17

49
fi2
28
28
8

5
3

..
3
. •• .

13
4
6
6

6
6

..

3 ....

26
26
9
0
• ..

4 . . .. .. . . . . ..•.
42 . ••. 7 •••
10

I 2ll

11

30

12

80

1:1 .• • .

4

JO

5
5

l
2
.. .. .. . .
. ... ....

4

2

.......... .

• • ••

2 ·. , ... · ·
5 . • ,. 1
4:2 ••.•

4

I 24 I 24 I 22 I 55

1
l

49

1····

l
2 ··•· _ _ _
13

212
132

6

I

6

I

4

I 10

677, 000
1,026,777
:i 14,597

6 77.000
1,026,777
314,597

52

378,642

13

67

~~;cii~
638, ,66

638,766

5:12

3,148,006

3, 14t',006

7

378,642
96,447
lfl, 677

~
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t:I
tr.1

1-tj

tr.1
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C.- ll'orks under ,·01utru cl io11,.

Fort on f'oster':3 hank, l'en~11cola, Fla ••.••••••
2

650 I 24 I 24 I
300 . .. ... .. .. ..

Fort Livi11gsto n, Durrutnria island, La ••••.••••

24

950

24

66 .... ....
28 .... 6

3
3

..

9

10 .... ... .
5 .. .. .. ..

94

6

9

15 .... .. ..

.. .

6

2

i....

.... .... ....

1 .............. . _
3 ....

..

....

..

1
1
1 1 --1 -1 -1- 1
- - - - - - -1 -1- 1- -

rn!l
52

30'2,648
75,000

14,000
325,000

316,fi48
400,(100

181

377,648

339,000

716,648

12 , .......... ..

25,000

t25,000

3,ooo,coo

13,000,000

1

E .-Works to he con~trttcte,l after those in D of
statement l are completed.
•rower at Pass-au-Heron, l\fobile bay, Ala •••••

60 , .••••. , .•••• ·

6 I 2 I 2 / .••.

1.... 1

2 , .••. , •••. , .••• , •••. , .... , .... , ••••

- - , - - 1- -·1 - - 1- 1 - -1- r - 1 - 1-

1-

1-

1-

1-

r-

1- 1 - - 1- - - - -

F .- Works to be last commenced.

l
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
10

~

Works nt K1>y West or Tortngas, }'la . .•••••••. 2,500
500
Work s at Cha rlotte harbor, }'la .••••.•••••••••
Works at Espiritu Santo bay, Fla ............ .
Works at Appalachicola bay, Fla .••••••••••••
250
Works at Appalachie, Fla .................. . ~ I,250
Work~ at St. Joseph's hay, Fla .............. . I
Works at Santa Ro~a bay, Fla .•••....•••.••• ; )
\Norks to cove r navy yartl 'i t P en sacola, Fla •..
100 , ...... , ...... , .••••. , . • . , .... , .... , . ••. , •••• , •••• , •••. , .••. , •••• , .• • . , .... , .•• · 1 · . . . . . . · 1 · . . . . . . . . . . .
400 ••••. . . •• . . . ••••. •••• . ••. •• •• •••• .••. • ••• •. •. . ••• •••• . • . .••. •• •.
50 .•••••••.••.
W orks at Pertlido bay, Ala ................. .
900 .• • • . .• •• • . • • • • . . •• . . • •. • • •• . • . . • • •• • • . . . • . . . • • . •• •. •• • . • • . • . • . .
128 •••••••••••.
Fort at Dauphin island, Mobile bay, Ala .••••••

l

5,150 I 118

61 I 394 I 21 I 58 I 25 ILI3 I 78

1. . . . 1
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I

21 I 7 I 8

I

5

I
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1,000,000

+1,000,000

200,000
200,000
880,000

t200,000
+200, 000
+880,000

928 I.. ...... .... I 5, 2eo, ooo

5,280,000

~
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z
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RECAPITCLATION.

tj
A. Old forts and hatteries ....................... ..
n. New fortifications co111pleted •••••••.••••••••••.
c. Fortifications unde r construction .•••••••••.•••..
E. Works to be co11strnctcd after those in D, of
statemeut 1, are completed ..................... ..
F. Works to be last commenced ................. ..

3)iZ
950

I""11'
I
24

60 , ..ll 8
5,150
9,570

11
17
24
61

2191113

* Included i_n B.
For the board.

26
5
3
21 L 11 39
91 .... 6

3
12
6

8
80
9

8
42
15

2

4

....

]3
6
3 ....

I
6

4

2
10

69
532
]81

75,000
3, 148,Y06
377,648

.... ....
.... ....
12 ...........
6
2
2 .... .... 2 .... .... .... .... ....
928 ............
7
8
5 14
394 21 58 25 113 78 .... 5 m
- ·----3,601,554
731 39 ,108 46 1210 145 • •• • 9 39 13 15 9 26T l~722
t Work projected.

152,780

... 339,000
25,000
5,280,000
5,796, 780

227,780
3,148,006
716,648
25, 000
5,280,UOO

---9,3!18,334

t_rj
'zj

t_rj

z0

t_rj

rn

+ Guns, cost, &.c., conjectural.
JOS. G. TOTTEN, Colonel Engineers.

W ASIIINGTON, .flpril 23, 1840,
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Estimated cost of ordllancc of all kinds req1tircdfor tlic arma·m ent iffortifications, agreeably to statement 2, embracing cannon mounted,
and l00' rounds ef a1nmu,nitionfor eaclt, piece.
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Old forts and battcries.-Tnblc A, ••• , ................ I Required ... , .......... , ••••••...
On hand ...................... .
To be provided ••••••••.•••...

New fortificntions completcd.-Table B ......... , •• ,. I Required .... , .............. .,.

• • • •

To be provided .............. .

~

rd>.

5
5

26
26

3
3

17
17

211
211

11
11

39
39

~

24

24
24

94
94

I•••••'

6

6

I...... \..... \ ....61

Works to be constructPd after those in table D, state- \ Required ....................... ·
mcut I, are co111plctcd.-Tablc E.
On hand. ............... .... ... ...... .....

Required from A to E .......... .
Works to be last commenccd.-Tablc F ............. \ Required ...... , . . ............ .
On hand...... • .............. .
To be provided •••••••...••• ·
Grand total rrquired .... .....
Grand total on hand. .. . .. • ..
Gmnd total to be provided.....
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8 , ...... , ......
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Fortifications under conHruetion.-Table C •••••••••. I Required .•.••••••••••••• , •••.•.
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Bstinwtf'd rost qf on711mu·<' qf all khuls rcquirctlfor tlte armament offortifications,
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Fortification s und er construction.-Table C ........ Required ....................... .
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NoTE.-The cost of saltpetre and brimstone may be estimated at one-half of the cost of gunpowder.
ORDNANCK OFFICE, Washington, January 16, 1840.
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MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

REPORT ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER.
'This frontier extends, as described by the terms of the resolution, from Lake
Superior to Passamaquoddy bay, a distance of somewhat more than two thousand miles, ,binding all the way on the British American Provinces.
Whether we regard the strongly marked geographical features of this frontier,
presenting, as it does, for the most part, a chain of great lakes Oi inland seas,
stretching along the border, the common property of both nations, and affordin1r
facilities for an extensive commerce, almost rivalling that of the ocean itself; or
whether we look to the growing strength of our colonial neighbors, fostered by
the immense power and resources of the mother country; its vast importrnce
cannot fail to impress us with the necessity of being prepared, not only for defence along that line, but also to act offensively, with decisive effect, in the event
of our being involved in a conflict.
ltrom the peculiar character of this frontier, its defence must necessarily partake somewhat of the system applicable to the seacoast; for, although it i~ _denominated inland, in contradistinction to the latter, it is, nevertheless, mantime
in many of its features, and must be treated accordingly for purposes of defence,
So important is the mastery on the lakes, in any military operations in. that
quarter, that it is scarcely to be doubted that, in the event of war, there will be
some naval preparations on both sides, and a struggle for the ascendancy on
those waters. Whichever power shall acquire that, even temporarily, will have
the means of assailing his adversary with great effect along the shores_ of the
lakes, in the absence of fortifications, by occupying the harbors, destroymg !he
towns, (some of which are fast advancing to the rank of cities,) and controlling
the commercial operations of which those lakes constitute the principal cha~el.
These considerations render it highly expedient-indeed, necessary-to fortify
the larger harbors on the lakes, as well as the more important passe on the
straits and rivers by which they are connected.
.
.
Without entering fully into the military details of the subject, wh1~h m1_ght
be deemed somewhat out of place here, regarding the object of the resolution,
which seems to look rather to the expense involved, the board will proceed to
enumerate the works of defence deemed necessary on the northern frontier.
beginning at Lake Superior; merely glancing at the effects and advantage5
which are likely to result from the establishment of those works.
l. Fort at Falls of St. Mary.-A fort here will control the communication
between Lake Huron and Lake Superior, and, at least, prevent an enemy_ from
availing itself of it for purposes of communication and for the trans_por!at10n ot
supplies, if it does not secure th-:>se important advantages to us ; which 1t would
do, unless counteracted by a work on the British side of the line. In that event.
almost certain to occur, it would be neutralized, but would still serve to coYer
and protect our settlements along the St. Mary, and form a rallying point for
local defence in times of alarm.
E timated expense of fort, barracks, &c. • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •
·75, 000

2. Fort at Micl1,ilimackinac.-Although this position is somewhat int rior, it i regard d of high importance from it geographical r lation . A fort here, in conjunction with floating battcrie ,
may be made to command, effectually, the approach to Lake
Michirran, and hut out an enemy who might po, e.., a naval
a .cendancy on Lake Huron; thu prot cting the entire circumforichigan from attack t which it would otherwi e
nce of Lak
be xpo cd, even from a mall force, and , ecuring it to our . lve
n a afi chann l of commtmi ation with the rich and productive
tatc in the rear, who ·hor it w he .
Estimated expen e . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . • • . • . • . • . . . . . • . • . •

50. 0
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3 . F ort at the foot ef Lake Huron.-A work here will control
the outlet of Lake Huron, and interrupt the navigation between
that and Lake St. Clair and the river Detroit. It will serve also
to cover the settlements on that part of the frontier, and form a
rallying point for the neighbori11:g militia for local defence.
E stimated expense................... - . - . - . - - - - - - - - - · - -
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$50,000

4. F ort and barrack establisliment at Detroit.-In the event
of war , D etroit would undoubtedly be a point of considerable concentration of troops, not merely for the defence of that portion of
the frontier, but for such offensive operations as might be deemed
expedient in that quarter. It may be regarded as the centre of
the upper section of the northern frontier, and has important
relations, both geographical and military. Although true policy
would, in such a case, dictate that our chief efforts should be
directed against the vital points of the enemy's possessions as low
down the line as practicable, still it might become expedient, with
a view to distract his attention and divide his forces, to menace
him above ; and this is one of the points from which he might be
assailed by minor expeditions, especially if he should relax his
measures of defence in looking to his safety elsewhere.
Estimated expense of barracks for one regiment, including
site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $150, 000
Estimated expense of fort at Spring Wells, including
site... • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 100, 000

250,000

5. F ield-work and barrack establishment at or near Buffalo.The wealth and commercial importance of Buffalo, and its close
proximity to the British line, will make it an object of attack in
time of war, unless it be protected by the presence of a respectable fo rce there. It may also become a point of concentration of
troops for minor offensive movements, by way of diversion; and
is thus, in every view, entitled to seasonable attention. An
extensive barrack establishment, defended by field-works, would
be sufficient for all necessary objects.
Estimated ex?ense ..........•.........................•

150,000

6. Fort N iagara to be rebuilt.-A fort at this position is
important, on the assumption (admitting, it is believed, of but
little doubt) that in time of war there would be some naval preparations on Lake Ontario. It commands the entrance into the
Niagara river; and a work here will shut the enemy's vessels out
from that harbor, while it will afford protection under which ours
may take shelter in case of need.
Estimated expense of completing the work now in progress.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $27, 500
:E'or repairs of buildings and new barracks there. . . . 37, 500

65,000
7. Fort at Oswego.-The growing importance of Oswego, the

relation it bears to the great line of internal communication to the
west, and its exposed situation, directly on the shore of the lake,
from whence it might be assailed by armed vessels without the
co-operation of a land attack, call for works of defence to protect
the harbor, and thus secure a safe retreat for our vessels in case
of need, while we shut out those of the enemy. Besides, this
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place possesses many advantages for naval preparations for vessels
of light draught of water, and would probably be made a subordinate depot in time of war.
Estimated expense of completing the works now in progress... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $20, 000
For barracks, quarters, storehouses, and magazine. . 25, 000
$45,000

8. Fort at Sackett' s Harhor.-In the event of naval armaments of any considerable extent being resorted to on Lake
Ontario, Sackett's Harbor, from its bold water, and its excellency
as a harbor, would at once become a depot of great importance;
the safety of which should be insured against the enterprises
of the enemy by the timely construction of appropriate works of
defence. Situated directly opposite to the strong post of Kingston, on the Canadian side, and adjacent to the head of the St.
Lawrence, it is one of the points at which a concentration of
troops may become expedient for the defence of that portion of
the frontier and the protection of the naval depot. 'rhe barrack
accommodations already established there are deemed sufficient,
and it remains to fortify the approach to the harbor.
Estimated expense of fort and barracks within ............ .

7fi, 000

9. Fort at the narrows if the St. Lawrence, below Ogdensburg.-The chief object of a work here would be to cut off the
enemy's communication, by the river, between Montreal and
Kingston, and thus prevent him from availing himself of that
channel for the transportation of troops and supplies if we cannot
entirely secure it to ourselves. By this obstruction on the St.
Lawrence he would be thrown altogether upon his back line of
communication by the Ottawa, which, although it has the merit
of being more secure from interruption, is longer and more difficult, especially in seasons of drought. This would also be
another point from which the enemy might be menanced, and
from which auxiliary movements might be made in aid of the
chief attack.
Estimated expense of fort and barracks .................. .

100,000

10. Fort near tlie line on Lake Cltamplain.-A work here may
be made to command the pass of the lake, and is considered by
f~r the most important of any proposed on the whole line of front1er.
The po. ition of Lake Champlain is somewhat peculiar. While
Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior stretch their whole length
directly along the border, (forming, in fact, the boundary,) Champlain xtends de ply into our territory, at right angle. with the
line of the frontier; and, while its southern extremity reaches
al.mo t to the Hudson, it £nds its outlet, to the north, in the St.
La,n-encc, n •arly midway between Montreal and Quebec, the two
great obj ct of attack.
Thi i. undoubtedly tl1e avenue by which the Briti.. h posse ions m, y b mo. t effe tnally a Flail cl; while, at the ame time,
it wonlcl afforcl to th n ·my po. .. e :--ing a naval a"c ndancy equal
fa iliti •: for hringina th war within our own border ' if it be left
unfortifi d. It ther for b come important to fortify a point a.
near th line a- pra ·ti ·abl , o a t :hut ut th n my'· v ~ 1:-,
and thu, cff ct the double obj ct of protecting the interior hore
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of the lake from the predatory attacks to which they would otherwise be exposed, and of securing it to ourselves as the great
channel by which our troops and supplies may be rapidly thrown
foTward to the points of attack or defence.
For a permanent work on Stony Point, (N. Y.,) including purchase of site ................................. $300,000
FOT a permanent work on Windmill Point, (Vt.,) including purchase of site. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300,000
11. Barrack establisliment and dPpot at Plattsburg.-In the
e"\"'ent of war, Plattsburg will become the great depot for the
operations on the Champlain frontier, the point of COJ?.centration
of troops preparatory to any offensive movements, and the station
of the reserve to sustain those movements, and the posts that
may be established in advance. Even in time of peace a respectable force should be posted here, especially during the continuance
of the boundary q_uestion and border disturbances. Barracks for
a regiment, at least, with suitable storehouses, are recommended
to be erected, on a plan admitting of extension, if required, and
also of suitable defensive arrangements.
Estimated expense of completing the works in progress on the
scale here suggested ................................•....
12. From Lake Champlain, eastward, the geographical features
of the frontier materially change character, and require a corresponding modification of the means of defence. The line no longer
intersects great lakes, admitting of naval preparations, nor binds
on straits and rivers, the. navigation of which may be controlled
or interrupted by fortifications. It is altogether inland until it
reaches the St. Croix, where the principles that have been applied
to other portions of the frontier similarly situated will again become applicable. Running on a parallel of latitude to the Connecticut river, and thence along a chain of highlands, not yet
clearly defined, to the Province of New Brunswick, the board are
not aware that there are any points immediately on the frontier
sufficiently commanding, of themselves, to call for the establishment and maintenance of fortifications or works of defence.
Should it ever become necessary to sustain by force our title to
the territory now in dispute, it must be done, not by isolated forts
along the frontier, commanding, probably, nothing beyond the
range of their own guns, but by an active army, competent not
only to occupy the country and hold it, but also to assume the
offensive, if necessary, and caTry the war beyond our borders.
But while it is not deemed expedient to construct a chain of
forts along this portion of the frontier, the board consider it a
proper measure of precaution, in the present state of our relations
with the British provinces, that positions should be selected and
preparatory anangemcnts made for the establishment of depots
of supplies at the head of navigation on the Kennebunk and
Penobscot. In the event of movements in that quarter, these
would be proper points for the concentration of troops, and would
.. erYe a · a ba, e of operations, whether these should be offensive
or defensive in their character.
E.2timated expense of storehouses and other accommodations ..

159

$600,000

150,000

150,000
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13. Fort at Calais, on the St. Croix river.-A work here,
while it will serve to cover that part of the State of Maine from
the attacks to which it would otherwise be exposed, may, from its
advanced position, be made to act an important though indirect
part in the defence of the more northern portion of the frontier.
Calais appears to be a very eligible point for the concentration of
troops with reference to existing circumstances. A strong force
stationed here, threatening the enemy's posts on the lower St.
John's, and held ready to strike in that direction in case of movements from New Brunswick towards the disputed territory, could
not fail to have a decisive influence on such movements; since it
is obvious that they could not be made with safety while exposed
to attack in flank and rear, and to have their line of communication intercepted and thefr depots seized, by a prompt movement
on our part from the St. Croix.
Estimated expense of fort and barracks __ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14. In reference to the northern frontier generally, it is the decided opinion of the board that, besides the defences which have
been suggested along the border, chiefly for purposes of local
protection, there should be a great central station at some position
in the interior at which troops might be assembled for instruction,
and where they would still be within supporting distance of the
more exposed parts of the frontier.
Turning our views inland in search of some single position at
which preparations might be made for extended operations on this
frontier, and from ·which aid and succor could always be speedily
derived, some position which, while it shall be equally near to
many important points of the enemy's possessions, shall afford at
no time any indication of the Jirection in which our efforts are to
be made; which will, if it be possible, unite the opposite qualities
of being at the same time remote and proximate far as to distance,
but near as to time; which, while it brings a portion of the military resources of the country to the support of the inland frontier,
and places them in the best attitude for operations in that quarter,
whether defensive or offensive, at the same time takes them not
away from the sea-coast. Looking for these various properties,
we find them all united in a remarkable degree in the position of
Albany.
From this place, by steamboat, canal boat, or railroadcar, troops
and munitions could be transported in a short time to Buffalo, or
onward to Detroit, to Oswego, to Sackett's Harbor, to Plattsburg,
to Bo ton, and along the coast of New Englal'.).d ; to N cw York
by steamboat now, and soon by railroad also; and thence onward
to Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, and the heart of the
south •rn country if necessary. In a word, Albany is a great
central po ition, from which radiate the principal lines of communication to the north, to the south, to the east, and to the west;
and c~mbine o many advantages for a military d pot that the
exp d1 ncy of occupying it and thu availing ourselves of tho e
advantao-es would c m to be manifc t.
E tirnat d cxpen c of the purcha c of land, and the construction of barrack and other buildings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Total for northern frontier. . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . • . . . . • • . . . •

$100, 000

300, 0 0
2, 160. 0 0
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The board beg leave to observe, in conclusion, that, in the preparation of the
estimates submitted, they have not attempted to aim at precision. Hence the
amounts stated for the various objects are to be regarded only as approximations.
They could not be anything more, on the data used, which, for want of minute
surveys and reconnoissances, were necessarily vague. It is believed, however,
that the results presented will be found sufficiently accurate for the general
purposes contemplated by the resolution under which tl1is report has been prepared.
For the board,

JOS. G. TOTTEN,
Colonel
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REPORT ON THE WESTERN FRON'rIER, FROM THE SABIXE
BAY TO LAKE SUPERIOR.
The principles which should govern in fortifying the seaboard are not considered applicable to Oltr inland frontier, which will very rarely be found to call
for regular fortifications. Hence, in relation to that portion of the fronti er now
under cousideration, the duty of the board will be performed by indicating the
military positions or stations which should, in their opinion, be occupied by
troops, in order to accomplish the .objects in view, and in presenting estimate~
of the pTobable cost of constructing the necessary barracks, quarters, and storehouses, combined with such works of defence as circumstances may appear to
require, to insure their protection against the attncks to which they may be exposed.
'l'he want of personal knowledge; on the part of the board, of our extemi,e
western frontier, and the very limited surveys which h~ve been made in tliat
quarter, have somewhat embarrassed them in the selection of positions; but
they desire to be )understood as merely designating places in a geographical
sense, leaving the particular sites on which the works should be erected to be
determined hernafter, by minute examinations of the country at and around
those positions; which become the more important, inasmuch as the original
locations of some of the places that will be recommended to be retained have
been considered faulty.
The southern section of this frontier, extending from the Sabine bay to ~he
Red river, borders all the way on '1.1exas, and has, it is believed, little or nothm(J'
to apprehend from Iuclian aggressions. 'I'he Comanches, the only tribe of any
power iu that quarter, are represented as gradually receding to the westward,
and the progress of the 'l'cxan settlements will tend to pnsh them further from
our border. But our relations with the '11 exan republic, however amicable they
may be at present, woul<l. seem to require that some military force should be
stationed on or near the boundary line; and the board therefore re~ornm;nd
the establishment of two smaJl posts on the Sabine river, suppressmg } ort
Jesup, which is considered too far within the frontier, or retaining it merely a~
a healthy cantonment.
.
As these would be posts of observation, having reference to national police
more than to military defence, they ought to be established on the river_ wherl'
the principal roads cross it, by which we should be enabled to supen'18e tliP
chief intercourse with our neighbors by land, and, at the f:'.ame time, con~·ol the
navigation of the Sabine. 'l'he points where the Opelousas and Natclntoch ·~
mads, leading to 'l'exas, strike the river, are therefore recommended af< the poitions ·which should be occupied, and at which barracks for two or three com1mnie , defended Ly light worb, should be constructed.
. .
'l'hc middle ection, which extends from the Red river to the :Mis~on11, 15 hy
far the mo t important portion of tl1e whole of our western frontier. It i-. nlon'.!
thi:-; lin ' that t11e numerous tribes of Indians who have emigrated from the r~::,
li:n~ h · n loeat d; thu14 adding to the indigenous force already i_n tl1nt rl';!'10n
an nnmcn maR. of migrant., . ome of whom }rn.Ye been sent tb1t1H·r liy cotrci, n wi_th , mot~1rrccl fo ·lin_O's of ho:::tility raukling in tl1 ir bo. om, wh i~·h. prob 1,!y, wait:-t hut f ran occa 10n to burst forth in all it ...,avagr fiuy. 'I hr.~ cor.:id<·.r.~tion. alo~1 wo_ul<l .ecm to _call for stroncr precautionary mea, urc, :_ Ln an
ncl<l1t1011al motive will b found 111 our pc uliar rc·lation with tho .. c Jndrnn~.
ar · hound, by ,·ol nm treaty stiJ>ulationR, to i11tcrpo e force, if JH' • ,~ary.
t o pr •vc•nt donw:-ti · t-trifo amon"' th m pr '::serve peace between tlie cvt'ral tn . •·
and to J_Jrot ·ct th m a<rain.-t auy cli:-1turhancc, at their n w homr hy tl1
I
ll(l°;m: wh inhabit th countr' he· ·ond. The o-ovcmmcnt ha tlm-- conrra
th two.fold oLligati n of int rv ntion among, ;nd prot ction of, the 1
,
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tribes, in addition to the duty which it owes to its own citizens of providing for
their safety.
It appears to the board that this obligation can only be properly fulfilled by
maintaining advan~ed positions in the Indian coun~ry with an a~e~uate r_e. ., training military force, and that the duty of protectmg our own citizens will
be best discharged by establishing an interior line of posts along the western
border of the States of Arkansas and Missouri as auxiliaries to the advanced
positions , and to restrain the intercourse between the whites and the Indians,
and serve as rallying points for the neighboring militia in times of alarm.
With these views they would recommend the maintenance of Fort Towson,
on Red river, and Fort Gibson, on the Arkansas, and the establishment of a
post at the head of navigation on the Kansas, and one at r.P&ble creek, on th_e
Missouri, below the mouth of the Big Platte, as constituting the advanced po~1tions on this portion of the frontier.
For the secondary line intended for the protection of the border settlements
the boar d would adopt the positions which have been selected by a commission
of experienced officers along the western boundary of Arkansas and l\Iissomi,
at some of which, it is understood, works are already in progress, namely: Fort
Smith , on the Arkansas river; Fort Wayne, on the Illinois; Spring river and
::\Iarais de Cygne; terminating to the north at Fort Leavenworth, on the Missouri. They would also recommend the establishment of one or two intermediate
posts between the Arkansas and Red rivers, if, on further examination of the
country , _suitable positions ca.n be selected near the State line. It is not deemecl
advisabl e to establish those posts on the route of the road lately surveyed, which
(especially the southern portion) is considered too far in advance of the border
settlements to accomplish the object in view; but if eligible positions cannot be
found along the line, then a post on the road where it crosses the Poteau river,
which is not very remote from the settlements, might have a salutary influence.
On the northern portion of this frontier, extending from the Missouri river to
Lake Superior, the board would recommend the establishment of a post near
the upper forks of the Des Moines river, the maintenance of Fort Snelling, on
the )lississippi, and the ultimate. establishment of a post at the western extremity of Lake Superior. The last is suggested with some qirnlification for
want of the necessary information by which to determine the channel of communication to that remote position ""\Vhether it shall be through Lake Superior
or by the Mississippi and its tributaries, it would in either case be difficult in
peace and next to impracticable in time of war. As the position has, however,
important geographical relations, and would enable us to extend our influence
~nd control over the Indians in our territory, and afford protection to our traders
m that remote region, it would seem to be worthy of early occupation if its
maintenance can be rendered secure-a point which can only be determined by
a careful examination of the country.
I t is nevertheless recommended to retain Fort Ora,vford, at Prairie du Chien,
Fort 1Viunebago, at the portage of the :Fox and Wisconsin rivers, and Fort
~oward, at Green l)ay. These posts are deemed necessary to protect that portion of our frontier, while at the same time they serve to cover an important line
of intercommunication between the northern lakes and the western waters.
It ha.-, n ot been thought expedient to continue the interior line of defence
1<uggc.-ted for the middle section of this frontier across from the Missouri to the
1Ii:::~is:-i]!pi river. Our Indian relations in ~hat quarter assume a different aspect.
There i.: no , pecial guarantee of perpetual occupation of that country by thE.
tribes who now inhabit it, nor can it be doubted that they will ultimately be
P~:ihed "Ly th e advance of our population to the west of the Missouri river.
[ nder tho. c circumstance, it is believed that the intermediate post recommended
r, be c·tablished on the Des Moines river, co-operating with the posts on the
Ii:isouri and those on the U ppe1· Mississippi, will afford adequate protection to
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the border settlements against any attacks to .which they are likely to be exposed.
rrhe board have not felt called upon by tlte terms of the resolution under
which they act to project a plan of operations for the western :frontier, nor to
go into an estimate of the military force that will be required there, furth er than
·was necessary to determine the extent of accommodations to be erected and the
expense which these will involve. They would, however, observe, that the
positions which have been designated will not of themselves have the desired
influence in restraining the Indian tribes and protecting our border :settlcment5
without the aid of a respectable force, of which a full proportion should 1Je
mounted and held disposable at all times fm active service in the field. To
effect this the works should be so constructed that, while they will afford adequate accommodations for all the troops when they are not actively employed,
their defence may be safely intrusted to a small force. With these precautionary :q:ieasures, and the co-operation of small but effective reserves posted within
sustaining distances of the several sections of the frontier, it is believed that
peace may be preserved and the first onset of war met until the militia of the
neighboring country could be embodied and brought into the :field.
It only remains to recapitulate the positions which have been recommended
to be occupied, apportion the requisite force, and present a conjectural estimate
of the cost of erecting the accommodations and defences deemed necessary at
each.
1. Itor quarters for 100 men at the post on the Sabine where the
$20, 000
Opelousas road crosses that river, including defences. . . . . . . . . .
2. For quarters for 100 men at the post on the Sabine where the
20, 000
Natchitoches road crosseR, including defences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. For permanent quarters and other accommodations for 500 men
at Fort Towson, including defences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
100, 000
4. For permanent quarters and other accommodations for 1,000 men
at Fort Gibson, including defences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 0, 000
5. J! or quarters for 300 men at the post on the Kansas river, inclu60, 000
ding defences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. For quarters and other accommodations for 500 men at the post
at Table creek, near the mouth of the Platte, on the lUissouri, includiug defences._.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
75, 00(1
7. For quarters and other accommodations for 400 men at the post
on the Des Moines river, including· defences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
60, 000
For the enlargement and repair of Fort Snelling, to fit it for the
accommodation of 300 men, including defences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30, 000
9. l!--,or quarters for 400 men at the post at the western extremity
of Lake uperior, including d fenceR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
50, 0<YJ
INTERIOR LINE.
1
or quart r. for 200 men at t11c 110. t between tl1e Red and Arkan~a. riv r,· , iuclndino· defences._ ....................... .
11. .l! or cornplc•tincr quarter. and other accommodatin. for '200 m •n
at :Fort , 'mith, includino- defc,nc: , ......................... .
12. } or cornpl ·tii1g quartc·r:l and oth er accommodation. for 200 men
at l! ort '\Vayn(•, includino- dPfc>nCP.' ........................ .
1:3. } or cpiart •r-: and. oth r a ·c:ommoc1ati n ., for 200 men at the po-:t
at 1 '1n-i1JO' 1-iY r, including d ·fence ........................ .

10.

50 . 0Dfl
50:

1 1

50.00 1
50.00
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14. For quarters and other accommodations for 200 men at the post
at Marais de Cygne, including defences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
J 5. For completing quarters and other accommodations in progress
for 400 men at :E'ort Leavenworth, including defences..........

1'otal for western frontier.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$50, 000
50, 000

895, 000

All which is respectfully submitted.
For the board,

JOS. G. TOTTEN,
Colonel Engineers.

stimall'd ,·ost o
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rounds ef ammunition for each piece.
CANNON •

•

rn

a

::,

'O
·c"<:l

"'
"O

cS
c..

::,

:::, O>

J,

--

~

ri:,
C

...t::1l s•
O>:,

...

2
2

......

······
......
......
4

~~

c..

0

c..

--

Po~t on the Sabine nt the crossing of the Ope:ousas road.
l'o,t n11 the 8nhine whcrr the Natchitoches road crnsseti .
PrnJ>o,wd l'~tnhli.- hment for 500 men at Fort TO\won .. .
Propo~rd e~tnhll,;hnieni for 1,000 men at Fort Gibson •. .
Prnpo~t:d C'$lUbli,h11wnt for 300 men nt the Kansas river
l'ropo,;1•,t catabh,hnwnt for 500 men at a post on Table
crel'k . .... ..... . ...... ... .......................
Pmpo,:1•d t•stnbli~h111rnt for 400 men at a post on tbr. Des
Mo1111•s ................. ... .. .....................
Hcpnirs, &e., of Fort SnPlling for 300 men . ............
l'ropo,rd cstnbl!Rhmcnt for 400 men at a post on westcrn extremity of Lake Superior .............. . , .....

0

C "1
:., ,!:;
0

(i:,

~

..!.

"C.,

C

2
2
10

10
10

10
IO
10

12

....0
...

s

0

.c::

t::1l

C ARRIA GE S.

i::.

Cd i::

sg

~o~ s

:::, C

:::,

.c::
<)

~

· - Cd

C

al<)

s::
,..:u

<d

C

Ol
....

"O

<:)

.c

0

o<i::

PROJECTILES,

;;;

!!l

~00

-5l...

:cs

Ct:
'7 0
00

s

5

~
C

g

c..

00

-~

-- ~Fnr thn hnnr,f

······

......
·····
8

-

IO
10
10
10
10
10
136

"O

C

::,
0

c..

"'

"O
C

:,

0
Cl,

"O

~
.c::
"'
.c::
<)

C

l;l:

=

0

....0::,..
U)

"O
C

:::,

~

0
C
C

i
""

Cd

::,

"'"'
<)

Q)

·e

0

Q)

"O

~

s

Cd

<d

00
E-t
0
J;
:0
....
p.,
p.,
0
0
p.,
E-t
"" - -.... - -....- - -- -- -- - ---- --- -- --- --- --- --1
1

l

......
......1
.... .. . .....
.... .....
..... ......
······
·· ····
...... ......
,

1

2

6
6
10
10
10

10
10
lU

10

10

10
10

10
10

19

5
5

17

l
l

200
200

.....
..... .
.....
...
...... .....
. ..... .....
......
......
. ..... ......
2

400

Interior line .
For propoRe!I c~tnh li~hmcnt for 200 men at a post betwl'en llt!1I nnd Arkan sas rivers .....•.•....••.•••••
For e,tnhlt~hmcnt nt Fort i'lmith for 200 men •.•••.•.• ..
For e,tnl,lishment nt Fort Way ne for 200 m en , .•••••• .
For ,·~inhlishment at Spring river for 200 m e n •. .•.•••.
For cstnhli~hmcnt at Marni ~ de Cygne for 200 men •.•• .
For e~lllhli,hnwnt at Fort Leavenworth for 400 men •••

~

COST OF AR~1AMENT.

t

~

.C::'c,;

POWDER,

······ .....
······
...... ·····
.... ·

di

200
100
200
100
1,000 .
1,000 .
1,000 .

0

100
100

.....
..... .....

.... .....
...... .

1,000
1,000
1,000
1,200

..... .....
....
. ..... .......

......
100

200

1,550
1,550
1,500
1,500
1,500

Cd

Cd

IO

10
10
10
10

10
10

10

0

$ 770
770
1,000
1,000
1,000

$ 1,455
1,455
1,000
1,000
1,000

$508
508
250
250
250

$310
3 :0
300
300
300

$3,043
3,043
2,550
2,550
2,550

1,500

1,000

1,000

250

::100

2,550

1,500
1,500

1,000
1,000

1,000
1,000

250
250

300
300

2,550
2,550

4,150

2,892

2,523

1,166

830

7,411

1,000 ...... ...... 1,500
1,000
1,000
250
1,000 . .....
1,000
1,000
250
....
......
1,000 . ..... ·····
..... 1,500
1; 500
1,000
1,000
250
......
......
10 ..... . ......
1,00 l . ... .
l,5UO
1,000
1,000
250
.... . .....
.....
10 ..... . ..... . 1,000 ..... . ·····
..... 1,500
1, 000
1,000
250
.....
JO .....
1,000 .... ' .....
1,500
1,000
1,000
250
.
······
-3
4
l:il
147
4
800 13,600
300
400 25,250 16,432 17,433
10

~

O':>
00

.....
······
...... ......

5,182

ts:
H

r
H

~

~

l:d
~

~

t:;

z~
~
~

r

t:;
t_rj
1-rj
t_rj

300
30C
300
300
300
300

2,550
2,550
2,550
2,550
2,550
2,550

5,050

44,097

za

t_rj

r'l

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

169

REPORT ON THE ARMORIES, ARSENALS, MAGAZINES, AND
FOUNDERIES, WHICH ARE MENTIONED IN THE THIRD SECTION Ol, THE RESOLUTION OF THE SENATE IN THE FOLLOWING WORDS, VIZ:
" The armories, arsenals, mao-azines, and founderies, either constructed or
deemed necessary, with a conjectural estimate of the expense of constructing
such of said establishments as may not yet be completed or commenced, but
which may be deemed necessary."
The necessary arsenals and magazines will be first consic1erec1, as armories
and founderies, being manufactories of arms destined for general distribution,
do not pertain exclusively to any particular frontier. Arsenals and· ordnance
depots will be understood to include magazines in the general sense of the term;
and these establishments will be rated, according to their relative importance or
magnitude, in three classes :
I. Arsenals of construction, which embrace also repairs, and for deposit.
II. Arsenals for repairs and for deposit.
III. Depots, or places for deposit and safe-keeping of arms, and other ordnance stores.

I. On tlie nortliern frontier, from Lake Superior to Passamaquoddy bay.An arsenal or ordnance depot will be required at some suitable point on the
L pper Mississippi; and Fort Crawford, at Prairie du Chien, offers a good position, particularly with reference to supplying the line or tract of country extending so uthwesterly from Fort Snelling, through the Territory of Iowa, towards
the Des Moines river, as well as northwardly toward Lake Superior, and eastwardly through the Territory of Wisconsin to Lake Michigan. The expens~
of constructing this depot, on a scale commensurate with the probable importance
$70, 000
that must be given to it, will be not less than................
forming an arsenal of the third class.
'l'he Detroit arsenal, on the river Rouge, twelve miles from Detroit, now nearly finished, is an arsenal of the second class, destined to supply the lake frontier from the Sault de St. Marie, the
20, 000
outlet of Lake Superior, to Lake Michigan and Lake Erie.~ . . .
will effect the completion of this arsenal.
Alleghany arsenal, at Pittsburg, an establishment of the :first
cla1-s, is also available for the supply of the lake frontier, as well
as the western frontier, through the western arsenals.
Rome arsenal, of the third class, is the place for deposit for
etores required at the posts on Lake Ontario.
Champlain arsenal, at Vergennes, Vermont, also of the third
cla~s, will supply the posts on Lake Champlain and the northern
part of Vermont. But the whole lake frontier, and the arsenals
in that region, may be supplied from the Watervliet arsenal, near
Albany, which is an establishment of the first class, and admirably located for the preparation and sending forth of ordnance
· tores, not only to the northern, but likewise to the maritime
frontier. The periods of free navigation of the New York canals
and the Hudson river arc used for the distribution from vVatervlir,t of such upplies as may be required in the winter season.
. Th~ Kennebec arsenal, at Augusta, Maine, of the second class,
13 df·:-1gned to supply the northern and eastern frontiers of that
,'.tau·, and part of New Hampshire; but arms would be furnished
rJ the frontier of the latter State from Springfield armory, and
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ordnance stores would be passed up the valley of the Connecticut
from arsenals either east or west of that river.
It may become necessary to establish a depot on the Penobscot, at Bangor. But this point is only sixty miles from Augusta;
and no estimate of the cost is furnished, as the deposit would
probably be temporary.

II. The maritime.frontier from Passamaquoddy bay to Cape
Florida.-'rhe Kennebec arsenal is the place of deposit for the
greater part of the sea-coast of Maine ; the sum of ............ .
will finish the additions required.
The Watertown arsenal, five miles in the rear of Boston, also
of the second class, will supply the westerly part of ~faine, the
sea-coast of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island;
and .................. _. _. __ ..... _.. ____ .. _....... _.. .
will be required for additional buildings and encfosures.
Both the Kennebec and Watertown arsenals are of considerable
extent, with every facility for being converted into arsenals of the
first class; and the construction of gun-carriages, necessary for
arming the forts and batteries within the limits above stated. may
be effected at both or either. The Watervliet arf;lenal, before
mentioned, is, however, the principal one relied on for supplies required, not only from Cape Cod to the capes of Delaware bay,
but for much of the maritime as well as the lake frontier. Additional quarters and storehouses at this post will cost ......... .
A depot in the harbor of New York receives articles from W atervliet, during the season of navigation, which are transhipped,
in time of peace, to all parts of the coast and to the Mississippi.
nuriug a war, supplies would be furnished from arsenals in the
more imme<liate vicinity of the sea-coast defences, viz : Frankford
arsenal, six miles above Philadelphia, is of •the second class, and
will supply works on Delaware bay and river; Pikesville arsenal,
of the thi.J:d class, four miles from Baltimore; Washington arsenal
and :F'ort Uonroe arsenal, both of the first class, will furni h what
may be required for the sea-coast defences of Chesapeake bay and
Potomac river. 'rhe last mentioned was established with special
reference to the construction of the gun-carriages required at that
post and at Fort Calhoun. It has been found advantageous, however,
to construct there carriaO'cs for other southern forts; but it cannot b · considered as a pe~anent establishment of the first class, to
be kept up after the occasion which called for it shall have passed
by.
The North Carolina ar enal, at Fayetteville, on Cape Fear
riv r is uucl r construction, and wa. originally intended to be
mad one of the fir. t cla , . Doubt have been entertained
wh ther it onght to exceed tho e of the second cla ; but the
plan i: ._ u ·h that it can at any tim b xtended according to the
ori 0 -inal dct<ign. Th , um of eio-hty thou and dollar will be requir d to fini:-h it a one of the 8C'cond cla s ............... ·:
'harl f\ton cl pot is at pr nt of diminutive capacity. It 1
prop •r to r.niaro- · it, ancl thirty thou~and dollar will make it u eful a, a plac(! of d po it ........ _.................... - . - ..
ll"'U. ta ar:Pnal at U"'U, ta, '<'Or -ia i of th ccond cla. , and
with the two la~t m ntion cl will fnmi:-th uppli · rcquir d from
h . ap akP hay to 1 ap :E lorida.
Th, ugu.:ta ai· ·cnal ha it powder magazin detached and
0

$30,000

25,000

50,000

0,000
30.000
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located at an inconvenient distance, beyond the control of the force
at the post. For the construction of a new magazine, and other
n~cessary a~ditions to this establishment, sixty thousand dollars
will be requrred .................... - · . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Several of the arsenals have been built upwards of 20 years,
and require extensive repairs and additions, which it is suppose~
may be effected, from time to time, by the aid of annual appropriations, amounting in all to abo~t ................ · · · · · - · · · · ·

III. "The Gulffrontier,from Cape Florida to Sabine bay.".Appalachicola arsenal, at Chattahoochee, just below the junction
of the Chattahoochee and Flint rivers; Mount Vernon arsenal, on
the ~Io bile river; and Baton Rouge arsenal, on the Mississippi,
are all establishments of the second class, and destined t-o supply the
whole Gulf frontier, and the forts below New Orleans, on the Mississippi. About sixty thousand dollars will be required to complete them, and erect some additional buildings at Baton Rouge ..
IV. "Tlie western frontier, .from Sabine bay to Lake Superior."-Baton Rouge arsenal, already mentioned, will furnish
supplies for posts on the Sabine and Red rivers.
Little Rock arsenal, just commenced, will be the source of supplies for posts on the Arkansas, and along the western border of
that State. It will necessarily become at :first an arsenal of the
second class, with the depot at Memphis as subsidiary, and will
require one hundred thousand dollars to complete it .......... .
St. Louis arsenal is a large establishment of the second class, but,
with very little expense can be raised to the :first class; with the
subsidiary depot at Liberty, on the Missouri, it will supply the
posts on that river, the western border of the State, the posts on
the D es Moines, and the Upper Missippi.
A depot at Prairie du Chien, mentioned in relation to supplies
required ·in the direction of Lake Superior, and southwesterly,
through the Territory of Iowa, would be sustained by the St.
Louis arsenal, and completes the chain upon the several frontiers
embraced in the resolution.
Total amount required for constructions, additions, and repairs
to arsenals and depots .................................. .
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$60,000

180,000

60,000

100,000

705,000

Armories.
The two national armories at Springfield, Massachusetts, and Harper'-: 'Ferry,
Virginia, are the only public establishments for the manufacture of small arms.
They furnish about twenty-five thousand stand of arms yearly. rrhis number
might be extended; but it has been an object of solicitude with the government
for nearly twenty years past to establish an armory west of the Alleghanies.
Commissioners were employed in 1823 to examine the western waters, with a
new to the location of an armory. Many sites were surveyed, and careful estimates made of the cost of an armory at each, with an exhibit of their several
advantages and disadvantages. The result of their investigations may be found
~t large in Gales & Seaton's reprint of American State Papers, folios 729 to 790
inclut-ivc, Yolume 2, :Military Affairs.
It i::; perMps fortunate that the place then selected was not adopted by Congrcsic:; for, since that period, the immense increase, not only of population and
the gf'll ·ral re ources of the western region, but of the particular articles required
for the manufacture of arms, by the discovery of masses of coal, and the exten-
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sive working of iron mines, where nothing of the kind was then found, has
shown that an armory should be located much further west.
The data collected by the commissioners in 1823 may be usefully applied in
estimating the probable cost of an armory at the present day, making suitable
allowances for the increased price of everything connected with such an establishment. This cost will be found to vary, according to localities of positions,
from $280,000 to $500,000 for an armory capable of furnishing twelve thousand
muskets per year. It will therefore be stated at the mean of $390,000, to which
twenty per cent. should be added; making the sum of_ ____ . . . .
$,468, 000
Another mode of proceeding proposed, consists in forming an
establishment complete in itself, of limited extent, and having the
great mass of component parts of arms manufactured by the piece
in private workshops, and only the inspecting, assembling, and
finishing be done at the public works. '.rhis course would materially reduce the first cost, or necessary expenditure for buildings
and tools. It also admits of extension to a great amount of fabrication, with but little additional cost of permanent fixtures.
But, whichever mode is followed, or whatever site may be
selected for its location, there can be no question of. the necessity
for an armory on the western waters; and as regards a proper
location, it may be observed, that, to consider the relations of an
armory in the same light as that of an arsenal or magazine, would
be an error; the means of production being the principal requisite
for the one, and those of transportation or distribution for the
others.
Total required for an armory on the western waters ........ - .
468,000

Founderies.
The United States own no cannon foundery. Although possessing some ore
beds, from which iron of approved quality for casting cannon has lon g ?een macl~,
yet artillery of every description is procured from private foundenes. 'l'~r
subject has been so recently before Congress, and so ably treated, tha! nothmg
will be said further than to state the probable cost of such an estabhs~ime~t ;
and here, again, so much depends upon the location, that only an approx1mat1on
will be attempted. A report from the War Department made to the 24th Congress, 1st session, Doc. No. 106, states the cost of a foundery, to be located a
Georgetown, in the District of Columbia, at $312,000. If this estimate i correct, (and it is known that great care was bestowed on its preparation,) it may
be a sumed that about __ .. _____ . _.. __ .. ____ .. _. _________ .
300, 000
will be required for a foundery when favorably located for the use
of water power. Should team power be adopted, the fast co t
of the e tabli hment would be les , while the annual expenditure
,vould be greater than for water power.
A regard a suitable location for a foundery, the great weight
and bulk of the raw materials u eel in the manufacture of cannon,
an l th wc•iO'ht of heavy gnn , which are required for u e only on
th , aboard, would em to c1 mand that particular attention
i:ih uld b iv n to them an of tran portation both to and from
th founcl ry.
Total amount required for a founclery .. _.. _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
300. 000
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Recapititlation.

Total amount required for constructions, additions, and repairs to
arsenals and depots .... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · - - - · · ·
Total amount required to establish an armory on the western
"'aters ........................ - ...... - . - - · · · · · · · · · · Total. amount required to establish a national foundery .... - ...
Total .................... - ....... - - - - - · · · · · · · ·

$105,000
468,006
300,000
1,473,000

-----

All w bich is respectfully submitted.
By order of the board,
JOS. G. TOTTEN,
Colonel of Engineers.

MEMORIAL OF EDMUND P. GAINES.

ef Representatives of the

United States of America
in Congress assembled :
The memorial of Edmund Pendleton Gaines, a major general in the army of
the United States, commanding the western division, respectfully showeth:
That, believing the federal and State constitutions guarantee and consecrate to
every free citizen capable of bearing arms the ri·glit and duty of participating
alike in the civil and military trusts of the republic, solemnly requiring the
soldier to exert his every faculty "in peace to prepare for war," so that
on the recurrence of war he may be well qualified to fight the battles of his
country in the greatest possible triumph, and at the least possible cost of blood
and treasure; requiring him, moreover, to study and respect her political and
social institutions; and requiring the statesman to discipline his mind for the
tate and national defence, by adapting his civil acts and occasional military
studies to the purposes of the national defence and protection, as well against
foreign enemies in war as against the home incendiary and other criminal offenders
" in peace; thus rendering the statesman and soldier equally familiarized with
their common kindred duties of self-go·vernment and self-defence: by a knowledge of which our independence was achieved, and without which this inestimable blessing cannot be preserved ;-your memorialist, a native Virginian, a citizen of Tennessee, schooled in her cabins and her camps to the profession of
armt\, has, within the last seventeen years, matured a system of national defence,
to ·which he now respectfully solicits your attention and support: a system of
national defence which the late giant strides of invention and improvement in
the arts have rendered indispensable to tlie preservation of the Union: a system
of national defence which recommends itself peculiarly to the central, southern,
and Atlantic States, as well as to those of the north and west; as it assures to
our i::lolated central States of Tennessee and Kentucky, and to all the western
, 'tatcf, of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Arkansas, in peace, commercial
advantaO'c•s equal to those enjoyed by the most favored eastern, Atlantic, or
::outhern btatei:i; and in war, giving to the disposable fighting men of these central and western States the inestimable privilege of flying with unprecedented
certainty, celerity, and comfort to any of our vulnerable seaports, to aid our
hrethren of the border States to repel the invading foe ; and to accomplish this
es::ential duty in one-tenth part of the time, and one-tenth part of the expense
To the Senate and House

174

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

-

that would attend such an operation over our present bad roads. But, above
all, to accomplish these great and good objects by means that will more than
double the value of our State and national domain, and without expending a
dollar that may not be insured to be replaced in the public coffers in from seven
to ten years after the completion of the work here recommended.
Your memorialist is admonished by the universal employment of steam power,
and its applicability to every description of armament hitherto moved upon the
sea by wind and canvas, or upon the land by animal power, that an epoch is
at hand in which the art of war, in whatever regards the attack and defence of
seaports, has undergone an unparalleled revolution.
Hitherto the transition from peace to war between neighboring nations,
though sometimes sudden and unexpected, was usually preceded by some significant note of preparation not easily mistaken; and after the actual commencement of hostilities there were frequent opportunities and ample time for the
belligerents, and more particularly for the nation acting upon the unerring
principle of self-defence, to complete the work ef preparationfor war before the
work of destruction upon her principal seaport towns had been begun by the
invading foe. Hitherto the enemy's fleets were to be seen for weeks, often,
indeed, for months in succession, " standing qff and on," waiting for suitable
winds and weather to enable them to enter and attack the destiued port, and
then, in case of accident, to carry them safely out again-winds such as could
never be calculated on with anything like certainty. Hence the great and
unavoidable delay in the attack by fleets propelled by wind and sails has often
enabled the people of the threatened seaports to throw up works of defence;
and after slowly marching their interior volunteers and other forces at the rate
of twenty miles a day, they would in time be so well prepared for action that
the menacing invaders have but seldom ventured to attack places of much
importance, but have usually condescended to vent their prowess in a petty
border war against villag·es and private habitations, as upon the Chesapeake bay
ancl the Georgia sea-coast in the war of 1812, 1813, and 1814.
.
If the obvious effect of steam power, in the rapid movement of e:erythmO'
to which it has been applied around us, has not been sufficient to convmce us of
the expediency and transcendent advantages in war and in peace o~ ~he propo>ted immediate work of preparation, by steam power, to guard agamst the
incalculable disasters that must otherwise attend the sudden outbreak of war
with any of the great nations of Europe able to send against us even a small
fleet propelled by steam power, it would seem obvious that the late naval and ,
military operations in the harbor of Vera Cruz were sufficient to prove clear~y,
that to bring a hostile fleet inside tlie breakers of a seaport of the country mvaded, and within the desired range of the best of cannon and mortars for
red-lwt slwt ancl sliells of one of the strongest castles in America, wa the work
of but ·two hour ; and that the utter destruction of that ca tle by three mall
hip:-of-war r quired but four hours more.
.
'l'o provide for the defence of our , eaports, and thus effectually to obviate
the po:i ibility of a sudden calamity like that which has befallen the ca.'tle of
'an J nan clr Ulloa, anc1 to enable u to repel by the agency of team po,-rcr
v ry inva, ion suddenly forced upon u by fleet prop ·lled by stcan_1 power,
I now , uLrnit for the con:--id ·ration of the national legitilature the prqJcct and
~·pl~rnttory vi w which follow:
ART. I. Floating batterie for the defence ef tlte seaports and lwrbors of th
Uttit ,fl , late..
1. ~ our nwmoriali. t propo:- tl1 imm diate con truction of from two to four
hr"' floatino- Lattcri :, for th' c1 f ·nee of a ·h navigal>l pa. into th .Ii,-.:-i:;-.ippi
riv :r and from tw to five other. for th d fi 11 • of very other n:rvilTaLlc i1~l •
I ·1dino- in
ny of the principal ap rt of the United tatc . Each floatwz
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battery to be from 200 to 300 feet long, and from 90 to 150 feet wide-the
bottom to be as nearly flat as the best tested principles of naval architecture
will allow, consistently with the great weight of timber and metal to be provided for, with the requisite facility of the movement that will be required over
shoal water. Each floating battery to be secured in the bottom and sides with
copper sheeting, and copper or iron bolts ; and on the upper parts, exposed to
the enemy's shot and shells, with the thickest sheet iron, and iron bolts; and
otherwise made capable of sustaining a heavier broadside than the larg·est of
our ships-of-war is capable of sustaining; to carry from one hundred and twenty
to two hundred heavy cannon-say long 24 and 32-pounders, with some 80pounders for carrying hollow shot, together with some mortars for throwing
shells ; with a furnace for heating red-hot shot for illuminating the enemy's
fleets and transports. · Eaca . floating battery to have state-rooms for the comfo rtable accommodation of from 600 to 1,000 men, with storerooms for all the
munitions of · war requisite for that force for six to eight months' service. Each
floating battery to be attended and propelled by sueh number of tow-boats as
the exigencies of the service shall from time to time demand-to be permanently
stationed in each harbor in time of peace, and in war as many tow-boats to be
chartered as the commanding officer may deem necessary to render the floating
batteries in the highest degree efficient. As in war tow-boats will seldom be
needed for the merchant service, an ample supply of them, particularly in our
large seaports, may be chartered on moderate terms : for example, in the harbor
of K ew Orleans it is believed that twelve tow-boats, with several steamboats
having the best of engines to be converted into tow-boats, would be thrown out
of employment during a state of war. These could be usefully employed in
the United States service, in aid of the public tow-boats and floating batteries.
But should this reliance be deemed unsafe, we can readily adopt the obvious
alternative of having each floating battery supplied with two tow-boats of great
power, as in war they would be needed near the batteries, ready to wield them
in the event of an attack, and at other times to act as tenders in eupplying them
with men and munitions of war. In a state of peace the floating batteries, it
is believed, would require but one tow-boat each, excepting when employed in
deepening the ship channels-a work which ·may be accomplished with the
most perfect ease and to any desirable extent, wherever the bottom of the channel consists of mud and sand, as iu all the outlets of the Mississippi. This
important work will be done by attaching to the bottom· of each floating battery
a framework of ploughs and scrapers ef iron, made to let down and raise up at
plea ure, according to the hardness or softness of the clay and sand, or mud, of
which the bar or bottom of the channel may be composed. If very hard or
tough, the ploughs and scrapers might not break up and take off more than two
to four inches in depth at one movement; but where the bar is composed entirely '
of ..,oft mud, as that at Balize and the Northeast and Southwest passes have
often been, from four to six inches in depth, it is believed, may be carried off at
once- wherever the bar is very narrow, and in the immediate vicinity of very
deep water, which would be the reservoir or place of deposit to which the mud
and ... and would be removed. But in a state of peace, when the batteries should
not be employed in deepening the ship channels, their extra tow-boats might be
advantageously employed in the merchant service.
2. :Floating batteries such as are here proposed, consitute, as your memorialist
-verily believes, the only sure means of defence of the passes into our seaports
again t ships-of-war propelled by steam power-means of defence without which
it i::; in the power of any nation, or community of men, or pirates, capable of
fitting out ten or even five such steamships-of-war as those employed in the
df.:'" truction of the castle of San Juan de Ulloa, to destroy the city of New
York or ....,. ew Orleans by fire, with the newly invented SO-pound cannon shot
and hell , in a single day, at any season of the year i approaching them in the
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night, and taking them by surprise : as with such a fleet, well manned and
supplied, either city could be fired in five hundred places in one hour; and in a
few hours more thousands of the most splendid edifices, by which these magnificent cities are embellished, would be reduced to ruin and desolation.
3. This opinion has not been formed without a full knowledge of the fact that
both New York and New Orleans number among their citizens many men and
volunteer corps of military science, patriotism, and unsurpassed chivalry. But
these fine volunteer corps, attacked by means and by weapons hitherto unknown
to them, or unprovided for, and thus taken by surprise, may share the fate of
the heroic Danes at Copenhagen, when attacked by Nelson; with this striking
difference in their favor, and against us, the Danes were not taken by surpri e.
A protracted negotiation with England preceded the attack; and after the British
fleet had made its appearance on the coast of Denmark, and in sight of their
harbor, they had some three or four days for preparation; they had a fleet nearly
equal to that brought into action against them by Nelson, together with an army
of some thousands of men, seamen, soldiers, and volunteers, with several fo1tifications on land, aided by some floating batteries-presenting altogether an armament of upwards of 1,000 cannon, with an immense supply of small arms and
every requisite munition of war. In this state of preparation the harbor of
Copenhagen was entered in open day by twelve ships of the line-three of w~ch
were rendered nearly useless by having got aground; with nine ships of the lin~,
therefore, Nelson sustained a close action for four hours, during which time hIB
loss was less than one thousand, while the loss of the Danes was near six thou·
and men, together with their fleet-to say nothing of the losses sustained by the
inhabitants of the city. This was the result of an attack with nine ships of the
line, propelled by wind and sails, upon the seaport of Copenhagen, when strongly
fortified and defended by large naval and land forces. What then must be the
fate of such a city as New York, or New Orleans without any effective mean"
of defence, attacked by ten, or even five ships-of-war, armed with the newly
invented SO-pounders, and propelled by steam power? We know that a fleet
consisting of this description of ships-of-war may cross the .Atlantic from a
European port to New York in the short space of fourteen days' time, and that
it may enter our harbors in the night, and be seen at our wharves, with matche5
lighted ready for action, at daylight in the morning-ready to take or de tr?Y
money or property amounting to ten times as much as all the :floating b'.tttenes
and railroads embraced in the proposed system of national defence would _c~~t.
In the outrageous attack on Copenhagen, England was :fighting for the d01mn10P
ef tlie sea. Denmark and Sweden, with Russia and France, were then nob~y
opposing that lawless pretension, as we, the United States, have long opposed it.
Nelson, on embarking in the expedition, is reported to have said to hi co~mauder, Admiral Parker, "I hope we shall give our northern enemies that hail• torm of bullets, which gives our dear country tlie dominion ef tlie sea; we ha-re
it, and all the devils in the north cannot take it from us if our wooden wall ha-re
fair play." 'I1his is the language of a truehearted Briti,·h seaman and ~oldier.
u ·h wa the noble bearing of our own Decatur, when he exclaimed, 'Our
country! in her intercour,·e with for ign nations may she always be right; bu
iu war ma ' he alway triumph-right or wrong!"
In th· memorable attack on Copenhagen, it is worthy of remark here tha·
the xpcri nc d Admiral clflon, ·who had won more great naval victorie: th_an
any other ommandcr had, pr viou, to the action , tated to the command r-inchi ·f th followino- 01Jinion: "If th wind i. fair, and you determine to at a
the .·hip, and rown i:--lanclt-1, ycv must expect the natural £ssue of ucli a battlt-:
h111 crippled, a11d pcrlwp one or two Lost/ for the wind wlticli carries '!f
will most probably not bri11g o_ut a crippled lu'_p."
el on, however had
goocl fortuu , aft r takinr, and de.:troyin,,. a fl t n arly equal to hi: own .. •
killing "ix tim · a many m ·n a he lo tin action, to ail out of the hru·bor. whic
1
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he had filled with wrecks, without the loss of a single British vessel, though ~ie
,
.
4 . With floating batteries, such as are here proposed, it is more than probable
that the brave Danes would have destroyed the whole of Nelson's fleet without
sustaining the loss of a vessel, a battery, or one hundred men. rnie floating
batteries of the Danes, like those of the French and Spaniards at the siege of
G ibraltar in the year 1783, were inefficient, simply because they were unwieldy.
~ o effective means for wielding floating batteries, when large enough to be
formidable, had ever been discovered previous to the discovery by Robert
Fulton of that development of steam power applicable to ships and all other
floating structures. With regard ·to the ten great floating batteries, especjally
constructed for the memorable siege against Gibraltar, it is obvious to every
man of military mind that, however formidable such batteries might have been,
even without towboats, or steam power in any other form, employed in the
defence of a high rock fort like that of Gibraltar, such floating batteries could
never be relied on as effective means ef attack upon a high rock fort of that
description, as the immense strength ef tlie position and ef the work, with the
g reat ele·vation of the cannon of the work attacked, would insure the destruction
of floating batteries, or render an attack by them ·unavailing. It is a well
ascertained fact, however, not generally known, as but few historians have
noticed it, that the floating batteries employed in the siege of Gibraltar were
manned principally with convicts. This fact may be considered as the most
conclusive among the principal causes of their failure, as well as of the opinion
entertained and expressed by the French and Spanish commanders, that most
of these batt<~ries were set on fire by the men on board, whose duty it was to
defend them. Be this as it may, a minute examination of the military history
of the ten:i-ble siege of Gibraltar is respectfully referred to by your memorialist
as evidence in favor of his proposition for the immediate construction of floating
batteries for the defence of our ports and harbors; inasmuch as it is obvious that,
if the commander of Gibraltar had been supplied with ten floating batteries, such
as are here proposed, with our present means ot towboats, with steam power to
wield them, he would have destroyed the whole of the combined fleets employed
against him, or at least have kept them out of the bay or harbor of Gibraltar.
To the siege of Gibraltar and the attack on Copenhagen, two of the most terrible
and extraordinary events known to modern history, in reference to the attack
and defence of seaports, an event known to your memorialist anc1 many other
officers now in service will be added, to show the utter impracticability of locking
up a navigable river or inlet, or of arresting the movement of a fleet thereon, by
fortifications with cannon placed on the banks of such river or inlet. On the
night of the 6th of November, 1813, the flotilla, under the command of Major
General Wilkinson, consisting of nearly 300 boats, sloops, and schooners, passed
the fort of Prescott, upon the Canada side of the river St. Lawrence, under a
con tant fire of the cannon of the fort, manned by the best of British artillerists,
·without the loss of a boat or other vessel, and with the loss of but one man killed
and two wounded; notwithstanding the flotilla was nearly one hour in the act
of pas ing the fort, during the whole of which time the fire of the enemy's cannon
wa~ incessant, and the line formed by the flotilla in its movement was deemecl
~o be within pointblank shot of the fort-say from 600 to 800 yards' distance!
This fact was proven by the whistling of the enemy's shot, many, probably
hundreds, of which passed apparently from 20 to 50 feet above our heads, while
on Loard the boats in their slow passage, for they were propelled by oars, upon
a gentle cuuent, which enabled us to move at the rate of not more than three
mifes an hour. This movement was effected in the night, tolerably c~ear, but
"ithout moonlight. With the history of these three events before us, it :v-ould
::.eem to be the height of imprudence in us to persevere in the construction of

had several greatly damaged.
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costly forts, with the vain hope of protecting our seaports against fleets propelled
by steam power, :without the employment of floating batteries, such as are here
recommended, with railroads to sustain them by timely re-enforcements.
5. But it has been contended by men of high pretensions in theory, if not in
the practical science of war, that, in place of the floating batteries here propo..,ed
as means of lwrbor· defence, we should direct our attention mainly to the construction of steams'7.,-ips qf war. In reply to this theoretical suggestion, it is
only necessary to say that we must, indeed, ultimately have steamships of war,
or we must give up the whole of our foreign commerce; but, if we desire to
preserve our seaports and commercial emporiums, we must have for their protection .floating batteries, which constitute, in the present state of the arts, the
natural link in the great chain of national defence between the land and naval
means of service: and, as these floating batteries are not designed for going to
sea, (excepting near our ports and harbors, in calm weather,) they properly belong to the land service. 'The fact that our seaports are rendered more than
ever liable to sudden and unlooked-for attacks by fleets propelled by steam
puwer, renders it all-important to their security that our means of harbor defence
should never, even for a single clay, be left exposed to an assault~ when that
assault may, in all human probability, result in the destruction of one of our
most vital points of military and commercial operations. If, however, steamship~
of war should be preferred to the proposed floating batteries, a solemn act of
Congress should be passed, forbid.cling any officer from removing them beyond
the immediate vicinity of the harbor to which they may be assigned; as itnm~t
be obvious that our seaports cannot be protected without every requisite mean,
of protection is held ready for action within our harbors, repectively. The
floating batteries1 it is believed, will cost but little more than the timber, iron, copper.
and other materials for their construction, if they are built, its they should ?e.
by the troops intended to defend them, aided by some ship-carpenters to give
them tight bottoms.
6. With three to five of the proposed floating batteries placed in the form of
a crescent across the lVIississippi river, with the concave side of the crescent do'ITTI
the river, and this curved line of floating batteries flanked by a small temporary
fort on each bank of the river, so as to bring the cannon of each fort or battery
to bear on any fleet or vessel ascending the river from the sea, we should b(,
certain thus to give each of the enemy's leading vessels a double cross-fire;_
raking them in front and on each side at one and the same time, with several. 11
our heavy guns from each one of our floating batteries and adjacent forts, uit
red-hot slwt-a description of defence which would to a certainty, in 99 ca~r:
out of 100, be fatal to any fleet that could possibly be brought against our ~n
of batteries. But, "to make assurance doubly sure," we could have our fl.oati_ng
batteries occasionally connected together by cliain cables and clievaux-dej n •
,vhich might ·ometimes bring us in close contact with a daring foe, a 1 e~ n
or our own Decatur and Perry wBre in the mode of attack which charactenzed
tho e chivalric naval commanders. But the cont,tet thus produced would_in~
t u _the moral and physical effect of our efforts being in self-defence, mth h.
sup_ r1or trcngth of ?ur batteries, bulwarks, and weigkt of metal-ad:~t-1gt''
which w
h oulcl enJoy from the moment the invading foe comes Wl~ID rh
f our long ancl h avy cannon, until he finds himself entangled m,
arret-t d by, our chewux-de-frise, where the contact would be so clo.,e a, ·
uabl_ u to throw i:1-to hi ship ltand grenades and incendiary sliells. wi h
occa 1onal . upply of h at d team; while our own batterie would be pre~ r ·
from a ·im~lar annoyance by th_ ir superior width, strength, and peculiar_dnl ·
tur of thell' upp ·r work~, wlnch are propo cd to be secured by .. beet- n
imrn ·n .. e thickuc:-i~; a d '· ripti n of ,York which it i believed could not
·ff · tuall · appli<'d to vc .. : L of auythu1g like the ordinary model of shi -- ·
w ar d c~i n-u d for s a .. rYicc.
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But again: u to make assurance doubly sure," we should not risk such places
as New York and New Orleans-by far the most vital, and in a civil and (the
latter more especially) in a military point of view, the most important seaports
in .America-without at least two curved lines of defence-one at or near the
entrance of the harbor, and the other at the next narrow, strong, interior point,
fortified as above suggested, with the curved line of floating batteries flanked
by a fort on each side of the river or channel; for example, for the harbor· of
New York, the Narrows; and for the Mississippi, Forts Jackson and St. Pliilip.
7. Floating batteries, such as are here proposed, constitute the only effective
means of defence against fleets propelled by steam power, in a nation situated
as the United States are, covering a large extent of country, bordered by a
seaboard of near 4,000 miles in extent, indented by many fine seaports, with
great cities filled with the wealth of a lucrative commerce with every quarter of
the globe, together with our own agricultural products, fully capable of sustaining our expansive commerce, until it surpasses that of any other part of the
globe: provided we take care to maintain an attitude of honest defiance
towards the licensed as well as the unlicensed pirates of every quarter of the
world, by which they will clearly understand that we desire to be at peace, to
do equal and impartialjustice to all nations, and to engage in entangling alliances
with none; and above all, if we are attacked, we should be prepared speedily to
concentrate at the point of attack sufficient force and supplies to overwhelm the
invader with irretrjevable defeat before he will have it in his power to destroy
any of our means of defence, or our seaport towns. Our law less neighbors will
thus be taught that if they attack us they do it at their peril, and at the risk of
leaving their armies to enrich our plantations.
8. So much for their uses in a state of war; then, on the return of peace,
when the most expensive fixed fortifications are absolutely useless, and, moreover, a heavy burden to the country to keep them in repair, floating batteries
will be usefully employed as barracks and hospitals, and in deepening the channels, liable to be filled up by clay, and loam, and sand, as those at the mouth of
the Mississippi river are often filled up. As floating barracks and hospitals, the
proposed batteries would be of essential benefit to the service everywhere, inasmuch as the outlets of our rivers and seapods are generally healthy positions;
and they will form the most appropriate asylums for our convalescent or slightly
disabled soldiers or seamen, most of whom will render essential service in preparing fixed ammunition, and in the instruction of the young and inexperienced,
and in holding them ready for action. Above all, in a state of peace the proposed floating batteries will be of immense utility to the service for all purposes
of military schools, to which the aspiring youth of our country of the community will gladly repair, for the attainment of military knowledge, where it can
be acquired both in tlieory and in practice, and where its study and practice
will be rendered most delightful and praiseworthy by the simple process of the
students rendering immediate and important public service in return for the public instruction received by them. 'I1he military education of our youth should
commence at the age of sixteen, and be completed at the age of twenty-one or
twenty-two. If our youth are educated upon floating batteries at the entrace of
our harbors near the Balize, Sandy Hook, or the Narrows ; otherwise, if the
youth of each Atlantic or southern State are educated at the entrance of the
principal eaport of such State, the graduate, after finishing his equcation, would
have the proud satisfaction of exhibiting to his parents or guardian, on his return
home, the gratifying evidence of his having performed five years' honorable
service, while acquiring attainments qualifying him for a high, perhaps the highest,
command in the army; attainments, too, tending to qualify him in no small
degree for the highe t stations recognized by the free institutions of our country,
and exonerating him for ever after from any other than mere voluntary service.
9. Shall we be told by the advocates of our obsolete systems of national de-
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fence that the risk: of health and comfort fa too great to have the youth of onr
country educated upori our floating batteries at the entrance of our harbors, or
at the mouths of our rivers, where the swell of the sea and the turbid water of
our overflowing· Mississjppi and other rivers may too sensib1y affect the nerves
and disturb the meditations of the students on whom the defence and fate of the
republic must soon depend 1 Will o~r opponents point to the United State·
Military Academy, and contend that the graduates of that institution are the
better for the serene stillnesR, quiet, and comfort of the interior position of that
institution 1 We may answer, no! no! The only great defect to be founcl in
that institution consists in the quiet and almost exclusively sedentary mode of
li-ving which has long marked the character of that otherwise admirable instih1tion; a mode of living which contributes too much to sacrifice the vigor of constitution necessary to a real hard-duty soldier, to the attainment of that literahue
and science, with the social habits and enjoyments more befitting a country
gentleman of affluent fortune, than a thoroughbred soldier, statesman, or man of
business:
'' The life of fame is ACTION understood ;
That action must be virtuous, grea,t, and good."

Habits ef action, of mind and body, should be formed in childhood, or at
least before the seal of manhood is fixed upon the student. Why is the seaman
placed on duty on board the ship-of-war at the age of twelve to sixteen, and
required to perform his practical labors from the moment he takes his first le sons in the theoretical duties of his profession 1 It is to facilitate his attainment·
of both in the shortest possible time, and to the greatest possible extent of pe~·fection. His health and habits are perfected upon the precise element, and m
e'J;posures to the climates and weather, tow hich his duties will call him, and often
confine him during a state of war. Why is the law student required to attend
the courts, and the medical student the hospitals, while attending to the theory
of the profession 1 It is because, even in these learned professions, where much
more depends upon books, or theory, than in the profession of arms, all expe1·ienced men unite in the opinion that great benefit to the student results from
combining practice with theory. 'I'he watchmaker, shoemaker, carpenter, and
blacksmith, always put their students or apprentices to work at the eru·lie, t ~o~sible period of their instruction; often, indeed, before they are able to wield
many of the tools of their trade. With these facts before our eyes, added to the
custom which has obtained in many of the enlightened States of Europe, and
which we are apparently disposed to rivet upon our own land of freedom and in"'e~tiou, it would seem impossible to resist the conviction that the science of war 1s
indeed in its infancy. Of all the sciences and arts, there are none where the
'union qf theory and practice, in all the duties of preparation for the grea
dernier r ,tuts, are so much altogether necessary and proper, as in the cienc
of war and the duties of an army; and yet, wonderful to tell, there i no trade
or pro£ s ·ion, red.need to separate and distinct rules of science and ru·t, in whic~
theory i so much relied on, or practice so much neglected, as in the art ot
war, a it regards military operations on land, or in the attack and defence ot
-eapo1i .
ART. II. So much for floating batteries, and their u es in peace and in war.
L t u now proceed to con ider the all-important kindred mea ure of railroad,
for co-op ratino- with the propo ed :floating batterie , and perfecting the pn>m·
i ed .:yi-t m of national d t uc .
10. "\V propo::-e th imm cliat location and con truction of even railroad,.
to c. t ·ncl from th two c ntral ~ 'tat of 'I enn
and K ntucky to the, ,- ·
grand divi,'ion of the national frontier, a ugge tcd by a plan embraced in h
a companying diagram, viz:
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First One principal railroad from Lexington, Kentucky, to Buffalo or Plattsbm·g, New York, with branches to Detroit, Albany, and Boston.
Second. One principal railroad from Knoxville, Tennessee, to Norfork, Virginia, or Baltimore, Maryland, with branches to Richmond, Virginia, and Newbern, North Carolina.
T'7/ird. One principal railroad from Memphis, Tennessee, to Charleston, South
Carolina, or Savannah, Georgia, with branches to Milledgeville, Georgia, and
East Florida.
Fourth. One principal railroad from Louisville, Kentucky, to Mobile, Alabama, with a branch to Pensacola, Florida.
Fifth. One principal railroad from Lexington, Kentucky, via Nashville, to
Kew Orleans.
Sixth. One principal railroad from Memphis, Tennessee, to the Sabine ridge,
with branches to Fort Towson and ] 1 ort Gibson, Arkansas.
Seventh. One principal railroad from Louisville, Kentucky, or Albany, India na, to St. Loms, Missouri, and thence to the Misouri river, north of the mouth
of the Big· Platte; with branches from Albany, Indiana, to Chicago, and from
the northwest angle of the State of Missouri to the upper crossing of the river
Des Moines.
11. These seven great arteries or principal railroads here enumerated will
each be from 500 to 700 miles in length, (averaging 600 miles,) making altogether a distance 'of 4,200 miles; and the average cost of locating and constructing them is estimated at $15,000 per mile_; amounting, altogether, to the '
sum of $64,000,000, provided they are located anc1 constructed by the army of
the United· States-the railroads to be of the most substantial kind, each having
a double track. The whole work to be completed by the . authority and at the
expense of the United States; provided that, on its final completion, it shall rev ert to the States, in their sovereign and individual capacity; each State to retain forever the right of property in and to all of such section or sections of the
said railroads, with all their appurtenances, lying or being within the territoi-ial
limits of such States, respectively, upon the simple condition that all troops,
whether regulars or volunteers, in the service of the United States, with their
munitions of war, together with the mail, shall be transported forever upon
these railroads free of expense to the United States.
12. Without attempting to enumerate all the benefits to be derived from the
proposed railroads in peace as well as in war-benefits which are for the most
part too .generally known to require any particular notice here, (and others, cert ainly of very great value, can only be conjectured, inasmuch as they are to
some extent invisible, and to be developed, principally, it is believed, by the
excavations necessary to complete the graduation of the basis of the work
through the vast regions of mineral wealth over which its various lines will
extend, where accident has hitherto led to the discovery of a sprinkling of gold,
with millions of acres of the richest iron and lead ore and coal, together with
copper and other valuable minerals,) yourmemorialist will here concisely advert
to the principal benefits which the military aspect of the proposed work prom-_
i ~es, and conclude with a notice of such advantages as must immediately result
t o the army, to the several States, and the UNION, from the organization and
employment of the national regulars and volunteers as operatives upon the
work.
13. The principal advantages· to be derived from the proposed railroads
ill a military point ef view .
. ~ a state of war they will enable us to transport the military men a?-d ~umt1on of war of the two central States of the Union, and of all the wtenor
dibtrict.. , of the twenty-four border States, to the seven grand divisions of the
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national frontier, without animal power, in one-tenth part of the time, and at
one-tenth part of the expense that the movement would cost in the present state
of our bad roads. The proposed railroads would thus enable us to obtain more
useful service in war from ten thousand men, by the increased rapidity and
safety of their movement to the point of attack chosen by the invading foe,
than without railroads we could obtain from an army of one hundred thou and
men marched upon our common roads; as, in addition to the saving of time,
which in war is power, and healtli, and life, and money, we shall save our citizen -soldiers from what they usually deem the most irksome and insupportable
affiictions and privations attending their tours of military service; we shall sa,e
them from long and tedious marches, and from the still more trying scenes of a
long-continued delay in camp, and the consequent painful separation from wife,
children, friends and business. On the contrary, after being assembled and prepared for action, we shall fly to meet the invading foe at the rate of 250 to 300
miles in 24 hours-taking with us every desirable necessary of life for the pre ervation of health, activity, and personal prowess, so that when we meet the
enemy we shall enjoy every desfrable advantage in every conflict, in mo t of
which we cannot but be successful; and in place of the usual campaign of three,
six, or twelve months of distressing service, we may reasonably calculate on
being conveyed, with every desirable supply from the central States to the fr?ntier, in the short space of fifty or sixty hours' time, and of meeting and bcatmg
the invading foe, and returning· to our homes in a few days, or at most a few
weeks more. Hence the great utility of the proposed railroads in a state of
war; and then, on the return of peace, when our sixty millions of dollars worth
of fortifications, and armories, and arsenals, and ships-of-war, are worse than
useless for any of the purposes of peace, and a great and constant expense to
repair and replenish them in order to hold them ready for another war; then
our railroads, taking, as they must take, precisely the direction that the commerce of our country takes, from the seaboard to the central western States,
will, when turned to commercial purposes, produce a revenue to the States ~hat
own them that will be more than sufficient to replace, in seven year./ time,
every dollar expended in their construction, and forever thereafter produce a
revenue sufficient for the support of all the State governments, and to pay f?r
the education of every orphan child in America. The proposed railroads will
do more-they will form ligaments of union more powerful than bulwark' of
adamant, or chains of iron or gold, to bind the States together in perpetual
union. In designating the military men of the central States of Tenn~~ ee and
Kentucky as the disposable force of the nation, we have reference to the fact
that this force is rendered disposable by the central position of these two State::
-they having no frontier to defend; while the forces of all the other twent):·
fo~r Stat s are rendered local forces, and not disposable, by rea on. of th ·ir
b mg all border States-the boundary of each extending to the frontier : and,
th r fore, having no frontier of their own to defend, they arc thus rendered local,
not di po. able.
14. 01ganization ef tlie regular forces and operatives to be intrusted with
th<' location and r:onstruction qf t!w work.
n major g ncral ; one adjutant g neral, with even a i tants; two bri!!adier
g~n ra1 ; v n urn- on , with twenty- ight a i tant urgeon ; and twent,wht hi f artific r. or ci ntific m chanics; cv n r giment , each r ~ment to
ou ·i t of one colon 1, two lieut nant colonel , four majors, one adjutant. a~ 1
one quart rma t r, two ro- ant major,, and two quart rma ter r 17 anr-, nth
t n companic : each ompany to 011.·i.-t of one captain, two firt Ii ·ut n n ,.
two
concl Ii ut nant ancl tw
c1 t , with on quarterma ter ,. r!r<'llll • n
rd crly . ·r 17 ant, four ro- , nt , four c rporal. , two mu ician , t ·n artific r,, an
•i 17hty privat ;olcli r . ' h o- n ral, fi ld, and taff ffic r , with the pt in,
an fo t lieutenant , to Le taken from the offic r of the engin er, t pogra hie.
L
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engineers, artillery, and infantry now in service; officers of established reputatiou for professional talents, experience, industry, economy, and exemplary
habits, and to have the pay and emoluments of mounted dragoons, with 50 per
cent. additional pay, while actually employed as eng'ineers, superintendents, or
operatives, upon the location or construction of the work.
15. Location if the proposed railroads.
The location must embrace the nearest and best routes, commencing within the
two central States of Tennessee and Kentucky, and extending to the seven
grand divisions of the seaboard and northern frontier, as above suggested; to
be ascertained, particularly through the mountainous regions, by a series of topographical surveys, and finally decided on and established by a board to consist of a general and four to six field officers, upon whose decision the major
general commanding upon this service should have power to act : to approve or
disapprove the decision of the board, upon the same principles that the President
is authorized by the Constitution of the United States to approve or disapprove
an act of Congress.
These surveys will produce an immense mass of mineral, geological, and topographical information, of great value to the States and the Union, and of indispensable utility to every member of the army and militia of the nation who
aspires to that employment in the national defence which leads to the true fame
of a citizen soldier-information tendiI1g to develop the military and physical
resources of every State and district preparatory to a state of war, and of essential benefit to the people of every clas,s during a state of peace.
16. Operations in tliefinal construction

if tlte work.

Each one of the proposed routes to be placed in charge of a colonel, who
will superintend the construction of the work; and for the prompt and convenient accomplishment of every part of the work, each route will be subdivided
into ten sections, and each section placed under the immediate superintendence
of a captain, to be assisted by the whole of the subaltern officers, non-commissioned officers, artificers, and privates of the company, with as many volunteer
a.rtificers and other operatives as will be sufficient to insure the completion of
each section in from four to five years after the location of the work, which may
be accomplished in one year; so that when one section of sixty miles in extent
is completed, the whole work will be quite or nearly finished, with the exception
of that which is unavoidably located over a mountainous country. rrhe completion of the mountainous sections may be hastened by such increased means
as the exigencies of the service shall demand. The simple process of carrying
on such a work necessarily increases the means and facilities of its progress
and peedy accomplishment. Thousancls of our young men, ignorant of every
operation upon the work, will soon become able operatives. To the regular
army we should have the power to add every scientific meclianic, artificer, and
able-bodied willing laborer, to be employed as volunteers, principally within the
limits of the States where the sections of the railroads on which they are to be
employed, respectively, are located and constructed, so that the services of all
may be near their places of residence. We shall thus call into action and usefulne s that class of American genius which would otherwise, to a great extent,
langui h and fall into the whirlpools of vice or imbecility for want of employment and judiciou direction-that genius which is found in the learned profes._ ion. , in all the walks of fa hionable life, in the pursuits of agriculture, commerce,
and the mechanic arts, as well as in the haunts of dissipation and idleness ;
who~e votaries may indeed often too truly say, "We are idle because no man
hath given u employment." By these idlers, wh0se employment would save
them from mi ery and min, and render them valuable citizens, and enable them
to render their country invulnerable in war ancl enrich it in peace-aided by the
enterpri ing young men which every section of the republic is capable of affording for the proposed great work, and arming with the irresistible weapons of
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industry and enterprise necessary to enable them, h1 obedience to the sublimP
mandate of Holy Writ, "to replenish the earth and subdue it," and render i·
fruitful, that it may multiply the benefits and blessings which it is capable ui
yielding to man-the proposed work will be speedily accomplished.
17. The hidden wealth which the progress of the work will disclose, addet
to the vast supplies of materials for construction, for transportation, and for food
and raiment fo1· the operatives upon the work, and for commerce-supplies, a
considerable part of which every year waste away among the interior sectiom
of the western and middle States for want of a cheap conveyance to good markets, such as the proposed railroad will afford-will contribute much towards the
completion and final profitable employment of the work; supplies that would
e,ery year be augmented by new improvements and by encouraged industry
until t.9-ey would far surpass the immediate wants of the great and increasing
influx of population and operatives upon the public works and frontier; and, on
the completion of the work, these constantly increasing supplies would be poured
into the improved channels of cheap transportation and profitable commerce.
gradually swelling the profits of both, as the millions of tributary rills and rivulets expand the mighty river into whose bosom they pour their liquid treasure~.
It is believed, moreover, that the construction of the proposed railroad through
the southern, western, and Atlantic States would not fail to create the means for
the speedy completion of all the lateral branches requir8d for every State ~nd
seaport, by multiplying among us experienced engineers and scientific mecbam_c~
with lrn,bits of industry and enterprise; giving to all classes of the commumt;
profitable employment, calculated to render them independent in their domestic
affairs, respectable and happy in peace, and formidable in war, while the money
expended would be kept in a healthful state of circulation among the farmer,.
merchants, and mechanics of our interior settlements, in place of its being carried off to enrich foreign merchants, or to form every year at home a new bone
of contention between the votaries of the spirit of party, such as go all lengthfor par'Ly men, regardless of the true interests and honor of the republic. .And
when, during a state of war with nations surpassing us in naval streng_th, _""e
find ourselve;- compelled to abandon the ocean, and be deprived of our foreign
commerce- the inevitable consequence of a war with any of the strong powen:
of Europe, without first supplying ourselves with a fleet of steam hips of "'~·
as well as floating batteries and the proposed railroads-these roads, even while
occasionally employed in the transportation of troops from the central State · t<J
the south, wi11 take return cargoes of southern products, such as sugar, cotton,
oranges, and lemons, from the southern to the middle and northern tates, from
whence they will bring return carg·oes of the numerous products and mannf~ctur ·rl article. of the northern and central States needed in the south-an mfrrior commercial intercourse by which the privations of our foreign comrncr
W?t~ld be remedied, and many of the evil. of war· removed, and all other _greatly
nn~wat cl. Indeed, the completion of the propo. eel railroad and floatmg ba~tf'rw;-1 your m moriali. t brlievcs would soon effectually prevent the recu!Tcnc
of war ,·o lono- as the United tat
·hnll i:-ee fit to confin their view::- and
national poli
to the mao-nanimous principle of dcfrn ive war; a. the prop
111Pan.; ot national drfonc would giv a d gree of available tr no-th, both phy·+
cal ancl moral, that would render th peril of an attack a p rp tual . ource o
t :rror to ur vil-rli;-1po ·d n io·hbors, aucl con cquently moral strellgt/1, and cc1J'rtl!J t our bclovc· l ·onntry.
. 1~. ~t _i_' prop r_ in a fate efpeace to prrp((refor war. Th wi- ,-t ,-ta~e--~ n
m all ·1nhzN1 nation. lrnv a ·t ·d upon thr prin ·iplc h re :-mmrr:;ted. It 1. nm
for n to imp1ir<· wha wonlrl lw th · ·on f'rin nee of our rc·ceivino- tlH' un -·1>
vi it of a larg<' fir t of . tPam:-hip,, annc-,l a~ the• } r nch fl, t lately in th h r1wr of \ ra 'ruz WP1'<', lirin"'ill"' in h ' mouth . of th ir annon an un :xp
d ·laratiou of war. ~Inch a we m y r ·ly n the un. urpa;· · d hirnlry
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our volunteer corps, such a visit could not but be attended with incalcula?le
mischief, without the means of defence here proposed-means of defence which
will enable us to march by land from Tennessee and Kentucky to Buffalo, ~ew
York, Philadelphia, Baltimore; Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, St. Aug~stme,
Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans, or 'rexas, from 200,000 to 500,000 men m the
short period of three days' time ! This rapid movement would have ?een very
desirable, as it would have saved millions of money and thousands of valuable
lives in our former wars, and would have been very essential to our security
against a land and naval attack when we had no reason to apprehend an invasion
by fleets propelled by steam power. But now that we know many o~ the most
warlike nations of Europe are busily occupied in the work of preparmg steamships of war, we have no longer a choice in the issue whether we must or must
not prepare the means here proposed for defence against the improved elem~nts
of destruction which we know our neighbors hold in readiness to employ agamst
us. We must lay aside our old obsolete military books of the last century,
such as we have borrowed from England and France, and we must profit by
the lights by which the present age, the present year is illuminated, and prepare
to defend ourselves by the agency of this mighty power, by which the invading
foe will inevitably attack us.
19. Ancient and modern history is replete with evidences of the wisest of
governments having promptly availed themselves of the use of every description
of weapon deemed to be most formidable in war, as well as of every kind of
power applicable to the purposes of rapidly wielding armies and munitions of
war, as soon as practicable after their discovery. We need only advert here to
some few discoveries which, trifling as the first and third may seem, were
deemed sufficient at the time of their discovery to merit the attention of men
and monarchs of profound wisdom and genius.
1st. When the commanders of the armies of ~ing David reported to that
. veteran monarch that they had sustained heavy losses in their operations against
the Philistines, in consequence of their having employed in battle the bow and
arrow, David promptly gave orders to his commanders to avail themselves of
the discovery of this then formidable weapon, and make themselves and their
men acquainted with t,he use of it, "so as to place them on an equal footing
with their enemy."-(See the" History of the Bible.")
2d. When in the fourteenth century an obscure monk of Germany discovered gunpowder, with some of its uses in war, all the other nations of Europe
that were blessed with wise rulers hastened to avail themselves of the discoverya discovery which ere long induced all the civilized world to change their unwieldly weapons of war for fire-arms; gradually laying aside their war chariots
armed with scythes, their battering-rams, with their coat of mail, and most of
their personal armor.
3d. The use of wheel carriages on improved roads added more than twentyfive per cent. to the efficiency of an army, by enabling it to march one-fourth
further in a giveri. time, and by carrying with it a more ample supply of artillery, ammunition, and subsistence, prolonging the period of active operations,
::i~d occasionally taking the enemy by surprise, as, by the increased celerity of
Ins movements, Napoleon took the enemies of Ji7 rance by surprise in his first
campaign into I taly.
,
4th. A.ll civilized nations speedily availed themselves of the discovery of the
magnetic _needle, with the inventions and improvements in ship-building, the
me of sails, &c. Many of the discoveries here alluded to, however, though
the:-y co~tributed to facilitate the movement of troops and munitions of war,
excited httle or no interest at the time of their discovery compared with that of
he application of steam power to ships and other vessels, and to vehicles of
l:.md tran portion on railroads. In these last discoveries we may well be allowed
to .,peak in the language of poetry, and say that"Steam power wa:; almighty in its birth;"
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while gunpowder, fire-arms, wheel carriages, and all former improvement in
marine structures, though partially known and in use for centuries past, hare
exhibited little or nothing beyond their now apparent state of infancy until
within the last and present century. Even now no civilized nation can boast of
any discovery or improvement in fire-arms, gun-carriages, or in naval architecture in anywise calculated to be of any pecuiiar advantage to any one nation
over another nation; while these developments of steam, with :floating batteries
and railroads, are calculated to render a nation, in tbe position which we occupy.
at least ten times more formidable in a war ef self-defence than in an offensire
war against nations of equal numerical strength, and provided with the mean5
here proposed. All the discoveries above referred to in the science of war have,
however, contributed much to ameliorate the condition of nations and of armies
in their conflicts and controversies, and greatly to lessen the evils of war. The
greater the improvement in this awful and sublime science, the less calamiton:;
and the more humane have been the results of milikry operations, wherever the
contending parties were equally acquainted with the progressive improvement~,
and had equal or nearly equal means of profiting by them. If these propo~itions are correct, (and history proves them to be strictly true,) where, it may be
asked, where must our improvements in the science of war, dependent on team
power, terminate 1 The wise and the good who have long cherished the protpect of a blessed millenium will readily answer the question.
20. Your memorialist had long cherished the hope that some patriotic state,man of military mind would be found at the head of the War Department, able
and willing to bring the subject of his system of national defence bef?re th ..
President of the United States and the national legislature; and in this hope
he has freely and frankly submitted to several of the heads of that departmem
hi.s views upon the subject at different periods during nearly seventeen. year:
past, until he received from Mr. Secretary Cass the most irrefragable eVld_enc
that the official communications and reports of your memorialist were either
misunderstood, disregarded, or disapproved. Nevertheless, assured as he hll"
constantly been of the practicability, propriety, and necessity of ~uch a. sy~tem
of national defence, and deeming it to be a matter of discovery, inventwn, and
improvement in the art of war, which should be discussed with the same freed 1 m
as any other discovery in the useful arts, your memorialist, as the author and
inventor of the proposed system, has addressed himself freely to _private ~s w~ll
as public men of several different nations and of all parties, and has received m
r turn, from men of the highest attainments and unimpeached and unimpeachable patriotism, full and cordial coE.currence in his every view hitherto ,presen~ ·
in favor of his system of national defence here set forth and explained. :E II!
from being discouraged at the opposition of three honorable 'ecretarie for P.
year in succession, he has learned from that oppo ition that th~ War .Depart·
m nt of the United States republic is rather a theatre of executive actwn u~
political matter already settled, enacted, or ordered, than upon new discoren 1 •
inventions, or impr&vements in any branch, ef tlte art ef war. He could not h ·
p 1-.· re, therefore, in hi humble efforts to render his country ome good . . ·
vie in peace, a he had done in war; convinced a he i that hi y tern:: ~
abo_ve th p til ntial atmo..,phcre of the evil spirit ef party, a it i a F m '
national d f nc d . igned to impart b nefits ancl diffo e ble ~ingA alike thr u.: ·
out v ry tate and T rritory of th r public and upon all partie .
~h oath f ffic takrn by your memoriali t, requiring him to s IT
l11llted tale , (not a party,) r ·quir him to act and ..,peak in accordanc
th rul · ancl articl of war. Ilr ha alway. held him.., lf ready to ri k
7ifi, 71.,i bread, and lu's forfl11ie, for hi ountry; and he ha th happin " •
kn winer tha h ha ri kf. 1 hi lif fi r h r oft n-hundr d of time . Hi,
of offic doc not r .. ti" in him from ·p aking frankly and truly in the nnd·
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of his motives, his conduct, his honor, and his system of national defence. rro
withhold his view3 upon an occasion of this kind, indeed, would be virtually a
violation of his oath of office, which requires him, as a primary duty, to serne
the United States honestly and faitlifully against their enemies or opposers
wh01nsoever; and he could not conscientiously comply with this oath, without
submitting to the national legislature every section and every J?aragra:J:lh co~tained in this memorial. He feels conscious that he is right. His enemies will
not hesitate to admit that he is either right or wrong. If p,ny member of the
national legislature believes him to be wrong, he entreats that member to institute any, the most rigid, scrutiny into the whole of the views here presented by
your memorialist. He thus respectfully solicits his friends, and fearlessly challenges his enemies, to put him in the wrong, by proving his system of national
defence to be either unnecessary or impracticable. But if he is deemed to be
right in the foregoing views, showing that his system is indispensably necessary,
an d that its accomplishment is practicable, at the expense and within the period
of time here suggested, surely no time should be lost in carrying into execution
this system of national defence. As it regards the treatment he has received
from the last three beads of the department of war, personally, he has nothing
to say ; having, ever since he entered the public service, acted upon the principle that
"The real patriot bears his private wrongs
Rather than right them at the public cost.''

Your memorialist desires no greater triumph over his weak or wicked calumniators, nor any other atonement for past injuries, than the triumph of truth
that must result from a full and perfect examination of his past life and services ;
and more especially a critical comparati·ve review ef his services in Canada
( approved by a Madison)-and his sPrvices in Florida ( condemned hy a Jackson ) -and more especially of his system of national defence, approved by a
Seward, a Gannon, a White, and a Lumpkin, compared with the services and
system of the party men opposed to your memorialist.
21. 1'he discovery, by Oliver Evans, of that development of steam power by
which the locomotive and other vehicles of land transportation are propelled
upon the railroad, and by which the movement of la1ge armies, which may be
hastened from twenty-six miles, (the day's march of Napoleon,) to three hundred
miles in one day; and the discovery, by Robert Fulton, of that kindred development of steam power, by which our rivers and lakes have been covered with
floating palaces and warehouses, surpassing in the velocity of their movement
anything before seen upon our waters-making an easy conquest of the previously unsubdued current of the mighty Mississippi, and now proudly encountering in triumph the mountain wave of ocean; as these discoveries were the
re~ult of previously known developments of steam power, in its application to
mill and other labor-saving machinery, suggesting to Evans and Fulton the great
p rinciple upon which their success was known to depend; so it must be obvious
to every man of military mind, and to every scientific mechanic, that the discoveries of these two great public benefactors must necessarily form the basis of
th~ .. yEtem of national defence which your memorialist here offers to Congress.
Oliver Evans and Robert Fulton were, until a few years before their death, denounced by thousands of learned tlteorists as eccentric visionary men. The
same class of censors have honored your memorialist with similar epithets. He
ha had the satisfaction, however, to learn from some of those who thus denounced him that they have since seen their error, and are now among the true
eli,..vers in the feasibility, value, and importance of his system. He adverts to
his fact, here, only to jue,tify or excuse what he deems it to be his duty to say
in his own vindication, and in reference to his own past public services; because
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he can refer to no historical work or biographical memoir containing any account
of his public services in the war of 1814, excepting such as have been distorted
by malignity or by ignorance. He is therefore co~strained to say, as an act of
justice to himself, that he is the only general officer now living, who, as commander-in-chief of a division, or separate army, or detached corps, ever achieved
a victory over any British army, upon any part of the Niagara frontier, in the
war of 1814; that he had the good fortune to command the division from which
his beloved Major General (Brown) had been taken, by reason of a severe
wound, on that frontier, in August, 1814, during twenty-three days of which
time your memorialist was actively engaged in battle, and in a brisk cannonade
· and bombardment, and other severe conflicts with the British army under Lieutenant General Drummond. In the principal battle, the lieutenant general acknowledged a loss of nine hundred and five officers and men killed, wounded,
and missing, with a similar loss of nearly six .hundred in the several other conflicts. During twenty-two days of the time, there were but few hours, from daylight in the morning until dark in the evening, in which the British·can'non shot
and shells did not present to your memorialist the most instructive exhibition of
every variety of effect of which a well-directed cannonade and bombardment
upon a very slightly and partially fortified camp, of which an unfinished ba tion
and block-house formed the only tolerably fortified angle, could possibly pre~ent.
In that long conflict-in which the British forces were reported to amount t•)
4,200, principally regulars, and the United States forces to 2,500, near onefourth of which were New York and Pennsylvania volunteers under Gene.ral
Peter B. Porter-your memorialist is convinced he had a better oppo~-tumty
than any other general officer of the United States army ever had durmg the
war of being thoroughly acquainted with the effect of the enemy's sliells and
cannon slwt upon our stone-masonry, earthen traverses, embankments, or breastworks. He had previously witnessed at Fort Meigs, and on the rive~- St. ~ wrence, as well as upon Lake Erie, in the British and United States ships-of-war,
three days after Perry's glorious triumph, the effect of the enemy's and our own
cannon shot upon block-houses, ships-of-war, and other vessels, as well a on
other means of defence. The investigation of these results of some of the m0~:
important conflicts between the United States and British troops, in the war of
1813 and 1814, added to a careful attention to the theory and practice of gunnery for several years prior to the war, with much attention to the subject ince.
warrants your memorialist in speaking somewhat confidently, as he h~ , upon
th~ various bearings and tendencies of cannon shot and shells on fl.oatm~ battenes, steamships of war, forts, and other means of attack ari.d defence of ~ea!)Ort~; and of railroads for the prompt movement of re-enforce~ents, a~ embraced
m his system of national defence here set forth and explamed. 1! or further
particulars in reference to the various conflicts referred to in this article, your
~ emorialist respectfully refers to the officers whom he had the honor to command
m tho e conflicts: among the most meritorious of whom are Payma ter General
Tow on and Adjutant General Jones, now on duty at W a hington city. Th
name of all others will be found by referring to the adjutant general' offic".
. ~1cl to s~ow in what estimation his conduct was held by the Executive a~d ru •
h onal leo-1 laturc, your memoriali t takes leave to refer to the joint re .. olut1ou 0
emb r, 1 14, by which he and the officers and men of hi command w~
honor cl ·with a vote of thank , and the Pre ident authorized to pre .. ent to _hi~
a gold medal. Il r ceivecl al o from the lcgi lature of the great and patnoa
· tat . of w York, Virginia, and T nnes ee, imilar re, olution of thank.; ~
from each a gold-hilt d :word of honor. With the e magnificent token of hi_h
, pprobation of hi conduct, your m .moriali t could not but£ 1 hims If in h .
and in clut r bound to :x rt hi be ·t facultie to serve ltis country faitlifullg 111
1.l'a r a ntl in peace. ,Yith th : impr · ions, he re p ctfully offer to Cou~n>·
hi' pr . nt y tern of national a fence.
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22. Yom memorialist is convinced that the proposed means of protection constitute the first and only discovery known to man, whereby a nation situa!ed as
we are, and acting upon the magnanimous principle of seif:dif:,nce, can, without
any doubt, at a moderate expense, and by means th3it wip. m a few years of
peace repay all the expense of the work, hold in their own hands: forever, the
incontestable issue of any possible war upon her seaboard or domam, waged by
any nation, or by any such combination of empires or kingdoms as have once
dared to assume the appellation of" h.oly alliance,-'' and that any nati~n of oui·
numerical strength and military resources availing herself of the discovery,
may, if she be just and true to herself, safely assume the attitude of honest ~efiance towards the armies of Europe, if not of every quatter of the globe: while .
the most warlike nations, neglecting the use of steam power, with railroads and
floating batteries, will be found wholly unable to maintain their independence.
In this view of the subject, it presses itself upon our attention not as a ma~ter
of choice, but as a work of absolute necessity-as a measure ef self-preservation.
23. The constitutionality of the proposed system of national -defence would
oe left untoucned by your memorialist, but for the veneration he entertains for
that sublime and sacred instrument bequeathed to us by our fathers of the
,revolution, added to the oath he has taken to support that inestimable charter
of om free institutions. He would not willingly be deemed capable of urging
or soliciting the adoption of any measure not in accordance with the Constitution
of the United States; and having, in common with each one of his fellow-citizens, an indubitable right to judge for himself upon all questions arising upon
the different provisions of that most perfect charter of human freedom and selfgovernment, without confiding too much in the opinions of statesmen laboring
under the despotic influence of party discipline-a despotism ever Qperating
upon the hopes and fears of all who tamely submit to the tyranny of such a
discipline-the vi~ws which follow are respectfully submitted. The 8th section
of the 1st article of the Constitution of the United States authorizes Congress
to "declare war," and "to raise and support armies," and "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections,
and repel invasions;" and also "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed
in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the
appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to
the di cipline prescribed by Congress."
Inasmuch as these important provisions of the Constitution cannot be carried
into effect without roads, and the effective defence of the republic .is a work
upon which our national existence depends, the transcendent importance of this
work calls aloud for the very best roads; and railroads being immeasurably the
best for all military purposes, they are deemed to be as fully authorized by the
Con. titution of the United States as the best of rifles, or the best of cannon, or gunpowder, o;r flints,or forts, are authorized, as will be seen by the last paragraph of the
abov:e-mentioned 8th section of the Constitution, which, after particularizing the
specific powers granted to Congress, as enumerated in that section, concludes with
the words which follow: "To make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof."
A wise people, with the experience which the framers of the federal Constitution had acquired in the triumphant revolutionary conflicts through which
t1ey had then recently passed, could never have authorized a declaration of
war "to repel invasion," without making provision for the best of means for
insuring a successful and glorious termination of the war : that provision was
accordingly made in the above recited authority given to Congres_s, to make all
law~ which hall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution " the fore-
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goi~g powers, vested by this Constitution in the government of the United State~,
or in any department or officer thereof." By this comprehensive grant of power
the national legislature has passed laws for supplying the land and naval
forces with many things not expressly named in the Constitution. Hundred::
of military roads have been made by the troops and otherwise at the expen"e of
the United States ; first, for the purpose of facilitating the march of the troops
to and from the places of their destination, at the rate of twenty to twenty-.,ix
miles a day, when, without such roads, they could not have marched a quarter
of the distance without leaving behind them their cannon and baggage-train;
and, secondly, for the use of the constantly-moving families and other travellers
to the continually-expanding border of the republic, by which simple proces~
thirteen new States and near thirteen millions of inhabitants have been added
to the old thirteen States of the revolution in the last sixty years. Who ever
pronounced these miserable roads to be unconstitutional? These roads seldom
cost more than at the rate of from fifty to one hundred 0.ollars per mile; and
jet these poor roads contributed more to the immediate benefit of the commu:
nity at large, during a period of peace, than any of our fortifications, which cost
from one to two millions of dollars each. Your memorialist is unable to percei,e
upon what ground a military road, upon which our troops can be marched three
hundred miles in one day, can be unconstitutional, when roads upon which they
could march but twenty-six miles in a day were constitutional ,and proper,
(more especially when all are made by the troops themselves,) no1;,withstandin0'
the great difference in the cost of the two kinds of military roads here alluded
to. As it is obvious that the military railroads will enable our young warriors
of the central and western States to fly at the rate of three hundred mile in a
day to meet the invading foe, the constitutionality of such roads, as "nece, s~
and proper means for repelling invasion," cannot but be admitted by all parhe.3,
convinced, as they must be, that we are destined in another war with any
European nation to be attacked by fleets propelled by steam power. But if: a5
your memorialist respectfully asserts, our seaports cannot be defended agrumt
an attack by foreign armies, with the co-operation of fleets propelled by , team
power, who can doubt the absolute necessity of the proposed railroads and
floating batteries ? If, indeed, then, they are indispensable, and our country
cannot be defended without them, they are strictly constitutional, as the m ~
rigid constructionist will admit. '1.10 make use of our common bad roads t r
marching our volunteers and other troops from the central and western Stat to our seaports in a state of war, or to continue the use of sails, without team
power, to meet an invading foe with large fleets of steamships of war, would
as unavailing and as unwise as it would be to attempt to extinguish by wattr
carried in a nutshell the flames by which thousands of our houses are doom
to be enveloped in the course of a war when destitute of the propo..,ed mealli
of d fence, while po sessing the power to obtain the best of :fire-engine . . .
24. The apprehended expense of the proposed work con titute the prmcip
obj ~tion advanced by any state, man, or by any man of military_min~, ':h ~e
opunon have come to the know! dge of· your memoriali t. To this obJechon 1
may b an .w red:
Fir t. Tl1at the appr bend d appropriations to meet the expen ... e will b~ n
mor than_ lev n million of dollar. a year for a p rfod of ix year, prond
th work 1:-1 lone by the army of the U nit<>d tatc. , a heretofore uo-0' ,ted.
1 econcl. Th
mploym nt of the army upon the work will be to th offi .
and men , nd to the y uth of v r 'tat and di, trict throun-h which th work
_·t nrl, tb . h ·t of a11 po,. ibl . ·hool:-, to pr I arC' th m fo~ the d fence of th ·
ountry; a, th offic ri- aiul m n . o ·mploy d will have the l)roud ati,fn ·
of knowin...,. th, t v r • rla ·' lab r in thi." . , utial work of pr paration
·ontriLut · t incr a ·e th ir moral and phy ical ca1)aciti for u efulu ,
0
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domestic happiness in peace, and for a glorious triumph over the invading foe in
war.
Tliird. In exhibiting the cost of this system of ·defence, it is gratifying to
find that of the $66,000,000, which is the estimated amount required for the
seven railroads from the central States to the seaboard and northern frontier,
with five floating batteries for the Mississippi river at the passes,. ~nd below
New Orleans, and five others for the defence of the harbor of New York, more
than sixty-three millions of that sum will be expended for materials and ,vork
which the interior of the United States will afford.
Fourth,. The most costly material required for the work will be bar-iron for
the railways, and sheeting for the sides and tops of the floating batteries; of
this article, not less than /500,000,000 pounds will be needed. This quantity, at
four cents, will amount to twenty millions of dollars.
Fiftli. For supplying the whole of the iron, it is proposed to erect at convenient places near the site of each one of the seven great railroads a foundery
and a roUz'ng-mill, for the manufacture of the iron required, upon the same
principle that armories are established by the United States for supplying the
army and navy and the militia with cannon and small arms. By these works
ample supplies of the best of iron may be obtained in season to complete the
railroads and floating batteries in the time here suggested.
We shall, in this way, lay open to the individual enterprise of the people of
the United States rich mines of wealth hitherto but little known; and we shall
moreover relieve ourselves of the reproach to which we have for many years
been subjected-the reproach of sending to Europe and expending there many
millions of dollars for iron, whilst most of our States abound with inexhaustible
supplies of this valuable metal equal to any in Europe.
25. The great 1·evolution which steam power has produced in its application
to everything that is wafted upon the sea and that rolls upon the land, applicable to the attack and defence of seaports, leaves our country absolutely destitute ef the means of defence indispensably necessary to the protection of our seaports against any nation or community of men, or pirates capable of· attacking
us with a respectable fleet of steamships of war, armed with the improved battering cannon of the largest calibre, without floating batteries of sufficient
strength and number to enable us to lock up our seaports and railroads extending from the central and western States to the principal seaports, for marching
our disposable force and munitions of war of the central and western States, at
one-tenth part the expense and one-tenth part of the time that their movement
on our present bad roads would cost.
26. The floating batteries here recommended constitute the most sure and
economical means for the immediate defence of our seaports in war; and when
aided by the proposed railroads, in the rapid transportation of troops and munitions of war from the central and western States to the principal seaports of
the Atlantic, southern, and northern States, aided at sea by steamships of war,
we shall thus render our means of defence complete and impregnable in war.
And on the return of peace, when all other expensive means of defence, such as
fortifications, armories, and fleets propelled by wind ancl sails are useless, then
our floating batteries and railroads, turned to commercial purposes, will contribute to deepen our ship channels and to the improvement of our seapo1ts, and
afford facilities to our interior commercial intercourse, which it is believed will
replace every dollar expended in canying into eflect this system of national defence in from seven to ten years.
27. The floating batteries and rnih·oads, embracing the system of national
defence here recommended, which will cost not more than eleven millions of dollar a year for six years, will, it is confidently believed, by the simple process
of its construction, contribute more to qualify the army, and the young :11-cn of the
United State employed upon the proposed floating batteries and railroads, for
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active military service in the national defence, than they could possibly be
qualified by the expenditure of double the estimated amount of the work paiJ
for giving each one of them a complete military education, according to the
system pursued at the Military Academy at West Point; as in that system the
theory of the art of war alone is acqHired, and much of that mere tlleory is
rendered useless by the revolution which steam power has produced in all that
relates to the movement of armies and fleets, and the attack and defence of 13eaports; whilst in the system here recommended, the young student upon the
floating battery, as well as upon the railroad, is enabled, from the first moment
be takes in hand his book to study the theory, at once -to combine with it
the, practical scie14ce and manual labor of his profession; and when, at the end
0£ four or five years, he graduates and obtains his discharge, his mind, limbs,
and body would be alike improved and invigorated by his having learned lwzc
to make and lww to wield, and having· actually assisted in making and wielding floating batteries and vehicles of land transportation on railroads, with
every other preparatory means for rendering them formidable in war and profitable in peace. This will afford him the happiness of knowing that he has rendered his country much useful public service for the public instruction which
will enable him ever after to be in the highest degree useful to ,his country and
his family, in war and in peace.
28. With the floating batteries and railroads here recommended, we can fearlessly and truly say to all Europe, and to all the world, " We ask ef you notltfng
but wliat is ri'glit, and u:e will submit to nothing tltat is wrong;" whilst, wi.thout the proposed or some such system of national defence, such a declarat1~n
might be considered as pure gasconade ; as, without floating batteries and railroads to lock up and promptly re-enforce our seaports when menaced by an enemy, it would be in the power of any one or two of the great nations of Europe
(with two of whom we have boundary questions to settle) to enter any one or
more of our principal seaports, and destroy the richest of our cities in the coui:~e
of a:i;iy day or night in the year; and in doing so, to damage our commerc_ial
establishments to the amount of more money and property than would thnce
defray all the cost of the proposed system of defence.
29. The opinion has been expressed that these raih·oads will, during a sta~e
of peace, produce a revenue that will replace the money to be ex~ended m
their construction in the course of seven years after their completio?· Bu
should it be twenty, or even forty years, before their annual revenue 1s fo und
adequate to reimburse the money expended in the construction of the work.
this delay will tend to do no wrong or inju tice to our immediate or remote po-terity. They cannot fail to enjoy, as much we can enjoy, the bene~t of our
labor for our and their protection and prosperity. But the great que tion upon
which we are now to act is, not whether we have or have not a right to tax our
po terity with a heavy debt for a work that will certainly be of great value to
u , and which is destined to be, in all human probability, still more 1:al11 ahle
to tltem; but the true question is, whether it is not our imperative duty to do
what ver i obviously necessary and proper to ecure to our elve , and al::Co 0
our po terity, the means of pre erving to each and all o deeply inter , t
the bl , ~incr of that liberty and independence seclll'ed to u by Olll' fath r,
the r volution, in the a ·hi vement of which a great national debt wa;:i con tr, ct
for u,_ to pay-a debt which we have mo. t gladly and gratefully paid. ~ 11
hav we not good r a. on to b lievc that our imm <liate 1>O::;t rity will a: '!1'3_ •
fully pay auy ·uch cl ·Lt which w may deem prudent to contract, toJ>r nd
for th ir u:: and IJrotection, a w 11 a, our own, a y.;t ·m of nationnl
n
without whi ·h our and tlwir lib rty and indc·peud nc would L l ·ft at th m Y
of what v r nation of Europ may
· fit to hold in th ·ir own hand-. .. th
1ni,ao11, of the ea?" 'l'hi. will L att mpt ·cl, without doubt, y the !'.!'f m ·
itimc nation , ·ho firt pr vidc for h r · ·lf a fleet of .. omc fifty or a hun
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steamships-of-war, with floating batteries and railroads for s~curing her own seaports and her interior. This is a measure, however, more hkely to be undertaken by some future combination of empires, arrog·ating to themselves, as the
enemies of France did in the years 1814-'15, the title of "Holy Alliance,"
than by any one nation.
30. Our unnatural mother, England, who has had the address to subsidize
most of her neighbors, and to force others to sanction. her pretension to t~e
dominion of the sea,· and for half a century past to hold m her own hands, amid
professions of peace and good will towards us, near a third part of our greatest
eastern border State, and to hold several of their and our border savage nations
ready to take the scalps of our frontier citizens; tJ:iat enlightened nation, who
has shed more blood than any other, if not more than all other nations, to secure
to herself the dominion ef the sea, has, it is believed, at this moment, among us
organized bands of spies and pioneers, assuming to themselves the plausible
character and vocation of" advocates of human freedom," more familiarly called
"abolitionists." That this same England will, in due season, avail herself of
her newborn abolitionism to secure to herself some favorite scheme of a foothold
near us, to the northeast or south of us, or to pay us for our having twice·
beaten her, and more especially having, with our little giant navy, taken from
her the glory of · her long contested dominion ef tlie sea, we can have no doubt.
Without railroads and floating batteries, such as are here recommended, with
steamships of war, England's banner of abolitionism may ere long be planted
in Louisiana, and in every other border State upon our seaboard, from Sabine
bay to Eastport, Maine. Thus may we soon behold England openly attempting.
by force to accomplish what her spies and pioneers have long been secretly em-ployed in preparing and hastening, a tragedy of blood and desolation, the
elements of which were principally provided and brought hither from Africa,.
within the last two centuries, by the outrages and avarice of this same
England, in her efforts to monopolize the freedom of the seas. The incendiary
fires have already been lighted up at Charleston, South Carolina, and Mobile,.
Alabama, and perhaps somr, other cities of our southern and eastern border can
testify. The system of national defence here recommended will enable us
effectually to guard against the apprehended catastrophe. It will do mo:c.e. It
will, when the proper time arrives, enable us effectually to fulfil the apparent
destiny by which an overruling Providence has decreed that the African
savages should, by the simple though often abused process of the slave trade,
with the long continued pilgrimage of slavery which they are undergoing, (a slavery ~arked_as it has been here, ~ver since the reign of England ceased among
u~, with a high degree of humamty and benevolence,) when the proper time
arrives, namely, whenever, in the next century, our own caste and color shall
have increased so as to amount to two hundred millions of free white inhabitants,
then it is believed that our statesmen will see clearly the propriety of preserving
every acre of the national domain for the support of our own caste and color,·
then hall we plainly see, and cheerfully do what we can to fulfil, that apparent
destiny-a destiny by which the supposed evils of the slave trade, and of the
slavery of the Africans in America, shall eventually contribute to cover that be-nighted quarter of the globe with all the blessings of civilization and freedom;.
A consummation not more devoutly to be wished, than it is certainly to be accompli hed within the coming century; unless, indeed, the great work is delayed·
by the lawless interference of the blind votaries of abolitionism, or by the apprehended incapacity of the African blacks for self-government. Be this as it may,
our own United States republic of the coming century will, in all human probability before the middle of that century-say 80 or 90 years hence-have it in
heir power to make, for the first time since our political existence, a fair experiment towards the solution of the long contested problem, involving the question of
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the utility ef Africans when left alone as members efa free civilized communitythe question upon which their possible capacity for self government necessarily
depends; for we shall then be able to spare from our two hundred millions of
free white population a fleet of steamships-of-war, with an army of missionaries
and United States volunteers, for the instruction and protection of the numerous
savages of Africa: the terms protection and instruction are here employed in
connexion with each other, because these two great engines of civilization have
always gone side by side, wherever the work of civilization has succeeded kt.
That complete instruction necessary to all the purposes of civilization and selfgovernment, as we understand it, never was, nor ever can be perfected without
mil£tary protection.
'rhis navy and army of protection and instruction may be accompanied and
followed by such detailed corps of the instructed blacks of our country as may
be qualified to assist in the great work: these detailed corps to continue, with the
consent of their owners, until every black in America shall find a comfortable
and a safe home in the land of his fathers. Any other system of abolition would
inevitably delay though it might not defeat the accomplishment of the great
work of giving civilization and self-government to Africa, and of giving to the
United States republic the glory of the achievement-of giving civilization and
self-government to two quarters of the globe; first to America, and next to Afri~.
To secure to ourselves the happiness, the imperisliable glory, of giving to A.menca
and Africa all the blessings of civilization and self-government, we have onlyto
do that which we are now admonished by every dictate of the first law of nature
to do quickly for our qwn preservation-that which we possess more a~ple
means of accomplishing before the year J 846, than the patriotic people of :N ew
York possessed to enable them to complete their magnificent canal before !he
year 1826-namely, to locate and construct the proposed railroads and floatmg
batteries ; as by the simple operation of the execution of this work, we hall
insure the instruction of all the young men of our country that may be nece ~ary
or desirable as engineers or scientific mechanics to teach millions of the youth of
South America and Africa the art of covering tlieir country, as we shall ~ave
covered our country, with these essential means of'national defence and natwnal
wealth,. The missionary, whose sacred duty it is to extend to every people the
blessings of the Christian religion, may with perfect propriety himself learn. to
be a scientific mechanic and a practical engineer. He may thus add the ~ttracn:e
power of practice to tlieory; and to the sublime precepts of Holy Wnt, and m
teaching men lww to live and how to die, teach them also how to pre erve unt 1
their country the things that belong to their country; ancl how to defend. an
protect the helpless women and little ones confided to their care, in obcd~e?c
to the solemn mandate which should apply alike to each social ancl pohncal
union most dear to us, namely: " T lwse whom 0od liath, joined togetlter, l~ ~
man put asuuder." Such will be-such must be-a portion of the glono~
r ult of our carrying into effect the proposed system of national defence. Bu·
if w neglect it until the crowned heads of Europe shall have lei ur to prepare
another holy alliance, with fifty to one hundred first-rate ship -of-war adapted
t t~1 action of team power, we may, pos ibly in the next ten y ar:::: .. ee our
for icrn_ comm rec under the control of that holy alliance; and if w r :-1:::t- imd
who will have the hardihood to ay we u ill not resist ?-we may be told by th
vain di plomatL t. of that imperial combination of pirat -"Yanke ::, ! the holy
allianc i graci u:4ly pl a. ed t permit you, with your wive ancl childr ~· ·
k au a: Tlnm b y ncl th Rocky mountain ."
th rwi e w mu-:t :-ubm1
th de!!radati n of I" ing c 11 our ea port.· in the po, . :-don of th inrndin2'
r of · inn- ur c mm r ial iti Latt r ·d clown wHhout the po~,iuilitv ot ur
rin°·ing to th ir .·uc ·or .-uffici •nt for in tim fo1'. th ir protection.
- ..
31. 'l' obviat any, u ·h c· lamity a the for going view ·uo-g I a p ,~ D
your memoriali t pray Congre., to pr vide for the con truction of th pr
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works. Or, should some previous experiment be desirable, he prays that he
may be authorized by law to select and employ, under the authority of the President of the United States, such engineers and other officers, scientific mechanics,
artificers, ship-carpenters, and laborers, as may be necessary to enable him forth-with to locate and construct, upon the principles and in the manner here stated,
one ef tlie proposed principal railroads-say that from Lexington, Kentucky,
to Nashville, and thence to New Orleans; or the one from Louisville, Kentucky,
via Xashville, to Mobile; or that from Memphis, Tennessee, to meet the one
already completed from Charleston, South Carolina, and Augusta, Georgia, to
Tennessee river. And also to construct three of the proposed floating batteries,
viz : two for the harbor of New Orleans, and one for the harbor of Mo bile; to be
constructed under his direction, in accordance with the project here recommended,
and under the immediate superintendence of such officers as he may select. And
when the floating batteries and railroads here recommended are completed, armed,
equipped, and manned, the said floating batteries and railroads to be sujected to
a scrupulous inspection by such committee of Congress, and by such other public
functionaries as may be authorized by Congress, or by the President of the
"C nited States: provided that no military or naval officer be selected for any
such inspection, but suck as shall have been in battle and witnessed the effect of
the enemy's cannon shot upon our works of defence; to the end that by such
inspection the precise cliaracter, 'value, and utility ef these works ef internal
improvement as means ef national defence and national icealth, takrn in connexion 1£ith each other, may be fully ascertained and certified. Under such authority, with two regiments such as the foregoing organization contemplates, sustained
by an appropriation of three millions of dollars a year, for three years, your me~orialist pledges himself to complete in this period of time the proposed railroad
and tliree .floating batteries,· which will serve as an expei;iment upon which the
residue of the. works here recommended may be safely undertaken.
32. Your memorialist having, at different times during the last seventeen
years, submitted to the proper authorities of the War Department most of his
views contained in the foregoing 30 sections, as will more fully appear from his
official reports, (which he pra.ys may be called for and taken as a part of this
memorial,) he has .thus repeatedly appealed to the War Department, but he
deeply regrets to say that his appeals have been wholly unavailing. He now
respectfully calls on every member of the national legislature who loves his
country and her institutions to sustain his efforts in preparing for her a system
of defence worthy of their fathers of the revolution, worthy of the Union, and
of the Constitution which we all stand pledged to support. Your memorialist
did not enter the service of his country for the mere selfish enjoyment of the
pomp and ephemeral lwnors ef the.field of battle, (though he would not shrink
from a comparison of liis services in battle with those of any other United
States commander now living;) his anticipated glory and great o~ject have been
to employ her means of defence, ample as they must ever be, so effectually as
to convince her neighbors that honesty is th.e best policy, and that defeat must
attend their every act of invasion; and thus to direct th.e elements ef war to tlie
attainment of "peace on eartli and good will towards men." With these impressions he deems it to be an act of common justice to himself, his wife, children, and £ii.ends, that he should solicit the only relief to which a United States
general officer, honored as he has long been with one of the highest commands
in the army, and whose best efforts are ever due to his country's service, can
·with propriety claim. He claims to be th.e autlior and inventor ef the system
if national defence herein set forth and· explained; he therefore prays Congress
to confirm his claim by such act or joint resolution as in their wisdom shall
::eem just and right. And your memorialist, as in duty bound, will ever pray.
EDMUND P. GAINES .
_~ASHVILLE, December 31, 1839.
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BUREAU OF TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS,

TVasliington, April 24, 1840.
Srn: I l1ave the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th
instant, referring to this bureau a memorial of Major General Gaines, proposing
a system of national defence, of which he enumerates, as an essential part, an
extensive series of railroads. · Upon these last, your directions are that I should
submit an estimate of the probable cost.
rnrn various routes enumerated by the general will be found in the 10th
page of his memorial. According to his computation, they would embrace
about 4,200 miles; are to b_e laid in double track; and would cost, on an
everage, $15,000 the mile.
rI'he routes are1st One principal railroad from Lexingto, Kentucky, to Buffalo or Plattsburg, New York, with branches to Detriot, Albany, and Boston.
2d. One principal railroad from Knoxville, Tennessee, to Noifolk, Virginia.
or Baltimore, Maryland, with branches to Richmond, Virginia, and Newbern.
N ort.h Carolina.
3d. One principal railroad from Memphis, Tennessee, to Charleston,_ South
Carolina, or Savannah, Georgia, with branches to Milledgeville, Georgia, and
Eest Florida.
4th. One principal railroad from Louisville, Kentucky, to Mobile, Alabama.
with a branch to Pensacola, Florida.
,
5th. One principal railroad from Lexington, Kentucky, via Nash ville, to
New Orleans.
6th. One principal railroad from Memphis, Tennessee, to the Sabine ridge.
with branches to Fort 1'owson and Fort Gibson, Arkansas.
7th. One principal railroad from Louisville, Kentucky, or Albany, Indiana
to St. Louis, Missouri; and thence- to the Missouri river, north of the mouth oi
the Big Platte, with branches from Albany, Indiana, to Chicago, and from th1•
northwest angle of the State of Missouri to the upper crossing of the ri-rer.
D es Monies.
As the general has given no precise indication of the courses which the-~
routes would pursue, or of that of their branches, I find it difficult. to detcrmin'
the method by which he has ascertained the whole distance. But, taking Tanner's map of the United States as a basis, drawing straight lines from point o
point, without refereJlce to the physical peculiarities of the country, and invoh-ing but once in the consideration those parts which may be common to mor
than one principal route or branch, I make the distance of the whole spte
equal to 5,260 miles.
This is a distance of air lines, and of course is mur h less than what would
be the_ actual distance of the roads. Their windings and sinuo itie~ would
much mcrea e that length, to an extent which I think may, with propriety. L
a., u.mcd a equal to 20 per cent. and which would make the entire length oi
roa~ ~nd branches equal to 6,310 miles.
U util urvey are made and the roads located, it is impos ible to make a
ac ·ura~ . ~ timatc of the cost. But, in the ab ence of the e, by rea:-onin"' '
probabihti and from xp riencc in ca es somewhat similar, one may arri,e a·
a re· ult which may be con id red a a probable minimum. 'l'he g neral r a, n'
upon th uppo, ition of a doubl track, throuo-hout· but I doubt if thi,
n •c .. ary. A , ingl track, with , uitablc turn~ut , ;nd double lin ;; of ,
· ·t n in particular localiti , wm J>_robab1y be found adequate to all th o ~
of :h r ad . .A, th r a? ar mt nd •d for gr at peed a well a~ !!'"n' ••
w 1ght. and ar to be n~tional r ad., tl1 y mu t be made of great tr"r'- h ,
w 11 a, of durable mat 11al · and a th y will cro the counh-y in . . man. -
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directions, they will no doubt encounter all the causes of great expenses in st~ch
strnctures-rock excavation, deep-cuts, tunnels, heavy embankments, extensive
bridges, &c.
Under these considerations, and after having, in addition to my own investigations and observations, c<;msulted some of the most experie1:ced and ~ost
eminent railroad engineers of our country, I find myself obbged to differ
with the general in reference to probable cost. He states the average, on the
supposition of a double track, at $15,000 per mile. I cannot, consistently with
my own views, state it at less than $20,000 the mile, for a single track and its
requisite accessories; and this amount I desire also to be understood as my
opinion of a probable minimum.
Six thousand three hundred and ten miles, at $20,000 the mile, will amount
to $126,200,000.
There is no doubt that many advantages may be taken of the railroads
ah·eady made and being made by States and incorporated companies, in adopting
them as parts of the major general's system, but one cannot say to what extent,
until the same shall be shown by the surveys. If we suppose it, however, to
be equal to 1,000 miles, it will reduce the cost before stated to $106,200,000.
The objects of these various roads being to transport masses of troops and
. munitions of war with great speed and to great distances, means of transporting
will have to be provided, and will also have to be under the exclusive control of
the government, which last condition makes it necessary that these means should
be owned by the government; they become, then, an essential part of government expense belonging to the system.
rrhese means are locomotives and cars. A car that would properly accommodate 50 men with their arms and necessary baggage would probably not cost
less than $500. To transport 10,000 men, then, would require 200 cars. We
will now suppose that to move these cars with the anticipated speed will require
one locomotive to each train of ten cars; there must, then, be twenty locomotives, which, with the requisite tender to each, will not cost less than $8,000
apiece. It will, therefore, be necessary for the transportation of 10,000 men to
have 20 locomotives and tenders and 200 cars. This may be considered as an
equipment for one of the principal lines; but as there are seven principal lines,
a_nd as each should be supplied with an equipment adequate to the transportation of 10,000 men, there will have to be, for the whole system of roads, not less
than 140 locomotives and tenders and 1,400 cars. Applying to these the prices
which we have stated, it will make the cost of the means of transportation equal
to - - - - - • - - . - ......... - . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . .
$1, 820, 000
To which add the cost of the roads .............. __ . _..... 106, 200, 000
And the whole will be ............ _....•.......... $108,020,000

_I have, in the foregoing, supposed the plan to be practicable-that is, that
:a~lroads may be made in the several directions as required by the system; but
it 1;5 proper to add that this is a point which cannot be determined except by
accurate surveys.
Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,
J. J. ABERT,
Colonel Topographical Engineers.
Hon. J. R. POINSETT,
Secretary of War.
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NA VY COMMISSIONERS' OFFICE, April 25, 1840.
Sm : The board of navy commissioners have the honor to acknowledge the
receipt of the letter from the honorable Secretary of War to you, of the 16th
instant, requesting your ~·eference to them of the memorial of General E. P
Gaines to Congress, submitting a system of national defence, "for a report a to
the practicability, expediency, and expense of the plan, so for as relates to floating batteries and other naval defences;" and, in compliance with your indomment, respectfully state :
That in relation to the "expense," the board called upon the chief na-val constructor for the probable cost of one of the floating· batteries and a tow-boat, as described in the memorial, a copy of whose report is herewith enclosed. These
estimates form the best data which the commissioners can fmnish for ascertaining the aggregate expense which might be necessary to carry into effect the
recommendations of General Gaines. No definite number is specified in the
memorial, nor any other information given by which that number can be ascertained with any probable certainty; and no attempt has been made to supply
the want of this information by conjecture.
There appears to be no cause for doubting that the approaches of an enemy
by water to any of our cities and seaports might be prevented by the employment of a sufficient number of floating batteries and tow-boats, prepared, armedi
and manned, as are proposed by General Gaines; and, consequently, that the
plan is "practicable," provided the expense can be met and a sufficient number
of men be obtained.
In considering the " expediency" of adopting the fioating batteries whi~h are
proposed in the memorial, it is necessary to estimate their comparative efficiency
with other means ·which may be provided, manned, and supported with an eqnd
expenditure of money ancl an equal number of troops or other persons.
The board of navy commissioners, when presenting their views upon thF
general defences of the country upon former occasions, have expressed the
opinion that, upon a subj ect so important and evidently requiring the be t combinations of military and naval force, it was very desirable, if not indispen.able.
that it should be considered and reported upon by a board which should comprise officers of both branches of the service. This belief has not been changed
by any subsequent information or reflection upon the subject, and consequently
they can only offer opinions upon the relative advantages and disadvantage, ;
the floating batteries and fixed fortHications, which are based upon fact~ th,··
apprar to be too well established or so obvious as not to be questioned.
The system presented in the memorial is intended "to provide for the defen
of our. seap?rts," and "to enable us to repel, by the agency of steam po-we::
Yery mvas1011 suddenly forced upon us by fleets propelled by steam power.
'Io rffect this object, the m moriali. t proposes floating batteries and attrudan
tow-boat."', which he has de._cribed in very general term,, and con iders. th·
prc.fC'rablc .to fortifications with cannon placed on the banks of ri~·e1-. or mlet,:
hccau::-e with , uch fortification. only it woulcl be utterly impracticable to lock
up a naYigahl riYcr or inl t, or to arre t the movement of a fl et tber on. H
al:o prc·[c~·t- th fioaiino- batterie to tC'am~hip -of-war, unle such ..,bi~-- ~}JOU!
b prol11b1t?c1 from lraving the vicinity of the port' or harbor to :'·h1ch. they
may he a .. :-:1g-n cl. From the. e g 11 ral views it appear to be the mt ·ntion ,
the m moriali..:t that rach and eYcry port or harbor .,hall have at all tim '~
th m an: for c1 fence ao-ainst a naval force which may be necc:-.:ary tor ',·
a ta ·k. until r inforccmc·nts can b olJtainC'd from th int rior · and tha no ·
li:mc i: to b plac :cl upon th one ·ntrntion of th sc .,eparate floatin.,. tl ·nCt..:
from c nti!!l1ou · port for trmporar • pnrpo,' <':-:.
Th r can b no loubt that n hap rfi• t . y .. tcm of cl £ nee would b_ ,··ry
d . irablc, if it could h obtain d with , prop r reo-ard to it~ co::t and 1 ' J ·
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mands upon the population of the country .. But if th~ probable expense of !lrn
construction and maintenance of the floatmg batteries and tow-boats which
would be required, and the number of persons neces1:1ary for their advantageous
use, are considered and compared with the resources of the country, reasonable
doubts may be entertained whether an attempt to obtain complete security in
this manner would be expedient.
That floating batteries of some kind will be necessary as component parts of
the defences for several of our harbors is generally admitted, and it is believed
formed a part of the plan of defence as proposed by the board which had' that
subject under examination shortly after the close of the last war for those passages to important points which could not be well and thoroughly commanded
by the fortifications on the land.
One of the strongest objections which is usually made to fixed fortifications
is, that they must of necessity await an attack, and leave the choice of time and
circumstances to an enemy. '11he greatest advantage of a floating force over
fixed fortifications consists in the greater power which they possess of choice of
position, with facility and prompitude to meet in the best manner any form of
attack with which any point may be threatened. All varieties of floating force
are liable to greater danger from shells and hot shot, and require much larger
amounts, in proportion to their original cost, to keep them in repair than fixed
1
fortifications.
In considering the defence of a coast so extensive as that of the United States,
and upon which there are so many positions which are important either for their
commercial, military, or political relations, the Board of Navy Commissioners,
when they refer to the probable nature and force of the attacks which may be
expected from a naval enemy, and the physical, fiscal, and personal resources
of the country to meet them, are led to the conclusion that many points must
be left more or less exposed for many years ; and that, while permanent arrangements are made for giving security to others in proportion to their importance,
the best policy for the whole country will be to extend those movable defences
which can advantageously meet an enemy at the greatest distance from his
meditated points of attack, or be soonest concentrated to retard his progress, or
to repel him from our shores.
This force, if composed of steam and ordinary ships-of-war, employed separately, or in combination, as circumstances may require, might, it is believed, be
used (except at some few points) with at least equal advantage as the floating
batteries which are proposed in the memorial, and would possess the further
advantage of being able to meet and annoy an enemy in his progress, to conc~ntrate where it should be most required, to retire, if necessary, before a supenor force, and be held ready to take advantage of any accidents to the enemy,
or of any mistakes which he might commit. Its powers would be activeaggressive if necessary, whilst that of the batteries proposed must necessarily
be a~ost wholly passive and strictly defensive.
Without entering more particularly into the general subject of national defence, after a careful consideration of the employment of such floating batteries
as are proposed in the memorial, the board are of opinion that, although a few
such or simil~r batteries might perhaps be useful in particular places, it would
not be expedient to adopt them generally as substitutes for fixed fortifications,
or for a floating force which should be adapted to more extensive use and capable of quicker and more rapid combinations.
·
The papers are herewith respectfully returned.
I have the honor to be, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,
C. MORRIS,
For tlie Board ef Na·vy Commissioners.
Hon. JAMES K. PAULDING,
8ecretary of tlie Navy.
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WASHINGTON, April 22, 1840.
Srn: I have read the memorial presented by Major General Gaines to Congress on the defence of the coast. A part of the system proposed by the
general is the construction of heavy floating batteries, the probable cost of which
with their tow-boats, you require me to state. It is difficult to form an opinion
on the cost of vessels of such unusual dimensions as those proposed by General
Gaines; and in addition to this difficulty there are no data given on which to
ground an estimate, excepting length and breadth, but it is believed that the
largest battery with her tow-boats will cost about 1,400,000 dollars, and the
smallest about 700,000. 'l'his estimate includes copper-fastening and coppering,
cables, anchors, boats, and water-casks, but does not embrace masts, spars, sails,
armament, nor stores of any description .
. I am, sir, respectfully, &c.,
SAMUEL HUMPHREYS.
Com. CHARLES lVIoRRIS,

President efthe Navy Board.
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HO. REPS,, EX. DOC, No. 5, 32d CONGRESS, 1st SESSION.

LETTER
FR01l

THE SECRETARY OF WAR,
IN

Reference to Fortifications.

DECE1lBER

11, 1851.-Referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, and ordered to be
printed.
. WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, December 8, 1851.
Srn: On the 3d of March last, your honorable body adopted the following
resolutions :
" 1. R esolved, That the Secretary of War be directed to report to this House,
the second Monday in December next, on the subject of the land defences of the
country, in which he will review the general system adopted after the war with
Great Britain, and since pursued in regard to the permanent fortifications then
deemed necessary for the national defence; and that he report whether the general plan may not now be essentially modified by reducing the number of works
proposed to be erected, and by abandoning some of the forts now in progress of
construction.
,
" 2. R esolved, That the Secretary of War also report the number of fortifications which have been built, including those nearly completed under the general
sy tern, the number in process of construction, and the number not yet commenced,
but proposed to be erected, and in such form as will conveniently show the States
and Territories in which the several forts are situated, or to be located; when
the work was commenced, when completed, or expected to be finished; the number and calibre of the guns mounted, or to be mounted, the estimated cost, the
amounted expended, and the sums yet required to finish or construct, as the
ca::::e may be, each work respectively."

I now proceed to discharge the duty thus imposed on me.
On more than one occasion during the last war with Great Britain, the country
had been exposed to serious misfortunes from the want of suitable fortifications
at important points. Its capitol had been taken, and several of its largest commncial cities owed their preservation from the same calamity to the undisciplined
couraue of troops hastily assembled for their defence. It is not surprising,
therefore, that at the restoration of peace, the attention of the government should
be turned to the defences of the country.
In the year 1816 a board of engineers was organized by order of President
:\fadi.,on, charged wit~ the duty of preparing a general system of fortifications
f, r our maritime frontier; and, by a resolution of Congress, adopted in the same
YE:ar, the P resident was authorized to employ ." a skilful engineer as an as-
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sistaut" to this board. The appointment was conferred upon General Bernard,
a distinguished officer in the l!.,rench army. The board of engineers, thus constituted, entered zealously on the discharge of their duties. They planned an
extensive system of permanent coast defences, and surveys were immediately
commenced with a view to carry it into execution. They ananged the proposed
works into six classes.. Class A comprised certain old works, constructed during· the two wars with Great Britain, but which required alterations and repairs.
Classes B, 0, D, E, and F, the new works proposed to be erected, arranged in
the order of their relative importance.
The plan, both in its formation and execution, appears to have been left for
several years (from 1816 to 1821) entirely under the control of the Executin.
Congress appears to have had no agency in it, except to make the necessary appropriations, which were made in a gross sum "for fortifications," and were expended with the approval of the department, by engineer officers, under the
direction of the chief of that corps. In 1821 the practice was changed, and the
appropriations were made for each work specifically.
This plan has been partially carried into execution, with a few exceptiom
made by direction of Congress, in the same order as that in which it was fir~t
arranged1. By altering and repairing the most important of the old works.
2. By commencing the new works embraced in class B; then those in class C.
]from that time to the present the works have been slowly but steadily advancing. , Doubts were occasionally expressed, both in and out of Congref'S, nr
the necessity of so extensive a system, and the appropriations were frequently
so curtailed as materially to retard the completion of the works, but they were
suspended but for a single year.
.
In the year 1836, when our relations with France wore a threatemng aspec:;
the attention of Congress was again called to the defences of the country, anu
the President was directed, by a resolution of the Senate, adopted on the Lt1
of February of that year, to :ipake a report on that subject.
General Cass, then Secretary of War, took this occasion to review the who!~
system adopted by the board of engineers. He disapproved of ~everal of rh:
works recommended by them, either as useless or as unnecessarily la1:ge, an
con idered the whole system as on too extensive a scale. Par~s of th1: d~curnent, referring to particular works, are no longer of any practi_cal app~1cat10~as the works to which they refer are completed; but such portions of 1t a~ rtlate to the general system adopted by the board, are as appropriate at the pr
sent day as they were when they were written, and whatever difference_ n
opinion may exist on the subject to which it refers, none can exist a~ to the
ability which it displays. 'rhe report is Senate document No. 243, of the year
1836 .
. In tran, mitting this report to the Senate, President Jackson (on .,~ch a ~ne~t10n undoubtedly high authority) expresses his concurrence in the news of the
Secretary.
·whatever effect this repo1-t may have had on the Oongr
to which ~t w-a.:
tranemitt cl, it does not appear to have produced any permanent change m th
,_y,·t ·m which, from that time to the pre nt, ha been gradually ad-vancin5!'. , an ·
in but on instance, until the la. t , e. :ion, did Oono-rc, fail to carry out the r ·
ommcmlation. of thr boru·d. ..Within that p riod many (and tho-.e by tar
mo:--t important) of th work. hav be n compl tcd; other ar n arly ... ·
tao-es of ad-vanccm n ·
vcral hav b n commenced and arc in varion
h rcwith app nd a tahular Rtatcrn nt, in w11ich the work r comm nd d by
boarcl • re arran(J' cl into their r :-pcctive cla. :e , howin(J' th work-.. n h
I. ntic and 1 ulf of )I xi o that ar compl t , or n arly , o; tho-. , th
r (J'r · · · of con ·truction, and tho.- that ar propo. cd to be built, but whi
not yet been commenced, tog th r with th c t, actual or e ·timat d (a-- th
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may be) of each work, the number of guns for which it is calculated, &c. I
also append sectional maps showing the exact position of eac~ work, exec_uted
or proposed, and exhibiting to the eye its actual state, that is~ wheth_er it be
completed, in course of construction, or not yet commenced. :E rom this statement it will be seen that tlie number of all the works recommended by the
board, on the Atlantic and Gulf of lVIexico, including old works repaired, is one '
hundred and fifty-seven, carrying, in the aggregate, 12,685 guns.
·
That the cost of repairing the old works, class A, has been $3, 583, 742
The cost of the new works that are completed, ornearly so, class
B, has been ...................................... - . . . 13, 172, 966
Making, of all sums expended since the year 1816 to the present
day, in the construction and repairs of the works embraced in
classes A and B, an aggregate amount of .. _.... - .........• $16, 756, 708
To complete them will require ...... _. . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . .
1, 123, 896
That on the works now under construction, class 0,
there has been expended ..................... $3, 902, 828
To complete them will require.................. 5, 028, 194
Uaking, as the estimated aggregate cost of the works now under
construction, class 0, the sum of.........................
And that the estimated cost of all the works recommended, but
not yet commenced, is ....... _........... __ .............

8, 931, 022
18, 147, 000

Grand total.. . _........... ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $44, 958, 626
Thus we find that the total cost of the entire system recommended by the
board for the defence of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts (including the cost of
old works repaired) is estimated at $44,958,626. It must be observed, however, that a large portion of the estimate for works not yet commenced is purely
conjectural.
Having shown what the plan adopted by the board proposed to accomplish,
and how far it has been carried into execution, I now proceed to consider the
question submitted by the House, whether that plan "may not be essentially
modified by reducing the number of works proposed to be erected, and by
abandoning some of the forts now in progress of construction."
As this question is one of vital importance to the country, I deemed it prudent to obtain all the aid that professional knowledge and experience could
afford in arriving at a correct conclusion ; I therefore addressed a series of questions to some of the most distinguished officers of the navy, and of the corps of
engineers, which I requested them to answer. The answers to these questions
are hereto appended, and, together with the able and elaborate report of the
chief engineer, constitute a mass of highly interesting and instructive matter on
the subject of the national defences. I have been much indebted to these
interesting papers in preparing this report.
I shall first consider that part of the inquiry submitted by the House, which
refers to the works now in progress of construction. The board, in carrying
their plan into execution, commenced, (as I have already said,) with the most
important works ; it follows, therefore, that those now in progress of construction arc deemed by them more important than those that have not yet been
commenced, and, therefore, that if the former are unnecessary, the latter are
still moi-e so. I shall confine myself at present to the works on the Atlantic
and on the Gulf of Mexico; those on the northern lakes will form the subject
of a eparate inquiry.
The works now in course of construction are enumerated in class 0. Some
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of those in class B are not yet quite :finished, but they are all so nearly so as
to _be classed by the board among those that are completed.
By reference to thfa list it will be seen that several of these works constitute
parts of the defences of some of our most important seaports, to wit: of Phil~
delphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, (with the navy yard at Portsmouth,) Charleston,
Pensacola, (the only good harbor for vessels-of-war, and the only naval depot
on the Gulf,) and Mobile. There can be no doubt that if any points on our
coast ought to be fortified these should be among the number.
With regard to important positions like these, my opinion is that nothing
should be left to chance, but that they should be fortified, so as to make them
impregnable by any force that may reasonably be expected to be brought
against them. In the event of a war with a great maritime power, these points
would probably be the first to be assailed. Indeed they are the only ones at
which we are assailable. The power of steam has, in point of time, deprived
the Atlantic of two-thirds of its width, and in certainty of movement and accuracy of calculation has narrowed it still more. It is, perhaps, not going too far
to say that a naval expedition from England could now calculate with mor_e
precision the time of its arrival at one of .our ports, than forty years a~o. it
could have calculated the time of its reaching the opposite side of the Bnti h
channel.
It is evident, therefore, that our great cities should be prepared against such
~xpeditions, not only in time of war, but that as war may come unexpectedly
upon us, they should, even in time of peace, be always prepared to r~pel an
attack. The only question is, how is this to be accomplished 1 Three different
modes have been suggested:
1st. By such temporary, fixed, or floating defences as may be hastily prepared to meet an emergency.
2d. By vessels-of-war; or,
3d. By permanent fortifications.
With regard to temporary works on land, hastily thrown up, they are
unquestionably often of great advantage where there are no fortifications, and
sometimes have been found sufficient to repel an attack. It is manifest, however, that they ought not to be relied on as substitutes for the latter, for defending important positions like those we are now considering against ve els-ofwar. Their only recommendation is their cheapness. On the other band, t~ey
require greater numbers to defend them, and they afford less protection agarn~·
the enemy's fire. Even if they were equally effectual, therefore, they "?uld
only be the means of saving money at the expense of life. But it is manife~
that, even when skilfully constructed, they must be inferior, as means of defence,
to permanent fortifications of olid masonry.
In re pect to floating batteries there appears to be but one opinion among
officers both of the army and navy. This subject was brought before on<!'r~s
some years ago by a late di tinguished officer of the army, who propo .. ed _them.
a ub titute both for fortifications and for ve sels of war in the protecrton ~1
our coa t. The then ecretary of War (Mr. Poinsett) was directed to !!iw hi.:
vi w upon it. He refened the matter to the board of navy commi ioner~. by
whom it wa fully inve tigat d, and they conclude their report upon it by expre ·ing th opinion " that although a few such or imilar batterie might. ·
hap , • u ful in particular place , it would not be expedient to adopt th_
g n rally a uh titut for fi Id fortification or for a floating batt ry, whi _
hould b
apt d to mor xt n iv u e and capable of quicker and mor ra
c m inati n~," t wit, a naval fi re .
In thi opini n Ir. oin.. t c ncurr d, ancl it will b
n that the.offi . ~b th military and naval, wb have fi vor d m with th ir vi w on tlu, I
ncur in th
Ii f that altbou"'h t am att ri may, und r me cir um,tan
b highly valuable a auxiliaric · to fortification or vcs" 1 -of-w r, alou

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

205

are inferior to either, and that from the perishable nat~re of the In:ateri~l of
which they must be constructed they are far more expensive than fort1ficat1ons.
It only remains to inquire whether vessels-of-war should be resorted to as a
substitute for fortifications.
On this point opinions widely differ. The more prevalent one, even among
naval officers, is, that the navy could not, or if it could, that it ought n~t t~ be
relied on for this purpose. In this opinion I entirely concur. The obJe~t10ns
to this mode of defence appear to me insuperable. The moder1: P:acti_ce of
nations dispenses with any formal dec;laration of war, and the first mt1mat10n of
it may be the appearance of a hostile fleet before one of our cities, or, perhaps,
simultaneously before several. Is it probable that a sufficient naval force would
always be at band ready to repel such an unexpected attack? But eve1;1 when
the existence of a war was well known, could a city always calculate with certainty on the presence of a naval force precisely at the moment it was needed ?
The vessels assigned to this duty would either cruise off the coast to watch for
and intercept the enemy's fleet, or they would remain stationary in the harbor.
If the first course were adopted, what security would they afford? Any one of
the numerous casualties to which vessels are liable at sea might enable the
enemy's fleet to pass them, and accomplish his purpose of destroying a city and
millions of public and private property, or of selling forbearance at an enormous
price, before our vessels were aware of its approach.
If, on the contrary, the vessels assigned to the defence of a city remained
constantly in port, this would necessarily involve an immense increase of our
naval establishment. The chief engineer estimates that, inasmuch as it would
be necessary to retain at each important point a fleet entirely adequate to its
defence, the entire naval force destined for the defence of our coast alone would
have to be as many times larger than the squadron that might reasonably be
expected to attack one of these points as there are points to defend. Supposing,
therefore, that Boston, N(;lw York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, and New
Orleans were unprovided with land defences, each of them would require for its
protection a naval force as large as any that might probably be sent against it;
and as twenty ships-of-the-line would be no extraordinary armament to send on
such a mission, it would require a force , at least equal to that at each of the
above-mentioned ports, making in all an aggregate force of one hundred and
twenty ships-of-the-line for the defence of these ports alone.
. T~e argument is, perhaps, pushed to an extreme, but it cannot be denied that,
JUSt m proportion as fortifications are dispensed with for the protection of our
principal seaports, the navy must be augmented; and all naval officers who
recommend a partial substitution of naval for land defences admit that such
mu t be the consequence of the adoption of this policy. It follows, therefore,
that of the two modes of defence, the naval is by far the most expensive. A
few facts will more fully demonstrate the truth of this assertion.
1. A first class man-of-war, carrying say eighty-four guns, is estimated to cost
$500, 000. Now this sum would, under ordinary circumstances, construct a
fortification that would mount two hundred and fifty guns.
,
Th~ cost of building, equipping, and repairing the navy from 1816 to 1850,
both mcl~~ed, was upwards ~f $51,000,000. rrhe aggregate cost of building
and repa1;1Ilg ~11 the forts which have been completed and are now in course of
con_ truct10n will (when the latter are finished) amount to $26,811,626. The
entire na~al force of the United States carries 2,032 guns; the number of all
the guns m the forts that are completed and being built will be 6,093, so that to
kee~ 2!032 ~ns on ship-board costs nearly double what it costs to mount 6,093
on fortifications, and the first amount does not include the cost of docks and
other establishments erected by the government for the construction and repair
of ve sels. But this is not aJl. It is computed that few ships last longer than
forty years, and their average duration does not exceed fifteen years, and at the
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end of sixteen years the expense of repairs of a ship about equals her first cost.
On the contrary, a fort when once built lasts forever, and the cost of repair is
trifl.iug. It is evident from these facts, that, supposing the two modes of defence
to be in other respects equal, on the score of economy there can be no comparison between them.
I will not undertake to decide a question which has long been a subject of
controversy between officers of the army and navy, and that is, the relative
superiority of fortifications and vessels-of-war. It is believed, however, that
few naval officers, at the present day, would venture to affirm that, in a contest
between a regular fortification and a vessel-of-war, equal in the number and
calibre of their guns, and in the skill and courage with which they are managed,
the vessel would be likely to prove victorious.
The practice of the civilized world is opposed to such a theory. There is
hardly a nation that has seaports to defend that does not resort to fortifications
for that purpose, and the instances are rare in which they have failed to accomplish the object.
Some memorable instances of successful attacks by vessels-of-war on fortified
places have been adduced in support of this theory, but it is probable that the
result in these cases may be traced to some fortunate accident, or to causes not
inherent in the two modes of attack and defence.
On the other hand, many examples may be found (some furnished by our own
history) of successful resistance by forts to vessels-of-war. It would seem, too,
that if there were ever any doubts on the subject, the Paixhan gun, which, it iE
admitted on all hands, gives great advantage to forts over vessels, must have
removed them.
England is frequently cited as an example of a country which has long relied
successfully on her navy for the defence of her seaports. Even if the fact w~re
so, it would constitute no argument in favor of the adoption of the same policy
by the United States. England has a small coast and a powerful navy. The
United States have a sea front nearly equal to that of all Europe, and a mall
navy. r_riie naval supremacy of England has always enabled her not ~nly ~o
protect her own commerce and harass that of her enemy, but often to d1:1ve h~
.,hip:; from the sea, and compel them to take refuge under the guns of his fornfi.cations, while the proximity of her shores to those of France often enable the
same squadron to overlook the ports of her enemy, and to protect her own.
But it is a mistake to su1)pose that England relics exclusively on her navy fo:· the
defence of her ports. On the contrary, those of her ports that are mo t likely
to i~1vite attack, from being the site of public naval establishments, are tI~on 17ly
fortified. Nevertheless, the most eminent state men of that country admit and
deplore the insufficiency of her land defences, since the introduction of war
t amcrs has almo ·t bridged the Briti h channel. ·what effect thi new lemen
of naYal warfare i destined to produce on the de. tinies of Eno-land-whether
it tend to incr a. e or to diminLh her maritime, uperiority-whether it will not,
in ,·omc mca, ure, deprive her of the immunity from inva ion which her in.:ul&r
pol"ition ha. hitherto secur c1 to her, are question that yet remain to _be c~ cided.
I conclude, ther fore, that wh nev r a plac i con iderecl of uffic1ent lIDJ>Ort·
anc to rcc1uire defence. , and iB , u"c lJtibl of b ing defended by fortificMion-.
th Tar in Yery point of vi<'w pr £,ral,le to ve cl -of-war.
In _a~ ·ing thi , I mean do di. paragement to th navy. On th contr:iry. I
would , till r ly mainly on it for the cl fi,nce of the country, but I would h , e
them clcf~nd h •r, not by rc:maini11"' at anchor in her poli , but by ""Oiug abro:
on tl1 · w1cl o · an, prot ·ctnw h ·r comm •rce and hara" ino- that of the •nemy :
hovcrin"" on hi coa,t ancl com1, ·lliiw him, in tcacl of attackinO' ur iti ~ ·
look to th d .fcnc of hi · wn. Th ·:- , in my opinion, are th appr pri
Inti ::; of the navy, and by a chi v ment like the· have all their laurel;::
won.
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The form of expression used in the resolution, that the Secretary of War be
directed to report whether the plan of 181_6 may not "now" ~e modified by
abandoning the works in course of construct10n, would seem to imply a supposition on the part of the House that although they may have been necessary at
one time they have ceased to be so now.
·
Great changes have undoubtedly take1:1 place_ s!nc~ the plan_ was adop~ed.
The country has advanced with unexampled rap1d1ty m wealth, m populat10n,
and all the elements of military power. Discoveries and improvement~, directly
or indirectly affecting the facilities of attack and defence, have astomshed the
world. Railroads have been introduced; steam has been applied to navigating
the ocean ; the telegraph accomplishes what would then have been considered
miracles.
Among these changes there is one which, although of far less general importance than those just alluded to, nevertheless as it is directly connected with the
military art, deserves to be mentioned, and that is the invention, or, at least,
introduction into general use of the Paixhan gun, as it is generally called from
its supposed inventor.* These discoveries or improvements are destined to exercise an influence on military affairs, the extent of which cannot be appreciated
until it shall have been tested by experience.
There can be no doubt that so far as regards its capacity to resist invasion,
these changes have vastly increased the relative power of this country. The
rapidity with which intelligence may be transmitted, and troops and munitions
of war conveyed from one extremity of the country to the other, enables us to
combine the opposite advantages of an extended territory and a rapid concentration of force. 'l'hese advantages, together with the augmented population
and resources of the country, must remove all apprehension of an invasion of it
by an army from abroad . No army could be transported across the ocean large
enough to venture beyond the reach of the transports that conveyed it to our
shores, and any fortificat!ons designed to provide against such a contingency,
may safely be dispensed with.
But the fortifications now under consideration look to no such event. They
are designed to protect large cities from attacks by vessels-of-war, and against
such attacks numbers are of no avail; the most populous city is as powerless
against them as the smallest village. It follows, therefore, that neither the increase of our population nor the facilities afforded by railroads and telegraphs
tend, in the least degree, to diminish the necessity of these works.
·
On the other hand, it is admitted by all that the introduction of war steamers,
which greatly facilitate the attack on all places accessible by water, renders it
more necessary than ever to fortify them against such attacks.
It is also admitted that the Paixhan gun, so terrific in its effects on all floating
defences, is comparatively harmless against the solid masonry of forts, and has,
therefore, rendered the latter, at the same time, more necessary and more efficacious.
I therefore conclude that if the above-mentioned works were necessary in
1 16, they are still more so at the present time, and that they ought not to be
abandoned.
.
There are several works comprised in this class (C) that stand on different
ground. They are, Fort Knox, in Maine; Fort Clinch, in Georgia; Fort 'l'aylor,
at Key West; and Fort J efferson, on one of the Tortugas islands.
Fort Knox is designed to protect Penobscot river, which has a large commerce

'
0
This formidable gun is said to have been invented and introduced into our service (by
the name of ''The Columbiad") by the late Col. Bomford of the ordnance, some years
before the alleged discovery by the French officer who has had the honor of giving it hi.s
nam·~. Hence the manner in which I have qualified my remarks in relation to it.
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and affords a fine anchorage The large town of Bangor and several flourishinO'
villages lie on the river and bay.
b
Fort Clinch is intended to defend the entrance into Cumberland sound.
'rhis sheet of water affords an excellent harbor, and the bar at the entrance, it
is said, affords a sufficient draught of water for sloops-of-war and merchantmen.
There is no town of much consequence, I believe, either on the sound, or on
St. Mary's river, which empties into it, and the utility of this work depends
upon the importance of excluding an enemy from the sound, and securing it to
ourselves. Both this work and the preceding belong more properly to another
class of cases to which I shall presently refer.
The two remaining works now in course of construction are those on Key
West and the Tortugas. In relation to these there can be but one opinion.
~I.1hese islands, situated directly in the narrow channel between the southern
extremity of Flo,rida and the island of Cuba, may be said to command the
northern gateway of the Gulf, as Jamaica does its southern. ~I.1he latter is in
possession of the only nation from whose naval power the United States have
anything to apprehend. Were these islands, with their fine harbors, also to fall
into h er hands, they would enable her to cut off all communication between our
naval forces on the Gulf and those on the Atlantic, to obtain complete control
over the Gulf, and block up the vast and increasing commerce of which it is the
theatre. A railroad across the isthmus of 'I'ehuantepec (the existence of which,
at no distant period, can hardly be doubted) would impart additional importance
to the Gulf, as it would then become the main channel of communication between the Atlantic and the Pacific; and recent events admonish us that our
progress in that quarter is watched with jealousy by more than one of the great
powers of Europe.
··
I am, therefore, decidedly of opinion, not only that these two works should
not be abandoned, but that they should be completed as soon as practicable.
It has been objected to several of the works which have been or are nearly
completed, that they are on too large a scale. One or two of those which we~
commenced shortly after the adoption of the plan, are doubtless liable to !his
criticism. They are calculated not only to repel an attack by sea, but to with·
stand a long siege by powerful land forces. It seems to me extremely doubtful
whether the strong defences on •the land sides of these forts were ever necesnary;
be that as it may, however, there can be no question that railroads and the
telegraph have, in most cases, done away with the necessity for any works on
the land side, except such as may be requisite to resist a coup de main, or pre-ren
an escalade. It is to be presumed that the board have modified the pla~ o~ ~ho:
works now constructing so as to adapt them to the present time, and to dimlill-h
their magnitude and cost. This concludes what I have to say in relation to th '
works now in the course of construction.
I now come to the last branch of the inquiry proposed by the Hou e, and
ancl that is, whether the number of fortifications proposed to be built may Ill)'
be reduced 1
The...,e works are enumerated in classes D, E, and F, aRd the accompanyin~
map will show their respective positions. I t will be seen by the statement A.,
that they con id rably exceed in number those which have been completed, or
ar now in progres of con truction.
ome of the proposed works are designed to complete the ystem of defi,n •
for the protection of the large seaports or naval depot . Whether the e 1>l c •
be not ah ady ufficiently prot ct d by the work that have been completed. or
are in progre~ of con. traction, i a pur ly profi ional que tion, in r 1!'3l'd_ ·
of the concludon ~ at wh1
whi ·h I hav no r a on to dou t the corr ctn
the board have arrived . In r o-ard t two of tho e fort , however, I will Y n
to oft r a fi w ugo- ..tion.. . 'I h y ar the two mention d in cla ~
an f
which it is propo ed to con tru~t on the atu.xent river, as part of the Y e
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of defences of Washington. The construction ~f these works is based on the
supposition that the enemy may cross the Atlant~c, asce?-d the Ol~es~peak~ bay
to the Patuxent river, disembark a large army with all i~s rnateriel, mcludmg a
h·ain of artillery, and then march upwards of twenty miles through a countr;y
abounding in facilities for resisting or retarding his march, and capture this
eity.
It appears to me exceedingly improbable that ~uch an att~mpt should be
made, or, if made, that it should be successful. It 1s true that it was once made
and succeeded, but it was under very different circumstances fro~1 t~10se which
now exist. rro say nothing of the probability that there would, m time of war,
at all times be found some vessels-of-war at Norfolk, lying securely under the
protection of Fortress JYionroe and Fort Calhoun, (neither of which existed in
1~14,) a telegraphic despatch might in a few hours concentrate in the bay all
the war steamers as far north as Boston, and as far south as SaYannah, whereby
the enemy's retreat might be cut off, and the squadron (unless a very powerful
one) be captured.
In the second place, the two forts on the Potomac-Fort Washington, and
the one proposed to be built at Cedar Point-would prevent the fleet from a cending that river (as they did on the former occasion) to co-operate with the
army, cover his flank, and secure his retreat in case of disaster. Lastly, a more
numerous and efficient militia could now be assembled for the defence of this
city, in twenty-four honrs, than could have been brought together in 1S14 in the
.ame number of days; and my opinion is, therefore, that these works may safely
be dispensed with.
But the great majority of these works are intended to fortify places where no
fortifications now exist. Whether any or all of these places are of such importance as to 1·equire permanent defences is a question in regard to which it is
probable that a great diversity of views will be found to exist.
I have already given it as my opinion that all seaports where there are important public establishments, such as docks and navy yards, or where there is
great accumulation of private wealth, should be strongly fortified against attacks
by sea. Beyond this it is difficult to lay clown any general rule, and to say
where we should stop, although it is evident we must stop somewhere. General
Ca",, in the report to which I have already alluded, says :
"I think every town large enough to tempt the cupidity of an enemy should

h~ defended by works, fixr d or floating, suited to its local position, and sufficiently extensive to resist such attempts as would be made against it."
And again:
"All the harbors and inlets upon the coasts where there are cities or towns,
who,_e situation and importaI).ce create just apprehension, and particularly where
wr, have public naval establi, hments, should b e defended by works proportioned
to any emergency that may probably occur."
The correctness of these propositio;s may be admitted, and yet a wide field
rJf dif:cu:sion be left open, for the difficulty does not lie so much in finding a

ruh: a,; in applying it to a particular case; a difficulty increased by the local and
P' litical con iderations which will always exercise more or less h1-fluence on its
<lf-frion.
It will be seen, howeYer, by an examination of the lists D, E, and F, that the
board have gone considerably beyond the limits which this rule would prescribe.
Jlany of the work embraced in thi, list arc not de, igned to protect any city or
" :-u that could "tempt the cupidity of an enemy," or ·where there are many
public etitabli, hment of any kinc1, or "whose situation and importance could
tT ate ju t appr hension."
Most of them are intended to protect the entrances
·,) bay,, ;:ounds, inlet ... , road.~ tead, or harbor , the loss of which might be in
H. Ex. Doc. 92- -14
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convenient to our merchantmen, or the possession of which might be useful to
the enemy.
For information in regard to these works I refer to the very able report of
the chief engineer, in which they are separately examined, and the object of
each is fully explained. This report may satisfy Congress, though I confess it
has failed to satisfy me that all of these works ought to be built.
The construction of fortifications at such points and for such purposes seem::;
to be based on the supposition that the enemy is to have complete mastery over
our coast, a supposition we are not warranted in making. On the contrary, it
seems to me that the protection of our commerce, whether on our own coast or
elsewhere, -is the appropriate function of -our navy, and may be safely left to it.
We cannot expe~t, particularly since the introduction of war steamers of light
draught, by any system of fortification, however extensive, to exclude the eneipy
from every bay, inlet, or creek in a seacoast on the two oceans, of several thousands of miles in extent; and there can be no great advantage in preventing hi~
access to one when he can find another nearly or quite as good at no great di~tance. I admit that some of these harbors may be so important as to require
fortifications, but I believe that such is not the case with a great majority of
them.
In determining the extent to which we will fortify our seacoast there i.. one
fact which we ought never to lose sight of, and that is, that every fortification
which is not necessary is a positive disadvantage. },orts are elements of weakness as well as of strength, for, if they happen to fall into the hands of the enemy.
they become means of annoyance and even of danger to the country by which
they were erected. ':rhe strength of Gibraltar, which did not prevent it cap·
ture by the English, has enabled them to retain it, in spite of the effort' or
Spain, for nearly a century and a half; and Calais was more than two centuriein the possession of the same power. Although -we have no reason to apprehend that any attempt would be made to acquire permanent possession ?f an;
of our works, yet bays or harbors, in themselves of little consequence, mwht, u.
they were fortified, and the forts were taken by the enemy, become a ource ot
great annoyance during the whole period of the war. It follows, therefore, ~ha·
every fort should be provided, in time of war, with an armament and garruon
fully adequate to its defence.
By statement A it appears that if all the works enumerated in the list for ~e
.Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico were completed they would require, to pronde
them all with proper war garrisons, 62,300 men. Those on the lakes would r'·
quire 2,600 more, making, for the forts on the Atlantic side of the State~, no
less than 64,900 men, a larger force than the regular army of this country h~
ever amounted to.
I have no means of knowing what force would be necessary for the worh on
the Pacific; but if the system were carried to the same extent on that coa,t
which it is proposed to cany it on the Atlantic, to garrison all the wor ~ ~ on
both ocean in time of war would carcely require a maller force than 100,00
m n.
The hi f engineer ha suggested that the militia of the neighborhoo~ m~h.
in a gr at m Ul'e,_ be reli cl on for thi purpose, a" it i a ervice to wh1~h 1. '
w 11 adapt d. Thi may be tru , but it doe not entir ly obviate the obJecrt n.
Thi, duty would diffi r from tha for which re ort i u ually had to militia. I·
i not lik ha tily coll cting m n to r i t an imp nding danger, and then allowincr th m to cli!'lp r and r turn t th ir u ual a-vocation a ~oon c" it i, o
It woul not d t I v th fort unprovided with arri. on until the n · had actually mad hi · app arau · .
n th c utrar ~, a there would
m an f knowincr wh n h' would m ,, th militia w uld hav to remain c ·
t ntly in the fort . This w uld
p rticularly th ca with w rk.-, o t
la.. tha w , ar now . aminiug, many of which ar rcmot fr m
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from which they could be speedily reinforced._ Fo_r this kind of service, therefore, the militia would possess no advantage, m pomt of economy, over regular
troops.
.
.
.
Great, however, as would be the expense attendmg this syste~, th~re is no
doubt that, in a time of war, the country would cheerfully submit to it. But
thi is not all. These works ought not only to be protected in time of war, but
even in time of peace they ought to be prepared to resist an attempt to capture
them by a surprise or coup de main. To construct them and leav~ _them_un!!l.larded until war has actually broken out, when the first act of hostility_ might
and probably would be to seize them, would, it seems to me, be the height of
imprudence.
What is a proper peace garrison for works of this sort is a question in regard
to which military men differ. 'I1he strength of the garrison would depend not
only on its size, but, in some measure, also, on the position of each work, the
facility of speedily affording it relief, &c.
Supposing that the estimate I ha-ye made of the war garrisons of all the
works erected and to be erected according to the plan of the board, on the
Atlantic and the Pacific, of one hundred thousand men, to be correct, and estimating a proper peace garrison at one-tenth of this number, (which is believed
to be a very low estimate,) the force required for this purpose would be almost
equal to that of the present army.
Would the country submit to the burden which such a gigantic system of
fortifications would entail upon it 1 I think not. The people of this country,
although prodigal of their expenditures in time of war, are parsimonious in preparing for it. They would never consent to expend annually large sums in
order to prepare for a remote and contingent danger. The consequence would
be that these works, when completed, would be neglected, and would never be
prepared for a sudden and u~expected attack.
We have ample experience of this fact. No military man will affirm that the
works already completed are provided with such garrisons and armaments as a
prudent foresight would dictate. The reverse is notoriously true, and yet
within a few years past events have several times occurred calculated to admonish the government of the necessity of preparation. If these preparations
have not been made, it is not because they have not been repeatedly urged upon
Congress. 'l,hus, by attempting too much, we run the risk of accomplishing
nothing, or worse than nothing. I am, therefore, of opinion, that many of the
ork in the classes D, E, and F, particularly in the last two classes, might and
r 1ght to be dispensed with.
It is with regret that I feel constrained to differ from the board of engineers
'n a . . ubject to which they have devoted so much time and attention ; but this
i~ not a mere question of engineering. To designate the points that are suscep1ble of being fortified, to determine the extent, character, and strength of the
-orb, and to superintend their construction, is the province of the engineer;
l_nt whether any and which of these points it is expedient to fortify is a ques_ion of national policy, involving a great many and important considerations.
I'bi- question should be fully investigated, and now is the time to make the
inve tigation. As soon as the works now in progress of construction shall have
ken completed the board will enter upon a class of works of more questionable
ilit~.
I ;ecommend, therefore, that the department be authorized to organize a
~ard, compo ed of officers of the army and navy and of civilians, whose duty
• 3hall be to examine which of the works comprised in classes D, E, and F
" o-ht to be con~tructed, and/whether any that are not comprised in that list be
e<:e ·ary ; that they be directed to report to Congress the results of their
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inquiry, and to state at length the grounds of their decision in reference to each
particular work.
I shall now say a few words on the subject of
THE LAKE FRONTIER.

General Cass, in 1836, expressed the opinion that this frontier required nr
p ermanent defences; that we might safely rely for its security "upon tho51·
means, both in personnel and the materiel, which the extent and other advant ages of our country insure to us, and which must give us the superiority in tha
quarter." ~I1his opinion has been ably combated by the chief engineer, and I
cannot entirely concur in it.
The m ercantile marine of Great Britain on Lake Ontario considerably exceed,
tha t of the United States, and her undisputed command of the St. Lawrence
enables h er to augment her naval force on that lake to an indefinite extent.
On the other lakes the reverse is the case; our shippfog there far exceeds that
of England, and every day is adding to our superiority. But to enable us tn
retain this advantage we must have docks and navy yards, and in time of w11r
these establishments ought to be rendered secure against a coup de main. The
Welland canal, affording an inland communication between Lakes Ontario and
Erie, would greatly facilitate enterprises of this nature.
Statement B contains a list of the works on this frontier, with their po ition,
strength, &c. It will be seen from this statement that there are in all eight
forts on the whole northern frontier, of which only three, to wtt, Fort Porter, a'
Buffalo, l!--,ort Wayne, at Detroit, and a fort at Rom;e's Point, Lake Champlain.
are new ; the· remainder are old works, constructed before and during the la::·
war with Great Britain.
With regard to the first two, as they are completed, it is useless to di .. cn:·
their utility. In reference to the first, however, I presume there can be scarcely
a difference of opinion. Buffalo, with the great amount of shipping alway coll ected there, would offer great temptations to an enetny, and its proximity to. th
W clland canal would render an expedition against it not so improbable as mwb·
be supposed. There was, therefore, an obvious necessity for the defence· a
that city.
The necessity of the strong work at Detroit is not so apparent, unle th
enemy should acquire the ascendency on Lake Erie or L ake Huron, an mn
by no means probable.
My first impressions were against the utility of the very stron~ fort n?w u
course of construction at R ou se's Point. 'l1he arguments of the chief engm~ r.
however, on this point are very strong if not conclusive. The enemy, ban-~
the command of the St. Lawrence, could, by means of their canals commnn:·
eating with the head of Lake Champlain, in a very brief space of time throw 1
suffici nt naval force into that lake to give them command of it. I ·think, the
fore, that tbi. ·work, on which a large sum has been already expended, ,.,ho
be completed.
'l'h frv oth r fort. on the lake are old work,, con tructed during or bet
the la t war. A only .'mall appropriation are required to repair and enl th m, d not think th y ouo-ht to be abandoned .
Fort-. . ntario and ~iagara ar the only fortified place we have fr?m •.
m nth of tlH' t. Lawr nc to Lak Eri ; and, althouo-h they ·w re bmlt •
r fi r nee to a ,liffi r nt .'tat of thiivr from that which now xi tB, they wo
u · ful in affi rclinl1' prote 6on to our .'hippino· in tho e wat r..
.
• rt: rad • ~.fa kina and rrati t ommand, r pectiv l_~, th narrow ,t •·
tw en ak .,. UJ ri r ancl Iuron, and b twe n th latt r lake and L:
i hio-an and , 't. lair. ~ 1th u 00h d not think that cir um.:tancc arc Ii· .
oc ur to r nd r th rn n · · ar - a .. mean. of d fi nee
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recommend their abandonment. In the event of a war it will always be neces~ary to keep a military force on that frontier, and ~10 more eligible statio?s co~ld
probably be selected than the very points at which these forts are built, bei?g
all directly in the line of communication between the lakes, :where sup~hes
could be easily sent to them and whence they could be most easily and rapidly
transported to any other point where they might be needed.
The chief engineer suggests that, in addition to the works above enumerated,
it will be advisable to construct one on the St. Lawrence and one or more on
Lake Ontario, as a protection to our shipping in that quarter. His rema1;ks on
this subject are entitled to great weight, and will form a very pr_oper sub3~ct of
consideration for the joint board I have recommended, should this suggestion be
favorably received.
THE PACIFIC COAST.

In 1848 a joint commission, composed of naval and en~ineer officers, was
organized to make a reconnoissance of the Pacific coast, with a view to a designation of such points as it might be deemed advisable to fortify. That board
has recently made a report in which they point out various positions where, in
their opinion, fortifications should be constructed. These positions are divided
into three classes in the order of their relative imp@rtance, and a list of them
will be found appended to the report of the cqief engineer. The commission
recommended that measures be taken as soon as possible for the construction of
fortifications at San Francisco, San Diego, and the mouth of Columbia river.
There can be but little doubt that these three last mentioned points, from
their importance in a commercial point of view, will require defences, and considering their remoteness and the difficulty of affording them speedy relief in
time of war, I should think that no time ought to be lost in carrying this recommendation into effect. With regard to the other points, my remarks as to the
extent to which the Atlantic coast should be fortified apply with still greater
force to the Pacific, on account of the difficulty and expense of constructing for- '
tifications and of providing them with proper garrisons. I need not, therefore,
repeat those remarks.
Before closing this report I beg leave to make a few remarks on a subject
which, though not embraced by the resolution of the House, is yet so intimately
connected with the defences of the country that the report would hardly be
complete without some reference to it; and ~hat is the
ARMAMENT OF FORTIFICATIONS.

Cong1·ess, at their last session, omitted to make the usual appropriations either
for fortifications or their armament. But, whatever policy may be adopted with
reference to fortifications, it will still be necessary to provide a much larger supply of ordnance than we now have on hand. By reference to the report from
he head of the Ordnance bureau, hereto annexed, (marked 0,) it will be seen
_hat the whole number of guns, of all calibres, now on hand, whether in the
'orts or in the arsenals, amounts only to 3,535, and that of gun carriages is still
"maller. The entire number of guns that can be mounted in the forts already
completed, (classes A and B,) amounts to 4,572 guns; and if the works now in
Pro~es of construction should be completed, the total number of guns that
\\'ould then be required for all the forts would be 6,093. It appears, therefore,
'hat th e supply of ordnance now on hand is very inadequate, even to the present
anL of the ·ervice. I will ob· rve, too, that even if Congress should determine
·rJ rhtrict the sy tern of fortifications, this ·would not obviate the necessity for
large increaoe in the supply of heavy ordnance. Some means of defence must
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be employed, and cannon is an indispensable part of .any system that may be
adopted.
It appears, too, from the reports hereto appended, that the great naval power~
of Europe have, within a few years past, greatly increased the calibre of the
guns mounted on their vessels-of-war. This renders it obviously necessary that
the power of the batteries intended to resist them should also be proportionably
increased. I believe it is the opinion of all officers, both of the army and navy,
who have devoted much attention to this subject, that many of the guns now in
our most important forts ought to be removed and others of longer range substituted. A glance at the report of the Ordnance bureau will show how very
deficient we are in the heavy descriptions of ordnance, particularly in eight and
ten inch columbiads, the most effective weapon against vessels- of-war.
To manufacture cannon of good quality is a work that demands considerable
time, and as they are imperishable wheii properly taken care of, there is no good
reason why the government should not at once provide the requisite supply.
In connexion with this subject I would venture to suggest that provisions b_e
made for a distribution of artillery among the militia of the States and Terntories. Our people are more deficient in the knowledge of this arm than of any
other, and yet it is one that would be most required in a war with any European
power. If a standing appropriation were made applicable to the distribution of
artillery, and of the book on artillery practice among the States and 'I.1erritoiie,,
it would tend very much to promote the knowledge of this essential branch ot
the military art among the citizens of the country.
Respectfully submitted.

C. l\L CONRAD,
Secretary

Hon.

LINN BOYD,

Speaker

ef the House ef Representatives.

ef War.
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List nJ documents accompanying tlie report if the Eecretary if War rf December 8, 1851, on tlie su~ject if.fortifications, i'n answer to a resolution ef tlie
House if Representatives ef Marcli 3, 1851.

.A..-Statement of fortifications on the Atlantic coast and Gulf of Mexico, the
amount expended on each, and the estimated co8t of completion and
armament.
B.- Statement of fortifications on the northern frontier. .
C.- Statement of cannon and carriages at the forts and arsenals.
D.-Report of General J. G. Totten, chief engineer.
E.-Letter to the Secretary of the Navy requesting the views of naval officers
on certain points stated, and their reports, viz :
1. Report of Commodore 0. Morris.
2. Report of Commodore l\'I. 0. Perry.
3. Report of Commander R. B. Cunningham.
• 4. Report of Commander S. F. Dupont.
5. Report of Lieutenant J. Lanman.
6. Report of Lieutenant l\'I. F. Maury.
7. Report of Lieutenant J. A. Dahlgren.
F.-Ordcr to the chief engineer, requiring the views of engineer officers on certain points stated, and their reports, viz :
8. Report of Lieutenant Colonel R. E. De Russey.
9. Report of Major W. H. Chase.
10. Report of Major R. Delafield.

.. ,, ·ti.fications 1aliicli liave been bui'lt on tlw Atlantic coast and Gu,if ef M exico, including tlwse nearly com,1>frt1·d 1111dt·1 th,• grurmt s.11stem, adopted aftrr tlw war wit/1, Great Britain, tlte number ·i n progress ef' construction, and tlw numbPr
11tJI ,I/ti t·om11um·etl 1mt proposed to be erected; and exltibiting also tlte States and Territories in wkicli tlte several /arts are sititated
,,. a re lo ht• 1ocall'd; 1chc1t tllC.1J were commenced, wlten completed, and wlten tlwy arc expected to be finislied; tlie garrisons rcqufred
.,'r>r rn ~·I, i11 Ii Ill<' '!l pea cl' and in war; tlie number and calibre ef the guns mounted or to be mounted; tlie estimated cost ef con,,~ rt.(( l1o11 and w ·mwncnt rl'spectively; tlw amount expended for construct1'on or repair; and an estimate ef tlie amount required to
'u wl, or cunslruct; and lite total amount requ,ired to be appropriated to complete tlte armament .
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Work~ nt Machias harbor, Mc* ................. .. ..
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Works at St. Gcorl?e's boy, Me* ................ )
Works at Damariscotta bay, lite• .... ...........
Works at llroad bay, Me* ...... .. . • . . .. • .. . • .. • • ·
Works at Shcepscot hay, Ille• ..... . ........... .
Works in lloA Jsland channel, Portland, Mc* ...... ..
Works al mouth of Saco river, Me* ...... . ......
Works at mouth of Kennebunk river, life* ...... , ..
Works at York, Me* .......... ................ J
Works at Newburyport, l\Inss• .••.•.•••••..••..•• , •
WorkH at Beverly, lllasb• .. .. .. • .. .. • ......... • ..
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3:J. Fort nt Wilkins's l'oint, East river, N. Y* ..........
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34. Redoubt in iulvnn~e of fort Tompkins, Staten
35.
36.
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48.
49.
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t52,000 ... . .. .. ..
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'Fort nt Dcluwnro brrakwater, Lewes, Del* .•...•... I, 125
f600,000 .. ..
Fort op1wsito l!'ort Delaware, Delaware river,
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521,000
..
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Del* ..........••... .•...• . •••••••••••.•••......
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169
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Fort on Elk rivrr, Md .. ......................... ... .
.... 376,000
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Fort on Hawkins's Point, lielow Baltimore, Md* .•••
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f246,000
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tl80,0UO
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.... 180,000
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250 ... ,
··
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Works at Stone sour1d, .S. C*. .. .. . . • . • • • .. .. • . ~
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Works at Tampa bay, Fla* .............. , ..... . I
Works at Apalachicola bay, Fla* .•.••.•••••.•• ·
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Works at Apalachie bay, Fla* ...•• ,...... . • • • • . • ·
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173,550

225

26

23,140
200,250

112
25
131
87
110
87
40
50

99,680
22,250
l L6,5!JO
77,430
97,900
77,430
35,600
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* Expected to be completed within about one year after the amounts required to complete shall have been appropriated.
t These estimates are conjectural.
j: Works have been projected for these positions,
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MILITARY .AND NAVAL DEFENCES.
GENERAL REMARKS.

In estimatipg for peace garrisons, it is considered disad,,antageous to discipline to break up the companies
when it can hll avoided. Several works are reckoned as requiring peace garrisons, though they will not, at
our present rate of progress, be prepared for troops for some years. Some of these garrisons might, on an
emergency, be _reduced for a time; but the force proposed -should be regarded generally as the minimum proper
to secure our ports from insult and keep watch over the military property, _The garrisons, as· stated, amount
to forty-seven and a half companies for the Atlantic and Gulf seaboard, independent of Tampa Bay and the
eity of New Orleans.
The works that have been under repair of class .A, and those of class B, may all be regarded as completed as
respects efficiency. The expenditures still required have relation, most generally, to matters of accommodation
of troops, to storehouses, sea walls, wharves, and roads; to repairs of perishable portions; to the substitution
of permanent for certain decaying. materials ; to preservation of sites from the action of the sea, &.c.
The amounts given in the column under the head of expended for construction or repair, include all the appropriations heretofore made, In some cases balances of these appropriations remain, and are in course of
.expenditure.
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Class A.-Old works repaired •••••••••••••••.••••••••• ~..........
Class B.-New works completed or nearly completed..............
Class C. -Works now under construction •.••••.••••••••••••• _....
Class D.-Works the first _to be commenced.......................
Class E.-Works to be commenced after those in cJass D·. •••••• ••••
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2,235,000
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$688,396
435,500
5,028,194
4,083,000
2,235,000

1,852
2,720
1,521
1,413
778

$1,719, 126
2,332,904
1,364,351
1,249,064
653,436

12,470,090

8,284

7,318,881
2,899,305

----------------- - - - - ------

Amount still required for armament of the first five classes •• ,•••••• ,_ ••••••. , . - ••• - ••••• - ,- •••• - •••••. ,••••••••••• - , •••••••• --4~ 428, 576

22,900 ·, 11,829,000

11,829,000
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Deduct value of ordnance and ammunition now on hand ••••

4,401

3,916,490

Grandtotal •••••••••••••••••••••·••••••••••••• I 47½ j 62,300 j 44,958,626 j 20,659,536 j 24,299,Q90 j 12,685

8,345,066

Class F.-Works to be commenced last of all •••••••••••••••••••••
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B.-NORTIIERN FRONTIER

ts!).

t,!)

·nocr qi.fortifications wliicl1, ltm,e been built, including tlwse neat·ly completed under tlie general system, adopted
it/1 Great Britain, tlie number in progress ef construction, and the number not yet commenced, but proposed to be
hihiti11g, also, the States and Territories in which the several forts are situated, or are to be located J. wken they were
nerd, when completed, and wlien tliey are expected to be.finished; the number and calibre ef the guns mounted or to be mountthnated ~ost qf construction and armament, respectively; the amount expended for construction or repair, and an estimate
amount requzre,l tofinisli or construct; and the total amount required to be appropriated to complete the armament.
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2. Fort Mn<·kinnc1 Michigan• .•••.•..••• .
3. Fort Grntiot, l\'1ichi11an* .•••.•........
<l. New Fort Durruoks, nr. Detroit,Mich,*
5. Workti nt Oufl:110, including Fort Por.
ter, Nt•w York• . ............... .
6. Repnir of old Pon Ninllorn, N cw York"
7, Rcpnir of old Fort Ontario, New York*
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Statement of tlic cannon and carriages at tlie forts and at the arsenals.
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Fort Columbus, NcwYork-------28
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Fort Mifflin, Pennsylvania _______ .
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Fort McHenry, Maryland _________ 19
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80 1------1---5
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Fort Moultrie, South Carolina ________ _
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Castle Pinckney, South Carolina._. 4
Fort Sumter, South Carolina.·---·· ---10
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Fort McRee, Florida •••••••••• __ •• 24
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Fort Ontario, New York.--------- ___ _
Battery Hudson, Staten island, N. Y. ____
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C.-Statement of tlie cannon and carriages at tlte fo·rts, ~.-Uontinued.
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MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

D.
Report

ef General J.

G. Totten.

November 1, 1851.
to present
my views and opinions on the subject embraced in the first of the resolutions
adopted by the House of Representatives on the 3d March last in relation to
the permanent fortifications of the country.
I shall successively take up the points which you have made particular subjects
of inquiry, though I foresee that I may need your indulgence for some time, using
a rather broad license in connecting them with collateral topics. I hope, also,
to have your indulgence for occasionally quoting from a report on national defence, made by a board of officers to the Secretary of War on the 10th of May,
1840. I have the less hesitation in thus quoting since that report was written
by myself, and its statements and opinions have been confirmed by all my subsequent meditation on the subject. As I shall, however, repeat herein a part
only of what is therein set forth, and as that report goes into a pretty full discussion of the whole subject, and was concurred in by several experienced
officers, whose countenance and support gives to it, indeed, all its authority, I
would respectfully urge the whole report upon your attention. It is to be found
in House Document No. 206, 1st session 26th Congress.
The remarks made by Mr. Secretary Poinsett, when laying the report before
Congress, as given in the same document, seem to me worthy of full consideration.
I do not consider it necessary to urge the point that wars may again visit us,
and wars moreover with powerful nations. All the questions of the Secret~-y
assume this as a possibility at least, as do the resolutions of OongreEs calling
for this inquiry. How much soever a nation may love peace, and however well
disposed to preserve it by moderation, justice, and impartiality, it is not les true
now than it ever has been that the interests and honor of nations cannot alway"
be made to run in parallel courses, and that jostling and interference are the
more apt to occur where there is the closer proximity by position or by the relations of trade and business.
Within the last :fifteen years four or :five times has this country, owing to
some question suddenly rising into importance, been surprised to find it. elf on
the very verge of war with the most powerful nations of the earth. And the
latent spirit, not to say belligerent, aptitude on either side, has not alway been
quite satisfied that the concessions made for peace have not purcba ed it at too
high a price. The point of honor will always, when really touched, a it e_ver
has done, keep with nations as with men, the poh1t of interest in subject1?n.
And a hackneyed adage shows that it is ever deemed not less important ~nth
nation than with men that there should at all time be obvious preparation and
r adine to d fi nd both honor and intere t. It is, therefore, notwitb tandin!r
certain th ori of the day and public d claration..,, that the aO'e of trife and
warfare ha pa.:cd away, only r asonable and prudent to a sume that a ' .
of war may xi t, and to inquire in what way a powerful enemy may ·a!!e
aO'a_in t u.. H may do o1. By attackinl>' ur ommercc and navigation upon the ocean. A.-:. h wv r, n military pr aration nth h r can avert tbi danger, and them ::
of me tin()' it mu t
I ur ly naYal, th
mean do not now fall under c n,· ·
ration; r,
2. By a sailing ome one or m r imp rtant point or point of the co m
WASHINGTON,
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a large military and naval force, with a view to immediate damage or more or less
protracted occupation; or,
.
.
3. By suddenly appearing with a large squadron of vessels b_efore our p~mcipal commercial cities, laying them under contribution, and burnmg or ~arrymg
off the shipping, and by making powerful attacks upon our navy yards m order
to destroy those establishments ; or,
4. By attacks upon smaller towns and establishments of the coast with small
squadrons or single vessels, or with privateers, capturing the shipping therein,
and levying contributions, and by like means intercepting the interior commerce
within the bays, sounds, and estuaries of the coast ; these lesser enterprises being
often conducted under the countenance and support of considerable fleets.
The danger may take any of these forms, or all of them. And against any
or all of these a naval force of equal or greater strength, if it could with any
certainty be found at hand, might be an adequate resort, though it would not be
the most economical. But, in the first place, we are yet and shall be for years
inferior in our naval preparation to nations with which we are likely to be in
conflict; and next, if we were even far superior, it would be impossible to have,
at each of the points to be guarded, a naval force sufficient to secure it, because
a hostile squadron of twenty or thirty sail of the line and war steamers, would
fall with equal ease on either of the important points, and could with no more
certainty be expected at one than at another; so that, to resist successfully, we
must be ready at each and all, with a force not less than that of the enemy; if
less, an unavailing resistance would but augment the calamitous consequences.
An enemy's squadron, assembled at Halifax or Bermuda, must be equally
looked for at every important point from the Penobscot to New Orleans, inclusive, for it could with equal ease fall upon either. The same would be true,
moreover, of such a force assembled in any Atlantic port of Europe.
Having seen the modes in which we may be assailed, and that no navy we
are likely to possess can supply the requisite guarantees, the first question of
the Secretary of War leads us to inquire, to what extent we may be aided by
our numerous and multiplying railroads. This question is in the following
words :
. How far the invention and extension ef railroads have superseded or dimin- _
ished tlie necessity ef fortifications on the seaboard ?
If there are cases in which fortifications will be aided by these roads-cases
in which works of less strength and efficiency may be relied on, because such
aid can b e afforded in moments of need-there are many others in which any
such aid as they could supply would be useless, and many also to which railroad can have no application.
In very rare cases, a fort lying near existing or probable railroads may also
occupy a _position exposing it to a besieging army. In such a case, undoubtedly, a railroad would have a direct influence; and the strength and cost of the
fort would of course be materially lessened, in consequence of the rapidity with
which the railroad would bring succor.
.In most cases, however, forts are not liable to a siege, nor to any attack that
will keep a~ enemy more than a few hours before them ; they are required, by
su~den action, to defend the passage of a river or a channel leading to important
ohJect ; or to prevent an enemy's squadron fr9m seizing, or cannonading, or
bombarding ships, navy yards, cities, &c., duties to be accomplished only by
h:3-vy artille:y in it~ various forms. The question whether the various forms
o~ heavy artll!ery will. be better placed for this purpose within forts or v~ssels,
will be exam11:ed hereafter; but that this artillery, however arranged, !s t~e
only effectual mstrument of defence, admits no doubt. This artillery bemg m
ad_ef1uate numbers, properly placed, sufficiently manned, out of the rea~~ of
~e1~e by the enemy, and too powerful to be silenced by him-all cond1t1~ns
indispensable, whether in communication with railroads or not-is prepared with
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all useful accessories and ready for its great functions, independent of any aid
to be supplied from without.
It happens, moreover, that few of the points necessarily occupied for this
defence are so situated as to be benefited .by railroads, unless the latter be constructed with the exclusive purpose of communicating with them ; and some are
wholly unapproachable by such means, were they ever so necessary.
As it is undoubtedly true that these communications, even as they now exist,
may bring with much rapidity militia and volunteers from the interior, and from
lateral sources, to many points of the coast, it may be worth while to examine a
little more in detail, whether such use could be made of these superadded numbers as to justify dependence on them for defence against a powerful enemy.
Suppose a hostile fleet to be in front of the city of New York, which nothing
would prevent if the channels of approach were not fortified ; in what way could
the 100,000 or 200,000 new men poured into the city and environs by railroads,
although armed with muskets and field-pieces, aid the half million of people
already there 1 It seems to me very clear that these additional forces would,
like the population proper of the city, be utterly powerless in the way of resistance, with any means at their command; and if resistance were attempted by
the city, would but serve to swell the list of casualties, unless they should at
once retreat beyond the range of fire. If the enemy's expedition were intended,
according to the second supposed mode of attack, for invasion or occupation f?r
some time, of a portion of the country, then in many places this resource of railroad~ would be of value ; because then the duty of defence would fall upon t~e
army and militia of the country; and these communications would swell their
numbers.
But of all the circumstances of danger to the coast, this chance of an attempt
by an enemy to land and march any distance into a populous district,. is_ lea t_ to
be regarded, whether there be or be not such speedy mode of receivmg remforcements, and our system of fortifications has little to do with any such danger.
In preparing ag·ainst maritime assaults the security of the points to be covered
is considered to be greatly augmented, whenever the defence can be so arran~ed
as to oblige an enemy to land at some distance; for the reason that opporturuty
is thereby allowed, in the only possible way, for the spirit and enterpri e of the
people to come into play.
Instead of being designed to prevent a landing upon any part of the coa t, a·
many seem to suppose, and some to allege in proof of extravagant view on the
part of the system of defence, the system often leaves this landing a an open
alternative to the enemy, and aims so to cover the really important and dangerou.s
points as to necessitate a distant landing and a march toward the object tb:·ou~h
th~ people. It is because the expedition would otherwise ea ily accompl:t:h it:
obJ ct, without landing and without allowing the population to partake m the
d fence, that the fortifications are resorted to. For in tance, without F ort Delaware, or some other fort low down in Delaware bay, an enemy could place hi5
fl t of steamers in front of Philadelphia by the time hi appearanc on ~the
coa t had b en well announced throughout the city. And in pit~ of. all - e
J r · y, lawar , and lower Pennsylvania he could levy hi contribution:-_ an
burn th n vy yard hipping, and be away in a few hour . But bein 17 l,h~
by the f~rt above mention d, to land full forty miles b low the city, the _r '.' ·
an to _h1 march may b a£ ly left to the courage and patrioti m that will tin
am1Jle ~ime to an:ay ~hem Ive in ppo ition.
.
d1 ·t nt landmg 1 d m d t b a gr at advantag to the defenc m
ca: ; and in p ul u cli ·ti-i t , if the fi rts be uffici nt for th" particular duty.
it make the ecuri y compl t .
. k a um d by the y tern of fortification.: t I · no part of th
a 00 nin t th invasi n and pr r t
cup ti n f c w 11-p pled di. trict, r
a p int ar und which the£ r
of th country ould be oon ralli d. In '
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attempts railroads would accellerate the issues ; but even the common modes of
conveyance would soon bring forces enough to overwhelm them.
But there are places important in themselves, or necessary to the general
welfare, that have not the advantage of a large population at hand or within
call, and which may nevertheless be very tempting objects to an enterprising
enemy. The navy yard at Pensacola will, for instance, in time of war, be of
infinite value in reference to the commerce of the Gulf of Mexico. Its destruction would therefore be a great object with a maritime enemy, and it has ac?ord- ..·
ingly been so fortified as to be safe from a coup de main, or, at any rate, will be· .
so when the little remaining to do is complete. A hostile expedition adequ~te
to the reduction of these defences would, however, be able to exclude all rehef
approaching laterally from the Mississippi, and there is no help to be supplied
from the neighborhood, and none but very tardy succor to come from the interior; so that an enemy would find time to reduce the forts established on the
islands at the mouth of the bay.
This case illustrates one aspect of the influence of railroads on the coast defence of the United States. While there is no such road by which succor can
come from the interior, the security of the harbor and navy yard of Pensacola
must depend wholly on the strength and state of readiness of the defences, naval
and military, at the mouth of the harbor, there being no neighboring population;
and these defences will be liable to a somewhat prolonged as well as powerful
attack, giving time for sieges of several days duration.
With a railroad extending into the interior of Alabama, an attacking force,
though large, would have to confine itself to comparatively brief and hurried
operations, even though a short siege may be considered out of the question.
But although such a railroad were made, a sudden onslaught would suffice for
the destruction of the naval establishments (if there were no fortification) whenever the attacking naval force were larger than that which might be present for
defence; that is to say, whenever we had not a large squadron present. As
before said, the railroad can supply none of the means of resisting such attacks.
Without fortifications no existing or projected railroad would do anything
towards the protection of New Orleans against a squadron of armed steamers;
and not more could such communications do for Mobile or for the hundreds of
large vessels that lie in the mouth of Mobile bay awaiting cargoes. There are,
~oreover, very great points in our system of sea-coast defence that derive their
unportance much more from their general relation to and bearing on general
commerce and the security of large portions of the coast than from local interesL Narraganset road, Delaware Breakwater harbor, Hampton road, Cumberland sound, (Georgia,) Key West, and the Tortugas, are points of this
character; and neither of these would derive material aid from any existing or
prob~ble i-ailroad communications. It is proper here to say something of these
relations.
Xarraganset bay.-As a harbor this is acknowledged by all to be the best
on the whole coast of the United States, and it is the only close man-of-war
h~rbor that is accessible with a northwest wind, the prevailing and most violent
wmd of the inclement season. Numerous boards and commissions-sometimes
compo~ed of naval officers, sometimes of army officers, sometimes of officers of
both ervices-have at different times had the subject of this roadstead under
Cvnsideration, and all have concurred in recommending in strong terms that it
be made a place of naval rendezvous and repair, if not a great naval depotone_~r more ~f these commissions preferring it for the latter purpose t_o all other
po~inons. 'Ihese recommendations have not been acted on, but it 1s next to
certain that a war would force their adoption upon the government. With the
<Jpenina- of this anchorage properly defended, hardly a vessel-of-war ?f ours
crJuld come, either singly or in small squadrons, upon the coast in the boi~terous
eea..."On without arming at this port, on account of the comparative certamty of
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an immediate entrance; and this would be particularly the case with vessels
injured by heavy weather, or in conflict with an enemy-with vessels bringing
in prizes, or_pursued by a superior force.
The use of the port would almost necessarily bring with it the demand for
the means of repairing and refitting ; and the concentration of these upon some
suitable spot would be the beginning of a permanent dock yard.
For the same reason that ships-of-war would collect here, it would be a favorite
point of rendezvous for privateers and their prizes, and a common place of refuge
for merchantmen.
From this, as a naval station, the navigation of Long Island sound and the
communication between this and Martha's Vineyard sound or Buzzard's bay
might be well protected; New London harbor would be covered; this navy
yard would command southwardly, as that from Hampton roads northwardly,
the great inward curve of the coast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras, the
influence of which command over the blockading operations of an enemy will
be apparent when it is considered that the only harbors of refuge left to him
will be the Delaware, Gardiner's, and Buz?Ard's bays and Martha's Vineyard
sound.
'The bays just mentioned belong to the class which, being too wide for complete defence by batteries, must call in such auxiliary defence as the navy may
sup'p ly; and, in reference to their defence by these means, nothing can be more
important than the fortifications of N arraganset roads, because all but Delaware
bay, including an anchorage for ships-of-war under Block island, would be commanded by a single squadron of those floating defences lying in these _road~.
To a squadron of steam batteries, for instance, lying under the fortifications, it
would be a matter of little consequence into which of the above anchorag~ ~
enemy should go, all being within reach of three or four hours, and some Wit~
sight. We will here observe, by the way, that this use of floating defence" 13
in accordance with the principle before insisted on. They are not expected to
close the entrance into these several bays-that would require a squad.Ton for
each at least equal to the enemy's ; but as the enemy goes in merely for re tor
sh elter, and there is no object that he can injure, he may be permitted to enter,
and our squadrons will assail him only when the circumstances of wind, weather,
&c., give all the advantages t.o the attack. The fortification of Narraganse:
roads is, therefore, in effect, a most important contribution towards the d~ence
of all the neighboring anchorages. But the same properties that make l\arraganset roads so precious to us would recommend them to the enemy also, and
their natural advantages will be enhanced in his eyes by the value of all the
obj ects the e advantages may have accumulated therein.
If this roadstead were without defence, an enemy could occupy it withon·
oppo ition, and by the aid of naval superiority form a lodgment on the ish~d
o~ Rhode I land for the war. Occupying this i land with his troop , and mth
h1 fl ct the channels on either side, he might defy all the force of the ea-:t~rn
St t ; and while from thi. po ition hi troop would keep in alarm and mrtio..
th population of the ea t, feigned expeditions again t New York or again t mo
outh rn cities would qually alarm the country in that direction; aud th ;,
thotwh h might do no mor than menace, it is difficult to e timate the em
ra .. m nt and xp n into which he would drive th government.
t ha b n alleg that ..imilar con equencc would flow from the occupa
of oth r po.·iti n , ( u h f r in. tance a ru· afford d in the bay ju t mention ·
an 1 th, t th r for th d fi•n · , in a trong manner, of . . arrao-an et r ad-. i, - 1 . Ev ·n all wino- that th r ar oth r inacce ible po ition. wh r n
en my mio-ht place l1imH lf'. i it a r a on, h cau~c the foe can, in pit• o ·
I .· . him. If of omp, rativ ly un,af and open har ors that we houl
apply to our own u. , but yi l l u to him the very bet harb r on th c - ·
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that we should submit to capture and destruction the valuable objects that accumulate in consequence of the properties of the har?or 1
.
But it is believed that none of the outer and wider harbors will answer for
s11ch a n establishment as we have supposed, nor for any other purpose than an
occasional anchorage for ships-of-war, and for these reasons, among others : that
although ships-of-war might possibly ride in these broad waters at all seaso~s,
it would seem to be a measure of great temerity for transpo!ts to attempt _it,
ex.cept in the mildest seasons; and there can be but little douDt tha~ a hostile
ex:pedition would resort to no harbor as a place of rendezvous, unless_it affor~ed
sure pr otection to its transports, these being the only means by which ultenor
purposes could be executed, or final retreat from the country effected.
If, moreover, Narraganset roads became a naval station, or at least the sta~ion
of a floating force designed to act against these outer waters, such an estabh~hrnent by an enemy on other positions would at once be _put upon the defensive
aitd require the constant presence of a superior fleet, thus measurably losing the
object of the establishment. Independent of deficient qualities as harbors, however, none of these bays would answer our purposes: :First, because they cannot be securely defended; and second, because they are difficult of access from
the main, the communication with them being liable to interruption by bad
weather, and liable to be cut off by the enemy.
I t seems quite evident that the circumstances involved in the occupation and
defence of Narraganset roads will not be materially changed by the facilities of
railroad communications; so far as numbers can aid in defensive arrangements
they could be supplied in due time and to the extent needed, by the surrounding
district and common modes of conveyance.
D elaware Breakwater Jwrbor.-In the long stretch of coast between New
York bay and the Chesapeake, a distance of about three hundred miles, there is
no other entrance from the ocean (except for small vessels) than that at the
mouth of Delaware bay. This circumstance led the commercial men of the
country to call, with great unanimity and earnestnes~, for the creation at this
place, w hich was without a safe anchorage and was full of dangerous shoals, of
an artificial harbor. This call had reference mainly, it is true, to protection in
stres of weather; but for the same reason, namely, the great distance on either
hand to any place of shelter, it must become a place of refuge from an enemy.
Ves els near that coast, whether bound north or south, will be liable to be cut
ojf from other refuge and forced into this only entrance ; and vessels bound up
the Delaware must seek it, of course; so that as this artificial harbor provided
by the government must be resorted to in time of war for security of both
klnd , thereby becoming a place of rendezvous, it will be an attractive point for
an. enemy. It would, moreover, since it now yields a safe anchorage, most certainly become the habitual resort of an enemy's vessel cruising on this coast, in
order to command the great channel of commerce that sweeps in near these capes.
'These considerations show the necessity of defending this harbor, and its
ecure defence would afford the further great advantage of providing a port
Whence our cruisers, whether steam or sail vessels, might keep watch over this
ame channel of commerce whenever they were not confined within the defences
by the actual presence of a superior enemy.
Thi. case also is one in which the obj ects in view do not depend on the use
of railroad~; they can all be achieved without such aid. And it is also a case
ill hich railroads of themselves would do nothing, and in which nothing could
be i.~p ·n ·ed with because of their existence. If the enemy landing an army
°\\'ere to lay siege to a fort on the shore side of the harbor, then a railroad would
certainly be u eful in expediting the arrival of succor. But though an enemy
"'ould certainly use this harbor for the purposes above stated, if it were not defm cd, it is not to be supposed that for the conquest of these advantages he
\liould bring a great land expedition that might find much richer booty else-
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where. Forts capable of resisting a coup de main would no doubt, therefore,
fulfil their purpose and be respected, and accordingly no siege is to be anticipated, and any auxiliary force that great caution might demand could be easily
and speedily forwarded by the numerous and fast steamers on the bay.
Hampton roads and Chesapeake bay.-The board of naval officers and
engineers intrusted with the selection of sites for a great northern and a great
-iouthern naval depot, recommended, in their joint reports of 1819 and 1820,
i3urwell's bay, on James river for the one, and Charlestown, in Boston harbor,
for the other. 'l'hey also recommended Boston harbor and Narraganset bay at
the north, and Hampton roads at the south, as chief naval rendezvous. In these
reports the commissioners entered at large into the consideration of all the matters relating to these important objects, and reference is now made to those
reports for many interesting details.
Such an expansion has, however, since then been given to the present navy
yard at Gosport, (opposite Norfolk,) that there is little probability of any other
position on these waters being occupied for such purposes.
The great importance of retaining Hampton roads during a war, and of covering the navy yard, is conceded on all hands. But the bearing of this harbor
upon the general defence of Chesapeake bay is not generally understood.
Being the great naval depot station and rendezvous of the southern coast, it
may be safely assumed that this harbor, during war, will never be without a
number of ships-of-war, some ready for sea, others just returned from sea, ang.
others held in condition to be suddenly despatched. '.rhis being so, should an
enemy with a small or moderate force venture up Chesapeake bay, with designs
upon any of the rivers, harbors or towns, his capture would be inevitable by the
squadrons of sailing and steaming vessels issuing upon his rear from Hampton
roads. This certain result would keep back any enemy from any such predatory venture. If, then, we provide adequate defences for the more important
places upon the bay and its tributaries, there will remain no temptation to large
expeditions, and the peace~i0f this wide-spread navigable water and the safety
of the great amount of business and commerce traversing it in all direction"
will be secured. Thus, by covering the anchorage of our squadron, the defence
of Hampton roads become to a most important extent the defences of all the
upper waters.
The following very important relation existing between the defences of Hampton roads and the security of both Norfolk and the navy yard, independent of
closing the channel to those places, is also not generally understood, and ha5
been overlooked by cities.
If we suppose no defences at the mouth of the roadstead, or only such a can
be di regarded or easily silenced, an enemy might debark his troops in Lynnhaven bay and despatch them against N 01folk, while his fleet would pas up the
harbor to the vicinity of the town, not only covering the flank of hi troop5,
but landing parties to turn any position that might be taken by the army a_·
tempting to defend the place; or, instead of landing in the bay, he miO'ht, at hiE
opti n, land the main body quite near to No1folk, and having po se ion of Jam 5
riv r, he would prevent the arrival of any succor in steamboats or otherwise by
that channel.
' h r ar two or thr e d fil s on the route from Lynnhaven bay to orfolk
cau ·
by th inter! king of tream , that with the aid of field-works
nl
po. ... o-r at ,.tr ue-th; and b ino- occupied in ucce ion, would undoub
d la if n t r ul. , n n my a ailing them in front.
ince th naval d
m," fix d a 1 o:p rt, th ~ mu. t in e cl be chi fly r Ii d on for it~
nriry
fr m land atta k , nd tim ly a t nti n mu t
giv n on the br akin~ on
war, to the occu ·inll" of th ~
fil with appr priate defi nces. Th . .
ti n: h wev r, p
· n valu wha v r if th y can be turned; and
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no security for Norfolk or the navy yard, except in the presence of a large
.
military force.
On the completion of the defences at the mouth of Hampton roads, _the circumstances will be very different. Then those defiles must be attacked m front,
because no part of the enemy's force can be landed above the mouth of the
roads. But this is not all. The moment an enemy advances towards Norfolk
from this point of debarkation, his communication with his fleet wHl be jeoparded; because, as the defiles do not require a large body to defend them
against an attack in front, the greater part of the reinforcements arriving from
above by way of the river may be landed upon his flanks or in his rear. An
offensive land movement by the enemy, under such circumstances, could be justified only in the case of his finding an entire want of preparation caused by
the unexpected commencement of hostilities. In connexion with this disposition
for defence, it may be expedient on the breaking out of a war, to throw up a
field-work on the shore opposite the position of Fort Calhoun, which would
besides contribute to the exclusion from the roadstead of vessels of small draught.
The above rema~:ks show that the fortifications in progress are not less necessary to the security of the navy yard and the city of Norfork from a land attack
than from an attack by water; and that both these important functions are superse:ied to the task of defending the only good roadstead of the southern coast,
and of contributing in a very important degree towards the defence of the
Chesapeake bay.
As in the case of Narraganset roads, it has been objected to this system of
defence, that although it may shut up this anchorage, it leaves others in this
region open. May we suppose, then, that if there were no other than this harbor, its defence would be justifiable 1 If so, it would seem that the objection
re ts on the principle that, in proportion as nature has been bountiful to us, we
must be niggardly to ourselves; that having little, we may cherish it; but having
much, we must throw all away.
The same criticism complains of the unreasonable magnitude of one of these
work , (Fort Monroe,) and it is conceded that there is justice in the criticism.
But it has long been too late to remedy the evil. It may not, however, be improper to avail of this opportunity to remove from the country the professional
reproach attached to this error. When the system of coast defence was about
t.o be taken up, it was thought best by the government and Congress to call
from abroad a portion of that skill and science which a long course of active
warfare was supposed to have supplied. Fort Monroe is one of the results of
that determination. It was not easy, probably, to come down from the exaggerated scale of warfare to which Europe was then accustomed; nor for those
who had been brought up where wars were often produced and always magnified_by juxtaposition or proximity, to realize to what degree remoteness from
belligerent nations might diminish military means and qualify military objects.
Certain it is, that this experiment, costly as it was in the case of Fort Monroe,
would have been much more so but for the opposition of some whose more
moderate opinions had been moulded by the circumstances and wants of our own
country.
The mistake is one relating to magnitude, however, not to strength. Magni~de in fortification is often a measure of strength, but not always, nor in this
mstance. Fort Monroe might have been as strong as it is now against a water
attack, or an assault, or a siege, with one-third its present capacity, and perhaps
a not more than half its cost. I do not think this work too strong for its posi·on, nor too heavily armed; and as the force of the garrison will depend mainly
on the extent of the armament, the error which has caused an excess in the first
o tlay will not involve much useless expense after completion.
The railroad coming down from the interior of the country to Norfolk navy
yard might unquestionably render service in bringing forward troops in the
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event of a powerful and persevering land attack on the defences of Norfolk and
the navy yard, and in like manner useful reinforcements might arrive rapidly in
the steamers of James river. But we have seen that without the defences at
the mouth of the roads there would be no time nor opportunity for any such
force to arrive, or to act when arrived. The enemy would proceed from sea
directly up to his object, and need not necessarily lose a tide nor land a man.
If a sudden attack with a large squadron of armed steamers-for this great
naval depot presents an object worthy of a great expedition-is to be repelled,
it will not be by crowds of volunteers rushing in from the country with muskets
and rifles on their shoulders, but by fortifications of some sort, or by naval
means ; and if by the latter, by a force not materially less than the enemy's.
Cumberland sou?J,d, at the moutli ef St. Mary's river.-It is an important
principle, bearing peculiarly on the defence of the whole southern coast, that
. on a shore possessing few harbors it is at the same time more necessary to preserve them all for our own use, and more easy to deprive an enemy of that
shelter without which a close blockade cannot be maintained. r.rhis principle
is enforced in the instance of our southern coast by the two following weighty
considerations, viz : first, its remoteness from the naval rendezvous, the Chesapeake, which is, on a mean, six hundred miles distant, and to leeward both as
to wind and current; and second, its being close upon the larboard hand as they
enter the Atlantic of the great concourse of vessels passing at all seasons
through the Florida channel. While, therefore, this part of the coast, from the
concentration of vessels here, is in great need of protection of some sort, naval
aid can be extended to it only with difficulty, and at the risk of being cut off
from all retreat by a superior enemy.
.
All the harbors accessible to vessels-of-war on this part of the coast will
sooner or later need defences, because otherwise they will be seized by an
en emy, in order, for one thing, to paralyze the valnabJo commerce that circulates within the rivers, sounds, and internal lateral com munications. The products of a considerable portion of Georgia find outlet only by these channel ·
P erhaps it may require a war to demonstrate the necessity and advantage of
such protection; but there are reasons already alluded to, and of much weight,
for securing the mouth of Cumberland sound at any rate, independent of those
just mentioned. One of these is particularly important, namely, the situatio~ of
this point with respect to the commerce flowing t hrough the Gulf of Mexico.
E very vessel bound northward from the Gulf must pass close up by Cape Canaveral before she can bear away clear of the Matinilla reef, and hence two ?r
three cruisers may take such positions at this outlet that all passing ve sel will
be seen. While we occupy Cumberland sound our own steaming or ailinO'
crui ers can hold these posts p ermanently and fearlessly, assured of a place of
refuge from a superior enemy .
Wh n th e best and deepest of th ese Georgia entrances shall be fortified, the
op ration of investing the coa t and watching the great outlet of commerce
through the Florida pa age will be a difficult and hazardous one to an enemy,
to whom no per everance or kill can avail to maintain a continuou blockade,
while on the part of our mall ve el -of-war, steam f:rio-ate , and private rs. rhe
am ort of upervi ion will be at all tim sea y and afe. In the meantime
th fi rtification of Cumb rland ound alone will nable u , with the h Jp of a
floatiuo- for c, to prot ct th wh 1 of thi part of th coa t from all mall xp
diti n , and t hara. and di turb the op ration of larg r one , without endang rino- th .. fi•ty of ur wn mi. r .
Thi ound wa
cupi cl y th Br:iti h during th war of 1 12 and nm·
rland i.Jand mad h ad 1uart r ·, a gr at ollat ral urpo. b ing a· it wou1
o-ain b , to xcit th lav to in.:un-, ·tion, if po ibl at 1 a ·t to d
n.
railr ad now ·i..,t t iuflu n
in any way th
curity of thi:- hnr r
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n talked of, whi ·h would greatly nhan
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the value of defences on the Georgia coast, and especially those of Cumberland
..,ound.
.
··
l
Key West and the Tortugas.-These are th~ :fir_st important pos1t10~s t iat
present themselves on doubling round Cape Flonda n~to the Gulf of Mexico.
Strong opinions have been several times expressed m favor of these :fine harbors, and I beg leave particularly to refer to a letter from Commodore Rodg~rs
to the Secretary of the Navy, July 3, 1829, (Senate documents, 1st session
21st Congress, vol. I, No. 1, page 236,) and letter f:om the Secretary of the
X avy, :March 25, 1830, (Senate documents, 1st sess10n 21st Congress, vol. II,
X o.111,pagel.)
. .
.
A naval force designed to control the nav1gat10n of the Gulf could desi~e no
better position than Key West or the Tortugas. Upon t~e very wayside of
the only path through the Gulf, it is at the same time well s1t~ated as to all the
great points therein. It overlooks Havana, Pensacola, Mobile, the mouths of
the :Mississippi, and both the inlet and the outlet of the Gulf.
The Tortugas harbor and that of Key West affords perfect shelter for vessels
of every class, with the greatest facility of ingress and egress. And there can
be no doubt that an adversary in possession of large naval means would with
great ad vantage make them his habitual resort and his point of general rendez,ous and concentration for all operations on this sea. With an enemy thus
posted, the navigation of the Gulf by us would be eminently hazardous, if not
impossible, and nothing but absolute naval superiority would avail anything
against him. Mere military means could approach no nearer than the nearest
shore of the continent. rrhere are no harbors in the Gulf at all comparable
with these that an enemy could resort to with his large vessels. To deprive
him of these would, therefore, be interfering materially with any organized system of naval operations in this sea. The defence of these harbors would, however, do much more than this. It would secure to our own squadron, even
should it be inferior, the use of these most valuable positions, and would afford
a poin t of refuge to our navy and our commerce at the very spot where it would
be most necessary and useful.
I fo rbear to enlarge on this point, merely adding that certain and complete
defence will be easily secured, and that we shall thereby possess ports of refuge
in the middle of the Gulf whenever we have to fly, and points of rendezvous
and r efreshment in the very midst of all passing vessels whenever we hold the
ma:c:tery. Every vessel that crosses the Gulf of Mexico passes within sight of
the two forts commenced under the sanction· of Congress and now in progress,
one at Tortugas, and one at Key West.
It is n eedless to say that with the possession of these advanced posts, and
with t he control of the commerce of the Gulf thereby insured, no railroads upon
the m ain can have any relation. rrhe forts must rely solely on their own efficiency an d power of resistance. Happily the local circumstances allow these
condition s to be easily secured.
I could adduce many other illustrations of the truth of the assertions made in
the commencement of these remarks, that though occasional benefit will result
to the y. tem of fortification on the seaboard from the construction of railroads,
th ·y in general will have little or no bearing on the immediate means of defence.
Tl · ·e, whether they be forts or ships, must be put in a state of preparation and
keJ:Jt so by the use of means that railroads do not supply, or at least that can be
\n· l upplied without them.
~ -umerous and facile communications, whether by railroad or steamers, or
common road:1, arc important undoubtedly to the general activity and vigor of
\\-ar, whether offen ive or defensive; but it is as communications that they are useful, not a· bring of themselves instruments of warfare, or as supplying any that
can be sub ·titutcd for ships or forts.
H. Ex. Doc. 92--16

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

I ought here to advert to the idea often announced, though always vaguely
and in general terms, namely, that by the help of these railroads large bodies of
men may be thrown from the interior of the country upon the ,exposed points of
the coast, and there erect, and arm, and serve temporary batteries adequate to
repel any mari6me attack.
If we have waited for the opening of a war to do this, our enemy, who knows
the fact as well as we, will surely not allow time for the completion even of such
works as these. And in adopting this policy, we undertake to afford a prote~tion to the country in the first days and weeks of the war, that nations expenenced in warlike affairs have considered as hardly accomplished after year.., and
years of labor during peace.
In many important cases, the contemplated batteries could not be erect~d
hastily, because they would have to be supported by piling and grillage; and_ m
others, even the very sites would have to be raised out of the water. The mferiority in efficacy and equipment of such batteries, when erected, would have
to be compensated by an increased number of guns ; but in many instances, a
good defence could only be made in positions where there is not room for the
1·equisite number of guns, except by placing them tier above tier, an arrangement wholly inconsistent with sudden preparation.
But even if the sudden arrival of a number of men brought by railroad could
supply the want of duly-prepared batteries, there are important defensive pointil
to which railroads do not approach, and are not likely to approach. And it also
happens that wherever such railroads reach the coast, it is already peopled beyond all p_robable wants for laborers upon sea-coast batteries. ~If such bat;e~ies
were requned to be erected as speedily as possible at Boston, 1' ew York, I h1ladelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, 8avannah, &c., they could be much sooner and
better executed by calling in the laborers and mechanics of these cities, than by
r elying on the h eterogeneous aid of regim ents of volunteers and drafted militia.
The second question of the honorable Secretary is in these words : "In 1.r~at
manner and to wlzat extent tlie namgation ef the ocean by steam, and pa'.tzcu1arly the applfration ef steam to vessels-if-war and recent improvements marti"llery and otlwr military inventions and discoveries, affect tile question?"
.And the third question, which it will be convenient to consider in connexion
with the second, is in these words, namely : "IIow far ussels-qfwar, steambatteries, and ordinary merclwnt skips and steamers, and otlter temporary expedients, can be relied upon as a substitute for permanent fortifications for the
clrgence ef our large seaports ?"
'l'he application of team to vessels-of-war acts upon the question of sea-coa~t
defenc?, both beneficially and injuriously. It acts injuriously in several wa~~:
but chiefly, first, by the suddenness and surprise with which vm,sel may ia!l
upon th ir object, and pa from one object to another in pite of distance, chmat , and sea on; and secondly, by their ability to navigate hallow ,rater.: ..
. 'l'h fir "t property, hy which quadron; may ruu into our harbor ', out,tnppmg all waming. of their approach, afford.. 110 chance for impromptu pr<>pamtiou · ; accordi11gly, wliat ·vcr our pr 1wrations arc to be, they hould pr c rl the
var. It
m p:-u,t all bcli ·f tlrnt a nation havino- in commi::::::ion-as Franc£
an<l England alway::- lww-a laro-e numbn of w~~r- ·t am r · ready for di,tanl
1~v~ ·c i_n tw •Jlt ·-four hm~rfl, rcccivi1in- their ord ·r by t lcrr-ra1,h, c~1mbl £,f
umtmg m. Cfu·iclron ·, au~l m h't·o or thn'c day· at mo:-;t .;p di11g on their:- ,. ral
patht- to fall upon unclefencl<'d port:-it is not to b .·p ct d I ·ay, that tl1cy
h?uld d ·lay n ·h •nt ·rpri •. until t mporary r .'Ort· · ulcl b, ot r a«lJ· t _rr'lY th ru. And ' t tli r • am tho· who iu:-;i t that w
hould} •av d fo1Hv
·1te of ·n.r-thnt w ::h,,uld 1 ,t th da • . uppl · th n d.
, 11 uch mca. ur •. mu pr n·, th •r, woulcl not b tim t , rr 1 ° • ·v m th . <'. ] • the ·c 11d pr 'l' •rt • duo t th ir Jin-ht draw•l1t f • t r.
th ·c vei;. •ls , ·ill oLJj,.. th d ·f u · · t L · xt ud d in :::omc form to p ,,
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or channels, or shoals, that before were adequately gu:1.rded by their shallowness.
The bars at the mouth of th~ Mississippi formerly excluded all bu_t _small vesels-of-war, and the strong current of the river made the ascent of sailmg~vesse~s
exceedingly uncertain and tedious. Now these bars an_d ~urrents are 1mp~d1ments no longer; and all the armed steamers of Great Bntam and France m1g~t
be formed in array in face of the city of New Orleans, before a rumor of their
approach had been heard.
Had the English expedition of 1814, attended by a squadron of lar~e armed
steamers, arrived at the mouth of the Mississippi, a few transports might have
been taken in tow, and in a few hours the whole army would have been before
the city; or twelve or fifteen such eteamers could have carried the whole army
up in half a day, without the delay of transports. Will it be contended that
the attack in that form would have been repulsed with the means then in Gene ral Jackson's hands ? Would th~ landing, or even the presence on board these
steamships, of the British troops have been necessary to Lum the city or put it
under contFibution 1 Is there anything now but 'the existence of forts on the
river, to prevent the success of such an attack by fifteen or twenty steamers-ofwar, allured thither by the vastly increased magnitude of the spoil ?
But there would have been, even then and with those means, one reason with
the enemy for avoiding the channel of the river, namely, the existence, seventy
miles below New Orleans, of old Fort St. Philip. I will not venture to say
that in the then condition of that fort it could have repelled such an expedition,
though it did very manfully resist a protracted bombardment; but I do not
doubt tha.t the existence of even that feeble work would have had weight in
,_cttling the mode and channel of approach, and in turning off the attack into
<:ircuitous and tedious avenues, and thereby gaining some time, for preparation.
I am confident, however, that on the completion of the repairs to that work,
now well advanced, and on the completion of the exterior battery of l!'ort Jack:--on, (a new fort opposite,) no attack of that nature, . even of twice the force,
eould penetrate by that avenue to the city of New Orleans.
The use of war-steamers against New Orleans may take another phase. If
<leterred by the forts above mentioned from an attack by the river, an enemy
:might again take the anchorage off Ship island, and transport his army, either
on board steamers of light draught or in boats towed by such steamers, to the
f')ot of Lake Borgne, whence his march to the.city (a distance of twenty-eight
n1iles through an unpeopled district) would be over one of the best roads in
Louisiana.
There is nothing in the shallowness of Lake Borgne to prevent this, nor are
there now any defences on the way, though it is to be hoped that the erection
of a tower and battery at Proctor's Landing, which has been strongly urged for
~ome years, ancl which would effectually close this aperture, will at once be
ordered by Congress.
If, a during the war of 1812, it were now necessary to pass the troops from
the ~hips to the shore by means of tow-boats, we might, perhaps, considering
the auQ"IIlented population of the city and environf-l, trust for sufficient notice
and J_Jreparation to the time that must elapse before a considerable number could
be land ·d; but with ten or fifteen light-draught war-steamers, fifteen thousand
men could be landed and on their march toward the city within twenty-four
hour: of dropping anchor.
A.ll other avenues to New Orleans from that quarter have, since the war. of
1 12, been well closed by permanent forts and batteries.
1 ~e have another illustration on the Gulf of this action of hostile steamers
throu""h hallow channels, and that may be worth adducing. l!-,ort Morgan, at
Iobile Point, defends very well the main channel into Mobile bay, and there
i no o her entrance for sailing vesscb-of-war. But the sm1ller class of war- teamer· would find water nough near the end of Dauphin island, and, keeping
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out of reach of the guns of l?ort Morgan, could pass up into the bay. They
could without difficulty ascend as high as the ci y of Mobile, and reach that
place moreover in three hours. A dozen such vessels could in that short time
carry up, if they were needed, fiye thousand soldiers. It is surely not too much
to say, therefore, that Mobile, one of our greatest depots of cotton, is by this
new inlet for an enemy's cruisers, much exposed. But this is not all the danger. The large fleet of ships, often one hundred in number, and of the largest
class of merchantmen, that lie for months awaiting their cargoes in the lower
part of the bay, are within an hour's run of such steamers from the open Gulf,
and might be destroyed either by the same expedition that ascends to Mobile
or by one sent for that particular purpose.
J<...,or this and other serious consequences of leaving open this entrance to Mobile bay, the sure and the cheap remedy is the placing of a small fort at the
east end of Dauphin island, a work already wisely ordered by Congress.
When it iR said in general that the light draught of these vessels opens avenues
of attack before defended by 'nature, it must not be supposed that therefore it
is part of the system of defence to fortify all shallow channels. Whether shallow passages will rt'quire defences or not, will depend entirely on the importance
of the objects to which they give access and the power of the attack that may
be directed through them, and not all on the circumstance that an enemy's
steamers may enter them without difficulty.
There are a great many entrances and harbors on the coast, not shoal harbors
merely, but many affording water enough for the largest vessels, that will require, if any, no other d~fences than such as can be prepared in time of war,
because there are no objects upon these waterB of a nature to provoke the
cupidity of hostile cruisers: having nothing to lose in this way, they will have
nothing to fear. rrhe shallow and difficult avenues to great and valuable objects
are those for which we have to provide defences in addition to defences that
were necessary before the introduction of war-steamers. 'I'he danger of tbe
Hell Gate passage to New York sufficed to keep any man-of-war from attempting
to sail through, but it proYes to be no impediment to steamers. rrhe "Broad
Sound" channel and afoo the "Gut" channel into Boston harbor are easy tracks
for large steamers, though next to impracticable to line-of-battle ships and
frigates ; and so with other channels and other places.
.
In considering to what ext nt the introduction of teamers into war service
may help the coast defence of the country, should we assume that we ought to
rdy upon them to repel the enemy's steamers, so dangerous in coming with?ut
warnjng and penetrating promptly through all natural obstacles up to the y1tal
point. of the coa t, we should commit a very gTeat error, though it i perhaps a
natural one on a cur. ory examination, as it certainly is a frequent one. It would
b a fatal rror if practiced upon by a nation having more than one or two_ important ports, and even with such nation it would be the mo t expen ive oi all
r ~ort .
'l hi: cannot be a afi reliance with war-steamer any more than with ail in"
v s:C'l -of-war, and a f•w word may make thi clear.
I do not a: •1t that arm d v · eJ would not be u ful in coa t d fence. f-.lllh
an icle, would L ab:-urcl. I hall c•v •n have oc a:--ion to ..,how a n c,,ity t "
thi:-1 kincl of for c in · rtain •xcr.ptional ca . It i the n ral propo,ition.
viz : that arn_1 ·cl vc•:."el:- au~l . not fortification ar the prop r defi•nc .. _for ur
vulnembl po111t ·-a propo,' 1t1on th,, mor dano-prou b can~ · •ming1Y rn ,uch
a ·orclan · with th· wPll-tri<•d 1>row •:. ancl lieroi1,; achiev m •nt · of th 11 ':'"
tha w • hnv · now to ·ontrovcrt.
l o. ton, ~ • .,,, •ork Philaclc•lphi:r B.tltimor , 'linrl :-ton, and i: ~ ,
ar , w will ·uppo,p, to I, rrunr<l d not by fort , lm bv tho· • v '" I
·urr n · of a war with n nation p c:: iurr lnr
uaval m an... , • kn
that i i.. no ftort fi r uch nation to d pat h a fie •t f tweaty Jin -o - t 1
('f'
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ships and frigates, or an equal number of war-steamers, or even the combine~
mas , both fleets in one.
The United Service Journal shows that in the month of August last Great
Britain had actually in commission in their navy, in a time of profound peace,
thirty-eight line-of-battle-ships and frigates, thirteen sloops-of-war, and upwards
of fifty smaller armed sailing vessels, together with forty-eight armed warsteamers and near forty unarmed steamers.
What, then, shall we do at the above-named ports severally 1 Each is justly
felt to be an object worthy of an enemy's efforts, and each would be culpable
in sending elsewhere any part of the force required for its own defence . . Each,
therefore, maintains a naval force equal at least to that the enemy is judged to
be able to send promptly against it. Omitting any provision for other places
scarcely less important, what is the result 1 It is that we maintain within the
harbors of, or at the entrance to, these places, chained down to this passive defence, a force at least six times as large as that of the enemy.
He does not hesitate to leave his port, because it will be protected in his absence by its fortifications, which also will afford him a sure refuge on his return.
He sails about the ocean depredating upon our commerce with his privateers
~nd small cruisers, putting our small places to ransom, and in other ways followmg up appropriate duties, all which is accomplished without risk, because our
fleet. although of enormous magnitude, must cling to ports which have no other
d~fence than that afforded by their presence. 'l'hey cannot combine against
him nor attack him singly, for they cannot know where he is, and must not,
m.oreover, abandon the objects which they were provided expressly to guard.
It would really seem that there could not be a more impolitic, inefficient, and
dangerous system, as there certainly could not be a mrwe expensive one.
A navy, whether of war steamers or sailing vessels, should be aggressive in
it action. It should, by carrying the war into the seas and upon the coast of
the enemy, direct its calamities from our coast and commerce; but the system
we are now considering involves the absurdity of relinquishing all the incalculable advantages of mastery upon the ocean to an enemy who nevertheless may
possess but a sixth of our naval power.
To bring other means even in partial substitution for this defence by ships
and steamers, or to give it local auxiliary aid, by way of reducing its inordinate
magnitude, would be to confess its inappropriateness for harbor defence. We
know that other comparatively cheap means may be substituted, but this is just
~\-hat the proposition denied. Naval means would be useful undoubtedly. 'l'he
que. tion is whether they would be suJficient ,· and we see some of the consequences of making them sufficient. We come thus to examine the defensive
arrangements that can be made in aid of or substituted for armed sea-going
ves~els.
rrbese arrangements may be of two classes, namely: first, fixed forts and
batteries on the land, and in some cases movable batteries of heavy guns; and
se:coRd, upon the water-floating batteries of all kinds, gunboats, etc., fixed or
movable.
rI'here are doubtless situations where it may be necessary for us to present a
defeu ·ive array, at th e same time that to do so by fortifications alone would be
impracticable ; and it is not therefore prejudging the question we are about to '
examine. I t is neither underrating fortifications nor everrating floating defences
to ay that these last are some or all of them indispensable in such positions . .
Any very broad water, where deep soundings may be carried at a distance
from the hores, greater than effectivP. gun range, and where no insular spot,
natural or artificial, can be fo und or formed nearer the track of ships, will pre.;ent _uch a, ituation ; and we may take some of our great bay s as exampl es .
Broad ·ounds and wide roadsteads affording secure anchorage b eyond good
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gun range from the shores will afford examples of another so~t, and harbors with
very wide entrances and large surface exhibit examples of still another kind.
As in all such cases fortifications alone will be ineffectual, and nevertheless
Tecourse to defences of some sort may be unavoidable, it has not failed to be a
recommendation in the several reports_ on the defence of the coast since 1818,
that there should be a suitable and timely provision of appropriate floating defencrs. And until the invention of man shall have caused an entire revolution
in the nature of maritime attack and defence, these or kindred means must be
resorted to, not however, because they are means intrinsically good or suitable
under like circumstancee, but because they are the only means applicable to such
cases. In the circumstances just referred to there is no alternative, and therefore no point to be discussed. The remaining question is, whether these float ing
defences Hre to be relied on in cases that admit of defence by fortifications.
And first, as to gun boats. Although of undoubted use in peculiar circumstance:.,, it will hardly be contended that gunboats afford a safe reliance in har·bors that can be entered by vessels of magnitude. . Ships becalmed or aground
might be sorely harassed, if not destroyed by a spirited attack from this force,
and there are other situations wherein it would be very effective. But harbors
defended by gunboats will not be attacked in calms nor in adverse winds, and
it is not easy to believe that any probable array of these crafts would impede or
l1incler for a moment the advance of a hostile fleet. Nelson, at 1.1i·afa1gar, bore
down in two divisions upon the combined fleet, each division being exposed to a
Taking fire; and although suffering considerably from that :fire, he was able,
notwithstanding, to break the hostile line and defeat his superior adversary.
·what, comparative1y, with the raking fire of the combined fleet, would be the
:fire of a fleet of gunboats? Opposing no effectual obstacle to approach or
entrance, these smaU vessels, scattered and driven upon the shoals, could be
kept by the broadside of a few active vessels at too great a distance to produce
:my serious effect upon the main attack by their desultory :fire.
Although they might afford useful means of annoyance during a protracted
occupation by the enemy of harbors containing exten ive shoal grounds, and
t!hallow bays and inlets, they would be nearly useless in resisting the first assault
and in preveniiug the brief operation of levying contributions, or burning or
spoiling national establi ,Ji men ts.
.
The true reason of this defence must not, however, be misunderstood. It 1~
not th,1t the boattt do not carry guns enough or men enough for the object, but
it is because, from the comparntiYe weakness of the vessels, the gun and the
m n cannot be kept in an effective position.
'l'here are, moreover, many harbor requiring defence, in which there are no
1,hoal whereon the Lont. could take refuge; and in such th ir captnrc or detruction would be inevitable hould there be, at the sam, time, no river up
,~hich th y might fly, or Jat •ral i ue through which they cou1d e cap to a afc
d1 tance.
Floating batt ri R, of wl1ich n good u. e micrht be ometimc made in p culiar
ituationt1, would, I .-u1ipo e, diff •r from gunboat , in h ing larger, containin~
m ny gun <'ac·h, ancl iu h ing .-trongcr; that i to ny, haYi1w thicker :-irlc~ or
bulwark.- · anc1 it 11a t!Omc·timc even b n propo ,d to cont-truct th •m wi h
ball-p:oof parapct::l, and with platfonm1 open above-like, in th :: n•,p ·c ',
~tt r1:, npnn th<· ::-hor . Jfot in whatc,vcr way form d, it i. n c -.:-arily a pai ·
of tl.1 1<l ·:~ that th1·y lw . tro1w and maf', iv ; and, ont1cqu ntly, tha tlu y l
unw1 •ldy, m ·apal,I • of ncld, n drnng of p1a
and in , pacitut cl •itber adan · upon n cl frat ·cl fo' r to .vncl · : vi ·t riou n . \\ arc no,· o c ur ·.
tip aking f hat <·ric mnvccl h. · , tPam.
pj
cl ni c1 th powrr f 1
at 1 ·a for an: pnrpo of m 11 "un-in"' in fa·• of th en m •, w ar
the
att riP a· m r •<1 in po. i ion c ncl awaiting hi a v n
,h
l, 1 r"' r •quirin(J' · p , at r t fl at th m, r ·h uld
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across or near the channel, for the sake of proximity to the track of s~1~ps, the
enemy would engage them at close quarters. A:-11 advanta9·es of mob1hty--:of
concentrating his whole fleet upon one or two pomts, to which, under these cu-cumstances, no relief can be sent-of greater elevation and. commn.nd, would. be
on the side of the assailant, with no counteracting advantage to the batteries,
but greater thickness of bulwarks. Whether this exc 'SS of thickness should be
considered a material advantage, since the introduction of large bomb-cannon
into the armament of ships, is a very doubtful matter. 'l'he batteries if anchored
across the channel would· have the further advantage of a raking fire; but we
~ave seen that the raking fire of one squadron of ships upon another advancing
1s by no means decisive. 'l'he power of throwing the whole assailing force upon
one or two points, of pouring upon the decks of the batteries a greatly superior
force of boarders, would, of themselves, seem to leave little room to doubt as to
the issue.
If, now, we suppose these floating batteries to be smaller, so that having a
lighter draught they might be placed near the shores or upon the shoals, they
might certainly be thereby saved from the kind of attack which would prove so
fatal if anchored more boldly in deep water; but they would at the same time
lose much of their efficiency from their remoteness; and positions wherein they
wo:1ld be secure from being laid alongside, while they would be in a proper
attitude to contriLute materially to the defence of the harbor, are afforded but
rarely. It is doubtful whether, as a general rule, these smaller floating batteries,
notwithstanding their greater capacity of endurance, would afford a better
defence, gun for gun, than gunboats; or, in other words, whether this capability
of endurance in the one would be more than a compensation for the power of
locomotion in the other. But whether near the shore or in the channel, whether
large or small this description of defence, owing to its fixedness connected. with
the destructibility of the material of which it must be made, will be exposed to
attacks analogous to those made by gunboats on ships aground. The enemy
knowing of what the defensive arrangements consist, will come provided with
the requisite number of sailing or steam vessels armed with bomb-cannon,
against which the thicker bulwarks of the floating batteries would avail nothing.
He would, besides, hardly fail to provide himself with bomb-ketches armed with
heavy sea mortars; and as there could be no guarding against the effects of the
long ranges of these, a few fmch vesself'. would, with great certainty, constrain
the floating batteries to quit their position, abandoning every disposition apProaching to a concentrated array. Not to mention other modes of attack, which
would seem to leave the chances of success with the enemy, it will be noticed
that this kind of defence, whether by gunboats or floating batteries, has the
ame intrinsic fault that an inactive defence by the navy proper has; that is to
say, the enemy has it in hiN power to bring to the attack a force of the same
nature and at least as efficacious as that relied on for defence ; hence the necessity not of mere qua1ity, but of superiority on the part of the defence at every
point liable to be attacked; and hence also the necessity of having an aggregate
force as many times larger than that disposable by the enemy, as we have important places to guard. Should we, for example, have ten such places, and the
enemy threaten us with twenty ships of the line, we must have, in all these
place-, an aggregate of gunboats and floating batteries more than equivalent to
two hundred P.hips-of-the-line ; for it will lrnrdly be contended that these defences
can be transported from one place to another as they may be respectively in
danger.
But what will be the relative state of the parties if, instead of gunboats or
floating batteries, we resort to team batteries.
Althouo-h much has been said of late of the great advantage that defence is to
d'.:rive from thi description of force, I have not been able to discover the advantage ; nor do I see that sea·coast defence has been benefited in any particular
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by the recent improvements in steam vessP.ls, except that in the case before adverted to, where from the breadth of the waters defence from the shore would
b e unavailing·, a more active and formidable floating defence than by gunboats
and floating batteries is provided.
It must be remembered that by far the greatest improvement in steam vessels
consists in having adapted them to ocean navigation; and one inevitable consequence of this improvement will be, that if the defence of harbors by steam
batteries be regarded as securing them from the attacks of ships-of-the-line and
frigates, or at least of placing the defence quite above that kind of attack, they
will no longer be attacked by sailing vessels, but by steam vessels similar in all
warlike properties to those relied on for defence.
Not only is there no impediments to transferring tl1ese vessels across the
ocean, but the rapidity and certainty of these transfers are such as to enjoin a
state of the most perfect readiness everywhere and at all times; and also a complete independence of arr;mgement at each particular point, both the state of
preparation and the independence of arrangement being much more important
than when the enemy's motions were governed by the uncertain favor of winds
and weather.
It is not easy to conceive of any important properties belonging to steam
batteries acting defensively, that the attacking steam vessels may not bring with
them, or at least may not have imparted to them on their arrival upon tlie coa~t,
unless it should be thought proper to give to the former a greater thickness of
lJulwark than would be admissible in sea-going vcsseb.
But the peculiar advantage conferred by steam lies in the faculty of moving
with promptitude and rapidity, and any attempts to strengthen the harbor vesse!
by thickening their bulwarks considerably would unavoidably lessen therr
mobility, thereby partially neutralizing the advantage sought. At the same
time it is extremely doubtful whether any benefit would be derived from the
thicker sides. It is probable that the best kind of bulwarks for these vessels
and all otlwrs, is that which will be just proof against grape and canister-~hot
fired from moderate distances, because with such bulwarks a shell fired from a
bomb-cannon within a reasonable distance would pierce both sfrles, that is to ay,
would go in one side of the ship and out at the opposite side, producing: no
greater effect than a solid shot of the same calibre, while with thickened ides
every shell would lodge in the timbers and produce terrible ravage. by bursti n".
In the practice with these missiles in this country it bas beeu found diffi cult
to lodge a shell in thin targets, even ·when the load of the gun wa o r duced
a. to increase materially the uncertainty of aim. .A. it is probable, th erefor ,
that the protection from olid shot afforded by mas ive bulwark would be mo1e
than counterbalanced by the greater injury horizontal ~·hell would infli ct ~y
mean. of th e bulwarks, we may conclude that the harbor team batt •ry will
not di:ffi r in thi, respect materially from the attacking team hip .. ; and if they
do diffi r in having more solid and imp rvious bulwarks, that no advanta(J'e onr
th . f'nemy wi11 r ult ther from.
e om th refor to the i-ame rrsult as ·when con. idering the application
f the oth r kindfl of floatino- force to th d fenc ()f harbor ; and thi ' rc:,ult i~.
that tl1 r i n ·way of J>lacino- the coa t in a condition of r a..,onabl ' " ('urity
1 ut b. l1aying at :m ' point the n<"my may ha.ppm to 1 ct a force in p rt'
n ·:1Clin L•, whi ·h :hall h ' .-n1wrior to that brouo-ht to th attack.
Ther not onl • pr v_nil the id a, that w oncrl1t to rely upon th e~ flo:ui_n_
r1 P~ nc . , hut al. o th· Hl!'a that we may po:t1>011 th fittin°· th m for rn
till th comm •n ·c·m •11t of wnr. '1.'nruitw acraiu to th :-ix port~ L for m ·nti n. ,
nr "bole 1wac nav. • that may lrnpp<·11 t b in port and r ady f r u, . L 1 npp1 pi-int ·cl to l cal cl<'fon · ' in it: . <""C'ral . tnti 11,.;, imm , 11 . • addition · ul
liav to be made at ach port · ancl wh ther the• e a<ldition. · w ·r t b ,uppJi
from the hip-yard r hy · uv r ·ion of mer hant v
l an<l cnic ;::t
9
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into -floating batteries, a considerable time must necessarily elapse ~efore there
could be anything like readiness. In the meantime the enemy, sendmg a small
s quadron of war steamers against each-nothing being ready large squadrons
would not be needed-would nip all preparations in the ?ud. We ?ave to keep
in mind a fundamental principle of this system, which _is, not to n~cur ~he exp ense of preparation till the certainty of war has arnved, or, as 1t might be
phrased, till there will no longer be time to prepare.
.
.
I should not have gone so much at length into a branch of one subJect wherem
the general conclusion appears to be so obvious and incontrovertible but f~r the
prevalence of opinions which I consider not erroneous merel;y-. ·1:mt h1Phly
dangerous, and which, I think, must give way before a foll exh1b1t10n of the
truth. I do not anticipate any formidable objections to the . positions assumed,
n or to the illustrations; but even should all these in the form presented be obj ected to, I may still challenge oppo:sition to the following broad propositions,
namely:
1st. If the sea-coast is to be defended by naval means exclusively, the defensive force at each point deemed worthy of protection must be at least equal
1·n power to the attacking force.
2d. .A.s from the nature of the case there can be no reason for expecting an
attack on one of these points rather than on another, and no time for transferring
our state of preparation from one to another after an attack has been declared,
each of them must have assigned to it the requisite means; and
3d. Consequently this system demands a power in the defence as many times
greater than that in the attack as there are points to be covered.
B elieving that a well-digested system of fortification will save the country
from the danger attending every form of defence by naval means, and the intolerable expense of a full provision of these means, I will now endeavor to show
that such a system is worthy of all reliance.
There has been but one practice among nations as to the defence of ports and
harbors, and that has been a resort to fortifications. All the experience that
history exhibits is on one side only-it is the opposition of forts or other works
comprehended by the term fortification to attacks by vessels ; and although
history affords some instances wherein this defence has not availed, we see that
the re ort is still the same. No nation. omits covering the exposed points upon
her seaboard with fortifications, nor h esitates in confiding in them.
B ut it has been asserted, in a way to convey incorrect and hurtful impressions
to t he country, that fortifications for such purposes are obsolete resorts ; that the
improvements in the instruments and appliances of vrnr within late years have
caused the abandonment of such reliances. 'l'bis, however, is far from being
true ; and it is quite important in respect to the quarters whence such assertions
ha,e "'omctimcs proceeded not only to sustain but to enforce this denial.
If con. iderable additions have not been made lately to the defences of many
well-kn own European harbors, it is because they were fully fortified long ago.
And it might here be asked in passing what would have happened to the seaport of France during the long wars between her and Great Britian, and with
mc:h naval supremacy in the hands of the latter, if the French ports had not
been ·well forfeited 1 Can it be supposed that anything but these fortifications
kept the English out of the great ports and naval depots of l!""'rance, and permi Pd la rge fleets to grow, great expeclitions to mature, flotillas to manceuvre,
under the eyes of the blockading squadron and almost within reach of its guns 1
Bu it happens that even in well-fortified France any improvement or change
in a harb or that affords opportunity and place for new defences is sure to produce them; the Oherbourg breakwater, a work of late years, is supplied with
formidable batterie , perhap even now not quite :finished .
It hap pen , moreover, that iu Great Britain, which of all the nations of the
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earth has most reason to rely for defence on naval power, fortifications are the
reliance for habor defence, and of late years particularly.
'.rhe application of steam to ocean navigation has done much and is likely to
do more to lessen the naval ascendancy of that power, and the ports which
formerly found security in rather indifferent fortifications under the overwhelming numbers of her men-of-war, have, in the present liability to be surprised by
fleets of war-steamers, received and are at this moment receiving large additions
of strength in forts and batteries, and new "harbors of refuge " are being formed
and strongly fortified, in order the better to protect her coast and her commerce
under this change of naval relations.
Great Britain sees that she cannot effectually guard her coast and her ports
from this particular dang·er by the number of her war vessels, great as thi:;
number is, and greatly as it may be augmented from her vast commercial marine. She does not run into the folly of posting at every dock yard a squadron
of steamers as larg·e as any that can be brought against it, but she improves and
adds to her old fortifications to m:tke them adequate of themselves, and she
creates new (artificial) harbors for the sake of having fortified shelter near the
probable field of activity of her navy in its various forms .
Instead, therefore, of lessening· the utility of fortifications, we see that, in the
opinion of the high military authorities of that government, the late changes and
improvements have made the increase and improvement of fortifications indispensable. There are some particulars of her late course in this respect.
Refening to parliamentary estimates for 1847-'48, 1848'-49, and 1849-'50.
I find that for fortification alone, 1:ncluding new works and repairs ef old u-orh
upon the coast of Great Britain and Ireland, (chiefly along the Bnglish channel,)
and excluding estimates for barracks, quarters, storelwuses, ~c., there was ~emancled for those years, severally, $578,766, $282,892, and $439,036, bem"
$1,300,694 for the last three years.
.
I find that important colonial ports have received accessions of strength m the
same way lately, and that, for examplt>, on the water front of the reclonbta~le
Gibraltar the same batteries that repelled and destroyed the formidabl e fl.oatrn"
batteries of France and Spain in 17 2, expenditures exceeding six hundred
thousand dollars haYe been made within four or five years, and $367, 7 mor'
are rstimated to be necessary to pnt them in equilibrium with new mean 1
attack.
At Malta, already possessed of very strong fortifications, about $180,000 ha.e
already been voted, and $696,000 is called for in addition, to b applied to harbor
defence particularly.
'l'he ame nation is meanwhile placing in her new coa t batteric eight-inc_h
and ~fty- ix pounder., and thirty-two pound guns; and, at a great exp_ m,e, 1'
ubF1tituting thi hcavie t kind of ordnance for twenty-four pound r and 117ht · 1
pound r in th old batteri . . Bctw en the year 1 39 and 1 49 he ha:,; ·u11p1ir I, or ha isflu d ord r to upply, to ea-coa ·t fortific, tion at 1 a:-t t,~o
thou. and new pi<·c of tl1 larget1t calibr . Th , increa e of heavy ordnanc ' m
th' batt ri<'.' of fihraltar within th, t period, wa
iO'hty-two piec -: : ; and 3
l rt. mouth and vitinity it wa. two hundred and •icrhty- Y n pi cc..
/ir 'rhoma~ Ha ·tin..,.14, of th Royal .J.Yary, under xamin. tion befor a c mmitte of th. Hou.: e of 'ommon~, ·aicl: "I wa a.,ked ju t now wheth r h
<run· at P ort. mouth or otlwr pla ·e h:ul he n fired in ano- •r. I :-honld bed
to ln-incr unclc•r the con.·icl •ration of the· committr that the introdn ·tion of -.1 •
mal· ·: it mnc-11 more pot ihle now to make attack upon any ertain p iu ·
'rom th ditt<•r •nt point all alonrr tlH! c-hann •I : •one ·ntrnti n may b m l
a v ·ry Jar"', hocl. of frnm •r , and uncler . u ·h cir ·um. tan ·e · an quiprn n ·
(h i: ' JH~akin"' of ·ra-<·o t batt ·ri' ,) "which. would ha,· , n~w r cl Y )' •
wh en - u had nly in icl ·nt,tl : tt ·k · t · nt mplat . from
iliurr v ... 1-., m1_
h' iu uffi ·icnt wh •n you · uld brincr tw uty-fiv • r thirty y ,;-: 1
h
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heaviest possible gu~s to bear upon your works. I will take, for example_, if
rou will permit me, the port of Falmouth. In the event of any v.:ar occurrmg
,rith this country the probability is, being the most western port, i~ wo:uld becom~ the refuge of our merchantmen running into the channe! t~ avoid pnvateers
and teamships. If that port were left in its present state 1t 1s clear_ th~t. ten
powerful steamers might destroy everything in it, without any material rnJury
to the assailants."
In answer to the question whether, in his opinion, the merchant steam_ers
would be as available for the defence of the coasts as war steamers, he said :
"Certainly not; I think this country (England) would derive an immeils_e power
from her merchant marine ; but I look upon it to propose to contend with mere' :ant steamers against the poweiful vessels whicli are in existence in France
,rnuld be a very unwise thing."
In April, 1850, the Hon. Uolonel Anson, in explainin g the ordnance estim_a te
to the House of Commons, said, in reference to the estimates for "works, buildi11gs, and repairs": '' rrhe whole of this vote had been most carefully considered
by the master general of the ordnance and her Majesty's government ; and
though large in amount, the house would see how small a sum was asked for new
works, such as fortifications, &c., either at home or abroad. That reduction
was, however, attributable to the large amount that ha<l. been spent on those
works ju previous years. It was needless for him now to point out to how low
a state, he might say, indeed, to what a state of degradation our works of defence had fallen till within the last few years, and in what condition the means
we possessed of protecting our shores from aggression and insult were in 1835.
It was enough to say they were totally inadequate for the pur}Jose. They
remained nearly in the same state till 1845, and were in the very lowest possible
condition in that year. But, in the meantime, the l:'tate of things had not escaped
the observation of tho1.<e who turned their attention to our relations with foreign
powers, and many honorable gentlemen found fault with the government for
not providing more effectually for the defence of the country. In 1845 the
aspect of affairs became threatening; the few fortifications we had to rely upon
dismantled, dilapidated, and decayed. If a squadron of steamers had chosen
to make their way to any of our principal naval stations, either Portsmouth,
Plymouth, or Pembroke, or up the 'l'hames, they were completely open to attack,
and an enemy might have committed any act of aggression he pleased. There
Was nothing to prevent his vessel coming up the 'l'hames and insulting her
J[ajesty in the very heart of her dominions. These considerations pressed
th.emselves so seriously at the time that the attention of the right honorable
lllember for Tamworth and the existing government were called to it, and they
a.t once et to work to remedy the neglect. They proposed that a sum of money
•hould be set apart to improve our defences, and their example had been fol!owf:d by the present government to a very considerable extent. r.rhe result
Was, that very much had been accomplished during those four years, and he
\rn- happy to say the country might be proud of it. At Portsmouth the sea
<leftncc · had been completed and made very powerful; at Plymouth they were
1
_'1]_ ually complete, and he believed great improvements ha<l. taken place at
,'hecrne;_:.,, and in the defences on the Thames. Th ey had commenced similar
\\ro k at }Jembroke, which was one of the finest dock yards and harbors in the
World, and he was sure the house would be prepared to meet any reasonable
dem:md upon them for its defence. It was impossible to say what might come
I)
as : in a few year , and though the. expense might appear to be large now,
wh n he house considered the ultimate advantage to the country from ~he state
and the £,eling of security against aggression, they would, be was certam, agree
\ti 1 him that it far out-balanced any temporary inconvenience from the grant
of o much money.''
An 'ngli h officer of rank and distinction discussing, in 1849, the system of
1
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defence necessary to Great Britain, after recommending large iuland fortifications to be erected against the possible m/1rch of an enemy's army upon London,
estimates that it will require £1,500,000 ($6,G00,000) to complete existing
fortifications upon tlie coast, including new batteries to be constructed there, and
to supply them with artillery and stores. That js to say, in his opinion, the
sum of $6,600,000, in addition to what had within these few years been expended, was necessary to be arplied to the coast de ·ences of that country, in
consequence of the changes lately introduced into the means of carrying on war
from the ocean.
When I had advanced thus far in this report, and was still seeking facts in
illustration of the course pursued by Great Britain, I met the following summary
of remarks made in relation to fortifications by Mr. Pitt, sixty-five years ago,
(1786.) The principles for which he then contended are now and ever must be
as sound and as applicable as when he pressed them on the consideration of
p1,rliament with so much earnestness. The only change is one of degree. And
we have just seen that the statesmen and military men of that country, at the
present day, take the same view and press the same policy. During the wars
of the French revolution the vast naval superiority of England enabled her to
hold the closest blockade of all the ports of her adversary. This crippled
}..,rench naval enterprise in a twofold manner-by shutting up the commerce
which alone could supply seamen, and by shutting up the few war vessels that
they were able to man. But even then, with such little apparent cause to fear
anything from that navy, large sums were expended by England upon new seacoast ports, towers, and batteries. Now, when France can suddenly send out
large squadrons of steam war vessels in spite of the strictest blockade, Great
Britain feels the need of still greater strength at home. But it is we see alway'
on fortifications that England relics for the safety of her ports; in no case do
we see her resorting to a parade of war vessels within or at the entrance to her
ports. Where her largest assemblages of men-of-war of all sorts take place,
and where there must at all times be a considerable numb er, there she place.-,
not small batteries and insignificant forts and towers, but h er stronge t and
heaviest fortifications. Her hi tory demonstrates that she knows how to employ her fleets better than keeping them moored within her harbor and
roa<lstead .
In urging upon the House of Commons, in 1786, crrtain propositions in
relation to fortifications, Mr. Pitt, "to prove the utility of fortifications, appealed
to the unfortunate and calamitous situation in which we wer placed in the late
war. A considerable pnrt of our fl et was confined to our port in order to pr
t ct our dockyard,, and thus we were obliged to do what reat Britain had
11cv r do
before-to carry on ad fen ivc war-a. war in which we w re under
th n cc~ ity of wa. tino- our re onrcc and impniring- our Rtreno-th, without a~y
pro p<'ct of and po1-1 ibl b nefit by which to miti<>'ate our distre ~- )Ir. l'it
fi·lt the quc,:-:tion to be a portion of that mom ntou, ·~tern which cballrnll' ·d.
•
•
from it naturr, th vigilance and upport of ev ry admini.'tration."
•
"'\Ya th Hon r acly to ·tancl rcKpon, ibl to po t rity for a repe·
tition of imilar mi.Jort_un . and diFigrnce? ·w er thry willing to tak 11 n
thPm elv . thP hazard of tran:-imittin th<' dan,rc•r and alamitie which hey
th ·m •Ive•.. o l,itt r1 ' . p ric•n · rl?"
•
•
•
")fr. Pitt ob err
that tlwr • wi · a ron. iclnation whi h ouO'ht to hav mor w io-ht than oth I"!
and thi"' wa ·, that fortifi ·a ion:-! b,·in"' al ·nlated to afford ompl tc, ecurity
dockntnl , wou1C1 nahlc- our flt•c:t. to n-o on r mot
rvi •., and caiT,\" on th
JH: ·ation of war at a ,1i. tan
withou
.·p :-inO' th mat rial and ..
fotnr , uavi • · t d tru ·ti1111 hy th· inva. ion f an t·n my,"
•
•
' Hut it wa uot only Ly fon•i•rn .·pC' ition tl1, t w· mi..,.ht Jo-. tlw i
ur He ·t; in c~e of inv ,.,j n i might o happ n that th Lip , thoug-h in th
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,ery channel, might be prevented by contrary ~inds, tides, and other contingencies, from arriving to the assistance and relief of the dockyards."
" Were it to be asked why the sum to be required by these fortifications had
not been demanded for strengthening the navy, he would fairly answer that t!1e
money which would prove sufficient to accomplish these works would not bmld
so many ships as would serve for the defence of our most val_uable h~rbors.
There was, besides, a certain degree beyond which we could neither build nor
man any more. 'l'he true limit he could nnt, nor would it be prudent for him to
assign, yet in the nature of things such a limit must exist; but there could
nenr b e any line drawn to restrain the security which we ought to provide for
our dockyards."
" Mr. Pitt called upon the House to beware how they suffered themselves
lightly to be drawn into a line of conduct which might involve their posterity
in accumulated evils; and he suggested to their recollection the remorse which
they must feel if they should hereafter find that they had, by an ill-timed pertinacity upon the present occasion, brought upon the country calamity and
ruin."
I regret that I have not time to find and adduce a few pertinent facts from the
practice of the French nation in this respect, and especially within the last few
years. We know well, however, the general result, namely, that France has
always kept herself well guarded by sea-coast fortifications; and, as before said,
that sh e owes her exemption from many heavy calamities to a steady adherence
to that policy.
•
Believing that the statements just presented must conclusively show that
nations having experience in war have made fortifications their main reliance for
the defence of their ports, reserving their navies for offensive purposes, and that
the greater energy and activity imparted to the latter by modern improvements
ha,e compelled a still more powerful preparation of such defences, I turn again
to the p articular point of our present inquiry, namely, the use and influence of
steamers in coast defences. I have to add, that steamers as substitutes for
fortifications would be inferior to other armed vessels, because the efficiency of
the defence must depend, other things equal, on the number of guns; that is, as a
large num ber will be brought to the attack, a large number must be employed in
defPnce, and steamers carry very few in comparison. The power of rapid locornotion characteristic of steamers, is for this purpose nothing in itself, nor the
poy·er of t ransporting quickly bodies of armed men; there must be the power
of heavy and numerous guns, whether moving or anchored. Though very useful in reconnoitering an advancing enemy, in carrying orders, in conveying relief
to l1atterie, , in transporting quickly large bodies of men, and in such like duties,
,teamers could not constitute a good defensive array except against steamers
only ; and, accordingly, against such an array the enemy's fleet of steamers
'lrou1d bring in tow a few line-of-battle ships or frigates.
.
Even, therefore, should there be time after a war shall have been opened to prepare in each of the gr at harbors a hurried display of this kind out of the light
tiver and bay t amers, it would be no match for sea-going steamers and heavy
arm d ve el brought into the attack; indeed, it would not be easy to say what
:xce.; · of numbers, in favor of the defence, could establish an equalibrium. As
JU::,t ._aid above, there could be no resistance of moment made, except by
rnany heavy gun ; and to supply the e a great multitude of steamers or of
tner ·hant ·hip. would have to be converted into floating batteries. What the
e~ult of uch a re ort would be may be learned from the battle of Copenhagen.
Thi._ w· · in no sense a contest between ships and fortifications, as is generally
uppo .... ·d; it wa the attack of a fleet of sailing ships upon a line of floating
Lat cri · f one kind or another. 'l'he Dan s had anchored on the edge of a
hoal a line of the e battcri , parallel nearly with the wall of the city, and at
'he distance of at least three-fourths of a mile. This line could be attacked
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only on the outside, and, when attacked, was interposed between the enemy and
the walls, and consequently for the time entirely extinguished the fire from the
fortifications.
The line consisted of blor.k-sliips and praams-by which are understood to
be meant vessels converted into mere floating batteries and more or less strengthened for the purpose; and rafts, supposed to be floats of timber with a timber
parapet towards the enemy-in all eighteen batteries. A squac1ron of four sails
of the line, one frigate and two sloops-of-war, wei·e anchored higher up the
harbor-where there was also the "three-crown" battery. Lord Nelson carried
to the attack twelve line-of-battle ships, twelve frigates, and a number of smaller
armed vessels. All this force he concentrated upon the line of floating batteries;
every vessel of which was taken or destroyed, except one or two smaller vessels,
which cut their moorings and ran in under shelter of the fortification. 'fbis
concentration included the Danish squadron · above mentioned, and also the
"three-crown" battery from any material participation in the action. Some
English frigates within reach of the latter were greatly injured and obliged to
r etreat.
This faculty of concentration (applied with success on several memorable occasions by that great naval commander) is an inherent one in an attacking
squadron, and is not to be evaded by a line at anchor- especially not by a
line of floating batteries.
If, however, we should allow batteries of this sort whether aided by steam
or not-to be equal, gun for gun, to the attacking sr,1rndron, ancl that they can
be got ready in time, we nevertheless should :hereby throw au enormous expenditure of money upon the country at a moment of great fiscal difficulty. Let
us make a rough estimate of that expenditure.
Lord Nelson's fleet, just mentioned, was rated at 1,158 guns, and it is only
reasonable to assume that we should be liable to a visit from a force as great.
Assuming that the merchant vessels taken for conversion into floating batterie,.
would, on the average, carry ten guns on a broadside, which will be assuming
that they arc as large as sloops-of-war, we should need fifty-eight such ve~sel:- .
and estimating thrse at fifty thousand dollars each, which, including purcba~e.
armament, alteration, &c., is a moderate allowance, we shall have a total fi~t
cost of two million nine hundred thousand dollars for one part, and for the ~ix
ports before mentioned, a grand total of seventeen million four hundred thou~an •
dollars-a. sum much greater than has been expended in preparing for mon
than four thousand of the heaviest guns in permanent fortifications upon th,•
great points of the coast.
If we attempt to supply the 1w1uisite force in guns by the u e of river and
bay tearners, in. tead of sailing vesselB, we cn.nnot allow more than five gun,,
in th' average, to a broadside; so that we. hall require one hundred and ;-;ixt n
t am rR, which, at thirty thou. and dollars for purcha e, armament and alteration, will o-ive thrcr million four hurn1rccl and ighty thou..,:mcl dollar~, for th
fir. t co. t in a ·ingle harbor, and for the ,·ix port~, twenty million eight lnrndretl
ancl <·i,rht • thon.,ancl dollar .
I do uot c,ivc thP:::c cstimatr,_ a exact, though I believe them to b below th
co:t that woul<l h1w · to be incurr c1, but a: afforcling hint, of the co.-tline~~ •'
of that natmc·.
n r.xp nditurc for thi purpo:c qually !!'T • •
would h:w to Le rc•peatul, morr.ov r, at th commcn ·emcnt of ·Y 'IT w, r r
..till "'n t ·r outlay.. woulcl L iu ·urrccl iu kc pitw up thi p ri..:habl annam ·
during p a· .
•
·what conclu. ion. follow from th , })l'C edinO' con. id r tion.., 1 Why. th t in
nclo1Jtin"' thi .·p ·dicnt w houl,l involv
w-.· Iv . , at th openin"' of ,· .
war in a va t outlay for th c~cfl'11 · of th,,. port. · that th r would
_ ·
proba iii · tha th pr pamn n. nlthotwh inv h•in,.. that norm u..
c uld not h m·Hlc in tim •i that, •y ·11 if pr •p r cl in tim
nrything

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

255

put at the hazard of a single battle, with m~s~ ~mportant advantag~s on the si~e
of the enemy, and consequently few probab1hties of successful resistance; _o: _1(
by more extended preparations, we should endeavor to. turn these proba?1ht1es
the other way, it would be at the greater risk of not bemg ready, and with the
certainty of greatly enhanced cost.
.
. .
.
.
It has been deemed necessary above all tlungs, cons1dermg 1mpress10ns that
have been made on the public mind as to the influence of steam vessels upon
sea-coast defence, to show at large that while the introduction of the vessels
into naval equipment has greatly facilitated attacks, either by steamers alone or
in conjunction with sailing vessels, it has done more to avert or repel the~n,
leaving fortifications, wpich these vessel::! can in no case replace but at great disadvantage, more inclisp,ensable than ever.
In my desire to co~vey my own strong convictions, I am conscious that I
have tediously prolong¢d this part of the report.
Although what has been said above is undoubtedly true in reference to steamers or other floating defences as substitutes for fortifications, there remain important functions in defence, which must be committed to floating defences of some
kind, as has before been fully set forth ; and in some of these cases it is quite
certain that steam batteries may, of all floating defences, be the most suitable.
It must not be forgotten, however, that the very quaHties which recommend
this particular kind of force, will equally characterize the steam vessel of the
enemy, and that wheth1'r steam vessels or sailing vessels, or both, are relied on,
unless there are well-secured points on the shore under which they can take
refuge, they "'ill themselves constitute an inviting object to a superior force of
the enemy.
If, for example, we were to deem one of our open waters of such importance
as to assign eight or ten steam batteries for its protection, we should thereby
place within the reach of the enemy an object worthy of the efforts of a squadron of twelve or fifteen vessels of the same description. Even, therefore, intances where these naval means must be resorted to for defence upon the water,
there must be works at hand upon the shore, to the shelter of which, if likely to
be overpowered, they can retire.
A branch of the second question, namely, that portion which inquires, "In
'lf"hat manner recent improvements in artillery and other military inventions and
ill coveries affect this question," require some separate remarks.
The only invention and discovery, so far as I am aware, that can affect this
question, one way or the other, is that which has introduced the practice of firing
shells from guns ; and which has involved th e use of guns of comparatively
large calibre, so that guns which discharge missiles of eight-inch and ten-inch
diameter, arc rather extensively used, especially eight-inch guns. Even guns of
twelve-inch bore have been made in this country, and I believe also in other
countries.
It i · of course understood that even larger shells than these were long ago
thrown in the attack and defence of fortified places, from the mortars of land
hatri-:ries and bomb ketches. rrhe shells now spoken about, instead of being
projected under a high angle, as from mortars, are discharged from guns l'tt low
angle~, or nearly horizontally, like solid shot; these guns of large calibre being
rJften called Paixhan guns, after the J?rcnch officer who first succeeded in securing the favor of the military authorities for the idea-the idea having been
ugge..:ted long before, and even successfully tried.
The.:e ._hell-guns are now introduced by maritime nations in all vessels-of-war,
~hether "'ailing ve sels or steamers. Those latter vessels, which carry but few
gun~ in number, are much augmented in power by their introduction, but not
tu.ore ..,o than sailing vessels, to which these guns are equally appropriate; and I
have no do bt that their numbers will be every day increased, until perhaps
there will be few or no armed sailing or steaming ships of which the guns will
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not be modified in their calibre for this purpose, and provided with shells as
well as shot.
A.s to the injury sustained from an enemy's shells, that will undoubtedly be
more ::ierious in steamers than in sailing vessels, pecause, in addition to all the
liabilities to injury that belong, inherently, to vessels of all kinds, there are
several superadded by the machinery, the wheels, the boilers, &c., of steamers.
In contests between vessels, whether sailing or steam vessels, the effects of shellguns will no doubt be very destructive on both sides; but between forts and
ships, the peculiar injury inflicted by shells will be suffered by the vessel excluclusively. 'l'he fort will suffer less from hollow shot than from eolid shot. This,
though true beyond all question or caviling, may need a few words of explanation.
How are the batteries to be affected by them 1 It can be but in two way :
first, the ship's gun having been pointed so as to strike a vital point-that is to
say, a gun or a caniage-the shell may explode at the instant of contact. 'l'bis
explosion may possibly happen thus opportunely, but it would happen against
all chances ; and if happening, would probably do no more than add a few men
to the list of killed and wounded.. · For rea:::ons that will soon appear, it is to be
doubted whether the probability of dismounting the gun would be so great as if
the missile were a solid thirty-two pound shot. Secondly, if it be not by dismounting the guns or killing the garrison, the effects anticipated from these missiles must result from the injury they do the battery itself. Now we are perfectly informed by military experience as to the effects of these shells upon forts
and batteries; for the shells are not new, although the guns may be so; the
eight-inch and the ten-inch shells having always been supplied in abundance to
every siege train, and being perfectly understood, both as to their effects and the
mode of using them. W ere it a thing easily done, the blowing away of the
parapets of a work (a very desirable result to the attacking party) wouH be a
common incident in the attacks of fortifications; but the history of attack ' by
land or water affords no such instance. The only practicable way yet discovered of demolishing a fortification, being by attaching a mine to the foot of
the wall; or by dint of solid shot and heavy charges fired intermittingly.
during a long succession of hours, upon the same part of the wall, in order
not only to break through it, but to break through it in such a mann er that
the weight a11d pres:;;nre of the incumbent mass may throw large portiow ot
the wall prostrate. 'l'his, the shortest and best way of breaking a wall, rcquireH, in the first place, perfrct accuracy of direction; because the amc number of shots that being clistriLuted over the expanse of a wall would mercl_y peel
off the face, would, if conceutrated in a Ringle deep cut, cause the wall to foll;
and it requires, moreover, great power of l)Clletration in the missile-the chnr"
of a breeching gun being, for that reason, one-third greater than the common
, crvice ·hargc. Kow the requi 'ite precision of tiring for thi effect is wholly
unattainable in vcs cl , whether shot be solid or hollow; and if it were attai1 hle, hollow hot would be entir ·ly u. clc. for the purpo e, becau.. e every on·
th ·m w ulc1 break to pieces again t the wall, ev n when fired with a ch 1_
mueh I·~.· than the common ,.ervice charg<'. Thi i8 no n wly di 'coverccl f:ct·
it i. neitlt ·r nc:w nor doubtful. Every hollow . hot thrown ~waiu t the w, 11 of a
fort or hatt ·ry, if fir cl with a v lo ·ity affordi1100 any pen tmtion, will unqu -tioualily h · hmken into fr:i~ncnt.: by th<> :-hock.
At't<·r o muc-h hacl Leen c·1TOJH·011r,Jy i-aid about the effect of the:-e ._hc,11 u n
th ' ·a. tlP of, an J u:rn cl' -uoa, it wa d •emed advi:::able, althouo-h the r ·-ult
}.. urop<'~lll ·1w1i1_m·nt _wc•rc~ J>l'rfc•ctly well known, to r 'l' at, in our own rvi .
m trial tou ·lung tlu pomt. A tar,ret wa: tl1 r<•for, con. tructccl, hin-inz
third p, rt of th• liwrth fr.11111 ·d of "ranitc,, 011 -third of brick and th r m. inintliir1 of fr· . ton . Thi. wa firPCl at hy a. J>ai .·han oonn, au l LY a thirty·
pouwl •r, from the di. tauc' of h tlf • mil·, and th autici1Jat d r ",ult , ·
u.tiu cl, uamcl y :
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1st. Whether it was the granite, the brick, or the frees.tone that was struc~{,
he solid thirty-two pound shot penetrated much deeper mto the wall, and chd
much more damage than the eight-inch hollow shot; and, 2d. These 13:st_ broke
against the wall in every instance that the charge of the gun was sufficient to
give them any penetration.
The rupture of the shell may often cause the explosion of the powder it contain', because the shell, the burning fuse, and the powder are all crushed up
together; but the shell having no penetration, no greater injury will be done to
the wall by the explosion than would be caused by the bursting of a shell that
had been placed by the hand against it.
From all this it appears incontrovertible that, as regards the effects to be produced upon batteries by ships, solid shot are decidedly preferable to hollow
..,hot; and the ship that, contemplating the destruction of batteries, should
change any of her long twenty-fonr or thirty-two pound guns for Paixhan
guns would certainly weak.en her armament. Her best missiles, at ordinary
di·4ances, are solid shot ; and, if she can get near, grape shot to fire into embrasures and over the walls. The best shells against the batteries are the seamortar shells, fired at high elevations ; which, being of great weight and falling
from a great height, penetrate deeply; and, contaiuing a considerable quantity
of powder, cause material ravage by their explosion. Such shells, however, can
only be fired by vessels appropriately fitted; namely, by bomb ketches.
The use of these same hollowed shot or shells, by batteries against vessels, is,
however, an affair of a different character. r.rhe shells do not break against
timber; but, penetrating the bulwarks, they, in the first place, would do greater
damage _than solid shot, by making a large hole and dispersing more splinters ;
and havmg, as shot, effected all this injury, they would then augment it many
fold by exploding.
In all cases of close action between ship and battery the shells will pass
through the nearer side ; and, if not arrested by some object on the deck, will
pr bably lodge and explode in the further side, causing by the explosions a
m 1ch greater ~oss among the crew, and greater injury to the vessel, than by
the mere transit across the vessel i as before suggested, the vessel would suffer
le., q injury were her sides made so thin as not to retain the shell, permitting it
t~ pa ~ through both sides, unless fired with a small velocity. It is not impossible t~at an extensive use of these horizontal shells may lead to a reduction in
the thickness of ship's bulwarks. It is unquestionably true, therefore, that the
advantage of this invention or improvement starnls, as between forts and vessels,
~ holl;y on the side of fortifications; as between sailing vessels and steamers, it
is _behev~d to b~, as they are now prepared, on the side of sailing vessels; but
thr: la 't 1s a pomt with which we are not now particularly concerned.
Ar:other invention or improvement of modern days was for a time thought to
offer unportant advantages to vessels in contest with forts; not as making the
fort more valuable, but the vessel less so. It was the substitution of iron for
1:ood as the material of vessels' hulls . Experience thus far, however, is unfa~?o~able. To make the sides of a thickness to repel shot demands great cost
~d involves a material loss of buoyancy, and shot passing through the sides of
n-on "'"essel are apt not merely to make a hole of about their diameter, as through
wo d, but to tear whole plates of iron from their rivets. There is good reason
to uppo e that the use of this material for war vessels has or will be abandoned;
if adher d to, to say the least, it will not lessen the advantages possessed by
fortification.
h conre of the preceding remarks-in discussing the effects upon sea-coa~t
nee, of numerous railroads, and of the use of steamers as war vessels-led
o o many incidental ob ervations on the relative influence of fortifications, that
he _particular point of thi influence has already, perhaps, been sufficiently
e 1dated. 'Ihough the relative superiority of fortifications over any other
H. Ex. Doc. 92-17
1
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suggested means has been often enough asserted in these observations, something more must be said as to their sufficiency for the security of the great interests on our coast. If willing to trust for their sufficiency to the example of
other nations, we should find abunaant proof in the practice of all that ha-re
taken part in or been exposed to the hazards of war. All have resorted to fortifications, and many have, for long periods of time, owed to them alone exemption from some of the worst of its calamities. 'I1he example of other nations at
the present moment, as has before been stated, shows, moreover, that they find
no other satisfactory reliance under the increased energy now given to the instruments of warfare than an increase of the number and an augmentation of the
force of fortifications.
In opposition to this mode of defence much stress is laid on certain guccessful
attacks that have been made by ships on works deemed strong. I have no
doubt that all such results might be accounted for by circumstances independent
of the naked question of relative strength, but at any rate, when carefully considered, how little do these results prove in comparison with numerous other
instances in which there was an immense disparity of force in favor of ve sel:~
that have been signally defeated. These latter instances are those that should
be received as a test of the actual relation between the two kinas of force; not
certainly because they were successful, but because the smaller the works, it~
armament, its g·arrison, the less the probability that any extraneous influence
has been in operation. A single gun behind a parapet, provided its position be
a fair one and the parapet be proof, need, as regaras its contest with ships, 011c
nothing else to the art of fortification; and its effect will be the same whetl1cr
the battery were fresh from the hands of the ablest engineer of the age or ·were
erected at the aawn of the art. 'l'he gun is in a position to be used with cflcc_t:
the men are as fully protected by the JJarapct as the service of the gun will
allow; they are brave and skillful, and there is nothing to prevent them from
doing their duty to the utmost. 'l'llCse are all conditions easily fulfilled, and
therefore likely to be so. The state of things is not lcs just aud fair toward;
the ves"el; she chooses her time and opportunity. 'I1hr battery goes not to the
ship, but the ship to the battery, taking the wind, the tide, the sea-all a · ~be
would have them; her condition and discipline arc perfect, and her crew cour·
ageous and adroit. Nothing, undrr such circumstance , can prevent the ju~·
is ·uc of battle but some extmorclinary accident, po sible indeed to either 1iarty,
but ca.-,ily recognized when occurring.
.
'J'hc contest between larger works and heavy squadrous may be much ID re
complicated affairs; tlie cause of di.-,m1ter to thr former bein°· often traceahle o
potc-11t, though not always o1vion,· influ nc R. 'l'Jic, fortification mny han
ab:-nrdly planned originally, or Laclly executf'<l, for tl1rre ha,-1 at all time" b en
in tl1i. profo~.·ion, a~ i11 othn~, rnnch f-Cope givm to qnackcry; they may h, r
hr •n c·rc•cfril at a time when .·liip:-of-war, again:-t which tlwy were 1irovidcd,
WN<' very diffi,rcnt thing: froin the lofty linc-of-hattl • ;l1ip, of modern tim ,_
Ion~ p •ace or long impunity may have 1 >ft tlwm in a , tatc wholly unprepa
for the . nclcl ·u mw of thc·ir t-trc•ntrtli; th, command rn:iy han! b '11 intru,tcd t
111·r on· ig-11or:mt alih· ot' the mno1111t of po" •r iu their hancl,1, and of th m
of l'.· ·rti. i1_1" it; tl1e ~arri. on may han! bc>c·n nrnli ·eipline<l or mutiu n:-; th
p J ul.t<· · <11 cont •JJtc·d or di loyal; the ·lmnor of frj,rht •11 ·cl citizen. may h,
·•iu cl a pn•m1.ltm' , UJT<·1ul<•r · all thc:e, or :my of thPm maY hav J>r due d
i:-,11 I fl ·in" tlu• <{lit' tion of 1 •lativ«> po v ·r n;1tou ·hc>tl.
.,
\\ hilc tl1l'n :m lL n > d, uht tlmt tlu l' ancl othPr d,•tc·rioratinrr influ nc ,
haY r ·, i n 111: p rntc-d t > t1ic 1m:judicc· of fortification., :mcl th.it t11 ,
like! • to b m r nuuwr u nnd morP ·,mtrnlliiw ·1, thl' work w r m re
fr · it i
rtt in tha th r :m l (• 11 influ nt· • a -iin,,. i;1 a r
r dir j n
tlwm, tliat i t ·a.~ n n mukitw tlwm tro11:; 'rand m r. •ffici nt J1, 1
u,•!Jt t b .
h r c n JJ • JH fay rnbl • inHu •u ·: f u ·h a natur, or
?
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as to make the simple one-gun battery, before mentioned, equivalent to a battery
(say) ten times as large.
.
.
It must not be supposed from what is said in relation to larger fort1ficat10ns
that their magnitude necessarily involves imperfection or weakness, nor because
I have considered small and simple works as affording the best solut~on to the
question of relative force must it be inferred that small works are suited to all
circumstances. I speak here in reference merely to the judgment we are entitled to form of the relative power of these antagonist forces from their contests
a exhibited in history. In instances of the latter sort there cannot, from the ,
nature of the cases, be any important influence operating of which we are ignorant, OT for which we cannot make due allowances, while in examples of the
form.er kind we may be in the dark as to many vital matters.
These observations have been deemed necessary because, in judging of this
matter# it might not be so obvious that certain brilliant and striking results
should not be adopted as affording the true test of relative power. It would be
more natural to turn to Copenhagen and Algiers as indicating where the power
lies, than to Charleston and Stonington, and yet these latter as indices would be
true and the former false.
·
We will now turn to certain examples.
" The name of Martello tower was adopted in consequence of the good defence made by a small round tower in the Bay of Martello, in Corsica, in the
year 1 794, which although armed with one heavy gun only, beat off one or two
B~t:is~ ships-of-war without sustaining any material injury from their fire. But
th1 circumstance ought merely to have proved the superiority which guns on
shore must always in certain situations possess over those of shipping, no matter
ll·hether the fo1mer are mounted in a tower or not. r:rhat this is a just decision
will perhaps be readily allowed by all who are acquainted with the following
e9.ually remarkable, but less generally known fact, which occurred about twelve
year afterward in the same part of the world.
·
« Sir Sidney Smith, iu the Pompee, an eighty-gun ship, the Hydra, of thirtyeight guns, C:tptain Manby, and another frigate, anchored about eight hundred
yards from a battery of two guns situated on the extremity of Cape Lecosa, and
protected from assault by a tower in which were five-and-twenty French soldiere,
commanded by a lieutenant.
u The line-of-battle ship ancl the frigate fired successive broadsides till their
ammunition was nearly expended, the battery continually replying with a slow
hat de tructive effect. 'I1he Pompee (at which ship alone it directed its fire) had
fort_, hot in her hull, her mizzen topmast carried away, a lieutenant, midshiplll.an, and fireman killed, and thirty men wounded. At length, force proving inr:ffec•ual, negotiations were resorted to; and, after some hours parley, the officer,
a Or r.,ican and relative of Napoleon, capitulated. It then appeared that the
carriage of one of the two guns had failed on the second shot, and the gun had
.\lb::,eq_uently been fired lying on the sill of the embrasure; so that, in fact, the
:itta ·k of an eighty-gun ship ancl two frigates had been resisted by a single
piec · of ordnauce."-(,Journal of Sieges, by Colonel John r.r. Jones.)
"Th Corsican tower above mentioned, which had in like manner completely
l1affled a n:1val cannonade, was very soon found to surrender when attaclrnd by
land; not, however, before a small battery had been made (erected) to reduce
it."-(Pai~ley'f:l Oomse, vol. iii.)
Here are two exa~ples: 1 t. A single heavy gun mounted on a tower beat off
011e or wo Briti..h ships; 2cl. A barbette battery, containing two guns, beat off
aBritish ighty-gun ship, supported by two frigates.
I would . cem that no exception can possibly be taken to either instance as
tia.L of relative power. There is no complication of circumstances on one side
fJt t e o her; nothing to confnr-e or mi.l'lkacl; all is perfectly simple and plain .
.\ ~ all b dy of artillery judiciou.Jy l_)O, ted on the shore is attacked by armed
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vessels bearing forty or fifty times as many guns, and the ships, unable to produce any effoct of consequence, are beaten off with loss.
The cases present no peculiar advantage on the side of the batteries, either as
regards position or quality, for both works were immediately reduced by a land
attack- that which the eighty-gun ship and two frigates were unable to effect
being immediately accomplished by landing two :field-pieces with a very small
portion of the crew of one of the vessels. On the other hand, there was no
peculiar disadvantage on the part of the ships, as the time and mode of attack
were of their own choice.
In order that there might be no unjust disparagement of the vessels in the
manner of representing the affairs, the language of British mnitary writers (the
ships being British) has been exactly quoted.-(See Paisley's Course of Elementary Forti:ficatiom, Yol. ii, and Journal of Sieges, by Colonel John T. Jone•.)
Had the representation of these actions been taken from the victorious party,
the result, probably, would have appeared still more to the disadvantage of tl1e
ships.
'l'he circumstances attending the attack and defence of Copenhagen, in April,
1801, have already been briefly stated. A more minute description will be
found in House document No. 206, 1st session, 26th Congress.
I now proceed to examine a great instance of naval success, in which there is
HO room to doubt the extent to which fortifications were engaged.
This instance is the attack on Algiers, in 1816. The attack was made by the combined English and Dutch fleets, mounting about one thousand guns, under the
command of Lord Exmouth.
In the fortifications that looked towards the water there are enumerated, in a
plan su pposcd to be authentic, three hundred and twenty guns; but not more
than two hundred of these could act upon the fleet as it lay, The ratio of the
forces engaged, therefore, as expressed by the number of guns, (saying nothing
of the calibres, of which we know nothing,) was about as five to two. The ac·
tion continued from a 'lnarter before three until nine, without intermission, and
did not cease altogether until half past eleven.
It is very certain that the effect of the :fire upon the Algerine shipping and
town was very severe, because we know that all the shipping was de troyed except some small ve~sels; and ,ve know, also, that Lord Exmouth dictated the
terms of the treaty that followed.
Ilonorable as this result was to the combined fleets, and happy as it wa~ for
tlic cause of humanity, there arc, nevertheless, technical circum, tance~ con]l(~cted with it that excite doubts as to how much of the :final re~ult ·wa' due to
pliy:-ical chm,frcment, to moral eff ct, to inherent defects in the defence:-, and to
ig-11orance in the use of tlie e dcfi•ncc,, such as th y were. That the lo~.: in
killed and wounded. in the city and works wa o-reat i probable, because we are
inform cl that a very great addition ha<l h en ~adr to the o-arri~on, in }H' para·
tion for the atta ·k, under Hom impr ·s:-don. no doubt, that a l:mdino- would be
att<'mptecl. For the .er i c of the gun tlwr w re n eded but thr or four
thou: ancl men a.~ the utmo1-1t. An accumulation beyond that numb r woulll . dd
~otlung to ~he vwor of c1 •frnce: while, by cau:-;ing an increa.. of the ca--~l 1 1 _w_,,ul~ h '1ghtcn tl~ t ·rror. ~f th com?at.
Th . cl yre :si~g. fli t of tl_u I -ot lifp m th lmtt ·r1 · aucl of th Lurnrng of bml<lmo-: w1tlnn th t , n _n
a.hont the mole wa , of cour. r., in -re a.· d Ly th cntir, d •:,truction of th
12' nn
fl t anc-hor •cl within th · mol .
,, hav 110 nwm1 of ,indrring of the actnal condition of th work,· n r
th ir itu ,,., · for the
k of contc11,li11•,. with the h ·aYY. hip~ of mocl m tin
'I h • fort. and batti-ri,
!}1
hon• were probahlj· too !'l -vat •cl t b
mand <l ·wn u: th 1 ri!: tot th· ailing hip ; and, provided th ...:t, !!'llll- v r •cl with a proof par:111 t: tl1 y ma: I, re ,rardNl a: h •iu"" w II 'tu. t •
ut mor' than half th · "'UU 'll'":1',. •d w r in th • _fol •h al b 1tt ry. n
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mude of attack adopted, especially by the Queen Charlotte, of_ on~ hundred ~nd
ten guns, was calculated to test, in the severest manner, the prmc1ples on which
tbis work had been planned. She so placed herself, within "fif~y yards" of the
extremity of this battery, that she could either rake or take m re~erse ever:y
part of it. If she at the same time commanded the battery-that 1s to say, 1f
from her spar-deck she could look down upon its platform-then she must at
once, with her grape and canister, have driven the garrison from that pl~tform,
leaving only the lower and covered tier of guns, if there were such a tier, for
service. With our imperfect knowledge of the fortifications, all this must, however, be left to conjecture.
But there are matters connected with the service of batteries which are not
conj ectllre. Not a shot was fired until the Queen Charlotte had anchOl'ed.
1Vhat a different vessel, when she anchored, might not this ship have been if
the Iolehead battery had employed its fire, of more than one hundred guns, in
raking her from the time she arrived within· a mile and a half until she had anchored within fifty yards! How different might have been the condition of the
fleet, generally, if they had been subjected during the approach, and while assuming their stations, to the raking fire of all the two hundred guns!
It does not appear that a single red-hot shot was fired from the batteries.
We might almost rest on this fact, and assert that a defence w h~ch had failed
o provide itself with this auxiliary means must have been carried on in disregard if not in violation of all rules, all knowledge, and all experience; that it
,vas probably without plan or comLination, and not less probably without preparation m other particulars of importance scarcely inferior.
Before leaving this example it may be we'll to inquire what, after all, was the
effect of these batteries upon the ships, compared with the effect of ships upon
ships.
In the battle of the Nile the French fleet, rated at one thousand one hundred
and ninety guns, caused a loss in Nelson's fleet of eight hundred and ninety-five
killed and wounded, which is in the proportion of ten :E'rPnch guns to less than
eight Englishmen killed and wounded. In the battle of Trafalgar the French
fleet carried not less than three thousand guns, and they caused a loss to the
En~lis~ ~f one thousand five hundred and eighty-seven killed and wounded,
·wlnch 1s m the proportion of ten guns to less than six killed and wounded. In
thi::: affair 0f Algiers, with a force not exceeding two hundred guns, the batteries
c· i...,ed a loss of eight hundred and eighty-three killed and wounded, being in
the proportion of ten guns to forty-four men; and if we take into account every
gnu th~t w~s pointed over the bay, (say three hundred and fifty guns,) the
proportion will be ten guns to twenty-five men; being an effect more than three
ime a great as that produced by the JI'rench ships at the battle of the. Nile,
a d more than four times as great as that produced by the same nation at Traf: gar.
.
\\-bile reflecting on the circumstances of this battle the mind is not satisfied
-irh any reasons that present themsel-ves for the withdrawal of Lord Exmouth,
he moment the land wind enabled him to do so, on the supposition of entire
"-' cce::s on his part. It is not understood why he should feel the great anxiety
he state:-5 himself to have been under that this wind slioulcl spring up. " Providence at thi interval," (between ten and eleven o'clock at night,) "gave to my
a xi u wi ·hes the u ual land wind common in this bay, and my expectations
-ere completed. We were all hands employed in warping ancl towing off, and,
- the help of the light air, the whole were under sail and came to anchor out of
· r •acl1 of :hell. about two in the morning, after twelve h ours of incessant labor."
~ - v if anything had been decided by the action it must have been one of
-o hiug: : either the ships were victorious or the batteries were so. If the
· p ·w ·r · completely victorious it wouid seem to have been judicious for thE>m
r roaiu where they were, in orcler, if there was to be any more fighting, to be
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ready to press thejr advantage, and especially in order to maintain the ascendency, by preventing the remounting of guns,'repairing batteries and re-supplying
them with munitions, &c.
Had the people possessed the inflexibility report ascribed to the Dey, and had
they set zealously about the work of preparation for a new contest, it might not
have been easy for Lord Exmouth, in the condition to which his ships are
acknowledged by authentic accounts to have been reduced, to enforce his
demands. It is not understood, therefore, why, if he had been so successful as
to be certain that his end was attained, he should be so anxious to get ont of
gun-shot, when by so doing he involved the issue in more or less doubt and
hazard.
He relied on the effect produced on the people by his dreadful cannonade,
and the result proves that he was right; but his anxiety to clear the vessels
from the contest shows that there was a power still unconquered, which _he
thought it best to leave to be restrained by the suffering population of the city
th!ln keep in a stat':' of exasperation and activity by his presence. What was
this power but an unsubdued energy in the batteries 1
..
'l'he true solution of the question is, then, not so much the amount of I?Jury
done on the one side or the other-particularly as there was, OB the one side: a
pity to suffer as well as the batteries-as the relative efficiency of the part1eti
when the battle closed at about eleven o'clock.. All political agitation and
popular clamor aside, what would have been the result had the fight been continued, or even hacl tord Exmouth renewed it next morning 1
These are questions that can be answered only on conjecture; but the manner
the battle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts whether, bad the subsequent demands of Lord Exrnouth been rejected, he liad it in his power to
enforce them by his ships; whether, indeed, if he had renewed the fight, he
would not have been signally defeated.
On the whole, this batLle, although it stands pre-eminent as an example of
naval ~ uccess over batteries, presents no argument to shake the confidence
which fortifications, well situated, well planned, and well fought, deserve as the
defences of a sea board.
Gibraltar.-'rbe attack on the water batteries of Gibraltar, in September,
1 782, by the French and Spanish floating batteries, is a well known in tance of
the power of guns on shore.
'l'he e floating batteries had been rendered, as was supposed, shot pruof and
hell proof, by several additional thickne ·ses of timber to the side , and by
COVC'ritw the deck with a roof of sloping timbers.
Th ·y mounted one hundred and forty-two guns on the engaged ..,ide, -with
~· vcnty in reserve to replace any that might Le di mounted. They wer
anchored at the distance of about one thou and yards from the wall , and were
oppo.: ·d b ~ about ighty-five guns .
.1. ftc·r a protracted c:umound
nine of the floatincr batt ric> were burnt h:- Lo
hot from the .-bore, ancl the t ·11th, havi1w becn° taken po ·e ..,ion f by th
vietnr. , wa: i-et on fir· by th •rn.
~ o mnt<·rial injury was don to the ,vork · of the town hy tl1 .,ir fir , and
c•ighty-fin: m ·n and oflic-n.-. w<:rP. killed and wound ·cl Ly the fir from th · ,- -. •L tog •t h ·r with a nry viol •nt cannonacl • ancl bmnbardment from th ' ,i l,att11i . .
Ball/· r!f Alt:r• im . .n thP ith of Jul ·, 1 01, tJ1c :E rc•ncl1 admiral
, ·n · lyi11~ at a11C'hor off th town of Alge·. ira.- with two .-hip~ of i~hty ~ u ..
on f ·n·nt. ·-f ur "1111 • and 1111 fiigat •. 'l th :outh of him. on a ,m: I
i:lancl, wa a bntt<'l-Y, · JI ·d th ( :r •1 n i. lan<l hatt ·1J·, mou11ti110- •v ~n ·~h 0
and tw nt ·-four pound r · and to tl, north of him, on tlu, m, in nn th r
·
tery, ·allc;cl ~t. ,fo 'fJll • ' l,att ry, mountin,,. fiw ·i"'ht · n-p und •r . 'l'h
w ·r , L .id , fi urt u ._paui-.h ,,.uuL at. au ·h r d n · u, makino- to I o t
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hundred and six guns afloat and twelve guns in battery-altogether three hundred
a.nd eighteen guns.
Sir James Saumarez hearing that Leno is was in this position, advanced
against him from Cadiz with two ships of eighty guns, four of seventy-four
guns, one frigate, and a lugger-in all five hundred and two guns. On his a_pproach, Lenois, who was anchored in a line nearly north and south at some chstance from the shore, cut his cables, and ran into shoal water to prevent being
doubled upon by the British line: this manreuvre at the same time entirely unmasked the fire of the batteries.
The Hannibal, one of the British seventy-fours, in attempting to close with
the French admiral, touched the ground and could not be floated off. She, however, continued the fight with great obstinacy, even for a considerable time after
she was deserted by her consorts. Not being able to double upon the :E'rench
line, an attempt was made to assault the Green island battery, which, being
badly served by the Spaniards, had nearly ceased firing.
But this attempt was anticipated by the arrival at the island of a party sent
from the French frigate lying near; and the assault was defeated with the loss
to the English of one boat sunk and another taken-the Frenchmen renewing
~th vigor the fire of the battery. At the north end of the line the French admiral wan aided by seven gunboats, which took so active a part in the fight that
five of them were sunk or rendered unserviceable. rrhe St.Jacques battery being,
h.ow-ev-er, served sluggishly by the Spaniards, the French sent a party from the
De:c;saix to impart greater activity and effect.
After the combat had continued about six hours, the British squadron drew off
greatly damaged, leaving the Hannibal seventy-four alone and aground; and she,
after suffering great loss, was obliged to strike. 1'he French insist that the
Pompee, an English ship of eighty guns, had struck her colors; but as they
could not take possession, she drifted off and was towed away: it is believed she
w-a entirely dismasted.
We do not know the loss in the French squadron, but the killed, wounde<1,
and missing in the English fleet amounted to three hundred and seventy-five
m.e_n; being more than twelve men for every ten guns against them, and being
tWI.ce as great in proportion as the English loss in the battle of 'rrafa1gar.
In this battle of Algesiras there were five hundred and two English guns
afloat acting against three hundred and six French guns afloat. As the English
cho::5e their own time for the attack and had the wind, it is only reasonable to
,uppose that three hundred and six of the English guns were a match for the
thr ·e hundred and six guns of the French vessels. 'l'his will leave one hundred
and ninety-six English guns afloat, opposed to the twelve guns in the batteries;
or, reckoning one side only of each ship, it shows ninety-eight guns in the British fleet to have been overmatched by the twelye guns in the batteries.
There never was a more signal and complete discomfiture, and it will admit of
no other explanation than that just given; namely, that the two small batterieP,
one of five and the other of seven guns, partly eighteen and partly twenty-four
pounder·, more than compensated for the difference in favor of the British fleet
of one hundred and ninety-six guns.
The Hannibal got aground, it is true; but, she continued to use her guns, with
the be;:;t effect, until she surrendered; and even on the supposition that this ship
'lta.3 u~ele . after .,he grounded, the British had still an excess of one hundred
and twenty-two guns over the French fleet and batteries.
The.;:;e LatteriC': were well placed, and probably well planned and constrn~ted,
bu h r, wa nothing extraordinary about them; their condition before the fight
,ras comvlainecl of by Admiral Lenois, and they were badly fought in the ca,rly
part of the action; still th twelve guns on shore were found to be more than
equivalent to two seventy-fours aud one frigate.
1
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Battle if Fucnterabia.-This recent affair introduces steam batteries to our
notice.
On the 11th of July, 1836, six armed steamers, together with two l3ritish and
E1everal Spanish gunboats, attacked the little town of Fuenterabia. The place
is surrounded only by an old wall, and two guns of small calibre, to which, on
the evening of the attack, a third gun of larger calibre was added, formea the
entire of its artillery. The squadron cannonaded this place during a whole day,
and effected absolutely nothing beyond unroofing and demolishing a few poor
and paltry houses, not worth, perhaps, the ammunition wasted in the attack.
What may have been the number of guns and weight of metal which the asflailauts brought is unknown; tho11gh the superiority, independent of the superior
weight of metal, must have been at least ten to one; but not the slightest military
result was obtained.-(See United Service Journal, August 1836, p. 531.)
We will now turn to affairs of a similar character on our own coast.
In June, 1776, Sir I'eter Parker, commanding a squadron of two ships of :fifty
guns, four of twenty-eight guns, two of twenty guns, and a bomb ketch-in all
(according to their rate) two hundred and :fifty-two gum-attacked Fort l\Ioultrie,
in Charleston harbor, South Carolina.
It is stated that the fort mounted "about thirty pieces of heavy artillery.''
Three of the smaller vessels were aground for a time during the action, and ?ne
of them could not be floated off, and was in consequence burnt by the Enghtih.
Deducting this vessel as not contributing to the attack, and supposing the other
two were engaged but half the time, the English force may be estimated at two
hundred guns; or reckoning one broadside only, at one hundred guns againt
thirty guns.
'l'he English were defeated with great loss of life and injury to the ve ~eb;
while the fort suffered in no material degree, and lost but thirty men. The killed
and wounded in the squadron were reported by the commodore to be two hnn·
drcd and :five; being for every ten guns employed against them more th~n
sixty-eight men killed and wounded-a loss more than eleven time a great, m
proportion to the opposiug force, as the loss at the battle of Trafalgar.
In September, 1814, a squadron of , mall vessel., consisting of two ~l1ip and
two brigs, mounting about nin ty gun , attacked Fort Boyer, at the m?uth
of Mobile bay. A false attack was at the same time made by a party of marm ~
artillery, and Indians, on the land side. The fort was very ismall, and could
not have mounted more than twenty guns on all ides, nor more than fifte n g\lfu
on the water fronts. 'l'be action continued between two ancl three hour.:, wh n
one of the ships, being· o injur d as to be unmanageable, drifted a hor undn
the gun , and was abandoned and burnt by the English; the oth r ve.:;.:;cl-- r'·
tr atec1, after uffering severely.
rl here w re ten men killed and wounded in the fort; the los .. on the oth r part
i · not known.
T~1 affair of Stonington, during the la, t war, nffords anotl1cr in,·tanc': --u ·
C<'.', fnl cl fenc . Ly a battery.
In thi: cat:1 there were only two o-un-. (P1d1t
poundc1 ) in a batt ry which wa only thr fo •t hio·h, and without mbrazu .....
The: batt ·ry b i11 00 manned •.·clu:ivc·ly Ly citiz n° volunteer:- from th t
·
n·p<'llecl. a per:- veriug attack of a loop-of-war, cau ino- criou · lo::,.: and dam but . ufl ·rin,,. non·.
11 orcln uot to <·-·tend thi · 1,ranch of tl1P r port fnrthf'r, I b ,,. I :n·
for a c1Ptail1 cl ac ·otmt of the; atta ·1· of thf' Frc·nd1, in l 3 , on the · , l
.J i_m11 • ·110 to tlw_ cl, ·11~11P11t 1, •fore n•f<•rn·cl to.-(Ilou:-- • o . 20 ~
· hth
11gn·-- , p. 2;J.)
I· r th· 111111· r :i. on I al, .. t.1in from introdu ·m!!' . .
, 1h r. i1i--tan · wl1i ·Ii th uzh iut · t> tiu,,. :rnd in..:trn ·tiY ·, , · uld 11 t ... 1
: ff C' t }ip :lr"'llifll'llt.
,
In th· fa ·t '111 ted al ov tl1 r •
x · 1' iu th, ·a c
,ibralt: r.
u t11·
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made proof against cold shot, and, as was thought by the constructor, p_roof
against hot shot also; and so, indeed, for a time, it seemed. It was conceived
that the hot shot, when buried deep in the closely jointed timbers, would
, carcely communicate flame, and that it would not be difficult, by the use of the
fire-engines provided, to subdue so stifled a combustion.
By making these floating batteries impenetrable to shot, it was supposed they
had been rendered equal in perfectly smooth water to land batteries, gun for g·un .
...~nd so they might then have been, nearly, had the incombustibility of the
latter been imparted to them. But now l'esistance to firf: would not s~1ffice;
the...,e :floating batteries must either repel these horizontal shells from thell' _bul'1\-arks, or if that be impossible, permit them to pass though both sides.
K othing can be better calculated to exhibit the tremendous effect of these shells
than a ve sel so thicksided as to stop every shell, allowing it to burst when
nu-rounded by several feet of timber; and there can be no greatrr mistake than
"upposing that, by thickening the bulwarks of vessels-of-war, or fitting up steambatteries with shot-proof sides, the effects of land batteries are to be annulled
or in any material degree modified.
This branch of the subject will be summed up with the remark that the facts
of history and the practice of all warlike nations are in perfect accordance with
the conclusions of theory. 'rhe results that reason anticipated have occurred
a.gain and again. And so long as on the one side batteries are formed of earth
and stone, and on the other, ships are liable to be swallowed up by the element
on which they float, or to be deprived of the means by which . they move-so
long as they can be penetrated by solid shot, set on fire or blown up by hot shot,
or torn piecemeal by shells, the same results must inevitably be repeated at each
succeeding trial.
·
But after all, it may be urged that the general principle herein contended for,
namely, the superiority of batteries in a contest with ships, might be admitted,
and till it would remain to show that batteries constitute the kind of defence
best adapted to our peculiar wants. 'I'his is true; and I will now proceed to consider, severally, the cases to which defence must be applied. It may be well,
h.o'\vever, first to recal the general scope of the preceding argument. It has
been contended that floating defences should not be relied on-not because
they are actually incompetent to the duty, but because they cannot fulfil thjs
d.u y unless provided in inordinate numbers, and at a boundless expense; and I
have endeavored to show that thjs remark is generally true, whether the defen.ive fleet be made up of sea-going vessels, of floating batteries, or of steam batteries. I have next urged the point that properly planned and constructed
ba 1;eries are an overmatch for vessels-of-war, even when greatly inferior to
them in armament-sustaining the opinion by many striking examples, and
ex lai ing sati. factorily instances that have cast any doubt on such contests.
f the facts and reasoning presented do not convey the same strong convictions
way my own mind, it must be because I have obscured rather than illusth·
d th m; for it would seem to be impossible that facts could be more uuexl!e
iouable or reasons more beyond the reach of cavil. However that may be,
I 1.1w leave them to candid and dispassionate revisal, and proceed to examine
th roode of applying these defences to our own coasts.
I may be well to divide these into several distinct classes.
1. 'J.'here will be all the smaller towns upon the coast, constituting a very
erou:.: cla. :.
n
_
he :"ame time that no one of these, of itself, would provoke an enterprise
of :rna.t.•11itude, it is still nece sary to guard each and all against the lesser
·k : A .-mall ve , cl might , uffice to g11ard against single vessels that w~uld
,n 1::, he tempted by the facility to burn the shipping and exact a contn~u; bu .:omcthing more than this i. necessary, since the amount of te:11ptat1011
out l,y a numh r of these towns would be apt to induce operat10rn:1 on a
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larger scale. It might often happen, moreover, that our own vessel -of-war
would be constrained to take refuge in these harbors, and they should find cover
from the pursuer.
Although the harbors of which we now speak afford every variety of form
and dimension, there are few, or none, wherein one or two small forts and batteries
cannot be so placed as to command all the water that a ship-of-war can lie in,
as well as the channel by which she must enter. While the circumstances of
no two of them are so nearly alike as not to modify the defences to be applied to
them severally, all should fulfil certain common conditions, namely: the passage
into the harbors should be strongly commanded; the enemy should find no place
after passing wherein he would be safe from shot and shells; and the works
should be inaccessible to sudden escalade-tbat is to say, a small garrison
should be able to repel such an assault. With works answering to these conditions, and of degrees of strength in accordance with the value of their respective
trusts, this class of harbors may be regarded as secure. I cannot, however, here
avoid asking what would be the mode of defence, if purely naval, of these
harbors 1 Suppose the circumstances are deemed to require the presence of a
fr~gate, or a steam-frigate, or an equivalent in gunboats; would not two ho~tile
frigates or two steam-frigates infallibly arrive in quest 1 Could there be devised
a system more certain to result in the capture of our vessels and the submi ion
of our towns 1
2. Another class will consist of great establishments, such as larger cities, naval
depots, &c., situated in harbors not of too great extent to admit of good defence
at the entrance, and also at every successive point, so that an enemy could find
no spot within in which he could safely prepare for operations ulterior to the
mere forcing an entrance.
In this class are to be found objects that are in every sense of the ?ighe~t
value. On the one hand, accumulations of military and naval matenal, and
structure for naval accommodation that could not be replaced during a war.
which are of indispensable necessity and of great cost; and on t~e other hand._
the untold wealth of great cities. As these objects must be great m the eye· of
t~e enemy-great for him to gain and for us to lose-corresponding ~ffor~:':l on
~IS part must be looked for and guarded against.
If he come at all, it will be
m power; and the preparations on our part must be commensurate.
'l'he entrance to the harbor and all the narrow passes within it must be occupi d with heavy batteries ; and if nature does not afford all the position dceml'O.
requisite, some must, if practicable, be formed artificially. Batterie hould
succ ed each other along the channel, so that the enemy may nowhere find
shelter from effective range of ,.hot and shells while within the harbor'. e.e_n
~10ul~ ~e , ucceed in pa ·sing the first batteries. Provided the shore adrmt th15
d1..,poi:;1t1on, and the defence be suppliPd with an armament uumerou , b ~,Y,
a~d ,. 1 cted with reference to the pffects on hipping, the facts quoted tr m
hi t~ry ,·how that the. e defonc may b r lied on.
If th m re J)a, incr under , ail with a leading wind and tide one or e, n
s t of Latt rie~, and th n carryin · on operation· out of the reach of th
or an_
o.the~, wer al~, the . rn•my might perhaps accompli.·h it; but th ~re~ent ~upp +
hon 1~. that with tlu. cla~:, hi ulterior proc eding , and finally h1 return ar '
b ,_ubJ · ·t to th ince:~m1t a ·tion of the dcfi uccs.
3. Thi: hri110- u: to ·011.-i<l<'r a third cla~ ·, on. i, tino- of c tabliJ1m utimportnucc :itnat '1 at a di:--t: llC'C up .-ome rivrr or ba . ., there b iuo- int •nn ·
. pace too wide to h · ·nmmanclecl fr m the ·hor :. In ,:nch ca:-·:; th d · n
mn..:t b · ucc;ntrat cl upon the· narrow pa::e~, , ncl mu,t, of ·our:- . L Ip rtion cl in nrmam nt to th· vain• nf tlw obj · ·t.: ·over d. 1Vh n the va!u iYf'r • err ·at, a :tout an:,/ of hatt1·ri1·. at th h<·st po. ition woulcl l t ·r ,m ·II
from an att ·m1>t to f r · the pa:. :we . in
hi.: advantao-e, in ca~, f ,u
· ulcl not be comm n.:urat , ith uy immin nt ri--k. But with the m re
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The consequence of succe_ss might

jll~tify all the risk to be encountered in rapidly passing in face of _batteries, however powerful. This condition of things reqnires peculiar precaut10ns under an_y
system of defence. If, after having occupied the shores in the n~rrow pl~ces 111
tb..e best manner with batteries, we are of opinion that the temptation may rnduce
the enemy, notwithstanding, to run the gauntlet, the obstruction of t~e passage
mu...,t be resorted to. By this is not meant the permanent obstruct10:3- of the
pas~age; such a resort, besides the great expense, might entail the rum of the
channel. The obstruction is meant to be the temporary closing by heavy floating masses.
There is no doubt that a double line of rafts, each raft being of large size and
ancho:i:ed with strong chains, would make it impossible to pass _witho~t first
removmg some of the obstructions; and it might clearly be made impossible to
effect this removal under the :fire of batteries. Such obstructions need not be
resorted io until the breaking out of a war, as they could then be speedily formed
should the preparation of the enemy be of a threatening nature.
There would be nothing in these obstructions inconsistent with our use of part
of the channel, since two or three of the rafts might be kept out of line, ready to
move into their places at an hour's notice.
'I he greatest danger to which these obstructio11s would be exposed would be
~om explosive vessels, and from these they might be protected by a boom or a
line of mallcr rafts in front.
From what has just been said, it will be perceived that when the induc~ments
are ucb ?,S to bring the enemy forward in great power, and efficient batten~s can
be established only at a few points, we are not then to rely on them exclusively.
Iu such a_ case the enemy should be stopped by some physical imp?dime:1ts, and
th.e batteries must be strong enough to prevent his removing these impediments;
aud also to prevail in a cannonade, should the enemy undertake to silence the
Works. Not to encumber this report with details in relation to these channel
obstructions, I beg leave to refer for them to the same document 206, page 34.
It may b? repeated here that such expedients need not be resortecl ~o, exeept
to cover O~Jects of the highest importance and value, such as would i_nduce an
enemy to risk a large expedition. l!,or objects of less importance battenes would
afford _ample_protection. It will be remembered that this last power is, whe_n once
esta lu-hed :n any position, a constant quantity, and although it should be mcompetent ~o effect decisive results when diffused over a large fleet, may be an over~atch for any small force upon which it should be concentrated. At t~1e san_ie
tim , ther~fore, that there is the less liability to heavy attack, there will be m
the attenes the greater capacity of resistance to others.
I . mu~t not be urged, as a reproach to fortifications, that in tlrn case we are
eon 1dermg they are obliged to call in aid from other sources, so long as these
ai . s ar cheap, efficient, and of easy resort. By the mode suggested the defence
,nn undoubte~ly be complete, every chance of success being on the side of th_e
def; nc ; that is to say, if any confidence is to be placed in the lessons of experien.ce . How, on the other hand, will the same security be attained by naval means 1
Onl:y! a-: before shown, by keeping within the harbor a fleet or squadron, or whatever 1t may be, which shall be at all times superior to the enemy in number of

gll.Il3.
a naval defence there will be no advantage in obstructions of any sort,_for
th.e
· I: be no lessening of the array of guns in consequence of such obstructwn,
hr:cau~ • if thei, ob 'tructions are under the fire of the floating defenc~s, the enem;y'H
fir t ·.ubdue that fire and then remove the obstructions at his leisure. If this
6re prl)v ~ too powerful for th enemy, the obstructions will have been unnece~a • : and will ,·erve only to shut up our own fleet, preventing the prompt pursmt
i:,f
b · ten fo .
• ,. h re is a fourth class, consisting of harbors, or rather bays or estuaries, of
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such expanse that batteries cannot be made to control the passage. These have
been before spoken of. If the occupation of or passage through these must be
defended, it must be by other means than batteries upon the shore. 'l'he reliance
must, from the nature of the case, be a floating defence of magnitude at lea:-t
equal to the force the enemy may bring. The complete defence of each of tbe.-;e
bays would, therefore, involve very gTeat expense-certainly, in most case&,
greater than the advantages gained. The Chesapeake bay cannot, for instance,
be shut against a fleet by fortifications; and if the entrance of the enemy is to be
interdicted, it must be by the presence of a not inferior fleet to bis own. Instead
of such a system, it will be better to give up the bay to the enemy, confining our
defence to the more important harbors and rivers that discharge into the bay.
By this system not only will these harbors be secured, but the defences ,rill
react upon the bay itself, and at any rate secure it from predatory incursions,
becam~e, as before shown, while Hampton Roads and the navy yard at Norfolk
are well protected, no enemy would proceed up the bay with any less force than
that which could be sent out from the navy yard. In certain cases of broad
waters, wherein an enemy's cruisers might desire to rendezvous in order to
prosecute a blockade or as a shelter in tempestuous weather, there may be p~~itions from which sea-mortars cab. reach the whole anchorage, although nothmg
could be done with guns. A battery of sea-mortars, well secured from escalade.
would in such a case afford a good defence, because no fleet will lie at anchor
within the range of shells.
In thus distributing the various exposed points of the sea-coast into general
classes, according to the most appropriate modes of defence, we do not fin_d that
anything can be substituted for fortifications, where fortification are apphcablr.
and we find them applicable in all the classes but the last, and in the la ·t ve
shall find them indispen, able as auxiliaries. In this last class there are, no doubt
some cases where naval means mu ' t constitute the active and operative force; and
it is probable that steam batteries may, of all floating defences, be most uitable.
as before stated.
Before proceeding to a specification of the positions on our coast reqnirin~
fortifications, something more should be ..,aid on the general ubject, though on
another branch, namely: the proper magnitude and strength to be giYcn t
these fortifications .
The present system ifl founded on this principle, to wit: That the fortifications houlcl be strong in proportion to the value of the objects to be ·ecured.
The principle will not, I suppose, be controverted, although the mode of applying it may be.
There will hardly be n difference of opinion a to the mode of guanling th
le.: important points. There beiug no great attraction to an enemy work:
:impl in thrir fratures, rc•quiring· ftmall garri. ou only, containinrr a mod rat
armmn •nt, hut at th same time inacce::i:;ible to th <la hincr eut rpri~ ·:, tl_i •
,·hip.· ·an .·o ea:sily land, a.ncl which can be per e,·ered in for a f w l10u1: ,
rnnc·lt yjrror, will :-1ufficc.
~ircum:-ltan · ,, mn:-lt, howev •r, materially moth Y h
propc•rtic·.~ of thc::-:c worki-1, even wh ·n the poiutH to bC' guarded ar of qual
In rm , th cli:advautag- of po.·itio11 muHt b cornp<>n:-:atccl b gr ·atcr pow
auc,th •r, natural :-:trc·ngth may n ·c·d littlt: aicl from art; in m10thcr, gr•: r ,
in the gnardc·d chaum·l may dc·mancl a lar•r r armament; and in a u
pc ·ulinr .,_ ·po ... ur, to foncl attack may e.·act mur • than u ual inacc ,-;-.ibili ::
all th ... rnri1 tiP lie ~\·itliiu_ limit. that will probably b ·one d ·cl.
\ t th larg ·r nhJP ·t , it Jin. l,c·c·n cont ·ndc·cl that th re ha b en
tion in d vi ing w rk. to · n· •r tlu c> the: work haviurr
n calculat d
f rmidabl alt l ·k than tl1 ·: will h . ·po· ·cl to.
1 t j, n · to utt ·r ·a!!'ll 1·1iti ·i tn of thi: natur ancl it i:, not , ,v
t1wm without goill'~ int) an .·nminntion a minul. :1. if th' critickm, ·w
11r · i • ancl l' rtiu nt.
T

r:
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But let us look a little at the material facts.

What is the object of an enemy 7

'What are his means 7 What should be the nature of our defences 7

·

The object m::ty be to lay a great city under contribution, or to destroy one
of our naval depots, or to take possession of one of our great harbors, &c.
It was estimated that in the great fire in the city of New York in the
,ear 1835, the property destroyed within a few hours was worth upward of
017,000,000, although the fire was confined to a very small part of the city, and
did not touch the shipping. Is it easy, then, to estimate the loss that would
accrue from the fires that a victorious enemy could kindle upon the circuit of
that great city, when no friendly hand could be raised to extinguish them 7 or
is it easy to overrate the tribute such a city would pay for exemption from that
calamity? Can we value too highly the pecuniary losses that the destruction
of one of the great navy yards would invoke 7 and the loss beyond all pecuniary
,alue of stores and accommodations indispensable in a state of war, and that a
state of war could hardly replace 1
But what are the enemy's means 7 They consist of his whole sea-going
force, which he concentrates for the sake of inflicting the blow.
"From the nature ef maritime operations, such a fleet could bring its wlwle
strength to bmr upon any partzcular position, and by threatening or assailing
1:arious portions qf the coast, eitlier anticipate the tardy movements ef troops
upon land and effect the object before th,eir concentration, or render it necessary
to keep in service a force far superior to that ef the enemy, but so divided as to
be inferior to it on any one po-int."*
We have, then, objects of sufficient magnitude, and the means of the enemy
coneist in the concentration of his whole force upon one of these objects.
With the highest notion of the efficiency of fortifications against shipping,
these are not cases where any stint in the defensive means are admissible.
Having, therefore, under a full sense of the imminent danger to which the great
objects upon the coast are exposed, applied to the approaches by water an array
of obstacles worthy of confidence, we mnst carefully explore all the a-,enucs by
land, in order to guard against approaches that might be made on that side in
order to evade or to capture the works guarding the channels.
But before deciding on the defences necessary to resist these land attacks, it
will be proper to estimate m0re particularly the means that an enemy may be
expected to bring forward, with a view to such land operations.
History furnishes many examples, and' the expedition to Flushing, commonly
called the W alcheren expedition, may be cited as peculiarly instructive.
From an early day N apolcon had applied himself to the creation of a maritime
force in the Scheldt; and in 1809 h e had provided extensive dockyards and
naval arsenals at Flushing and at Antwerp. On his invasion of Austria that
~·ear he had drawn off the masses of his troops that had before kept zealous
rnkh over these naval preparations, relying now on forts and batteries, and on
the fortifications of Flushing and Antwerp for the protection of the naval
c~tabli..hmcnt, and of a fleet containing several line of battle ships and frigates
and a numerous flotilla of smaller vessels.
The great naval establishment at Flushing, near the mouth of the Scheldt,
and of Antwerp, some sixty or seventy miles up the river, with the vessels
afloat on the 1·ivcr or in progress in the yards, presented an object to England
worthy of one of her great efforts.
The troop embarked in this expedition consisted of upwards of thirty-three
ho rand infantry, three thousand cavalry, more than three thousand artillery,
and ~ome hundred of sappers and miners, constituting an army of about forty
hou·and men.
o Mr. Secretary Cass.
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rrhe naval portion consisted ·of thirty-five sail of the line, twenty-three frigates,
thirty-thn.e sloops-of-war, twenty-eig·ht gun, mortar, and bomb vessels, thirtysix smaller vessels, and eighty-two g·unboats, making a total of one hundred
and fifty-five ships and other armed vessels, and ejghty-two gunboats. The
guns, mortars, &c., provided for such bombardments and sieges as the h'oops
might have to conduct, amounted to one hundred and fifty-eight pieces, with
suitable supplies of ammunition and stores of every kind.
'fiie idea of sailing right up to their object, in spite of the forts and batteries,
seems not to have found favor, notwithstanding the power of the fleet. The
plan of operations, therefore, contemplated the landing a portion of the army on
the island of Walcheren, to carry on the siege of Flushing, while another portion
proceeded up the Schelclt, as high as Fort Bartz, which was to be taken; after
which the army would push on by land about twenty miles further and lay
siege to Antwerp, all of which it was th ·mght might be accomplished in eighteen
or twenty days from the first landing.
The execution did not accord with the design. Flushing, it is true, was reduced within fifteen days ; and in less than a week from the debarkation (which
was on the 31st of July) Fort Bartz was in possession of the English, havi~u
been abandoned by the garrison. Bnt it was twenty-five days before the marn
body, with all necessary supplies for a siege, were assembled at this point and
ready to take up the line of march against Antwerp. Since the first descent of
the British matters had, however, greatly changed.
.
The French were now in force; they had put their remaining defences m
good condition; they had spread inundations over the face of the country; and
not only would there be little chance of further success, but the safety of the
expedition, formidable as it was, might have been compromised by a furt_hcr
advance; it was therefore d ecided in council to abandon the movement agam~t
Ant,verp ; the troops accordin~;ly returned to the island of '\V alcheren, which
they did not finally leave till the end of December.
1.,he failure in the ultimate object of the expedition is to be ascribed to the
omission to seize, in the first instance, the south i:-hore of the river ancl caphrre
the batteries there, as was originally designed, and which was prevented by the
difficulty of landing enough trool_Js at any one• debarkation in the bad w atber
then prevailing. 'I,he capture of the e batteries would have enaLled the exp ·
dition to have reached Fort Bartz during the first week; aud, in the then
unprepared state of the l!·\·ench, the issue of a da,"h upon Antwerp can hardly
be doubted.
Thr dreadful mortality that as ailed the British army i wholly unconnect
with the plan, conduct, or is,·uc of the entcrpri:w a,· a military moYcment; unk '•
indeed, it may have fru:trated a scheme for occupying the i:,land of W alcher
a a poi-ition durincr the war.
Po. ·.·e;-;. ion ,va held of the i~land for five month ; and it wa· finally aba~donr.cl, from no prc~.-nr · upon it by th, French; althoucrh, after the fir--t
w C'k:-, th Briti. h force con, i:tccl, in th :t"'crr •rntc, of le~, than ' ,. •u 1
thou:a11,l men, of 1d1fr.:h, for the grea.ter rm.rt
the time, more than half w
. ick- ·fli ·tivc~ lH'i11cr often reclncC'cl lwlow fiv, thou:-and m •n.
'\Y . ' th rl'forc, that an ,•fli.•('tiv, fore of le·:-. than t •n thou and ID ll m intaincd JI :. c· ·:-ion of t1H· i la11cl i11 the fo ·e of, ancl in ·lo. c pr ~·imityto, th m ·
fonni<labl militarv JJOW<·r h1 Enrop for mor than tlir c month-.. • nd .1
rea-.on c·an lw p ·re· iw«l why it mi<>ht n t hav • r main cl an ind •fiuit" p ·
whil po . . ..., cl of nnval 111wri11rity.
'l h proximity of Lncrlan<l uurl ubte Hy 1 · n d th
p n of th .·p ltI
1 ut it foflu n · ·d the r · ul ill 11<1 oth •r wav 111, t ·rial to th• ar!!um ut.
I will allud • to IHI thC'r i11 lllJC'1. of J;u:,,. • <'.-p<'ditio11
nt li: the ·:ndi,h
<Ji tant ountri th, n th tw . p diti n , P'l ·h , f ah ut t n th u,nnd m
•nt. in t11c y ar 1 1 , n'" in. thi · uutr ·-on h · th"
1
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othe1· to the Gulf of Mexico. United, in a single force of twenty thousand men
against our sea-coast, the expense would have been less and the result more
certain.
The French, notwithstanding their constant naval inferiority, have found
opportunities to embark. in great undertakings of the same natl:re. In 1802
Leclerc proceeded to St. Domingo with thirty-four line of battle ships and large
frigates, more than twenty small frigates and sloops, and upw~rds of twe~ty
thousand men. We learn from these points in history what constitutes an obJect
worthy of vast preparations, and it is impossibl~ to resist the fact _th~t. our own
coast and rivers and bays possess many establishments not less mv1tmg to an
eaemy than Flushing and Antwerp.
We are taught, moreover, what constitutes a great expedition; in other words,
what is the amount of force we must prepare to meet. And, more than all, we
are taught that such an expedition, seizing a favorable moment when the military
arrangements of a country are incomplete, when the armies are absent or imperfect in their organization or discipline, does not hesitate to land in the face of
the most populous districts; and availing of the local peculiarities, and covered
and upplied by a fleet, to undertake operations which penetrate into the country
and consume considerable time.
It seems, therefore, that whenever the object we are to cover possesses a value
likely to provoke the cupidity of an enemy, or to stimulate his desite to inflict a
serious blow, it is not enough that the approaches by water are guarded against
hi~ ships; it will be indispensable to place safeguards against attacks by land
aJ~o. A force considerable enough for very vigorous attacks against the land
sides of the fortifications may be thrown upon the shore; and, if these yield, a
way is opened for the ships, and the enemy carries his object.
In certain positions the local circumstances would favor the land operations
of an enemy, permitting him, while operating against the fortifications, to be
aided by the fleet and covered from the reaction of the general force of the
country. In other positions the extreme thinness of the population in the
neighborhood would require the forts to rely for a considerable time solely on
th.eir own strength. In all such cases a much greater power of resistance would
be requisite than in circumstances of an opposite nature. In all such circumstances the works should be of a strength adequate to resist an attack, although
persevered in vigorously for several days. But when these land operations lead
a~ay from the shipping, or when the surrounding population is considerable, or
-when considerable numbers of volunteers or regulars can be speedily drawn in
by ..:teamers or railroads, or the enemy is unable to shelter his movements by
local peculiarities, then it will suffice if the work can withstand vigorous attacks
for a few hours only.
. The mag:nitude and strength of the work will depend, therefor~, on the joint
lnfluence of the value of the objects covered, the natural strength of the position,
and the succor to be drawn from the country. ,Ve may introduce, as instances,
.1:~ ew _York and Pensacola.
The former is as attackable as the latter; that is to
ay, it equally requires artificial defences; and, owing to its capacious harbor
and ea:-y entrance, it is not easy to place it in a satisfactory condition as to the
ap roaches by water. But, while an enemy in approaching any of the principal
,,rork: Ly land could not well cover himself from the attacks of the concentrated
population of the vicinity, the rapid means of communie;ation from the interior
would daily bring great accession to the defence. A land attack against the
ci y mu~t con. equently be restricted to a day or two, and the works will fulfil
their ouj ct if impregnable to a coup de main.
Pen.:,acola, an object in many respects of the highest importance, and growing
in con:::eq_uence every day, is capable of being defended as perfectly as the city
~ru: m ·ntioned_. rrhc principal defences lie on a long sandy island which closes
ln. the harbor from the sea. An enemy landed on this island (Santa Rosa) would
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be in uninterrupted communication with his fleet, could, owing to the sparseness
of its population, have nothing to apprehend for some time from any reinforcements arriving at the place, and would be well protected by position from the
effects of this succor when it should arrive.
While in possession of naval superiority, he might, therefore, not unreasonably calculate on being able to press a siege of many days of the work which
occupies the extremity of the island and guards the entrance to the harbor. And
even before coming into possession of this work, his gun and mortar batteries on
the same island could destroy everything not bomb-proof and incombustible at
the navy yard.
An attack not less persevering, and with equal chances of success, might be
made from the other side of the harbor also.
If, therefore, the power to resist a coup de main be all that is conferred on
the works at Pensacola, their object will be attained only through the forbearance of the enemy, it being obviously indispensable that the principal of these
works be competent to resist a short siege. If this liability resulted from the
thinness of the neighboring population, it would still be many years before this
state of things would be materially altered.
But it does not depend on this alone: the peculiar topographical features will
continue this liability in spite of increasing numbers and ever so easy and rapid
communication with the interior, it having been proved that a fleet may lie broad
off this shore and hold daily communication therewith during the most tempe
tuous seas0n. 'l'he Engfo;h fleet of men-of-war and transports lay, during the
last war, from February 7 to March 15, 1814, anchored abreast of Dauphin
island and Mobile Point, where the exposure is the same as that off Pensacola.
B etween the cases cited, which may be regarded as the class of extreme cases,
(a class comprising, however, many important positions,) almost every conceivable
modification of the defence will be called for to suit the various conditions of the
several points.
'rhe fortifications of the coast must therefore be competent to the double ta:--k
of interdicting the passage of ships and resisting land attacks-two distinct and
independent qualities. The first demands merely an array, in suitable number:
and in proper proportions, of heavy guns covered by parapets proof again t ~hot
and shell~; the second demands inaccessibility. As there i. nothing in the :f ot
quality necessarily involving the last, it h:u, often happen<>d, either from the
little value of the po.'ition or from the suppo:-;ecl improbability of a la~d attac~or from the want of time to construct proper works, that this property of macce:n·
l,ility has been neglected.
·whenever we have an object of sufficient value to be covered by a battery.
we . houl<l bear in mind that the enemy will know the value of the ohj ect , well a our, <'lvc ; that it i a very ea y thing for him to land a party of ~en
for an <'xprditiou of an hour or two; ancl unle we take the necc ~ary preventffe
mca:-um hi.- party will b
nr to take the battrry fir;-;t, after which nothiu~
will pr ·vent hi vc. chi con ummating the design it wa the purpo..,e of th
hattc·ry to prevent. In general, the ame fortification that guard the ,~:at r
approach<·.~ will protect th avcmm by land also; but in certain ca · ~ a fore
may be . o Janel cl a to rvad th<' channel defence. , rcachino- th objc•ct Ly a
route ntirc-1 · inland.
f cour.·e tl1i. dan"'Cr mu~t b o·nardr d ao-ain::-t bv uit ·
l,l · work. wiwm·v<'r tli · JH'OJll' annot come promptly to th re, cue.
·
After the pr c ·c1i11g c.·po::-ition of view:-< on the general . uhj ct of the defcn of th coa. t, it maY not hP ont of place her to indicate the mod by which th
y t ·m of f'ortifie:tti nn. ·an he 111:nnwcl nncl , crvecl without an angmentati n r
that particular pnrpo::-r , of th,, rc•gnJar nrmy.
. ..
r 'Ji for ·c~tlrnt ·houlcl h1; ·mpln:nd for thi . cn-ic in time of war is the m1hua.
(l~,;ino- th· t rm in.' compn·lll'JJ, iv· . c·n.- ,,) th probability b iug that. i_n m_f th • cl f ·ud •d p mt · on th
''lhoar l, th uniform d and volunteer compam 0 •
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will supply the garrisons needed; and it may be shown that ~t is a service to
which militia are better adapted than to any other. 'l'he promment defect of a
militia force results from the impossibility of so training the men to field mov~ment~ in the brief period of- their service, as to give them any confidence m
themselves as manreuvrers in the face of regular troops. The little they learn
merely suffices to show them that it is but little; every attempt of the kind
proving, by the disorders tha,t they know not how to avoid, how much greater
would be the disorder if in the face of an enemy and under fire.
Without the knowled()'e to be obtained only by long and laborious practice,
the militiaman feels that
is no match, in the field, for the regular soldier, and
it would not be surprising should he desire to avoid an encounter. But there is
no rnch difficulty in the service of fixed batteries; the militiaman has there to
be taught merely the service of a single gun, than which nothing can be more
"'imple. He must learn to use the rammer, and the sponge, the handspike, and
the linstock ; to load and to run to battery, to trail and to fire; these are all.
Each of these operations is of the utmost simplicity, depending on individual
action and not on concert, and they may all be taught in a very short time.
There is no manamvring, no marching, no wheeling. The squad of one gun
may be marched to another, but the service of both is the Bame. Even the art
of pointing cannon is to an American militiaman an art of easy attainment, ,from
the skill that all our countrymen acquire in the use of fire-arms, "drawing sight"
or "aiming" being the same art, modified only by the difference in the gun.
The mode of applying this force may be illustrated by the case of any of our ·
cities on the seaboard. The forts and batteries being put in perfect condition~.
,_hould be garrisoned by a small body of regular artillery, such as a moderate
military force could supply, and sufficient for the preservation of the publi.c:
property, and to afford indispensable daily guards. 'l'o these should be added
two or three men of the ordnance department, especially charged with the condi ion of the armament and ammunition, and two or three engineer soldiers, .
wLose sole duty it would be to attend to the condition of the fortifications, keepin;; every part in a state of perfect repair. In certain imiiortant works, however, .
that would be liable to a violent assault, or exposed to siege, or to analogous .
operations, it would be necessary, especially on the approach of a war, to keep
up a more considerable body of regular troops. 'rhe volunteer force of the city
..,hould then be divided into d!';tachments, if possible, without disturbing their
company organization, and should be assigned to the several work~ according to
the war garrisons required at each-from four to six men, according to circum~tance:: , being allowed to each gun. rrhe larger works might require ten, fifteen,
or eYen twenty companies ; the smaller ones, two, three, or more companies; . and
in ::ome cases even a platoon might suffice. Being thus occupied, each por-.
ti n of the city force would have its definite alarm post, and should be often.
ta -en to it and there exercised in all the duties of its garrison, and more
e ecinlly in the service of its batteries, and in its defence against assault.. 'l'he
1
ltipli<-i ty of steamboats in all the cities would enable the volunteers to reach
ev n he most distant alarm posts in a short time. In order that all these troops
u J- become expert in their duty, one of the works most convenient to the city,
b ~-id 1 ·ing th, alarm post of some particular portion of the volunteers, should,
during peace, be the ordinary school of drill for all; and in this the detachments
~
u1 in tum· a ·semblc and exercise.
B ~-ide the mere manual of the gun and battery, there should be frequent
:rg ~ practice, a· being not only necessary in teaching the proper use of the
ery, hut as imparting intere t and excitement to the service.
1t micrht be neces. ary for a time to submit the volunteers to the drill of a
t<'ut 01:ic:er or non-commi;"t:1ionecl officer of the regular artillery ; and in
i ·ular, to conduct the practic<' with shot and shells under such inspection.

lie
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The portion of the military force of the city not stationed in the fixed batteries would constitute, ·under an impending attack, a reserve posted either in one
or several bodies, according to circumstances, ready to cover exposed points,
to co-operate in offensive movements, or to relieve exhausted garrisons: this
portion having- connected with it the mounted force, the field artillery and the
heavy movable guns.
This appropriation of the volunteer force to the immediate defence of the city,
would operate in the most favorable way upon that force; superadding to the
impulses of patriotism, every feeling connected with family property and social
and civil relations; and while making military service the first of duties, relieving it of hardship and privation.
'.rhe organization of volunteer force here contemplated may comprehend the
whole maritime frontier, and be applicable, also, at the more populous points
upon the inland borders.
'.rhis arrangement, while it might be an enduring one, would be the least expensive by far of any that would be efficient.
'l'he days of exercise drill and encampment should be fixed and invariable,
in order that they may the less interfere with the private occupations of the
volunteers. During an impending attack, greater or less portions should be cons tautly at their posts; but still the service in the batteries would comprise but
a very small portion of the year.
.
According to the value of the interest to be defended, and the extent of the
works to be occupied., would be the rank of the chief command; which should
be intrusted to an officer of the regular army, whose control might often be extended, advantageously, over a certain extent of seaboard to the right and left,
constituting a maritime department.
'l'he existing fortifications of the sea-coast-includjng a few useless remain5
of the revolutionary works, are due to three distinct epochs, namely : 1. Tho~c
that grow out of the political ngitations attending the French revolution of] 7L9,
and the wars consequent thereon. As all the principal harbors had to be protecteil
at once, the contracted fi, cal means of the country required that the works should
be small; and they were also generally of a temporary character; but they
proved sufficient. :France, then a weak naval power, was moreover fully occupied ut home, and in pressjng her continental campaign.
.
2. On the approach of tbe war of 1812, the ·obvious inadequacy of exi ·trn~
forts led to large appropriation for fortifications, so that when the war brokr
out there ·was not a town of any magnitude upon the coast not provided w_ith
one or more batteries. Every place within the reach of an enemy's mnrandrn~
e,·peclitions called for thi · kind of protection; and there is no doubt that the ckfi •ncc· supplied, aved the country from great los 'CS . 'l1hese defence of the
second system were al o small and weak, and beiug built for the sake of pre~rn•
economy, of cheap rnat<'rial and workman hip, were very peri:-habl . Th
g v rnmc•nt, aware of this wcakne...,,, called out to their ·upport, during the war.
va t boclie of militia at normou exp n c-covering the e troop~ with cxtcniv line~ of fi Id-work .. .
. The war with England bcino- over, the governm nt promptly entered upon
, perman<:1d y.·tem of c a.-t cl ·f •nc , and to that nd con 'tituted a hoard of engin ' r..;, with in ·tructions to mak xamination and plan,', ubject to th<: r \'i-ion of th· thic•f c·11gin ·('r, Hnd th .:auction f th '<'cr•tary of ·war. And it ithi:, th· third y.-t ·m, that ha.· uc·cn vc·r ·inc 1 16 in th, cour 'C of ._·peuti n,
ancl i. now, a w • . hall .- 'C', w ·11 advanc· cl.
"\Yh ·n ·Yer th' ·.·aminatiou: of the hoard of nrri1H·1·r:·k 'arch-, naval clcp t , CC'., n:n-. 1 ofli · ·1-.. of rank and
·iat d , ith th ·m.
'l'h b arcl d ,,. t ·d cnral · ar · u interrupt dly to th cluty-pr · •ntinz-n ·
ive r port , and ubmittinrr-, fir ·t, pl n of the fortifi ation n d •d t the
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Afterward, they w~re ~ufficiently in _advance of the _execution of the system to apply most of the1r time to the duties ~f construction,
giving in occasionally additional reports and plans .. In ~-are cases it h_as hap}?ened
that plans have been made under the particular d1rection of the chief engmeer,
O\\,-ing to the difficulty, at moments, of drawing the widely dispersed members
of the board from their individual trusts.
The board and the chief engineer arranged the defences into cla~ses, according
to their view of the relative importance of the proposed works, m the order of
time. This order has been generally well observed in the execution of the system, with the exception of some cases in which, by the action of Congress, certain forts were advanced out of the order advised by the board.
~-,or many years gran,ts for fortifications were made, annually, by Congress in
agross sum, which was apportioned according to the discretion of the President.
But since March 3, 1821, the appropriations have been specific, the grants for
each work being particularly stated. }"'or many years every new fortification
ha~, before being made the object of appropriations, been sanctioned by a special
act of Congress upon recommendation of the military committee.
The classes are as follows, giving now merely the names of forfs and places:
the cost, armament, &c., of the several works executed or projected will be given
at the end in proper tables.
Cl ass A includes certain old works of the first and second systems. Some
of these are already repaired, some undergoing repairs, and some subject to repair, should a war impend before better works shall have been substituted.
Fort Sullivan ........................ Eastport, Maine.
Edgecomb ...................... Wiscasset, Maine.
Preble ......................... Portland, Maine.
Scammel .... ~ .................. Portland, Maine.
~IcClary ....................... Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
Constitution .................... Portsmouth, New Hampshire.
- - - - - ..................... Gloucester, Massachusetts.
Pickering ...................... Salem, Massachusetts.
Lee ........................... Salem. Massachusetts.
Sewall .... .................... Marblehead, Massachusetts.
Independence .................. Boston harbor, Massachusetts.
Winthrop ...................... Boston harbor, Massachusetts.
West Head Battery ............. Governor's Island, Massachusetts.
Southeast Battery .............. Governor's Island, Massachusetts.
- - - - - - ..... . ............ New Bedford, Massachusetts.
Wolcott ....................... Newport, Rhode Island.
Greene ........................ N ~wport, Rhode Island.
Trumbull .. .................... New London, Connecticut.
Hale .......................... New Haven, Connecticut.
Columbus ...................... Governor's Island, New York.
Ca tle Williams ................ Governor's Island, New York.
South Battery .................. Governor's Island, New York.
Gibson ...... .................. Ellis's Island, New York.
Wood ......................... Bedlow's Island, New York.
Richmond ..................... Staten Island, New York.
T ompkins ......... . .... ....... Staten Island, New York.
'8at cry Rud on ..................... Staten Island, New York.
Iorton .... .......... .... ...... Staten Island, N cw York.
l'o
fay tte ...................... Narrows, New York harbor.
~ iffiin ........................ Delaware river, Pennsylvania.
cHenry ...................... Baltimore harbor, Maryland.
adi on ....................... Annapolis, Maryland.
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Fort Severn ........................ Annapolis, Maryland.
Washington ................... Potomac river, Maryland.
Johnson ....................... Cape }-,ear river, North Carolina.
Castle Pinckney .................... Charleston harbor, South Carolina.
]Tort Moultrie ....................... Charleston harbor, South Carolina.
Battery ............................ Beaufort, South Carolina.
Fort Jackson ....................... Savannah river, Georgia.
Marion ........................ St. Augustine, Florida.
Barrancas . . . . . . . . . . . .......... Pensacola, Florida.
St. Philip ...................... Mississippi river, Louisiana.

Class B includes new works (third system) completed, or so nearly completed as to be able to use all or ne:;irly all their batteries, viz:
Fort Warren ....................... Boston harbor, Massachusetts.
Adams ........................ Newport, Rhode Island.
Schuyler ...................... Throg's Neck, New York harbor.
Hamilton ..................... New York harbor, New York.
Monroe ....................... Old Point Comfort, Virginia.
Macon ........................ Beaufort, North Carolina.
Caswell ....................... Oak Island, North Carolina.
Pulaski ..................•.•.. Cockspur Island, Georgia.
Pickens . . . . . . . • • . • • • .. . . . ...... Pensacola, Florida.
McRee • . . . . . . • • .. . . .....••... Foster's Bank, Florida.
Morgan .....................•.. Mobile Point, Alabama.
Pike . • . . . . . ............ , ... Rigolets, Louisiana.
Macomb (formerly Wood) ........ Chef Menteur, Louisiana.
Battery Bienvenue, Bayou Bienvenue, Louisiana.
Tower Dupre, Bayou Dupre, Louisiana.
Fort ,Jack son ...................... Mississippi river, Louisiana.
Livingston .................... Barrataria bay, Loui. iana.

Class C includes works now under construction, and more or less advanced,
viz:
Fort Knox .......................... Bucksport, Maine.
Delaware . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... Delaware river, D la ware.
arroll ........................ Soller's Point, :Maryland.
alhoun ....................... Hampton road., Viro-inia.
, umter ........................ Charle ton harbor, South Carolina.
1inch ......................... Cumberland , ound, Georgia.
Ta lor ........................ Key \V ·t, Florida.
J ff •r:--on . . . . . . . . . ............. Garden Key, Tortuga , Florida.
R don 1 t f Fort ananc:v ............ Pen, acola, Florida.
:E ort ain ......................... Dauphin Island, labama.

la . D in ·lmlc worh~ the fir t to be commr.nc cl, arranO'e<l in 0-eographic:1I
ord r, viz:

fr •1111 •

·k riv "r, and •ort 'camm ·I (n ·w.) Portland h. rbor.
oint, Ii rbl h d ·
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Fort on Sandy Hook Point, New York.
Fort on 'l1homas's Point, Patuxent river, Maryland.
~'"'ort at Proctor's Landing, Louisiana.
1Vorks at Galveston bay, and Brazos Santiago, Texas.

Cl ass E includes works to be commenced after those in Class D, in geographical order, viz:
New Fort Preble, Portland harbor Maine.
Works at Gloucester; Closing Broad Sound Pass, Boston harbor; works at
Gurnet Point, Plymouth, Massachusetts.
Works at Cedar Point, Potomac river, Maryland.
Works at Georgetown, and in Port Royal roads, South Carolina.
Works on Tybee island, Savannah river, Georgia.
Tower at Pass au Heron, Alabama.
Fort at Ship island, Mississippi.
·
Works at Pa~sa Cavallo, Matagorda bay, Texas.
Class F includes works to be commenced last of all, also in geographical
order, viz:
Works at Eastport harbor, Machias, Mount Desert island, Castine, St.
George's bay, Damariscotta bay, Broad bay, Sheepscot bay, Hog Island channel, (Portland harbor,) mouth of Saco river, mouth of Kennebunk river, York,
Maine.
.
"'\V OI'ks at Newburyport, Beverly, Nangus Head, (Salem,) Fort Sewall, (Marblehead,) Nantasket head, (Boston harbor,) redoubt on Hog islancl, (Boston:
har01·,) Nantucket, Edgartown, Falmouth, Holmes Hole, Tarpaulin Cove, Massachusetts.
"'\V OTks at Oananicut island, and works closing west passage of N arraganset
roads, Rhode Island.
Fort Griswold, (New London,) works at mouth of Connecticut 1·iver, Fort
Hale and Fort Wooster, (New Haven,) Connecticut.
Works for harbors and towns between New Haven and New York ; works in
Gardiner's bay, Long Island sound; works in Sag Harbor; fort 011 Wilk.ins's
Point, Long Island; redoubt in advance of Fort Tompkins, Staten island, New

York.
Fort at Delaware breakwater, Lewes; Fort opposite Fort Delaware, Delaware
riYer, D elaware.
Fort on Elk river; works on Hawkin's Point, below Baltimore; fort on Point
Patience, Patuxcnt river; works at St. Mary's, Potomac river, Marylaud.
"\York at Bald Head and Federal Point, Cape .Fear river, North Carolina.
"'\.York. at mouth of ~antce river, Bull's bay and other inlets, Stono sound,
~ ~ orth Edisto s0und, South Edisto sound, St. Helena sound, South Carolina.
\Vorks at Wassaw suuncl, 01:,sabam sound, St. Catherine's sound, Sapelo
sound, Doley inlet, Altamaha sound, St. Simon's sound, St. Andrew's sound,
Georgia.
\Vorks at Charlotte harbor, 'l'ampa bay, Appalachicola bay, Appalachie ba.y,
t. Jo. eph' bay, Santa Rosa bay, Florida.
~ ork., at Pcrdido bay, Alabama.
B ·ing arranged in the precediug classes , on the principles before stated, it
~ill b · een that tho e places which arc deemed to be least important in the
~y t m, and which may be po tponed till all others are executed, constitute 1y
ar the mo t numerous class. Within this class (ln there are, no donb_t, great
iffi renc ~ a to the claim for defences, and in the course of y~ars hkely to
elap-e before any of them can be taken in hand, several may rise in the scale
of r ·lative importance.
There are al o in cla s E differences of the same sort, and it is not unlikely
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that before they can be commenced, at the rate the system has heretofore
ad vanccd, there may be interchanges between this and class F.
In class D, however, it is less probable that there will be a material change,
as all the positions are important now, b,•ii1g designed to cover large towns or
~ities, or national establishments, or the outlets of valuable commerce or importaut roadsteads.
I proceed now to examine the coast in detail, proceeding geographically,
beginning at the northeastern extremity and referring to accompanying tables.
It may be well to observe here, onci· for all, that much confidence is not asked
for the mere conjectures presented below as to the number and cost of the
works assigned for the protection of the harbors which have not yet been surveyed. In some cases there may be mistakes as to the number of forts and
batteries needed; in others errors will exist in the estimated cost.
Eastport and Mackias may be mentioned as places that will unquestionably
be thought to need defensive works by the time, in the order of relative importance, the execution of them can be undertaken by the government. There
a.re several small towns eastward of l\fount Desert island that may, at that
period, deserve equal attention; at present, however, the places mentioned will
be the only ones estimated for, and $100,000 w'ill be assumed as the cost of
each.
Class I·i'-Mount Desert island, situated a little east of Penobscot bay,
having a capacious and close liarLor, affording anchorage for the highest cla~s
of vessels, and easily accesRiblc from sea, ofiers a station for the navy of an
enemy superior to any other on this part of the coast. From this point hia
cruisers might act w ith great effect against the navigation of the eastern coa:it,
especially that of Maine, and hi s enterprises could be conducted with great
rapidity against any points h e might select. Th ese consideration::;, added to the
very great advantage, in certain political eventR, of our occupying a naval
station thus advanced, ·whence "·e might act offensively, together ·with the
expedience of providing places of succor on a p:u't of the coa<::t where ve..,i:;cl~
arc so frequently perplexed in their navigation by the prevailing fogs, lead to
the conclusion that the fortification, in a strong manner, of this road:4tcad may.
before long, be n ce sary. A survey of this island was begun many years ago,
but the party being calle<l. off to other duties it was never completed. 'l'he
proj ct of defon. ive works bas not been made. The entire cost may be, a a::sumed by the engineer department "'Orne years ago, $500,000.
.
Class F-Castine.-It would seem to be impo dible on thi. coast to depnw
an nemy enjoying naval superiority of harbor,, or prevent him u ing them a~
l4tation <luring a war, in, ular situations, which his v ssel would render unappr achabl , b ing so num rou ; but it eems prop r that such of the e po. ition~
a ar • th it of town. , hould be ccured. lJuring the la t war, the Engli::,_h
h •Id the po ition of a tin for om time, and 1 ft it at th ir plea ure. It 1~
pr Labl a w rk co tino- about 50,000 would d ter an enemy from ao-ain makin?:
·hoi ·r of thi po:,1ition.
Gia s F-P·nobscot bay.- Tpon thi: bay, and upon the river of the .aml'
nam · flo~rin": into it, ar , evrral ffouri:-1hing town and villacr .
f th manr
ba. ', wh1 ·h mt(•r,·r · th
·oa. t, tlie P •nob ot i. th on whi ·h pr ::: nt.; th t•
,,.r •a_te:-t nmnlwr of :mfo and apa ionl'! anchorng . A. b for ohs 1T d a lar!!
portion of th .... ,. harbor._ mu:t, for tl1 • pre ent, 11 I ft without d f ·nce~, hut th t•
valunhln ·ommf'r ·e of tli hay and rin·r mu t b c:ov •r cl· and t afford a
n tr at for ·u<·h ,·"· :-<•1:- a. m;t_. he 1m11hh· to pla · them,.'·h· :- und •r th pr
tiuu of' th , , ·ork
th· "n. t or wp,t of the> ha ·, th pa.·,.ao- of th<· rivPr urn,
1, • I< fi•n,l '<1. 'l h lo · t poiu! at whi ·h thi: tan 1,p don without great c.·p n, ·
i oppo. it• Buc·k ·port. at tlu· m row . Port 1/"i ox, at thi · po:--ition i,.; now u l ·r · H~tm · ion, ·. tima cl a . ';
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Class C-St. George's bay, Broad bay, Damariscotta, and Slteepscot.above-mentioned bays, all being deep indentations le.1,ding to towns, villages, and various establishments of industry and
enterprise. The bays have not been surveyed, and of course no plans have been
formed for their defence. $400,000 are assigned to the defence of these waters.
The Sheepscot is an excellent harbor of refuge for vessels of every size.( Class F.)
Kennebeck river.-This river (one of the largest in the eastern States)_ enters
t?-e sea nearly midway between Cape Cod and the mouth of the St. Croix. It
ri ~es near the source of the Chandiere, which is a tributary of the St. Lawrence,
and has once served as a line of operations against Quebec. The situation and
extent of this river, the value of its products, and the active commerce of several
very flourishing towns upon its banks, together with the excPllence of the harbor within its mouth, will not permit its defence to be neglected. The surveys
begun many years ago, were never finished. 'l'he estimated cost of defences, as
formally reported by the engineer department, was $300,000. Positions near
the mouth will permit a secure defence.-(Olass D.)
Portland harhor.-The protection of the town, of the merchantmen belonging
to it, and of the ships-of-war that may be stationed in this harbor to watch over
!his part of the coast, or that may enter for shelter, (all of them important obJectsT) may be sec11red, as an inspection of the map of the harbor will show, by
occupying Fort Preble Point, House island, Hog Island ledges, and Fish Point.
If the two channels to the west and east of Hog island can be obstructed at
small expense, (to decide which some surveys are yet necessary,) there will be
no necessity for a battery on the ledge, and Fish Point need be occupied only
by such works as may be thrown up in time of wRr. The expense, a,s now estimated, of the works planned for this defence, will be $155,000 for Fort Preble
and $48,000 for House island; for Hog island channel, say $ 135,000.-(Classes
A, D, E,F.)
In addition, there must be repairs immediately applied to the old works at
Fort Preble, including the rr,building of a sea-wall lately overthrown, at an expen Ne of $7,500.
Saco, Kennt:,bunk, ancl Yorl.:.-Small works, comparatively, will cover these
place ; $75,000 is ~ssurned as the ao-greo-ate
cost.
0
Class F-Portsmouth lwbor and ·
7;ard.-The only good roadstcad or
harbor, between Cape Elizabeth and Cape Ann, is Portsmouth harbor, within
the m0uth of the Piscataqun. river. Line-of-battle ships can ascend as high as
:Fox Point, seven miles above th e town. rl'his situatiou, sufficiently commodious
f. r a naval depot, should be maintained; out it is to be regretted that, the bay
t0 the south of l!'ox Point was not chosen as the site of the na,7 yard, instead
o Fernald's island. Being where it is, it will be necessary, in time of war, to
make some particular dispositions for the protection of the navy yard from an
a tack from the north shore of the river.
The position of Fort Constitution will certainly, and that of Fort McClary
"' -ill probably, be occupied as the defence ; though the works themselves should
give place to those that would better fulfil the object. The other positions for
t· ,rt-· or batterie8, are Gerrist's Point, Fishing island, and Clarke's islan d, some,
i not a11, of which must be occupied. Surveys have been made an<l. projects
1· r the defence are now under the consideration of the board of engineers. 'rhc
>~timates have not been furnished, but there iAreason for 1elicving that the en- e co:--t for fortifying this harbor will not fall .:1 hort of $300,000.
Cla. a D- Newburyport lzarbor.-'rhc points formin g th e mouth of the harbor
a ·e continua1ly changing, and it . ecms necessary, therefore, tu re1y, for the de. -nee of the, haTbor, on work· to be thrown U}J <lurino- a war. rrhcrc is only a
- 10a.l draught of water. It is thought $100,000 wi11° defend this harbor ade<. ua cl ... ·.

,yest of the Penobscot occur the

navi
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Class F-G1oucester 1iarbor.-The position of this harbor, near the extremity
of Cape Ann, places it in close relation with the navigation of all Massachusetts
bay, and imparts to it considerable importance. No surveys have yet been
made, but it is believed that sufficient defence may be provided for $200,000.(Class E.) Should tl1ere be any occasion for defensive works before the proposed new works can be commenced, an expenditure of $10,000 in repairs of
the old fort will be requircd.-(Olass A.)
Beverly liarhor.-'l'bis harbor will be defended chiefly by a portion of the
works designed for Salem. $50,000 in addition will secure it.-(Class F.)
Salem lwrbor.-'riie port of Salem is distant from Marblehead two miles, and
separated therefrom by a peninsula. 'I'he occupation of the extremhy of Winter
island (where are the ruins of Fort Pickering) on one side, and Nangashead on
the other, will effectually secure this harbor. Projects have been presented for
this defence, estimated to cost $225,000.-(Classes D and JT.) On a sudden
emergency old .Fort Lee may be put in an effective state for $2,000, and Fort
Pickering for $5,000.-(Class A.)
JJ!Iarbleltead l,arbor.-Beside covering, in some measure, the harbor, of Boston, Salem and Marblehead possess an important commerce of their own, and
also afford shelter for vessels prevented by certain winds from entering Boston
or pursuing their course ea tward. 'I'he proposed mode of defending i\larblchead harbor consists in occupying, on the nortli side, the hillock which commands the present Fort Sewall, ( which will be superseded by the new work,)
and on the south, the po ·ition of Jack's Point. The two works will co t
$318,000.-(Classes D and F.)
'l'o repair old Fort Sewall which may be necessary if the new works are not
soon begun, will require ten thou~and dollars.-(Class A.)
Boston lwrbor.-We come, now, to the most important harbor in the eastern
section of tho coast, and considering the relations to general commerce and the
interests of the navy, one of the most important in the whole Union.
After a careful examination of all the necessary com1itions of such a problem
the board of naval officers and engineers, in their joint report of 1820, gavr this
harbor a preference over all other positions to the cast and inclusive of ~cw
York bay and the Hudson as tlie seat of the great northern naval depot; and
the government, by the great additions and improvements that have from year
to year Leen since made to the navy yard on the Charlestown side, have virtuaIJy sanctioned the recommendation of tho board. But independent of the navy
yard, Bo ton is a city of great wealth, and po Qesses an extensive and active
commerce.
'l'h old works defended merely tl1e interior bai;in from attacks by water, but
m~ it often happens that ve. :-1el ent r Nm1ta~k t roads with a wind too ~cant to
take, tlH·m to the city, or arc d tain d in l)rcAident roads by light wind: or au
adv •ri:,; ti<lr, a th form r i-pecially i a very convenient auchonwe whence to
pro Ped to <a, and above all a Nauta1-:k •t rond · afford the h<' ' t possible :::tation
for a Llo ·kadino- 14<fU:Hlron, it wa. cl cmed indi:-1pen~aLlc to place pcrmanrnt def,~n ·c·: at _thr mouth of tlJ · harbor. 'l'he projC'ct of defcncr r •gard · the ·xi~ti11
work:, with th nee ·::-1ary repair and modifications, a cou ·tituting a t>ccontl
barril'r.
H<·. id· 'a pP.rman<>nt work now aJmo:t fini. 11 d on Gcoro-r' i~1anc1, it cont mplat · p mHrn<·ut work· on ·anta. kC't Hrad, and :filJing up tl1c Broad ;~om tl
·hat111 ·I, :o a. to l<':t\'<· 110 pa . :t""' in that dirc•ction for ;hips-of-war.
U11til tl1 · l,c:-t ,1r1111"'ltt for !Mm "•,sd:--of~war ,·hall L , well a:cNtainerl. i
will not h r-:.ifo to ay to w11at cl1•pth th· Droad 'onncl hmm I .J10uld h
tri ·t<·cl, nor inclc •cl ·an it he: po. iti\' ·ly a· ·,·rted that tJ1i: d .. 'l'iption ot Y •, I,
·an l, • ·01n'Pni ntlv ,_·d1ul ·cl h! u ·h mean.. ( tlH·r ve: .. ·1. NIil, howt'Y . I
t hu
. duded and t1 am vc• ·L
hw thi . 1iann •I w ulcl . till liaY t p,"
th · inn r · rri r. 'I h · · timat cl
of th• work for thi harbor io l,j54,,-,3
17
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Besides the works of a perrnnnent character, it will be ne_eessar;r_ in t~e be~unin o- of a war to erect several temporary works on certam pos1t1ons m the
harbo/and on the lateral approaches to the navy yn,rd.-(Olasses A, B, E and Ji'.)
Plymouth, and Pro1Jincct01cn h.arbors.-These harbors have a commerce of
rnme consequence of their own, but they are particularly interesting in reference
to the port of Boston. While these are undef~nded, an enem:r:'s squad1:on
blockading ::Massachusetts bay ·will have ports of refuge under lns lee, winch
would enable him to maintain his blockade even throughout the most stormy
seaBons, knowing that the winds which would force him to seek shelter would
be adverse to outward bound and fatal to such inward-bound vessels as should
venture near the cape. Were the enemy deprived of these harbo:·s he would
be unable to enforce a viO'orous investment, as he must be constramed to take
an offing on every approa~h of foul weather. Our own vessels comi~g in from
sea, and finding an enemy interposed betw<.>en them and Boston, or berng turned
from their course by adverse winds, would, in case of the defence of these ports,
find to the south of Boston shelter equivalent to those provided in the east at
)Iarblehead, Salem, Gloucester and Portsmouth. Plymouth harbor has not
been fully surveyed. Provincetown harbor has been surveyed, but the projects
of defence have not been formed. The former, it is thought, may be suitably
covered by a work of no great cost on Gurnett Point, while to fortify Provincetown harbor in such a way as to cover vessels taking shelter therein, and at the
same time to deprive an enemy of safe anchorages, ·will involve considerable expen~e. Probably no nearer estimate can be formed at present than that offered
by the engineer department some years ago, which gave one hundred thousand
dollar to Plymouth and six hundred thousand dollars for Provincetown.(Ula~ses D and K)
~he ~oast between Cape Cod and Cape Hatteras differs from the northeastern
~_ection m possessing fewer harbors, in having but little rocky and a great pornon of sandy shore, in its milder climate and clearer atmosphere; and it differs
from all the other portions, in the depth a.nd magnitude of its interior seas and
sounds, and in the distance to which deep tide navigation extends up its numerou · large rivers. 'l'he circuit of the coast, not including the shores of the great
bay:, measures about six hundred and fifty miles.
_ ~ lartlia's Vineyard so,u nd.-'l'o the south of Cape Cod lie the islands of
~ antucket and .Martha's Vineyard, which, with several smaller islands on the
,.on h, and the projection of Cape Ma.la.bar on the east, enclose the above-named
0u:nd. rl'he channels through this sound being sufficient for merchant vessels,
and one of the channels permitting the passage even of small frigates, are not
onl;v _the ~onstant track of coasting vessels, but also of large number of vessels
arnvrng m the tempestuous months from foreign voyages. rrh(~re are within
the .-ou1;1d the harbors of Tarpaulin Cove, Holmes Hole, Edgartown, Falmouth,,
Hyann,s, :t?d Aantuclcet, besides small anchorages.
~n add1t1on to the many thousand vessels pas::iing this water annually, of
"b1 ·h there are sometimes forty or fifty (a portion containing very valuable
cargoe..,) to be seen in the harbors awaiting a change of wind, there is supposed
to l- ·, at lea t forty thousand tons of whaling vessels owned in the towns of this
0

eOUI.d.

, l · th_e h_arbors ju!'l t named are to be defended at all it must be by fortifications.
fhere _1 ~ httl~ or no population except in the towns, and even this is believed to
he < ut1rely without military organization. A privateer might run into either of
tbf::--c harbors _and capture, destroy, or levy contributions at pleasure. 1.'he use
rif he ...:ound itself a an anchorage for vessels-of-war cannot be prevented by
~.,rtificarion alone. '~wo hundred and fifty thousand dollars may :rerhaps s:iif·
tice for th defence of all the harbors against the kind of enterprise to wlnch
the_~ are expo ed.-(Class l!.,.)
_ ~ew B e<iford and Fairliaven liarbor.-Projects and estimates have been
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made for the defence of this harbor, on wl1ich lie two of the most flourishin g
towns in the eastern States, New Bedford being, as r egards registered tonnage,
the third harbor in the United States. Estimate $2 08,000.-(0lass D.)
Buzzard's bay.-Interposed between the main and the island of Martha's
Vineyard are the Elizabeth islands, which bound Buzzard's bay on the south.
This bay covers the harbor of New Bedford, and might be used as an anchorage
by an enemy's fl eet, but it is too wide to be defended by fortifications.
Narraganset bay.-Some of the properties of this great roadste~d have been
stated in the preceding remarks.
The defence adopted for N arraganset roads must be formidable on the important points, because they will be exposed to powerful expeditions. Although
the possession of this h arbor, the destruction of the naval establishment, the
capture of the floating· defences, and the possession of the island as a place of
debarkation and refreshment, should not be considered as constituting of themselves objects worthy a great expedition, they might very well be the preliminary steps of such expedition; and defences, weak in their character, might
tern pt rather than deter it; for although unable to resist his enterprise, they
might be fully competent, after being captured and strengthened by such means
as he would have at hand, to protect him from offensive demonstrations on our
part.
There arc besides, in the local circumstances, some reasons why the works
should be strong. 'l'he channel on the eastern side of the island being permanently closed by a solid bridge, requires no defensive works; but this bridge
being the upper end of the island, the channel is open to an enemy all along the,
eastern shore of the island. Works erected for the defence of the channel ot
the west side of the island cannot, therefore, prevent nor even oppose a landing
on the eastern side. The enemy may, consequently, take possession, and bend
llis whole force to the reduction of the forts on the island, which cannot be re·
lieved until a force has been organized, brought from a distance, conveyed b!
water to the points attacked, and landed in the face of his batteries; all thi~
obviously requiring several days, during which the forts should be capable ol
holding ont. 'l1o do this against an expedition of ten thousaud or twenty thouand men demands something more than the strength to resist a single a" ault.
Unless the main works be competent to withstand a siege of a few days, they
will not, therefore, fulfil their trw;t, and will be worsa than useless.
It mu t here be noticed that, althoug-11 the work. do not prevent the lan?in!!'
of an enemy on Rhode Island, th y will, if capable of resi:;;ting his efforts f_or 3
fow day , make hi, rr,jdence on the island for any length of time impo s1blr,
. ince fi rec, in any number may be brought from the main, and landed under
covc•r of the fire of the work .
'lo come now to tl1 e particular d ·fences propo. cd for thi road tead. It mu~'
b Rtat d that there ar thr e entrance into arrao-:w ·ct road :
1:-t. 'l'h •astern ·hannel. ·whi ·h pa. cs upon the ea,_t ide of the H and ,,t
Rhode faJancl. Thi·, a. b •fore tated, b ino- hut by a olid brid 00e, n ed-i no
cl<·fc·u · b ' fortifi ·a.tion., oth r than a field-,~ rk or two, which may b th rown
up at thP- 01> ·nincr of a war.
2cl. 'l'hP .,,mral chan11 ], which rntrr from ca by p:1. incr betw en Rhm1
I.land ancl 'onani ·nt i:-1:mcl. 'l hil'l i h far th hr ·t entrnnc ', and leads to th
lJ ·~t anchora 1~P-; and thi:-1 it i. propo,ecl to c1C'fonc1 by a fort on th a:-t :oi1lc oi
th C'ntr:rn ·c', clh-i<r1wd to l, tIH' pri11<:ipal w rk in the , y. t m. Thi:- w,_ r~.
callc-d F01t .A.clam:, i. n r.ar]y compl<·tc·cl.
n th , wt-. t ;:d • of th n tranc' Il 1propo r.cl to pla ·<' :uwth<•r lr ork, and on an i. lancl, call d R o,,: i ·Janel. fa ·in~ th
Pntrnn ·r. a thirrl work. It i al.-o propo..; ,c1 t repair th ol<l fmt on TO.'lt i,Ja.1 1!.
ju--t within th<' mouth· ancl ab olcl .} ort h·C' •n, which i.. a littl bizher up on
th e i.la11d of Hhocl<· I. la11<1.
3cl. A: to thew · t ·rn J..>U .. a,,. ·, thr m d • !Jr . cnt th m · h- : fir, t by ·
T
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ducing the depth of water by an artifical ledge, so as, while the passage shall

be a" free as it is now for the coasting trade, it shall be shut as to the vesselsof-war, including steam vessels; second, by relying on fortifications alone to
cl ~e the channel; or, third, by resorting in part to one, and in part to th_e other
mode just mentioned. Either is practicable; · but, being the least expensive and
most certain, the estimates are founded on the first. 'rhe total cost of the N arraganset defences is estimated at $1,699,000.-(0lasses A, B, D, F.)
G firdiner's bay.-It is uncertain whether this harbor, which would be a very
-valuable one to an enemy investing this part of the coast, is defensible by fortifications alone. After it sha11 have been surveyed, it may appear that, from one
or more positions, the whole anchorage may be controlled by heavy sea-mortars.
In ~uch a case, the defensive works would not be costly. If it be found expedient to fortify some particular portion of the bay, as an anchorage for steam
batteries, (which, however, is not anticipated,) the expense would probably _be
ru; great as was anticipated some years since by the engineer department, viz :
S4O0, 000.-(Class F.)
~ ag Harbor, New York, and Stonington, Conner:ticut.-Neither of these harbor3 hai:i been surveyed with reference to defence. rl'he first is possessed of
con3iderable tonnage; and the second, beside being engaged in commerce, is the
terminus of a railroad from Boston. $100,000 may be assigned to the first, and
820~,ooo to the other.-(Classes E and F.)
- ew London harbor is very important to the commerce of Long Island sound;
and, as. a port of easy access, having a great depth of water, rarely freezing,
a.n
bemg easily defended, it is an excellent station for the navy. It is also
,aluable as a shelter for vessels bound out or home, and desirous of avoiding a
blockading squauron off Sandy Hook.. 'l'he plan of defence includes the relmilding of Forts 'l'rumbull and Griswold-the former having been already done,
,ei:;~ nearly-remaining expense estimated at $198,000.-(0lasses A and F.)
. .'lloutli
.
of Connecticut river.-This river has been shown to be subject to the
exp ditions of an enemy. No survey has been made with a view to its defences.
81.0~,OO0 is introduced here as the conjectural cost.-(Olass F.)
- ell: Haven harbor.-It is proposed to defend this harbor by improving and
enlargrng Fort Hale, and substituting a new work for the slight redoubt erected
during the last war, called Fort Wooster. 'l'he expense of both may be set
do ·w n at $90,000, exclusive of $5,000 for immediate repairs of old Fort Hale.(Clas~e .A and F.)
,...There are several towns between New Hm ,en and New York, on both sides
of the ound; none of them are very large as yet; still, most, if not all, are
pro;;.. perou and increasing. Although in their present condition it might not be
deemed necessary to apply any money to permanent defences, yet, as part of
th.e pre.:;cnt object is to ascertain, as near as may be, the ultimate cost of completely fo rtifying the coast, it seems proper to look forward to the time when
som of these towns may become objects of predatory enterprises of some magnitu. e . Bearing in mind the probable increase of population in the meantime,
attd th situation of the places generally, it is thought that $200,000 will be
et10 uh to provide defences for all.-(Olass :F.)
.1 -PW York liarbor.-The objects of the projected works for the security of
~e-~v .,. rk are to cover the city from an attack by land or sea; to protect its
llum. ~rou , hipping; to prevent, as far as possible, the blockade of this great
Jio
a d to cover the interior communication uniting this harbor with the D ela\\·are.

T

er · ar two avenues to the city, namely, one by the main channel, direct
, and on
by the , ound.
'I e r dect d sy tern of d fenc closes thi. last avenue at the greatest diRtance
p055 ible from the city, nam ·ly, at 'l'brog's Point. 'l'he occupation of this point

fr 0
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will force the enemy to land more than twenty miles from the city on one side,
and still further from the navy yard on the other .
.A work now in progress and nearly finished at Throg's Point will prevent
any attempt to force this passage. It will, as we have seen, oblige an enemy to
land at a considerable distance from the object; and, as he will then be unable
to turn the strong position afforded by Harlem river, the cover on the New York
side will be sufficient.
But should he land on the Long Island side, he might, by leaving pa)ities on
suitable positions, with a view to prevent our crossing the river and falling on
his rear, make a dash at the navy yard, having no obstacle in his front. To
prevent this effectually, and also to accomplish other objects, a work should be
erected on Wilkins's Point, opposite 'l'hrog·'s Point. 'J.1his work, besides completing· the defence of that channel, would involve a march against the navy
yard from this quarter in great danger, since all the forces that could be collected
on the New York shore might, under cover of this work, be crossed over to Long ·
Island, and fall on the rear of the enemy, cutting off his communication with the
fleet. 'I1he two works on Throg's and Wilkins's Points may therefore be regarded as perfectly protecting on that side the city and navy yard.
Against an attack by the main channel there arelst. The works in the vicinity of the city, which would act upon an enemy's
squadron only after its arrival before the place. 'I'hey consist of Fort Columbus, Castle Williams, and South Battery, on Governor's Island, Fort Wood, on
Becllow's island, and Fort Gibson, on Ellis's island.
It is necessary that these works be maintained, because, in the event of the
lower barriers being forced, these would still afford a resource. It is a di.advantage of their positions, however, that the destruction of the city might be
going on simultaneously with the contest between the forts and the fleets. 'fhey
caunot, however, be dispensod with until the outer barriers are entirely completed, if even then.
2d. At the Narrows, about seven miles below the city, the passage becomes
so contracted as to p ern;iit good disposition to Le made for defence. On the
Long Island side of the Narrows is Bart Lafayette, which i a strong ~vatn
battery, standing on a reef at f\ome distance from the shore, and immedmtely
b ehind it, on the top of the bauk, is a small but strong· work, called Fort Hamt.lton. Some repairs being applied to these works, this position may be regarded
a · well occupied.
On the we t or Staten I sl· 1d ide of the Narrows arc the following work~, all
of which were erected by the 'tate of New York, vis: Fort Richmond, which
i a ·w ater battery; Battery Iludson, which is at some height above the water:
Battery 1vlorton, which is a :-mall battery on the top of the hill, and Fort Tompkins, which i; al:o on the hill, and is the principal work. All thc .. e work:-, awc·ll a: the ~it common to thC'm all, ar now the property of the United, 'tatc~.
b · pure ha, e from th
tat<' of ..1..,. ew York.
Batteries Ilurlsott and JIIorton lrnv, been put in pcrfi ct order, and aff~r~ 3
fo~m~claLl arn y of gun:-. Fort Rickmoncl, which occupied the b , t _po~1~1o_n
w1thm the whole harbor for c:hann ·I dcfen · , had fallen ntir ly to rum; it 1now l, iuo- r 011!-ltru ·t •d, and with th appropriation a k d for in th ,ti;n;1 ·
f In ·t · ·1r min·ht havp h<·P.n now rr·arly for 011 • tier of gun .
''hp uatun· an,l •xt<•nt of n·pair: r ·c1nircd by Fort Tompkins ha, n?t r ·
l, ·<·n :-; !Ul<·cl, thi, not L •ing· cl< t·mc·cl ~o prc~:i110- a a ..,tat
f r adinr., m h
hatt •ric•.· ju ·t mPntionc•cl. B •. i<lc· th·. e work., th •re ha .. be n proj1•c· <I I r
, tat n I land an aclvan · •d r •do11ht, whi ·h, howcv ·r, fall· within th cla"
work · (F} la ·t to h r.rc• ·t ,l.
"·ith th ... Tarrow, tl111 cl •ft ncl cl, an 1 th work n ar th citv in J
or 1 •r, • w Y rk mif1'ht b } r .,,.ar
a· pr tt ~ w 11 prot •t d aga.iu"-.t au , ta
by wat r through thi pa~ a•,.·.
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But there lies below the Narrows a capacious bay, affording good anchorage
f r any number of vessels-of-war and transports. An enemy's squadro~ being
in that bay, into which entrance is very easy, would set a seal upon this outlet
of the harbor. Not a vessel could enter or depart at any season of the )'."ear.
A.nd it would also intercept the water communication, by way of the Raritan,
between New York and Philadelphia.
The same squadron could land a force on the beach of Gravesend bay, (the
place of the landing of the British, which brought on the battle of Long Isla~d
in the revolutionary war,) within seven miles of the city of Brooklyn, of its
commanding height, and of the navy yard, with no intervening obstacle of any
sort.
This danger is imminent, and it would not fail, in the event of war, to be as
folly realized as it was during the last war, when, on the rumor of an expedition
being in preparation in England, twenty-seven thousand militia were assembled
to cover the city from an attack of this sort. It is apparent that the defences
near the city and those at the Narrows, indispensable as they are for other purposes, cannot be made to prevent this enterprise, which can be thoroughly
guarded againt only by
3d. An outer barrier at the very mouth of the harbor. 'This would accomplkh two objects of great consequence, namely, rendering a close blockade of
the harbor impossible, and obliging an enemy who should design to move troops
again t the navy yard to land at a distance of more than twenty miles from his
object, upon a dangerous beach, leaving, during the absence of the troops, the
tran::;ports at anchor in the ocean, and entirely without shelter.
The hazard of such a land expedition would moreover be greatly enhanced
by the fact that our own troops, by passing over Long 1sland under cover of
the fort at Wilkins's Point, could cut off the return of the enemy to his fleet,
which must lie at or somewhere near Rockaway. 1'ime, distance, and the direction of the respective marches would make, very naturally, such a manrenvre a
part of the plan of defence. Against an enemy landing in Gravesend bay no
such manreuvre could be effectual, on account of the shortness of his line of
march, as well as of its direction.
In view of these considerations, the board of engineers projected additional
works, one for the east banlc, and another for the middle ground, these positions
being on hoals on either hand of the bar outside of Sandy Hook. Before determi ing on the works last mentioned the board went into much research, in order
to -:certain whether these shoals were unchangeable, and it was thought to have
been fully proved that there had been no material alteration in more than sixty
years. This apparent stability of the shoals encourage the board to devise the
projec referred to.
_ fore recent surveys have, however, discovered new, or rather other channels.
If they, iudeed, be new channels, they show a want of stability in the shoals
that forbids any such structures as the batteries formerly contemplated. And
\\-hether new or not they would deprive these batteries of a material portion of
their efficacy. Removing, then, these defences from this outer bar, they must
occupy the position of Sandy Ilook; at which they will afford a very good
d.tfcnce of the main chmmel, and prevent the entrance to or occupation of the
lo ?er bay, for any ho.tile purpose whatsoever, and cover a secure anchorage
th<·re for our own merchantmen and privateers, and for our steam and sailing
crui.::er.-, .

r

To recapitulate as to New York harbor. The security of the city of New

k. Brooklyn, &c., and the navy yard requires, first, defences on the pass~ge
fr<' :n tl1e ~ound ; namely, the completion of Fort Sclwyler on Throg's Pornt,
(C ,a,5- B, anrl the erection of a fort on Wilkins' Point (Olaf' s :E')-cost of both
. ·7 1,000; f-!econd, completion of repairs on ,vorks of Governor's i~land, B~dlo ~' .; i ·lanc1, and Ellis's island-c:;timatcd cost $42,689, (Class A;) third, repaus
rJ
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of the works at the Narrows, including those formerly belonging to the State of
New York- cost $326,834, (Class A and B ;) and fourth, the erection of outer
defences on Sandy Hook-estimated by the board of engineers to cost $1,200,000,
(Class D ;) the total cost will therefore be $2,332,523.-(0lasses A, B, D, F,)
Delaware bay, Fort DPlaware, Fort Mifflin, Delaware Brealcwater.-'l'he
coast from the mouth of the Hudson to the Chesapeake, as well as that on the
south side of Long island, is low and sandy, and is penetrated by several inlets;
but not one, besides the Delaware, is navigable by sea-going vessels. The
Delaware bay itself being wide and full of shoals, having an intricate channel,
and being much obstructed by ice in the winter, affords no very good natural
harbor within a reasonable distance of the sea.
The artificial harbor constructed just within the mouth of Delaware bay supplies this need, and must be securely fortified. No plans have, however, as yet
been made with that object; and as to the probable cost, nothing· better can now
be done than to assume the conjectural estimate made some years since in the
engineer department, namely, $600,000. -(Claes F.)
'rhe lowest point at which the bay is defensible is at Pea Patch island, about
forty-five miles below the city of Philadelphia. A fort on that island, to replace
the one destroyed by fire; a fort opposite the Pea Patch, on the D elaware
shore, to assist in commanding the Delaware channel, and at the same time to
protect the mouth of the Delaware and Chesapeake canal; a temporary work
on the Jersey shore, to be thrown up at the commencement of a war, to assist
in closing the channel on that side; together with floating obstmctions, to be
put down in moments of peril, will effectually cover all above this positionincluding Philadelphia and its navy yard, Wilmington, New Castle, the canal
before mentioned, and the Philadelphia and Baltimore railroad.
The rebuilding of Fort Delaware was long delayed by difficulties attending
the settlement of claims to the island (Pea Patch) on which it is to stand; the e
having been adjusted, the fort is in progress-the tedious and difficult process of
forming· a foundation with piles and grillage being concluded. In the meantime,
Fort 1Yl!/fiin, an old work, standing about seven miles below the city of Philadelphia had been put in good order.
'l'he expeu.·e of .JTort Dela.ware is, n.ccording to revised estimates, $5 0,000,
and of the fort opposite, 521,000.-(0lasse C and F.)
Chesapeake bay, :Elamptort roads, James river, No1folk, and tlie navy yard.The worlut projected for the. are: :first, a fort at Old Point Comfort-thi'4 is
called Fort 1Ylonroe ,- second, a ca ematcd battery called Fort Ca1hovn, in the
Rip Rap hoal , oppoi--ite ld l)oint Comfort; and, tl1ird, a line of :floatino- obtructions, xtendi1w acro:4 th channel from one of th e works to the oth •r.
Fort Jlionroe i of it:,1 ·If complete, but an advanced redoubt on the land i-id i
unfini~h d, and con ·id raLle work i yet ncce ary to ccurc proper ventilation
ancl th n er 'ary dryn ', to th o-reat powd r miwazine' within the fort, deio-n d a a priu ·ipal d pot of that material. Atte~npt to ecure good w:iter
by au art ·ian well ar' ·till p r ever din. Rrquir d to complet , ·15,00 . 1
(
la B.)
Fort Calltoztn cannot yet be carric·d forward for want of tability in th fi unclati 11. 'l'he artifi ·ial ma· on which it i to . tand havinon rai; ·d on of
th wat 'r, th walll'l of th · b:ttt<'ry w ·re b •o-un , om ~car incc · but it \"fl',·oon found that th ir w irrht ·au-. ·cl con:-,icl rabl ,·ub~idc·nc .
n an in,p ·ti n
by ·n,,-in •c•r ffic ·r~ it wa tit II dt> ·i<l,•il to 1 •c•p th foundation loadNl wi h rn re
tliau tlu· whole W<•irrht r,f th tiui-.h 'd work until all uL id nc Ind • , d.
' h load ha<l hnrclly L ·n put 11, how •,·,•r lJC'for _ i wn injudi ·iou h· d
rnin d to t·tk • i off, :md b ~in t 1,nilcl, :dthourrh the ttlino- rn · ... till !! in~
lap1 ii :t h tter p Ji ·y jll" ·vniJ ·d I, •fon· th · <.·011. trn ·tion wn r ,..,urn ] bu n
·1 •11 of r •moving the load had b II in u
I ' r • th v •ry c·on i 1 mbl
and th ·urth r
p ·11
f r pin ·i1w it r •n ·r •cl n · ,.;:,ar . Th u ..j n
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~a~ now so nearly ceased that it is contemplated to resume the construction at
an early day.-(Olass 0.) Required to complete, $729_,3_32. .
.
.
It may be expedient in time of war, by way of p1:ov1dmg 1?-ter10r barners, !o
Erect batteries on Craney island, at the mouth of Elizabeth river, and to put m
c nrlition and arm Old Fort Norfolk, which is just below the city.
•
Harbor of St. Mary.~The central situation (as regards the Ohesapeak~ )_ of
thi, fine basin, its relation to the Potomac, its depth of water, and the facility
with which it may be defended, indicate its fitness as a harbor of refuge for !he
commerce of the Chesapeake bay, and as an occasional, if not constant, station
during war of a portion of the naval force. A survey has been made, but no
project has been formed. The Engineer Department some years ago conjectured
that the cost of defences in this harbor might amount to $300,000.-(0lass F.)
Annapolis liarbor.-Port Severn has been put in an efficient condition, and
repairs have been advanced on Fort Madison,· these will be continued until
that work also shall afford an efficient battery.-(Class A.) Estimated at
.:30,000.
Harbor o/ Baltimore.-The proximity of the city to Chesapeake bay greatly
endangers the city of Baltimore. In the present state of things an enemy, in a
fe~· ho~rs march, after an easy landing, and without having his commun~cation
wuh his fleet endangered, can make himself master of that great empormm of
commerce. There are required for its security two forts on the Patapsco, 0ne
at Hawkin's Point, and the other opposite that point; these being the lowest
positions at which the passage of the Patapsco can be defended. Besides the
advantages that will result of obliging the enemy to land at a greater distance,
thereby gaining time by delaying his march, for the arrival of £uccor, and pre-renting his turning the defensive positions which our troops might occupy, it
will be impossible for him to endanger the city by a direct attack by water.
The operations on Fort Carroll-the work occupying the extremity of Soller's
flats, ( opposite Hawkin's Point,)-are proceeding with all the rapidity allowed
by the appropriations. Estimate, $865,000.-(0lass 0.)
The work on Hawkin's Point belongs to class F, and is estimated to cost
8376,000.
The present Fort McHenry, Redoubt TiVood, a l1d Covington Battery should
be retained as a second barrier. The :first-mentioned is now in good condition,
aud the r<'pairs rrquired for the others may be applied at the beginning of a war .
..,_llouth ef Elk river.-'rhe completion of the line of water commm;1ication
~m t · l)Plaware to the waters of the Chesapeake makes it proper to place a
fort "'omc, 'line near the mouth of Elk river, in order to prevent an enemy from
de~troyino-, by a sudden enterprise, the works forming this outlet of the canal.
1'here have been no surveys made with a view to establish such protection,
\\'hich i · estimated at $!50,000.-(0lass F.)
Cities ef Washington, Georgetown, and Atexandria.-Fort Wasliington
covers thc.'e cities from any attack by water, and will oblige an enemy to land
at some eight or ten miles below Alexandria, should that city be his object, and
about t ;vic:e as far below Washington. It will also serve the very important
Iiuri,,o,~e of covering troops cros:-;ing from Virginia, with a view to fall on the
tlank:4 of an enemy moving against the Capitol from the Patuxent or the OhesaIieake. The repairs on thi work have been completed.-(Olaiss A.)
c·Pdar Point, Potomac river.-But all these objects would have been better
ftr.lfi le had the work been placed at Lower Cedar Point. As it is, however,
the contPmplated works being constructed in the Patuxent, and the militia of the
:u.rrou1 <liug country in a due state of' preparation, an enterprise against Was~lti<rt-l1n w ul<l be a hazardou one. As giving complete security to the towns m
th~ di:-- ri ·t, cov ·ring more than sixty miles in lcnoth of the Potomac; the river
erminu of the great railroad from tbe south, anl a large tract of country lying
het een the l>otomac and the Patuxent; the work on Cedar Point should not
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be omitted. There have been no surveys made of the ground, nor projects of
the fort, which~ in a conjectural estimate of the engineer department, was set
<lown at $300,000 .-(Class E)
Patuxent ri·ver.-The more effectually to protect the city of Washington
from a sudden attack by troops landed at the head of navigation in the Patu:x:ent, and to provide additional shelter for vessels in the Chesapeake, a fort has
been planned to occupy Point Patience and another to occupy Thomas's Point,
both a short distance up the river. 'l'he work on Tlwmas's Point is estimated
at $259,000, and the work on Point Patience estimated to cost $246,000.( Classes D and F.)
It will be perceived that the system of defence for Washington contemplates,
first. defending the Potomac on Cedar Point, and maintaining· a second barrier
at Fort Washington; second, defending the mouth of the Patmrnnt. This particular arrangement not having been al ways understood, a few words are added.
in explanation.
During the last war there was no fort in the Patuxent, and the consequence
was that the British approached by that avenue and occupied the whole river as
high as Pig Point, nearly fifty miles from its mouth, and less than twenty miles
from the Capitol; while, in consequence of there being· no forts in the Potomac,
they occupied that river as high as Alexandria, inclusive; by this latter occupation peifectly protecting the left flank of the movement during its whole advance and retreat. Both flanks being safe, the British had nothing to fear
except from a force in front; and that this risk was not great, in the short march
of le::;s than twenty miles from the boats, was proved by the issue.
On the ninth day from that on which the fleet entered the Chesapeake the
English army was in possession of the OH.pitol, having penetrated nearly fifty
miles beyond the point of debarkation. Ou the twelfth <lay from the time of
landing·, the troops were again on shipboard, near the mouth of the river. This
attack, exceedingly well conceived and very ga1lantly executed, owed its success entirely to the want of defences, such as are now proposed.
Let u s suppose both rivers fortified as recommended, and an enemy landed at
the mouth ·of the Patuxent. If now he attempt this enterprise, his march would
be prolonged by at least four days-that is to say, it will require more than sixteen day , during which time he will be out of communication with his fleet as
regards supplies and assistance.
The opposition to his invasion will begin at the landing, because our troops
having now nothing to fear as to their flanks, either from the Potomitc or Patuxent, will di, pnte every foot of territory; and although he should continue to
advance it must be at a slower rate. "\Vhile he ii:, tlnu, pur;-uing hi::; route to·
·ward '\YaHhington , the forces of Virginia, brought by railroad to the mouth of
..A.c1uia creek, will be cros::;ing the Potomac and concentrating at Port 'l'oLacco,
or some por-;ition b tweeu that place and l!'ort ,Va hington, preparatory to falling- on hi:-- flank and rear. 1'his would ::;cc1i1 to Le co11clusive, for it i::: clifficult
to couc·<'ivc of troops persevcrino- in an expedition when cn·ry moment will not
01ily plac<· tl1em further from, uicor Lut greatly increase their 1wc<l of it. Hailro:ul · n·:H:h from near the crossing plac<'S of the I>otomac to the Yery heart of
the c·otmtry r-onth, ancl a very few day:; w.oulcl bring forward a larg·c force, all of
whil'l1 woul<l arriv upon tl1e rear of thr e1H·111y.
It ha. be ·u ...;aid that if ~hut out of the 1'.ltn.·ent the enemy might land h ·
twcl'n thP mrrnth of that river anll Annapoli8, aud thence proce('(l agc1in~t ,Ya--~i1wt1111. But thr r-:1me clifiiculti<·:-i belong to thi proj<·et, anrl a 11<·w diffi ·ulty 1;
adcl1•1l. 'I h1! Yirg-inia fore•;; an-iv at-1 Lc·fore, mHl a:::,·ail hi: flank, cith r Letwc n
th• Potoma · ancl 'atu.· ·nt or LctwN•n the Patu.·cnt :111cl the 'he. apcake; and
th •n, i ·, Ii ,id<·., th· J>atn.·c·nt for the enemy to croi3., Lotl1 in er iw,.. ml r turni11"-it · ·If a formi<lable military ob.:tac:le.
lt i, nid, abo, that the luncliu•r may be maclc in the Potomac; but tlii-- on."
1
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that the system animadverted on had not been studied, it being a fm~daal principle of the system th~t such landing must be prevented by fortify.
: the river as low down as possible.
The southern coast, stretching from Cape Hatteras to the southern ~omt of
f1 rida, is inrnriably low, and for the greater part s~udy, much resemblmg the
,t from the above-mentioned cape to Montauk Pomt, on the east e~d of Long
L nd. A ridge of sand, here and there int~rrupted _by the _alluv10~1 of t_he
riv rs, extends through its whole length. 'This ndge, m certam port10ns, hes
n the main land; while in others it is divided therefrom by ba ins or "sounds"
f nrious width and depth, and is cut up into islands by mun?rous ch~1mel~,
which connect these interior waters with the sea. Wherever t1us sand nclge 1s
· terrupted, its place is occupied by low and marshy grounds, bordering the
_rincipal and the many lesser outlets of the rivers.
.
Ocracoke inlet, N. C.-The shallowness of the water on the bar at this
inlet effectually excludes all vessels-of-war-at least, all moved by _sails. ~ut
, this is an outlet'of an extensive commerce, and as, through tlns opemng,
rtempts might be made in small vessels, barges, or the smaller class of steam
-re,~els, to destroy this commerce, or to interrupt the line of. interior water communication, timely preparation must be made of temporary works, equal to
efence against all such minor enterprises.
B eaufort harbor, . N. C.-A work called Fort Macon has been erected for
' e defence of this harbor. It is in a very efficient condition, though ome
light additional work is needed, both for the fort itself and for the preservation
01 the site, which is acted upon violently by the sea.
Successful impediments
o thi action have been resorted Lo, which require a little extension, however,
d continual care. Estimate, $3,000.-(0lass B.)
~lioutlls ef Cape Fear ri,ver, N. C.-The defence o( the main channel of
·pe Fear requires, in addition to For~ .Caswell, (now completed,) on Oak island,
an ther fort on Bald Head. And the defence of the smaller ehanuel will require
a_ redoubt on Federal Point. 'l'he battery, magazine, block-house, &c., at Smith-.ille, houldremain as accessories. Fort Caswell, Oak island, $7,000.-(Class B.)
Tltefor~ on Bald Head (class F) will require $180,000. The redoubt on Federal Foint (class F) will require $18,000; and the battery, &c., called Fort
J hnston, at Smithville, (class A,) $5,000.
Georgetown liarbor, S. C.-The first inlet of any consequence s<;mth of Cape
.Fear river is at the united mouths of the ,vaccamaw, Pedee, and Black rivers,
:torming Georgetown harbor, which is a commodious and capacious bay, having
5ufficient water within, and also upon the bar near the mouth, for merchant ves,e · and small vessels-of-war. A survey of this harbor was begun many years
ago, l,ut never completed, and no projects for defence have been made. It is
probaLle that a work placed near Moscheto creek, or on Winyaw Point, would
give adequate strength, at the cost of about $250,000.-(Class E.)
Santee river and Bull's bay.-About ten miles south from Georgetown are
he mouths of the Santee, the largest river in South Carolina. It is not known
w-hether the bars at the mouth of this river have sufficient water for sea-going
"t""e-;:,eb . . The same u_ncertainty exists as to the depth into Bull's bay. It may
be ~ uffic1ent to consider these, and the other inlets between Georgetown and
Oharl~ston, as calling for small works capable of resisting boat enterprises, and
o ass gn as the cost $100,000. Should they prove to be navigable for privae r -, they will require a larger expenditure.-(Olass F.)-$100,000.
Charle.1ton, S. C.-This city, situated at the junction of the Ashley and
Go p r river;:;, i about five miles, in a direct line, from the sea. Between it and
the cean there is a wide and safe roadstead for vessels of any draught. Upon
th bar, lying three or four miles outside of the harbor, there is, however, only
w-a er enough for mailer frigates and sloops-of-war. On the southwest side of
_ ,e,
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the harbor is James's island, in which are several serpentine passages, more or
less navigable for boats, barges, and small steam vessels; some of them communicate directly with the sea and Stono river. Whappoo cut, the most northerly
passage from the Stono to Charleston harbor, enters Ashley river opposite the
middle of the city.
Interior natural water communications exist, also, to the southwest of Stono
river, connecting this with North Edisto river; the latter with South Edisto and
St. Helena sound; this, again, with Broad river; and, :finally, this last with
Savannah river.
On the north side of the harbor of Charleston lies Sullivan's island, separated
from the main by a channel navigable only by small craft. On the northwest
side of this island is an interior water communication which extends to Bull's
bay, and even beyond, to the harbor of Georgetown.
From this sketch it is apparent that it will not do to restrict the defences to
the principal entrance of the harbor.
The lateral avenues must also be shut. And it is probable that accurate surveys of all these avenues will ,::;how that the best mode of defending them will
be by works at or near the mouths of the inlets, as the enemy will be kept
thereby at a greater distance from the city; the lesser harbors formed by these
inlets will be protected, and the line of interior water communication will be inacce sible from the sea.
No position for the defence of the principal entrance to Charleston harbor can
be found nearer to the ocean than the western extremity of Sullivan's islan<l.
This is, at present, occupied by Fort lYioultrie-a work of some strength, but
by no means adequate to its object; its battery being weak, and the scarp so
low as to oppose no serious obstacle to escalade. How far this work, by a
modification of its plan and relief, may be made to contribute to a full defence
of the harbor, has not yet been determined. But so long as it is the only work
at this, the principal point of defence, it must be kept in good condition for
service, and no alterations that will disturb this efficiency should be un<lertaken.-( Olass A .)
On a "'hoal nearly opposite Fort Moultrie a new fort has been well advanced,
which will have a powerful cross-fire with Fort J.lioultrie. This is called Fort
Sumter.-(Olas s 0.) To complete this fort will require, it is estimated, $150,000.
In the upper part of the harbor is Castle P inckney, on Shuter's Folly island.
This r quire, r-;ome repairs, estimated at $800.-(0lass A.)
'tono, Nortli Edisto, and S011,tli Edisto.-All these must be fortified, at lea~t
in uch a manner as to protect these inlets from enterprises in boats or ~mall
ve , L. To tlrnt en cl $5 0,000 may be assigned to each.- (Olass F.)
't. Helena sound.-'l'he proper defences cannot Le pointed out till 1he ound
::;hall have b n urveyed. Although there i. supposed to be no great depth of
water on the Lar, it i · known to be navigable for the maller cla s of merchantm<·n and for . team boat., ancl to have a navigable communication with the hearl
of Broad river, or I>ort Royal-intcrsectincr the interior navigatiou between
'hm l<·, ·tc,n ~ud 'avaimah. The e tirnate i , "150,000.-(0la,' F.)
Broad nrer, or Port Royal roads. -'l'b value of this capaciou roadstead,
a. a harL~r of refuo- , cl pend upon the depth that can b, carried over th har;
n the ch:;t:m of thi Lar L yond the line of coa. t; and on the mean that
ma · li · np11li ·al,] of 1 .·• ·nino- th clanger of cro,, ino- it. Thi. is uppo ' d tc,
b · th
·p _t-_t bar on thP . outh rn coa t.
'lwuld th •r pr ve to b wat ·r
·nou d1 tor frwat 14, ai1d ,Ji uld it b pra ·ticabl to mak · th pa~ age OY r the
on tl1 ·hor ,, and lio-ht or oth r
lJar af • mid a.: l, 'the ·r ·tion of lio-ht-h u
di...:tin ·t ~uid · on the bar, thir- harbor, ituat cl within ...:ixty mile of th city t
'barl •. ton, and t" ut ' of ; 'avannah riv r, inter· ctino- th int rior wat r c municati n L ·tw en th · ·, citi ., , tl1 reby " curing th arrival of uppli :; of Y •ry

cl:

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES

291

kind, would possess a high degree of importance not only as a harbor of refuge,
but al o as a naval station.
.
The urvey of the exterior shoals, constituting the bar, sho_uld be made with
the greatest care and a~l possible_ m~nuteness. Only when this shall have been
done can the true relations of this mlet to the rest of the coast be known, and
on this relation the position and magnitude of the required defe1;1-ces will depend.
For the present the estimate made some years ago by the engmeer department
is adopted, namely, $300,000.-(Olass E.)
Savannalt, and rnoutli ef tlie Savannali river, Georgia.-Mention has been
made of the natural interior water communication along the coast of South
Carolina. A similar communication extends, south from the Savannah river, as
far as the St. John's, in Florida. Owing to these passages, the city of Savannah, like Charleston, is liable to be approached by other avenues than the
harbor or river; and, accordingly, its defence must have relation to these lesser,
as well as to the great channels.
'11he distance from the mouth of Wassaw, or even the Ossabaw sounds (both
to the southward of Savannah river) to the city is not much greater than from
the mouth of the river; and an enterprise may proceed the whole distance by
water, or part of th.e way by water, and part by land, from either inlet or from
both. As in the case of like channels in the neighborhood of Charleston, it
cannot now br determined where they can be defended most advantageously.
It is hoped, however, that the localities will permit the defences to be placed
near the inlets, because, thus placed, they will serve the double purpose of
guarding the city of Savannah and covering these harbors, which, in time of
war, cannot but be very useful.
The defence of Savannah river is not difficult. A fort on Cockspur island,
lying just within the mouth, and, perhaps for additional security, another on
Tybee island, which forms the southern cape at the mouth of the river, would
prevent the passage of vessels up the channel, and cover the anchorage between
Tybee and Oockspur.
Old l-1 ort Jackson, standing about four miles below the city, must be maintained as a second barrier, Loth as respeQts the main channel and the passages
which come into the river from the south, which last would not be at all controlled by fortifications on Oockspur or rrybee. Fort Jackson is accordingly
undergoing the repairs and modifications necessary to give the proper strength
and efficiency. Estimated to cost $45,000.-(0lass A.)
Fort Pulaski, a new work situated on Oockspur island, is, in all the most
important matters, finished. Some further work has to be done, however, on
the ctikes of the island, on barracks, and quarters, and storehouses, ancl in the
con truction of an advanced battery. Estimated to cost $35,000.-(Olass B.)
To fortify Tybee island may require $120,000.-(0lass E.)
TVassaw sound, Ossabaw sou,nd, St. Catliarine' s sound, at tlte nioutli ef
Medway river~· Sapelo sound, Doby inlet, Altamaha sound, at tlze mouth ef
Altamalla riter; St. Sirnon's sound, at the mouth ef BuJfalo creek; St. Andrew's
sour.d, at tlie united rnouths ef tlie Scilla and 1 'antilla rivers; and Cumberland
sound, at tlte moutlt ef St. Jvlary's river.-All these communications with the
ocean are highly important as regards the line of interior navigation, and several
of them as affording access to excellent harbors. 'l'he last and one or two
others are known to be navigable to the largest sloops-of-war and merchantmen,
and some of the others are but little inferior as regards depth of entrance or
safety of anchorage.
Fort Clincli, a work now in course of erection at the mouth of Cumberland
sound, is a most important contribution to the defence of this, the most southern
of the Georgia entranc('s. E ·timated to cost $180,000.-(Olass 0.)
All the above-named openings, except that into Cumberland sound, have to
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be surveyed. Some of them are probably easily defensible by forts and batteries, while othei·s may need the aid of floating defences.
Nothing better can now be done than to assume $200,000 as the average
cost of defending each of the eight entrances, giving a total of $1,600,000.(Class F.)
St. Augustine, Florida.-Thjs most southern of all the harbors of the Atlantic, and the key to the eastern portion of Florida, is accessible to the smaller
classes of merchantmen, to privateers, and to steam vessels, and requires a certain amount of protection from attack by water. It is believed that adequate
protection has been given by repairs bestowed upon the water battery of the old
Spanish fort, ( Fort Jliarion.)- (Class A.)
SEA-COAST FROM CAPE FLORIDA TO THE MOUTH OF THE RIO GRANDE.

Fort. Taylor, at Key West, is in a good state to be brought speedily into
efficiency; the walls have been rajsed up out of the water almost to the sills of
the lower embrasures; and with the sum asked for in the last estimates, the
lower tier of embrasures might be got ready for the armament in a shott time.
Estimated to cost $805,000.-(0lass 0.)
Fort Jefferson, Garden key, Tortugas.-This fort, which will perfectly
command the admirable harbor lying in the heart of this group of keys, is
advancing without the slightest impediment. '1.1he outer or counter-scarp wall
first executed, because necessary to prevent the flooding of the island in gales
of wind, has been completed, and labors are now bestowed on the main scarp.
Estimated at $989,862.-(Olass 0.)
Turning now to the shore of the Gulf, we find a portion, namely, from Cape
Florida to Pensacola, that has never been surveyed with particular reference to
the defence of the harbors. ..Within this space there ate Charlotte harbor,
Tampa bay, Apalaclticola bay, Apalachie bay, St. Josepli's bay, and Santa
Rosa bay. Nothing better can now be done than to assume for these the estimate formerly presented by the engineer department, viz: $1,000,000 for all.(Olass F.)
It may be remarked, as applying to the whole Gulf coast, that, from the re]a .
tive geographical position of this part of the seaboard and the country interested in its afety, from the unhealthiness of the climate, nature of the adjacent
country, and mjxed character of the inhabitants, it will be some time before that
portion within upporting distance, whose welfare may be endangered by an
enemy, will be competent of itself to sustain a serious attack from without.
Upon the Atlantic eaboard the Alleghanies crowd the people down upon the
shore, every important point on the coast being surrounded by a population den e
now, and every day rapidly increasing in numbers; while the ocean and the
interior parallel communications transmit rapid aid to the right and left. 'l'he
coa _t of the Gulf, however, is thinly peopled in itself, is remotr from succor from
b hmd, and i. almo t inacce,.sible to lateral aR, istanc . Tho e rea ons, therefore, which tend to e tablish the necessity of au organized, permanent, and
timely y tern of defence for the whole seaboard of 1he United State , apply to
thi part of it with peculiar force.
We now pa. on to th remaining point of defence on the Gulf.
Pensacola bay.-'l'hr upp r arm of thi con ·idrrable bay receive the yellow
wat r or P a river, MiddJ river, aud ERcamhi:i riv r. Th tiibntarie of the
la. t int rlocking with th
lab:una and 'hattahouchi , , em to mark tl1e route
wh r by, at om futur , clay, ·anal ,vill convey a J:JUrt of the product of the~e
1·iv r to }> n:,;acola · whil the cpialitie and po:--ition of th harbor, and the
fav r bl nature of th ountry, hav already marked out lin of railroad communication with a vast interior rl'o-i 11.
anta Ro. a ·otmd .·t ·nd. a.,twar<l, from th lower part of the hay, into
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2anta Rosa bay. On the west the lagoons of Pensacola,_ Perdiclo, and l\_fobile
ays, respectively, interlock in such a manner as to reqmre but a few m1les of
c tting to complete a navigable channel from the fo:st ~o the last ~amed bay,
and thence through an existing interior water commumcation to the city of New
Orleans.
Pensacola bay has rare properties as a harbor. It is now accessible to
friO'ates, and there is reason to hope that the bar may be permanently deepened.
The bar is near the coast and the channel across it straight and easily hit.
The harbor is perfectly landlocked and the roadstead very capacious. There
are excellent positions within for repairing, building, and launching· vessels, an_d
for docks and dock yards, in healthy situations. 'l'he supply of good water 18
abundant. 'rlrn harbor is perfectly defensible. These propertie:-;, in connexion
with the position of the harbor, aF\ regards the coast, have induced the government to select it as a naval station and place of rendezvous and repair.
An excellent survey has been made of the bay of Pensacola, sufficing to form
he cheme of defence for the town and harbor. Regarded, however, as an important naval station and place of rendezvous and repair which it now is,
further surveys, extending a greater distance back from the shores, delineating
accurately the face of the country, and showing the several avenues by land
and water, are found to be necessary.
·
The defences of the water passage as projected are nearly completed.
Fort Pickens, on St. Rosa island, is finished.
Fort Jl;[cRee, on Foster's island, is also finished; as is Fort Barrancas, on
the ite of an old Spanish fort. An old Spanish water battery has been
t~oroughly repaired, and placed in connexion with the last-namecl fort, and con-s1derable progress has been made on a redoubt, in aclvance of the same fort.
Permanent barracks in the same vicinity are about half finished.
The site of Fort McRee was, a few years since, seriously threatened by theabrasion of a new outlet from the lagoon that lies just behind it; but this danger
ha" been averted, and by the erection of a low ramp~rt exterior to the fort a
permanent security against any recurrence of the danger will be provided, and
place for a heavy additional battery acting on the channel will be prepared. At
a futu.Te day it will be proper to extend this exterior protection. At present it
is de...,igned to execute only that part lying over or nearly over the outlet that
wa lately so threatening and so difficult to close. Estimated at $204,000. ( la ses A, B, 0.)
Perdido l>ay.-'Ihis bay is intimately related to Pensacola and )fobile bays,
both as regards security and intercommunication, and should be carefully surT""eyed with a view to those objects. It must be fortified, and the cost may be
8200,CJOO.-(Class :F'.)
.1liobile bay.-'l1 he plan of defence for this bay requires a fort on Mobile
Poi_n~, an_d another on Dauphin island. Fort ];Jorgan, at the first-mentioned
pos1t1on 1. a finished work, in au efficient condition, but requiring, in the way
of barracks and quarters, storehouses, &c., for the accommodation of its garri::;on, ...,ome further expenditures. rrhese improvements are in progress-estimated
at .....-30,000.- (0la~s B.)
Fort_ Gafrtes, on Daupliin island, has been authorized Ly Congress, and the
expenditure of the appropriation awaits only the settlement of title to the site,
a to which there are supposed to be no remaining difficulties. Estimate,
. -1 0,000.- (0lass 0.)
- ~ew Orleans and tlie delta ef tlie 11/Jississippi.-The most northern water
communication between the Mississippi and the Gulf is by the passage called
the Rigolets, connecting Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. 'l'he next is
the pa..,· of Oltef Menteur, also connecting these lakes. '11 hrough these pas~age an en my entering Lake Pontchartrain would, at the same time that he
in. ercepted all water communication with :Mobile and Pensacola, be able to reach
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New Orleans from the southern shore of the lake; or he might continue onward
through Lake l\faurepas, Amite river, and Iberville river, thereby reaching the
Mississippi at the very head of the delta; or, landing within the mouth. of the
Chef Menteur, he might move against the city, along the edge of the Gentilly
1·oad.
To the southwest of Chef Menteur, and towards the head of Lake Borgne,
is Bayou Bien·venue, a navigable channel, (tlie one followed by tlie Englisl1, army
in tlte last war,) not running quite to the Mississippi, but bounded by shores of
such a nature as to enable troops to march from the point of debarcation to the
-city.
These avenues are defended by Fort Pike, at the Rigolets; by Fort 1Vlacomb,
formerly Fort "\Vood, at Chef Menteur; by a small fort at Bayou Bienvenue, and
by a tower at Bayou Dupre.
The defences of the Mississippi are placed at the Plaquemine turn, about
-seventy miles below New Orleans-the lowest position that can be occupied.
Fort Jackson is on the rig·ht bank, and Fort St. Pliilip a little higher up on the
left.
Forts Pike, Jltlacomb, Battery Bienvenue, and Tower Depri, have been put in
the most efficient state, and will perfectly accomplish the objects for which they
were de igned. They will still need some small expenditures in reference to
security of site, extension of accommodations, &c. Fort Jackson is also in good
condition as to its batteries, but will be much improved in that respect on the
completion of an outwork now in hand. It needs also more barrack room.
Fort St. Philip is a very old fort, and much dilapidated. Its position is o
commanding and advantageous as to require the fort to be put in the best state,
and much has been done to that end within a few years; still more is necessary
for the fort itself and its dependencies; and all the barracks, quarters, and storehouses have yet to be built. Estimated at $111,500.-(0lasses A and B.)
The most western avPnue by which New Orleans is approachable from the
sea passes on the ·west side of the island of Grande 'I'erre into Barrataria bay,
which is an excellent harbor for a floating force, guarding the coa.. ting trade on
that side of the Mississippi. :F'rom this bay there are several paRsage leading
to New Orleans.
Fort Livingston, has been erected on the west end of Grande Terre island.
'I'his fort is kept from entire completion to await the cessation of a slight subsidence which has been going on for some time. It could be :finished with the
means now applicable at any moment by a fr·w ·weeks' work.-(Ola..s B.)
Proctor's Landing, Lake Bmgne.-This po1-,ition, which was oYerlooked in
the ori 0 'innl project for the defences of the city of N w Orleans, has been already
adverted to. A ,:mall battery, enclosing a towPr, 8tanding on the shore, v,:ould
eff •ctually clo,'e this avrnue. 'I'he tower could not be carried by aR ault, nor
th' battrry while protected by the tower. No l:mcling could be made under it;.
fire, and there i.~ no other spot for a landing, owing to the i'i"\Ymnpy natur of the
ground, hut th site of th batt ry. Estimated at, 100,000.-(Clas. D.)
1 'f'veral timrs in thi.
r<'port we have alludrd to circum.. taucr. wJ1ich would
<lPm,md the· P1~1ploym nt of floating defence. in addition to fixed defence:- upon
the. horr. \\" hav hn· an iu;:-tance in which that kind of defence would lie
Y('l'Y n--c·ful.
Fortification. will 11alJle u1:< to prot ct N" ew Orlran.~ even from
tlw mo-:t :1·rinn" and cl t nnin cl •ffort.; of an en 'my; but, owioO' to th irreat
width of . om~ of th , ,·.· t,·rior paR~a 0 ·c:-, we cannot by fortification: a]on<' d privc· an c·w·my of :inchorao-P:-, ( RP<' ·ially that of hancl ]rnr i=-land,) nor covn
cntin·l · tlu· exterior water onnnnuication b twc n the• Iligol t::i and )IobiJ .
'\V<· mu, t. tlwrt>for · eitlH:r (Jllil.'tly :--nbmit to the annoyancP and injury that an
1wmy in po -.,•:-:-ion of th . , pm,. a 0 • •, may infli t, or ;n nt th m by a tim y
preparation of a tloatino- for ·1. adapt cl to th ir p culiar navio·ation, and •:tp bl
uncl,ir tlu· . helt r of fort:, of b fog alway. on the al •rt, and f a, -.urning
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offensive or defensive attitude, according to the designs, conduct, or situation of
he enemy.
.
.
A. floating force of this nature would be ve:·y t~seful m ?verlookmg t_he coast
eastward of New Orleans, especially the port10:1 JUSt mer~t10ne~, extend1~g from
the Rigolet (Fort Pike) to Mobile bay. And m connex10n with the active serTice of such a force, and as a further defence of the approaches to New Orleans
from that quarter, a fort on Ship island would be important. I~ would c~ver a_n
excellent anchorao·e for the defensive flotilla and for other cruisers. vV1th this
refuge at one end of the base of operations, and at the other the anchorage
between Pelican island and Dauphin island, guarded by works at the eastern
encl of the latter, a light steam squadron might, without being much exposed,
be Y-ery effective.
Projects have not yet been made for works on Ship island, but it may bG
e~timated that an adequate fort would cost about $200,000.- (0lass E.)
In this age of great improvements in the means of locomotion, it ~vould be
unwise to decide, without pressing need, on the details of the floatmg force
required at certain points on the Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico coasts-perhaps
even on the nature of the moving power. Although the probability undoubtedly
is that the power will be steam, genius may in the interim devise something still
better than steam.
..And I may here remark, in relation to the preparation of steam vessels for
warlike purposes generally, that wisdom would seem to direct a very caution
and deliberate progress. Every new vessel may be expected to surpas in important particulars all that had preceded, and to surpass the more, as each succeeding vessel should be the result of careful study and trial of the preceding.
It may be considered unreasonable to expect that steam itself will give way
to some agent still more potent, and at the same time not less safe and manageable. But it certainly is no more than probable that steam vessels now under
con truction may be regarded almost as incumbrances within ten years .
..A deliberate advance in this branch of naval construction is recommended the
more, by our ability to construct these vessels iu large numbers, when about to
be needed, the timber being collected in the meantime.
CO,AST OF TEXAS.

In.November, 1845, a special board of engineer officers was appointed to
examine the coast of Texas in relation to its defence. Their report, submitted
in February, 1846, was to the following effect:
The coast from the Sabine to the Rio Grande is about three hundred and
ceventy-five miles in extent. It is composed for nearly the whole distance of
long, nanow islands and peninsulas, ·which lie parallel to tbe main land, forming
e-veral bays and lagoons, the inlets to which exhibit channels generally only
suitable to the smaller classes of vessels.
Galveston bay is the most important one on the coast. Besides a number of
hayous and small tributaTies, it receives the waters of the river Trinity. This
river i said to be navigable for six hundred miles for steamers of a light class,
and. when improved., this navigation will doubtless be extended. 'rhe harbor
is represented as being undoubtedly the best on the coast, the bar at the entrance
having also the greatest depth of water. The charts submitted by that board
how a depth of nine feet at low water and twelve feet at high water.
_,\_ permanent work is propoeed for the defence of this harbor, of the class of
that con;tructed on Grande Terre island, Barrataria bay. Its estimated cost is
three hundred tbousancl d.ollars.-(Olass D.) The construction of some Martelle towers along the shore and across the island is deemed. essential to the
defence of the "Swash" channel and to the security of the town, Brazos Santi.a.go. The board deem this harboT of equal importance with that of Galveston:
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it has not much capacity, but is the only one in the vicinity of the Rio Grande.
The bay at the pass has eight feet water.
The trade of the Rio Grande and of its dependent country passes overland
thirty miles to Point Isabel, and from thence issues from the Brazos SantiaO'o.
The depth of water over the bar at the mouth of the Rio Grande being oitlv
four feet, admits the passage of very small vessels not suited to the purpo e
commerce.
With reference, then, to the trade of the Rio Grande, and to a point from
which military supplies could with the greatest facility be sent to the frontier,
the defence of the Brazos Santiago is deemed by the board of equal importance
with that of Galveston, and they recommend a permanent work, of the ize,
character, and cost of the one proposed for the latter place, estimated at threehundred thousand dollars.-(Olass D.)
Matagorda bay.-It is deemed due to the extensive country washed by therivers tributary to this bay, that its entrance should be defended. The difficulties, however, attending that entrance, and the navigation of the bay up to
Matagorda and La Vacca, would seem to lessen, in a military point of view, theimportance of its defence as · compared with that of Galveston and the Brazos
Santiago; but as a very good harbor for vessels drawing no more than eight
feet of water is exhibited within the bay at Porto Cabello, and as it would afford
convenient rendezvous for the light flotillas of an enemy, it is considered that a
permanent work of secondary importance to those proposed for Galveston and
the Brazos Santiago should be constructed for its defence. A small work,
mounting some twenty-five guns, and estimated. to cost $175,000, is accordingly
proposed.-(Class E.) The remaining inlets on the coast, either from the shallowness of the water, the comparatively little value of the harbors them clve~,
or the nature of the country immediately depending upon them, are deemed to
require, at present, no other defence than that of a temporary character. They
would depend upon the ultimate opening of a line of inland navigation, comiclered
practicable between the Sabine and the Rio Grande; and the necessary work
would be thrown up only in time of war.

of

GENERAL SUMMARY.

It may be of convenience to have here a , ummary of the principle~ contended for in the preceding remarks, and of the c sential points contained
therein.
1. As~uming that we may have wars with nations in possession of extcn ·i.e
naval means, we must consider ourselves likely to be attacked wherever there
are olJject tempting· to an enemy, either from the spoil he might hope to gather,
or the injury that through them he might hope to inflict. \Ve mu, t also con' icler t1,at the po,ver of the attack -will be. proportioned to the value of the
object; and that, consequently, the means of defence houlcl b of corresponding strength.
2. The mode of defence proper to our circum tances, a su tained by the
con, ideration pre entcd in the preceding remark~, ancl other,· of analogon, nature;
and as xcmplified by the prr, ent, as well as by the former practice of all nation having an exJJoscd seaLoard, is believed to be a y tern of p rman nt for~
tification:'4, con.-i::;tinn· of work adapted re pectfully in theii: power to the ,alu~
of the objr·ct covered, and applied, in tim s of peace, . ev rally, in an order ot
time al14o fix ·c1 hy th rclativ importance of the object:,.
3. It i ju.-t thi:- mod of defonce that ha.. been, to a great ext nt, built up
in thi · country ·inc<.' th war l 12, and that . , hould be carried to completion
rapid! · a· the 11H·all. of th trca:ury will allow. The point that ar most ,aluahle arc a1r ady, to a v ry important ext nt, covered by the 'e d fenc is. But
amo1w mau · }JOint..: th, t are valuable, a11 arc not equally o; '\vhil , for exam-
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ple, New y ork has had much done for it, Baltimore has had little, and_ New
Bedford-the tliird city in the Union for registered tonnage-almost notlung:,
)fore than four thousand heavy guns may, however, ns has before been saw.,.
now be mounted for the defence of places which it was necessa~·y Jh:st to gua~·d,
in permanent fortifications that are equal to any ir_i- the w~r!d, m thell" respecti:ve ·
grade.,, and placed, moreover, in the most effective pos1t10ns. These_ are m,.
1rhat are called in this report, classes A and B, namely, old works repa1red and
new ones completed, or nearly so, at a total cost of $16,756,70~.
.
Then follows the class of works in progress, (class 0,) of ·which the remam- ing expenditures are estimated at $5,028,194 .
.And then the class D, next to be commenced, in which there is no work that .
can be dispensed with, as must be evident on consulting the list, page 92. The ·
cost of class D is estimated at $4,083,000.
Then follows the class E, next in importance, of which the estimated cost is ,
S2,235,000.
As to those in hand, all have received the approbation of the government ~nd
Congress, and not one of those comprised in any other class can be begun with- ·
out the particular sanction of both.
The last class, marked F, the most numerous of ull, cannot be begun for·
many years, at any rate, and then only as the several positions shall, in the view·
of Congress, have risen to an adequate degree of importance. The estimate for·
that class is $11,829,000.
4. Though facility of communication with the interior of the country, byrailroa.ds, would be an advantage in all cases where an enemy might land and
conduct operations for two, three, or more days, there are few such positions that .
now have, or are likely to have, the advantage of. such communications. Generally, the points of the coast attained by railroads are not points at which the
people are deficient in numbers, but where they most abound; and besides, the
attacks to which the coast will be. liable, will be almost universally sudden
attacks--attacks without warning-attacks that must be settled, one way or·
the other, before relief could come, even by railroad, and to which railroads could
not supply relief, even ·were there time- men not being wanted to resist these at-tacks, but heavy guns, whether afloat or ashore.
The use of existing railroads, or of any railroad likely to be constructed,
cannot, in general, therefore, affect materially a system of forts and batteries
upon the sea-coast. 'l'here may be particular instances of partial benefit, but
none is likely to occur wherein their use could justify the reduction of the
power of fortifications othenvise necessary, much less the dispensing with such
works altogether.
5. The application of steam to vessels-of-war is believed to act detrimentally
to the defence of the sea-coast by opening new avenues of approach, and also ,
by the suddenness and surprise with which attacks may fall upon any
pojnt. The first augments the number of the defensive works, and the second
requires them to be at all times-at the opening of the war as well as during ·
it~ contin~ance-in a state of perfect readiness for action. w·ith the large
steam navies now kept in commission by naval powers, there would be no state
of transition between peace and war-no time for new defences to be prepared,.
nor for substituting new expedients even if any such would answer.
On the other hand, the use of steam vessels as a reliance for coa.st defence
i~ attended with all the objections inherent in other modes of defence with ves-..
sel , and with some of the objections exaggerated. The objections that are
inevitable are, inordinate expense and the perishable nature of the preparation;..
and to these are to be added uncertainty as to their proper state of readiness,
and a to their su:5ciency when ready. Steamers should in no case, therefore,,.
take the place of shore batteries, when the use of the latter is not forbidden by

"298

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

local peculiarities. As auxiliaries of fortifications they will always be useful,
however, and as substitutes in the cases just supposed indispensable.
6. No improvements or inventions of modern times tend in any degree to
lessen the efficiency of fortifications as means of coast defence, while the principal one, namely, the firing of shells from guns, unquestionably augments their
.relative power.
NORTHERN FRONTIER
The Secretary of War presents another interrogatory (the fourth) in the fol]owing words : " How far the increase of population on the northern frontier,
..and of the mercantile marine on the northern lakes, obviates or diminishes the
necessity of continuing the system of fortification on those lakes ?"
The system of defence for these lakes recommended by the joint board in
·1840 (see Doc. 206, page 100) comprised the following works:
1. Fort Brady, at the straits between Lake Superior and Lake
Huron. Estimated cost of repair .......... _................ ,
$75,000
2. Fort Mackinac, at the junction of Lake Michigan with Lake
Huron. Estimated cost of repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
50,000
3. Fort Gratiot, at the outlet of Lake Huron. Estimated cost of
-repair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
50,000
Note.-All these are old works, long occupied by United States troops, and
it is designed to give them further strength and means of accommodation for
~arrisons.
4. A new fort and barracks near Detroit. Estimated cost of con·.struction (original). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $250,000
Amount expended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
171,7-55
Amount required to complete ............................. .

66,000

5. Defensive works and barracks at Buffalo. Estimated cost of
..construction ........... .................... ........... - . - - $150,000
116,500
Amount expended ...................................... .

Amount required to complete ............................. .

33,500

-------

6. Repair of old Fort Niagara. Estimated cost of repair ..... .
Amount expended ...................................... .

$ 4,027
59,027

Amount required to complete .......................... - - - -

25,000

7. R pairs of old Fort Ontario. Estimated cost of repair ..... .
Amount exp nded ............... . ...................... .

$ 3,013
7 ,013

Am unt r '<p1ired to complete ............................. .

5,000

-----

.1Yote.-'I he"'c two are ola work., the former having been alway garri on d, I
·bclicw.
, . Auel a fort at the outlet of Lake Champlain. E timated co..,t
of con. tructi n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.Amount t xp

nu

d .... ..................... ..............

... mount requir d to ompl te ............................. .

411,497
1 7,3.5;
224,14'

-----
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The e, it was thought, should be executed as soon as the means of the
ea:::nry would allow.
.
~-lnd it was recommended in the above report, and m others on the same subject. that at the approach of war with England.
9. Works should oe placed at the mouth of the Genesee nver.
10. A fort should be built at Sackett's Harbor.
11. Another at a narrow part of the St. Lawrence river.
12. That a large barrack establishment should be prepared at Plattsburg.
13. Stone house, &c., at the head of the Kennebec and Penobscot.
14. A fort at Calais, on the St. Croix; and,
15. A large barrack establishment near Albany.
These last mentioned preparations for war (Nos. 9, 1.0, 11, 12, 13, 14, and
15) may still be left (as was designed) to be reconsidered at any time that such
a certainty may seem to impend.
.
-i
•
Xothing has yet been done to Forts Brady, Mackinac, or Gratiot, and,
though the maintenance of these forts in a war with England would undoubtedly
be necessary, they may, with less damage than the others, be left as the last? to
receive all the additional strength their situations demand. In the meantime
the indispensable repairs that small appropriations will accomplish !=:hould. be
provided for; for instance, a part of the very old wall of Fort l\Iackiuac havmg
fallen down, a small grant was asked last year for its repair, a request that is
this year repeated.
Fort Wayne, tlie new fort near Detroit, has, since the date of the report
abo-ve referred to, been built and is now in perfect condition, and there remains
therein only the re-erection of officers' quarters destroyed by fire just after being
completed, and the addition of some other quarters, storehouses, &c., the barracks being very nearly fiuished ; the remaining expense being estimated at
866,000.
Fort Ontario, at Osu:ego, has also been finished, with several entirely new

quarters, storehouses, barracks, &c., together with a long sea-wall, found to be
necessary to preserve the site. Only small grants, for slight repairs, will be
needed for this work for some time, but of which one for nine hundred dollars
is now a,_ked. This fort is not a permanent one, and, if required to be maintained many years hence, may need repairs somewhat extensive.
Fort Niagara has received extensive repairs, and is in a defensible condition;
but the expenditure having been restricted to the fortification proper and to the
magazine, the accommodations for the garrison, ·which are remains of the old
French work, are in a bad condition, and need repair for the health and comfort
of the troops. A new hospital was hardly finished, a year or two ago, when it
was destroyed by fire, originating in another part of the fort; which accident,
with the similar one at Fort "\Y ayne mentioned above, shows that economy even
exact that buildings be made fire-proof. The effect of this fire upon some
palisading, as well as upon the hospital, and the decay of some wooden gun
platforms, make a small appropriation necessary. The old stone houses will
h.a Ye to be rebuilt, though they may be kept up for a t:!hort time, and some
enlargement must be given to quarters; all which will, perhaps, involve an
expen._e of $25,000.
_.\_t Buffalo, Fort Porter has been built, and. is finished. It is a tower
enclo""cd by a battery. It commands the entrance into Niagara river, and also
the shore and anchorage in front of the city of Buffalo, nearly up to the mouth
of Buffalo harbor. There is connected with the fort a good house for officers'
quarters that wa.· purchased with the site. There will be needed, further,
another Lattery and tower, to be placed at or near the mouth of the harbor, at
an additional cost, beyond the means in hand, of, say, $33,500.
uch barracks a. may be wanted at a future day may there be hired or hastily
erected .
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Fort Montgomery, outlet ef Lake Champlain.-This fort is not less than half
finished; indeed, considering the difficulties and expense that attended the making a foundation of piles under the whole fort, it may be said to be two-thirds
:finished. The remaining expense may be estimated at $224,142.
We see, therefore, that of all the new works designed to be executed on the
northern frontier, in anticipation of a war, there remains tc, be expendedAt Fort Wayne, Detroit, for buildings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $66, 500 00
At Buffalo, for tower and battery...........................
33, 000 00
At Fort Montgomery, outlet of Lake Champlain..... . . . . . . . . . 224, 142 00
323,642 00

On repairs of old works there is now, or soon will be, neededAt Fort Niagara, say. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $25, 000 00
At :Fort Ontario, say.. ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5, 000 00
At Fort Mackinac, say . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20, 000 00
50,000 00

Making a total of.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

373, 642 00

If we add to this sum the estimates, before given, forFort Brady .. ·................................ $75, 000 00
Fort Gratiot.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50, 000 00
Fort Uackinac, the balance after the above provision ................ _ ... ___ ...... _. . . . . . 30, 000 00

155, 000 00
There will be a grand total for the northern frontier of

528, 642 00

==-:.--:-_-----=--==

I thought it best to show first the actual condition of things on the northern
frontier, before proceeding with a reply to the specific inquiries of the honorable Secretary of ,Var.
The great length to which this report has extend <1, notwithstanding· that a
sincere desire to keep it within more reasonable limits has induced me to omit
considerations that I wished to adduce, must now restrict my remarks, refening
to some previous reports wherein the subj ect of our northern defences have bee~
specially treated-I mean, particularly, first, a report of a special board of engineer officers, addressed to the Secretary of War, December 27, 1838; second,
a letter from the chief engineer to the Secretary of '\Var, of February 20,
1 39; and, third; a report to the Secretary of the Navy, from a joint board,
con ·i:,;tino- of Commodore l\Iorris and the chief ell~ineer, dated November 1 ,

1 45.

~

It is nndoubtedly true that the augmented population and extended navio-ation of th npp r Jak , will afford great resource, in that quarter to the nati~n,
ou th' occurrence of a war with England, and there eem to be a feelina- w1th
many that in , uch an event a great flood of armed m n would sweep aero;:; the
whol' ·mfacc of Uanacla, effacing all organized re i, tance, and trampfow down
all oppo,·ition. That thi · is 1io il,lo may Hot, I ·uppose, be que, tioned, but that
it ·will not h · clone i~ certain, if th re remain in our councils firmn
to re:-i::t all
. nch frnitlP, 'i-1 impul::; ·~, and wi ·dom to c · a.nd pursu · the prOJ!Cr cour,-e.
1
All ~pper anaclt micrltt be tlrn· ,.w pt, from Lake 'uperior clown to Montr al, without a r<·nl conqn "t of th country, and, incleC'cl, without o-aining any
aclvantacr of vital m m ·nt. ri1w;ton, in all that cli. tauc •, i the onl:· plac a
which anythi11,~ lik · a:.: •ri n impre ·sion would l, • macl • upon th military
m an: of cld',u · · · and, a. th flood . houlcl pa.::; away, all t]1at part of th· pr viut if loyal b ·fore, w ulcl not b m, d • lei! o by th d .:olation spread around.
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resistance would be made to such an inroad, and there being no fortifi1
~ 8 worth defending in a way to co~1promise the safety o~ the regula~· ~ro~ps,
. e-e would retreat before it, accumulatmg, as they receded: mto the lo-" er prnvince. where would be found, supported by the most formidable natur~l obstaele.-:, not the force of Canada, merely, but also the army and navy of England,
in daily cQmmunication with ~he mother country, and where would have to be
. u!!'ht and won the battles wlnch alone would secure a conques~. Any place of
ope~ation that contemplates overrunning U~per _Ca1;1~ua, or makmg such atta,ck
upon it, would be costly, beyond all calc~lat10n, m h±e and trea ur~, and unn:ce -ar'"° and fruitless after all. A country 1s conquered by concentrated efforts of
ell appointed armies upon vital points, often a single point-a l_evy en ma ~e
i.5 the great resource of defence ; a well prepared and well ~ppo1_nted army 1
the only reliable, as it is also, by far, the cheapest means of n~va.1011.
.
If we send a single army into Canada by Lake Ohamplam and the penmsula lying between the Richelieu ·and St. Lawrence, and posse._s om·'clv s of
1Iontreal, or of both shores of the St. Lawrence at any place below t)rn,t city,
here the channel can be commanded, all the wide extent of the Briti. h po s ·sions above that point will be paralyzed, being entirely cut off,_ not 0~1ly from
he mother country, but also from all relief from Lower Oan~,da, :nclu~mg Qu~bec, and from the provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. 'Io do tlns
a. great battle must be gained-probably on the peninsula just mentioned, and,
being gained, must be followed up by other victories, ending in the capture of
Quebec-the last barri~r that can be manned by the British. 'l'he policy of
the defence will be, while keeping an eye upon any preparations for the attack
just mentioned, by every resort, device, and effort, to agitate the frontier above,
and thereby draw the attention, and, as far as possible, the means of our government to the defence of that frontier. They will generally expose there but
:few regular troop?, but will collect volunteers, militia, and Indians in as large
numbers as possible. 'rhey will detach thither bodies of ship-carpenter and
.sailors, and make great efforts to obtain and keep a naval ascendency, if not
every-..vhere, at least wherever possible.
This was exactly the policy followed by the English during the war of 1812,
and with full success. By judgment, perseverance, and activity, they kept the
"'trength of this country so attenuated by stretching along a frontier of many
hu?-dred miles, that no great effort could be made anywhere; and upon the true
pomt of attack reduced the efforts to means so feeble as to end only in discomfiture a~d disgrace. Our government had its attention always, more or less,
turned rn the right direction, and several times attempted to assemble armies on
the Champlain frontier, but always withdrew these troops, giving way to clamor
rai ed by other frontier districts that were assailed, or believed themselves
endangered by British enterprises.
The British took Chicago, Mackinac, Detroit; besieged Fort J\Ieigs ; attacked Fort Sandusky ; captured Black Rock and Buffalo two or three times ;
they fou_ght the battles of Uhippewa and Lund~'s Lane; _besieged and assaulted
F ort Erie; they captured Fort :N"iagara and 1! ort Ontario; attacked Sackett's
Harbor; took Ogdensbuxg, French Mills, Malone, &c., &c. All these certainly
for no design or hope of conquest and extended occupation, but for the purpose
of keeping up an excited state of feeling and an energetic warfare that would
fully occupy this government. When in 1814 the assembling of six or seven
thou ~and men at Plattsburg, under General Izard, seemed to threaten their weak
point, the English forthwith began to concentrate their best troops in opposition,
and no sooner was that general withdrawn to re-einforce the Niagara frontier
than t his English force dashed forward in hopes, by profiting of our weakness,
to make themselves masters of the lake, and thereby cover for an indefinite
period their vital point.
If there has been a great increase of power and reasoning in the United
-. \

302

MILITARY .AND N.AV.AL DEFENCES.

States since the war of 1812, there has on the other hand been a great change
of the same sort in the population, and also in the military means of Canada.
The Rideau canal opens a communication between Montreal and Lake Ontario, and the Welland canal between Lakes Erie and Ontario ; and good roads
and canals from Toronto, on Lake Ontario, to Lake Huron, all d~ep in the heart
of the country, and not to be intercepted except by victorious armies. All
light draught war steamers of Great Britain can be sent fully armed, proT""Isioned, and manned, directly from sea up to the very head of Lake Ontario; and
we can now do nothing whatever, and shall be unable to do anything, except
by the erection of a fort at some commanding point on the St. Lawrence to "-' top
this transit. War steamers or other armed vessels, though of smaller size, m::y
branch off from this main line into Lake Champlain, and others into Lake Erie.
.Besides, the number of British merchant steamers on Lake Ontario and the St.
Lawrence, above Montreal, is greater than of American steamer~; and between
Montreal and Quebec there are several of the largest size, so that as many troops
as they might desire to send could be transported in twenty-four hours from
Quebec to Montreal; in two or three days to Kingston; and in three or fom
days to the head of Lake Ontario and the shores of Lake Erie. They have,
moreover, a strong new fortification at Kingston which will require a siege to
1·educe, and which, with other defences, covers a large naval depot and also the
outlet of the Rideau canal. Under these and other circumstances favorable to
the power of Canada, the relative numbers of the people of the two countries
afford no measure of relative strength for military purposes, especially at the
beginning of a war; and even as to numbers we shall :find the difference les
when we call to mind that the people of the British islands are quite as near in
time to this frontier as our more remote States, and that the help those islands
will send will consist of war steamers and regiments of disciplined troops. It
will not be with Canada alone that we shall have to contend, but with Canada
and Great Britain-the latter a nation always ready with great military power,
and prepared with naval means to throw a large army upon the lake shore a~
soon, at least, as we should be ready to face them with our undisciplined levies.
Our plan of operations being to move forward from the foot of Lil,ke Champlain as a base, we should not permit any demon;:;tration nor any real attack~
from Oanada upon the frontier above, to direct ui-1, althongh great efforts will
undoubtedly be made to that end all along the line from Montreal to L ake
Superior.
\Ve have not now, and without great and costly efforts could not acquire, the
naval a:;;cendency on Lake Ontario and on the 't. Lawrence.
e could no·.
attain to it at all without putting our building Htablishments under cover ot
fortifications.
By the time one half dozen merchant steamer:-: on Lake hamplain could b
})r parcel and armed, the Engli~h might pour into the lake throug'}.1 their canal.:
ncl quate naval mean , uppliecl by .l\Iontn·nl, Jndiec, and the 't. Lawrenc".
to make the struo-o-le for the mastery on that lake a doubtful one at lea:-t. lt
tl1 •y could think it po ·iLle that we slwulcl fail to fortify th outlet of th lak ~
th cont ·mplnt cl enlargement of th canal from Chambly to t. John:-, (ab u·
twelv mile ",) wh r by war teamers could pm~;· into that lake a tlwr n ·
may iuto Lal·e Ontario, woulcl uncloubt dly be ex cut d.
pon Lakrs Erie, Huron, and :Michi ,·an w, unqu 'tionably have a up •riority in naval preparation, which i lik Iv mor over to increa:-- from). r
t year; ancl if tim •1y car be tak •n to arm ai{<l man a uitabl portion o th·- ·
th ma t ry may b r tain •cl.
ff th re be truth ancl force in the for a-oino- tat<'m nt and opinion,,
with England ·will b · in with th naval ,·u1)r •macy iwai11.:t uti, alone, th .
rano- of th
t. Lawr nc aud the h ad of Lak 011tari ; with m ,:m,
n my' hand of contending for at lea t, if not · •izing a like ,upr

t?e
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Lake Champlain, with the power of throwing troops, _mechanics, and sa~lors in
afew days upon the shore of the upper lakes, and with the strongest mducements to keep up then an active warfare_. . The possession of a 1:-aval depot at
Penetanqueshin, on Lake Huron, which 1t 1s understood can readily be made ~··
,trong place, and where there is now one war st~amer, and the easy commumcation with it from 'I1oronto would allow enterprises to be prepared and sent at
farorable moments against the establishments and commerce of the upper lakes ..
But an anchorage under the defence of Fort Mack?:nac as a place of rendezvou" and watch for our own steam squadron, and a place of refuge in case of
di aster, would be very important in counteraction of any such project. Fort
Gratiot, when strengthened, would prevent any such hostile expedition from
passing through the strait in Lake St. Clair and endangering Detroit, while it·
would cover any of our vessels retreating to that end of the lake. Fort lVayne,.
near Detroit, will prevent the passing of any vessel between Lakes Huron and
Erie, while it would become the rallying point of the militia of that region
a. embled to meet threatened attacks of a serious nature, or to organize expe-ditions into the opposite territory, and its garrison would protect the neighborhood
from all predatory inroads.
Even on Lake Erie, where we might have the means of arming and manning·
any number of steamers, we should derive important if not indispensable aid
from batteries, duly prepared at Buffalo. 'rhe English now own several good
teamers on this lake, and by the aid of the Welland canal they could bring in
others, and they could also soon build a number within harbors secure and near;
so that we may reasonably look for vigorous efforts of that nature if we leave
our great places uncovered. The proposed battery and tower, in addition t()
the one already constructed· at Buffalo, will place that city out of danger of
conflagration, bombardment, or contribution, a security otherwise to be attained
only by keeping it constantly covered by a number of war -steamers greater
than the enemy can bring. 'rhere can be no comparison as to the expense of
the two modes, while the naval defence will be subject to all the chauces of
absence, at the moment of need, on other duty; of being enticed away by other
:eal or fictitious attacks; of being dispersed for ::i, time by tempests, &c. Other
Important places on the lake shore will be distant comparatively, not under
constant supervision from the Canada side, less valuable,. and for these and othe:r
rea ons may, with less damage, be left to such defences as temporary and hastily
prepared works may supply. 'rhe two batteries at Buffalo would cover the:
whole face of the shore, so that no vessel could lie within reach of the city
without coming under their fire, and the towers would guard these guns from
being Rpiked in any attempts at surprise.
On Lake Ontario, with the exception of some slight repairs,. all has been donethat ha been proposed for the present. But we have seen that we shall here
be under the naval command of the English, and must, therefore, make timely
preparation to avert the more serious consequences.
On the St. Lawrence we should, as soon as possible after a war becomes
probable, erect a work to command its navigation; and we ought, also, then todo , ornething for the protection of Ogdensburg.
'lhe obvious advantages afforded by our occupation of the outlet of LakeChamplain would seem to require nothing to be added to the preceding remarks.
I may "ay, however, that the fort now under construction, and more than half
~ished, will give to us the control of the lake beyond all doubt, and retain it
m spite of the energetic efforts that its great importance might induce an enemy
to make for it cnpture or reduction. It will keep all the shores of the lake, as.
well a. it surface, free from any hostile irruption, because no expedition could
penetrate, on itber f-ide, without exposing itself to be cut off by troops landed
in it rear, and it will secure the inappreciable advantage of taking the armies
de.:.:tined to the conquest of Canada, together with all their supplies, up to the·
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very frontier with all the velocity of steam; it will bring· all re-enforcements wjth
the same rapidity and certainty; and 1 moreover, in case of reverses it will
establish a limit to retreat-a place of shelter, refreshment, and a base for renewed operations.
It is necessary to consider that this point is so near to the point of concentration of the English, in the case we have supposed, that no temporary work
could be prepared in time, or if prepared would be competent to resist, unless
very strong, extensive, and defended by a large body of troops.
If these defences be not carried to completion we may look with certainty to
see the English widen and deepen the Chambly canal, a trivial operation, and
at the very beginning of a war throw a squadron of war steamers into the lake,
from which they could not be driven but by infinite cost and much sacrifice of
life and loss of time.
I forbear to enlarge further on this and other important matters connected
with this frontier system of defence, again taking the liberty, if the subject be
deemed worthy of further pursuit, to refer to the special reports before mentioned, and also to that in document 206. In these reports will be seen views
in relation to the embodying militia forces in support of the lake frontier, and
also in support of the frontier eastward of Lake Champlain, as well as other
ideas supposed to have an important bearing on the topic.
No speculations are ventured as to a possible change in the political condition
of Canada. Until Great Britain shall willingly relinquish her dominion we
may be certain that all her energies will, if necessary, be exerted in its maintenance; and whether this be for ten years or for a century, the defensive system
herein advocated, as dictated by forecast and prudence, should be steadily adhered to; for, up to the moment of relinquishment, if such moment ever arrive,
the defences may be growing more and more necessary.
'l'he considerations detailed in the preceding remark~, and otlwr. with which
it does not seem necessary further to burden thi. lon°· report, permit me to
make no other reply to the fourth inquiry of the Hon. 8ccretary of War than
that no change has occurred, or is likely to occur, that will ju .. tify the relinquishment of the system of defence for the northern frontier, of which ystem
the portion designed to be first prepared and to be permanent is now nearly
completed.
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The inquiries embodied in the resolutions of the House of Representatives, and
those specified in the letter of the Hon. Secretary of War calling for this report.
have seemed to me to require that the several topics should be gone into with
some minuteness. Certain of these, moreover, having been often of late placed
before the public mind in erroneous lights, according to my judgment, it appeared
to be a duty of my office to press such considerations as might be calculated to
satisfy the inquiries of the unprejudiced and uncommitted of the necessity of a
permanent system of defence, and of the adaptation to our wants and circumstances of a system of fortification.
Were it not for the length and diffusion of the preceding remarks, of which I
am fully conscious, but which I have not time to condense, I should have introduced other considerations of like tendency and of much weight.
As it is, in the full knowledge of our remaining weakness at many important
points, and under a deep conviction of the grave consequence likely to flow from
tardiness in the prosecution of the system, or interruption to hs progress, I feel
constrained to invoke for it, with all admissible earnestness, the prompt and
liberal support of the Executive and Congress.
At the same time, I only fulfil a further duty in warning the same authorfrie~
against relying on means that, though inordinately expensive, will be hut temporarily of use, and insufficient while they last, instead of those adopted by all
enlightened, experienced nations as relatively cheap as permanent, and in all
respects adequate.
COAST OF THE P ACJFIC.

Several works of defence will be required for this coast. The special board of
engineers organized for its examination, whose province it is to project the nece~sary works, have but just commenced their sessions, and have had the time to
examine and determine on the location of a single fort only. Thi i~ on the
southern side of the entrance to San Francisco bay, where a work ·will undoubtedly be required.
.
]Tor the other points of the coast no positive information a to the locality,
size, and cost of works can now be offered. The joint commi. sion of naval and
engineer officers who recently made a reconnoisf-\ance of the coast, without t_h
means of minute examination, suggest several points that will probably reqmrc
defence in the course of time. '.I'hese positions they deRignate as requiring f~rti.fications to be commenced immediately, namely, San Francisco &ay, San Dte!!O
ltarhor, and the moutli ef Columbia river; and thr clrpartment i dispo .. ed to r ly
confid ntly upon the opinion of the intrlligent officcn, compo ing the conunis::io_n.
i
v ral other point they also suo-ge t a,· ultiurntrly requiring defence, ubm1tting ~timate of cost. The numbe~ of these ,,·orks, a. well a::i the cost, m1Lt l
takc,n a· conj ctural until a thorough examination can be made.
Th localities, pecified, with approximate co~t of work:., arc a' follow~: .
"'lhe · mmi sion of navy and engin er offi ·e1-.· .co11:-titutecl by th Pr ;::1d_ n
for th purpo e of making an examination of the ·oa t of th United• 'tate lym~
on th_<' >acifi · ocean, with reference to points of drfcnc and occup: ti n, for h
, c·ctmt ' arnl a· ommodation of tracl aucl commerce, and for military ancl narnl
purpo:-<· · '
• • .tatr:
'' 'l'li<· , rv ·ral vork:-- 1w1nirecl for the defence of harbor~, roacl:::tcacl,. rh- i:··
;· mnch-, e ·. up n th· coa~t of th -nit<·cl , 'tat·· on the· Pacific will l, -.h wn ID
th· follm, i1w tab} :::, arran 1•· ·d in tlte ord<'r of th ir r ·lativ importune . in t~
cla · ·~ with appro.•imate <'stimatl-:4 of their co. t; ('ach clas: I, ino- -.h wn m
"'·parat · talJl ·, and th ' h ·acling L inrr applicabl to all th tahh·,."
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Approximate estimate of
cost.
Their denominations.

Sites of fo1 tifications.

On the Atlantic.

On the Pacific.

FIRST CLASS.-TO BE BUJLT WITHOUT
DELAY.

outh shore San Francisco bay, channel entrance. ___________ •• __ .••••
Xorth shore San Francisco bay, chan nel entrance .••••••.••••••••••.••.
Alcatrazas island, San Francisco bay ••
Cape Disappointment, mouth of Columbia river •••...•.•.••••. ·----PointAdams, mouthofColumbiariver.
Punta de Guianos, San Diego ..• _• _•.
Total •••••••••••• _•••• _• ___ •

Battery . _•• __ •• _••••

$400,000

$1,600,000

•••• do .•••••••••••••
•••• do .•••••••••••••

400,000
150,000

1,600,000
600,000

Redoubt, with battery.
I!'ort, with battery ••••
Battery, with coverface
___ , ________________

200,000
300,000
400,000

800,000
1,200,000
1,600,000

1,850,000

7,400,000

$400,000
150,000
150.000
100;000
100,000
150,000
,50, 000
50,000
50,000
50,000

$1,600,000
600,000
600,000
400,000
400,000
600,000
200,000
200;000
200,000
200,000

------ - - - -

SECOND CLASS.-TO BE BUILT AT A LAT~:R
PERIOD.

Santa Catalina island ................
Entrance to Humboldt harbor •••••••
Eutrance to Klamet harbor. ___ ••• __ .
...'eat island, (Scarborough harbor) .••.
n Pedro roadstead, (island) .•••• __ .
Monterey roadstead ••••• _•••••.•••••
. okt. Barbara roadstead ..••••.•••••.
Estero bay ..••••••••••••• ••••••••••
Entrance of Umpqua or of Cahons .•••
Bodega roadstead, (island) ••••••• __ ••

Fort, with battery ••••
Redoubt and battery •.
•••••••• do.~·-----·•••••••. do .•••••••••
•.•••••• do- •••••••••
•••••••. do •.••••••••
Battery and tower ••••
•••••••• do ••••••••• '
••••••• . do ••••••••••
Battery ••••••••••• _.

Total ..•.••••••••• ___ ••.••••

1,250,000
5,000,000
·------------------- ----------

----- -----

THIRD CLASS.-TO BE BUILT AT A RE"MOTf.l
PERIOD.

Port Lawrence, (Admiralty inlet) .•••.
Port 'l'ownsend, Straits of Fuca .••••.
{ West cape ••••••
Port Discovery, do. East cape ______
P1 otection island
.Tarrows of Puget's tiound .••••..••••
Entrance of Hood's canal. .•••••••••
Gray' harbor, mouth of Chiboby river.
Point Jose, San Francisco bay. _••• _.
An"el i land, San Francisco bay .••••.
n Pedro .•••..•.•••• __ .•.•••.•••.

Redoubt and battery ••
•••••••• do __________
.••••••• do .•••••••••
•••••••• do ••••••••••
•••••••• do .••••••••.
•••••••. do .•••••••••
•••••••• do •••••••••.
Battery and tower ••••
Temporary battery._.
.••••..• do .•••••••••
.••••••. do •••••••••.
nta Barbara ...................... •••••••• do ••••••••••
Total .••.. _••• _•••••••••••• Aggregate .•...••••• _•.•••••.'

$150,000
150,000

$644,000
600,000

------------ ----------~
... _____
--------·--- ______
·-----------

-----·"'··--·
150,000
150,000
50,000
20,000
20,000
10,000
10,000

600,000
600,000
200,00U
80,000
80,000
40,000
40,000

3,810,000

15,240,000

- - - - ----2,840,000
710,000
-------------------- ---------·----•-•••----••W•••
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In conclusion, I have to refer to a tabular statement of all the fortifications
erected, under construction, or intended to be built on the Atlantic and Gulf frontier of the United States, said fortifications being arranged in classes, according
to the order of importance, and, within each class, according to the geographical
order of the States in which they are situated.
The statement exhibits the amounts expended, or to be expended, for fortifications and for the armament; as also a specification of the armament.
Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
JOSEPH G. TOTTEN,
Bre·vet Brig'r General and Col. ef Engineers.
Hon. 0. M. CONRAD, Secretary ef JVar.

E.
Letter to tlte Secretary

ef the

Navy.

WAR DEPARTMENT, Waslzington, June 17, 1851.
Sm : I herewith enclose a copy of certain resolutions adopted by the House
of Representatives at the last session of Congress.
With a view to procure such information as will enable me to prepare the
report called for by the House of Representatives, I have propounded to several
officers of the engineer corps certain questions, to which they are desired to give
their separate answers.
I desire also to obtain the opinions of several naval officers, combining professional science with experience and practical skill on several points connected
with the proposed inquiry.
You will therefore oblige me by enclosing a copy of the within resolution _to
such officers as you may select, and requesting their separate opinions, in wnting, on the following points, viz:
l. '.ro what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications for the
protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application of
steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvement of projectiles, or other
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 18161
.
2. What reliance could be placed on vessels-of-war or of ,commerce, floatmg
batterie , gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent fortifications 1
3. I. it necessary or expedient to continue the :y tern of fortification on the
shores of the northern lakes?
Very re pectfully, your obedient servant,
C. L CONRAD, Secretary ef JVar.
Hon. WILLTAJH A. GRAHAM, Secretar!J qf the Kat!J,

No. 1.

Rrport

ef

ommodore Alorris.

"'\\'".A.' III \GTO\, J11ly 12, 1 51.
, rn: I h, w th honor to acknowlNlp,·p tlH• n ·c ·ipt of a C'Op · of y our l tt r of
,Ju111· 17, 1 ,'.il to tlw , <'l'rf'tar • of th TaYY, with <lir"ction. from him t r 1 rt
to )'O 1 lll • opinion upon C rtain point 'Ollll •ct cl with th Jff :-Cllt ,;, t Ill
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orifications for the defence of the coasts and shores of the United States, as it
, been recommended by boards of engineers and others appointed in 1816 and
at snb~equent elates.
The particular points to which my attention is directed by your letters are:
•· 1st. To what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications for the
protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application of
-team to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvements of projectiles, or other
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 18161
·'2d. What reliance could be placed on vessels-of-war or of commerce, floating
batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent fortifications 1
"3d. Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications on
·he .. bores of the lakes 1"
1. I have endeavored to ascertain, by an examination of some of the reports
from the boards of engineers and other officers upon this subject, what system of
Jefence they recommended, the bases of that system, the objects they proposed to
Jccomplish by it, the particular measures which they suggested to secure those
objects, and the data on which they determined the character and force of the
respective fortifications which are embraced in their general plan of defence.
2. 'Ihe bases of their system are: a navy composed of armed vessels capable
of navigating the ocean with safety and of reaching distant points speedily.
Fortifications, permanent and temporary, with the auxiliaries of floating bateries, gunboats, and steam batteries, and both fixed and floating obstructions to
channels.
·
Inte:ior communications by land and water, and a regular army and well
organized militia, all to be so combined as to form a complete system.
3. The objects of the system were to leave the navy free to protect our own
commerce or to act against an enemy on the ocean or upon his unprotected
co_a~t:-; to cloge all important harbors against an enemy, and secure them to our
military and commercial marine; to deprive an enemy of all strong positions,
where, protected by naval superiority, he might maintain himself and keep our
frontier in continual alarm; to prevent, as far as practicable, the great avenues
of interior navigation from being blockaded at their entrances into the ocean; to
~o"er the coastwise and interior navigation, by closing the harbors and the several
inlet from the sea which intersect the ·lines of communication, and thereby furher aid the navy in protecting the navigation of the country; and to protect our
!!Teat naval establishments.
_ 4. To seecure these important objects with all practicable sound economy, and
m a manner which in time of war should require the least necessary interruption
o the ordinary pursuits of our citizens, appears to have been the controlling
motive in determining the position, character, and extent or force of the respective works which the boards have proposed.
5. Of these works permanent fortifications are mainly relied upon, and have
preference over any of their auxiliaries wherever due security can be given without the aid of the latter.
6. The dimension~, form, and strength of each fortification appears to have
been determined by the local topography, the importance of the interests which
i wa. intended to secure, the character and amount of force by which it might
prr bably be a:sailed, ancl the time which would be required to concentrate upon
it a ·~ ufficient number of militia to secure it from capture by such assailing force.
7. Your fir; t que,Aion requires an opinion of the expediency of any modification of the present system of fortifications in consequence of two specified causes,
and of "any other changes that have taken place since it was adopted." It become~ nece . ary, therefore, to a:certain what" other change.·" have thus occurred,
and which would probably have lecl the boards of engineers to different recommendatir us, if the present tate of thincr:-; hac1 existed when the plans were proposed.
. .Among the e causes and change: the most important appear to be the dis-
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covery of a channel leading from the ocean into the bay of New York, which
could not be commanded by any of the fortifications proposed by the board; the
application of steam power to armed and other vessels for ocean navigation; the
great increase in the number and the size of the mercantile and packet st~am~rs
which are employed on our interior lakes, bays, and rivers, and the subst1tut10n
of shells for solid shot to be fired from cannon; the introduction of the electric
telegraph for communicating intelligence, and of railroads for the transpo1:tati~n
of persons and materials; and a greatly increased and more dense populat101?- m
the vicinity of many of the points which were intended to be protected agamst
an enemy.
9. The operations of vessels which depend on the wind alone must always be
uncertain, and the best devised plans will be greatly exposed to failure in execution by them. vVhen used as an assailing force against batteries or other :fixed
objects, the winds which are necessary to carry them to their desired positions
might frequently prevent the possibility of their retreat, if it should be desired.
The present defences were calculated to resist a force of this character, or which
depended on such vessels for its transportation.
.
Ships-of-the-line and anned vessels of smaller sizes are now moved by steam,
either as the only motive power or as auxiliary to sails.
These vessels, under ordinary circumstances and for special purposes, may
have their movements regulated and combined, at the will of their commander,
with almost the same precision and certainty as can be accomplished by troops
on land.
The capacity and armament of many of these vessels, connected with their
light draught of water, enable them to operate with comparative ease and safety
through channels and upon positions which would be almost secure against
attacks by common sailing vessels.
10. When the present system was proposed, the use of explosive shells was
only contemplated from mortars, either for attack or defence .
Arrangements are now made for the general use of such shells from large
cannon, thus combining the superior accuracy of shot firing with the destructive
effects of explosive shells~a change which greatly increases the dangers of a
floating force when opposed to permanent fortifications of earth and ma onry.
11. In determining upon the character and extent of many of the fortifications which were proposed by the boards an important element of their calculations was the facility or difficulty of concentrating troops upon the work in
ca e assistance should be required to repel an attack by an enemy. T~1is
cl m ut of calculation has been greatly chaug<'cl ince by the increa.. ed den 1ty
~ud amount of available population, aud at many points by the gr atly
mcrea · d facilities for communicating intelligence by tclegraphi: and railr ad:::,
and for receiving reinforcements of men and suppli . by railroad and -teamer~.
The purcha c of ]t lorida since the fortification, and defence for the 1 ulf of
I. , i ·o w r propo cd has given to us new and important position for ~tren crth. nmo- om~ defence. on that frontier, and for giving great r security to th
1mm n:-1r mt r t connected with the valley of the l\Ii i ippi.
ur more
r •c t:t a ·qui ition , which have giv nu an extensive oc an frontier on th' Pacific
o ran, ltav · hr ught with them new interest , whi h require fortificati n:- T
qthr.r l\<lcr1u~tc m an for th ir prot ction and curity.
12. l'h · m r a, d power wl1ich ha been iv n to v ,":-el. wh n m v •d by
team to r o-ul:~t and , cm: their joint or parat a ti n a may h d . . fr. d.
arnl t 1J rC"lch with omparat1v a,· , and , afi ty pla 'l-1 which mio-ht b ·ou,1 r rl a-. 11 arl 'C ·ure acrain,'t ordinm .-ailincr vc.-" 1~. th additiorn 1 I ' r
'·hi ·h i. o-j ' n to fortifi ·ation wh :n a ·tino· acrain:-,t .
r oth r fio tin!!'
b · the . nh:titntion f -·pl . iv' .-h ll. for , lid , h t · th dis · v r:
·hmmcL· to and. fr 111 • om of our harbor, ; th• fa ·iliti " for 10r • mpid n
r tion f tr np.- and .-uppli :- than wa: f rm rly pra ti ·: bl , an l tl1, ac<pii,i · 11
r

r

hi/
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r larP'e extents of new territory, are changes or causes which, in my opinion,
m, 1 ;ender some "modifications" of the details of the present system more
d,:antageous. At least these changes appe~~- to be _of sufficient i~po_rtance to
jllitify,ifnot to require, preparntory to defimt1ve act1~n, a re-exammat1on of the
p. ·sent system, as recommended by former boa~·ds, with_ t!rn same thorough and
(\'Ireful deliberation which was bestowed when 1t was ongmally proposed.
13. In reply to your second question, "What reliance could be placed on
w,~els-of-war or of commerce, floating batteries, gunboats, and other temporary
~ub~titutes for permanent fortifications 1" I respectfullJ: state that, m my
opinion, no safe reliance could be placed on any of the kmds _of f~rce enumerated in your question, as "substitutes" for perman?nt fort1:ficat1?ns, unl~ss
they should be multiplied to an extent that would reqmre an e~pend1ture wh~ch
would be unreasonably great, and much greater than would give equal security
by a judicious combination of permanent fortifications and a floating force as
auxiliary to them. On any sudden emergency, private steamers and other
merchant vessels might be usefully employed in aid of other means which had
been previously prepared, either by having them armed to contend with. an
enemy, or to bring forward reinforcements of men, materials, or other supplies.
Little advantage could be expected, however, from the vessels for direct assistance, unless all that was necessary for their armanent and equipment had been
previously prepared, and kept ready for immediate use.
14. 'l'he voluntary use of vessels-of-war, which are able to navigate the
ocean, as substitutes for fixed fortifications, or even as direct auxiliaries to them,
except in extreme cases, would, in my opinion, be highly injudicious. The
proper employment of such vessels-of-war or of our navy is to afford all
_i)OS ible protection to our merchant shipping, to destroy or harass an enemy's
commerce, and either by itself or in conjunction with troops to assail an
enemy's possessions at points where they would otherwise be inaccessible to us.
15. 'I.1he protection which the coasts of our country may justly expect from
the navy is that which it may afford by intercepting forces which may threaten
attacks upon it ; or when unequal to that task, diminishing the means of an
enemy for such attempts, by rendering it necessary for him to protect his own
.commerce or his own shores against our ships-of-war.
16. With a navy sufficiently powerful to compete fairly with that of an
enemy, great additional security would be given to our coasts by it, and still
~eater if our naval force wa1, decidedly superior. But even under these favorable circumstances the chances for avoiding the most vigilant watchfulness on
the ocean are so great, that so long as we expect wars with nations having a
r spc>ctable navy, sound policy and trne economy, in my opinion, requires
perma_uent fortifications at all points necessary to defend our important national
estabh.·hments, our populous and wealthy cities, against sudden attacks, and to
keE:I> open, as far as practicable, our coastwise navigation and other com117-unicat1on::;, which might otherwise be interrupted by any enemy who could elude
xhe vigilance of om navy. The navy, if employed as here suggested, would
not r ender it as substitute for fortification s, but would give an increased security
to our seaboard, and in proportion to its strength diminish the necessity of interrupting the ordinary pursuits of our population.
17. To the third question, "Is it necessary or expedient to continue the
'""~ · ··t m of fortification on the shores of the lakes 1" I state as my opinion that
n future attacks from the Canada shores of the lakes, of a character sufficiently
pow rful to affect the :final result of war, are to be apprehended ; still, the
a va tages ·which are offered by the St. Lawrence and Rideau canals for the
i ·r n e of a naval force on Lake Ontario might give to Great Britain a tempo.r ry ..:up riority of naval force on that lake. 'Thi:; superiority, ancl the presence
of_ a c?n idcrable bod! of regular troops w~1ich are always kept in Canada,
TI110-ht mduce and po :1bly enable an enemy m Canada, by a sudden incursion,
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to injure our great lines of communication by railroads and canals, on the lake
frontier, or to levy contributions on cities near it, all of which would be greatly
exposed if there were no' fortifications to furnish military supplies for the surrounding militia, and so aid them in repelling such attacks.
18. Under existing circumstances it would, in my opinion, be expedient to
continue the present system so far as to retain all the fortifications on the lake
frontier which have been completed, and to complete such as have been commenced. The expense would be comparatively inconsiderable, and would no
doubt be amply repaid by the increased security and other advantages which
would be gained at the commencement of any war in which Canada would have
the character of an enemy to us.
It has been difficult for me to confine my remarks very strictly to the precisequestions which were submitted, but it was believed that the reference to
"other changes" in the first question would be a sufficient excuse for thelatitude which has been taken.
With much respect, your obedient servant,
U. MORRIS,
Captain U. S. Navy.
Hon. 0. M. OoNRAD,

Secretary

ef

TVar.

No. 2.
Report ef Commodore C. M. P erry.
NORTH TARRYTOWN,

July 25,. 1852.

Srn: In obedience to your order of the 23d ultimo, covering a copy of a communication of the Secretary of War, together with a copy of a resolution of
Congress, calling for information upon the expedieBcy of modifying the system
of national fortifications established in 1816, I have the honor to report-In reply to the first inquiry, as follows:
"To what extent, if to any, ought the present system of fortifications for the
protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application of
team to vessels-of-war, the inventions or improvement of projectiles, or other
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in 18161"
I may remark that, in my opinion, it is desirable that the system refen-ed to
hould be ub tantially modified by an entire abandonment of the plan of exterior
coa, t fortifications, and a confinement to the completion of the works already
comm need for tL.e protection of our principal ports of trade and naval depot ;
and that no greater number of works houlcl be r ·cognized a permanent mean
of d f'_ nc of the more important points upon the seaboard than tho e that may
be .'mtaLly garri oned and kept in constant preparation, whether in peac or
war, for r ·p Hing an nemy.
~n th i~tt mpt to n tain th po ition which I propo:e to as umc, b ino- at my
r "'lf1Pnc· • m th country, without proper docum nt or oth r data to nabl me
t ·nt r fully into d ·tail, I hall, with but two cxc ption., r frain fr m alludin (J"
to th· pul,li, h c1 :tat ·m nt and r port of oth r upon th
nbj ct; and wl1ile
clt 1·1ful1 ' a· ordi1w to tho.<' who may difli r from me all credit for --in erity
and patriofo,m I may c nt nt m ·:c·lf with a o- _n ral xpr ion of opinion up n
th· 11m· . . tion uud 'r inv :tigation, callino- particular att ntion to th r port of - r.
a, , wh ·n 1 <' -r •tar· of "\Var.-( 'pc
. 29 , 24th 'ougr,. :-, April . 1 :J6.)
'on<·m-ri1w, a:-- I m<d folly cli,1 at th p riocl of it:- datr., (1 3G) and ru I ~o
now, i_n tlw >pinion, et forth in tl1at ma:--tn-1 , :,;tatc pap ·r, I mio-ht L ati _fi_ ~ m
:i mm1w th· wltol • ran"<' of argmn ·ut of that di.~tingui h ·cl lllan a, . lub1fm2"
1
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my own views upon the great question of national defence, bad not t~e imagina-

·on even of his prophetic foresight been outstripped by th~ extraordmary develpments of the few subsequent years-developments wluch'. though tl~ey have
·brown into bolcler relief the more prominent features of lus prophecies, have
.;.10ne far beyond the anticipations of the wildest visionary, bri~ging to light improvements in practical science utterly astounding to the thconsts of yestercl~y,
Jfranging all previous plans of war, whether by sea or land, and foreshadowmg
vren further changes, perhaps ~qually remarkable; a?-d thus s_howing that ~ ~he
-ystem, under things as they existed in 1816, was wisely devised, (a p1:oposit10n
I have never assented to,) there is no longer the remotest useful obJect_ to be
!fillled by persistence in the plan, but rather on the contrary. The erect10n of
i,olated exterior works upon our seaboard would, instead of contribu~ing to our
protection, hold out assailable points, inviting attention from an active enemy,
in the possibility of carrying them by coup de niain-an achievement not so
difficult since the use of steam for naval purposes; and when, moreover, it may
be fairly presumed that these works, however extensive and complete in them0elves, would in fact be weak as defences, for want of adequate garrisons; that
is, if we are to judge from past experience and the present desolate condition of
"ome of those already constructed, made necessary, it is true, for want of troops
to end to them.
Let us suppose, for purpose of illustration, that the two works recommended
in the original design to be erected on Sandy Hook b_ar,* (see report of War
Department, House Doc. 206, 26th Congress, 1st session,) are completed, and
garrisoned by the estimated number of rank and file assigned to them, say 1,760
each, their isolated position would place them beyond the effective range of guns
planted upon Sandy Hook, the nearest land; and being encircled by channels
navigable for the largest war steamers, they could not prevent the ingress of the
e_nemy, and unaided by a friendly naval force might be surrounded by the hostile ships, who, if they did not surprise and carry them by escalade, woulcl have
the power to cut off their communication with the land, and consequently their
supplies.
And let us suppose further, that in conjunctures like those growing out of the
northeastern boundary and Oregon questions, where serious difficulties with
Great Britain were anticipated by many, (and everybody knows that a similar
contingency did happen under the administration of General Jackson, with
Fra1:ce, and may again happen,) that these forts were completed, and armed, and
garrisoned, as they probably would be in time of peace, with a single company
?r half company each, and it might be the policy of the enemy to enter suddenly
rnto war, and give us the first intimation of hostilities by the appearance off the
port of a powe1ful squadron of war steamers, not only would the forts on the
bars, inviting attack by their very weakness, be at the mercy of the enemy, but
the safety of the city itself would be compromised. :E'or though by a delay of a
day or two the inner line of forts could be garrisoned by militia and volunteers,
a?d temporary steam batteries prepared in aid of the outer defences, if the opposmg squadron were to be commanded by a Nelson or a Suffren, such precaution
would be too late.
From any of the inner forts, should they perchance make a lodgement, the
enemy could soon be driven; but once in possession of the outer line of works,
with the sea open to them, the port would be entirely locked up ; hence, in the
pof: ibility of such an issue, is it not far better that they should not be erected 1
But many other solid reasons may be adduced to prove the impolicy of their
·rection. T'he impracticability of eovering tl1C whole extent of coast by for• I . ball apply my remark upon the sealioard defences more particularly to the port of
~~ew York, though they are intended to have a general bearing upon the whole coast.
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tresses, commanding every port, bay, and roadstead; the improbability of any
future attempt by an enemy to land an armed force upon our shores, except for
some marauding purposes ; and the perfect capability of the inner line of ·works,
assisted by floating batteries to repel whatever force might venture an attack
upon any of our principal cities or towns, except by coup de main, in which
event, as I have before remarked, the outer line of works would prove of immeasurable injury, ff captured, as some of them might possibly be by a dashing
enemy.*
And, besides, we have the experience of history to show that extensive military
works are alike destructive of the prosperity and the liberties of the people,
saying nothing of the enormous cost of construction and the keeping them in
condition for service. I may instance the fortresses of Spain, of Portugal, and
of the former republics of Genoa and Venice, as gigantic works: now of little
use, and looked upon by the voyager only as monuments of the extravagance
and peculating spirit which, at the time of their erection, characterized the people
-of those governments.
Experience moreover shows that while the fortifications of San Juan de Ulloa
at Vera Cruz, the Moro of Havana, the castle protecting the harbor of Carthagena upon the coast of Columbia, the Venetian fortress of Napoli de Romania, in
Greece, the castle of St. Elino, in Malta,t and many others of similar extent
and character, are considered by some impregnable. They command only a
circuit embraced within the range of their guns, and cannot in any manner
prevent a landing of the enemy upon the coast beyond the extent of such range;
in a word, these works are useful only to command the entrances of the ports
which they were intended to defend, and to cover with their guns vessels an.choring in their immediate vicinity. The celebrated fortress of Gibraltar neither
commands the passage of the straits nor the anchorage on the Spanish side of
the bay of that name. They are, in truth, like chaine.d monsters, harmless beyond the reach of their manacles ; not so with their fltram batteries-tliey have
the means of locomotion, and tlieir power can be rrnull effective at any point
upon the coast capable of being reached by an enemy's vessel.
.
f all the coasts of Europe that of Great Britain is the least provided with
fortifications, and yet her soil has not been trodden by a uccessful enemy since
the conquest-solely protecting her military and naval arsenals by 1)Clfect and
well garrisoned works. She depends mainly for defence of her coast upon her
navy and the warlike spirit of her yeomanry; and the very absence of fortified
works prevents a d~ceitful reliance upon uch defence , and keeps alive the
more gallant and more certain dependence upon their own personal prow '-'-·
And thu it should be with us, man to man. Th Americans are, at least,
qual to any other race, and they are fully ca1n1ble of drivin g back to their ..,hipM
or captming a1.iy number of troops that might have th temerity to Janel upon
our :oil.
·
Lc•t u. , uppo. e that New York is menaced with an attack by a force much
0
In ·peak ing of militia and volunteers above I may add, by way of note, that tbe city of
New Yo1 k could alone pr1ra<le, in six hours, one thou and, and in twelve hour., five thound uniformed troop , compo cd of men in the prime of life, who would, <louutle , do
good •tYin: hefore th• enemy.
Thi: body of troo1 i · w II ufficer<'il and under excellc11 t organiz tion, and embrace' fair
pro ortion of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, with all the requi ·ite materiel and munition.-.
'l he citie · and town, ' iu the immediate neigh borbood could furni ·h an equal num l>er with
th · am expedition, and tber · can be little donut that with the facilitie ,,f tran•port tion
hy railJ oad 11nd other mv<l<·., a. force ·uflici •nt for all purpo c: of <lcfenc." could IJ coucentmt •din a. v ·ry hort .p, c · of tim • at any poiut up<in our ca. t no1th and ea:t ofT•.. - .
I mor particu arly name th •.-e, among many other ·, for re ~on of bcin•r IJ ttt:r cqu dot ·cl wilh th em hyper. onal ·.-aminu.tion.
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JarO'er than the English have ever yet been able to concentrate upon our coast.
The only assailable point whi~h mi~ht promise any chance of success ·woul~ b~
debarkation upon the south· side of Long Island and to advance upon the rear
of Brooklyn.
.
.
,
Thi mode of attack was contemplated durm~_the war of 181~- 13, ~nd _extensive entrenchments were thrown up by the citizens upon a cham of lulls JUSt
be ·ond the town designed to hold the enemy in check until re-enforcements
could arrive from a distance ;* but the rapid increase of the ~lace ha~ no_w
brought these military sites within the corporate limits of the city, a~~ it will
be necessary, in the event of another war, to select more advanced posi~10ns on
which to construct redoubts to command the approaches referred to, and it would
be at this day a measure of wisdom for the government to take steps for selec~ing and securing the fee of suitable points for military purposes_. These ~os1tions, judiciously chosen, would, at the moment of alarm, be oc~up1ed by myriads
of militia and volunteers, who, judging from what was accomplished on a former
occasion, would, in an incredibly short time, throw up and man the necessary
works ; with these precautionary measures, and with a respectable number of
steam batteries as auxiliaries to the permanent works already con.structed, New
York would be safe from any foreknown attack of the enemy.
With respect to the second inquiry" What reliance could be placed on vessels of war or of commerce, floating
batteries, gunboats, or other temporary substitutes for permanent defences 1 "
I reply that much reliance could be placed on all vessels-of-war, particularly
those moved by steam, whether intended for ocean or harbor service, as auxiliarie to the fortifications, thereby lessening the necessary number and extent of
those permanent works; but there could be no dependence on gunboats or vessels
of commerce, except for the temporary conversion of the latter into public armed
..,hip .
.
But the most reliable force for harbor defence as auxiliary to the fortifications
would be steamers of war, in addition to which temporary. steam batteries might
be equipped at most of our principal ports.
It may be presumed that there is at this time but one opinion among naval
men as to the utility of steamers-of-war. The strongest and most unreasonable
prejudice ;.. ·, ,"1J,1;0' out of professional predilections must now give way to the
unmistakab r <',f~8011ces of their usefulness, and the absolute necessity of their
employment at ·t1f('1pN:scnt day in all naval operations.
These vessels sho:ulrl all be capable of traveTSing the ocean, and while efficient
for ocean navigation, not the less effective for harbor or coast defence.
Steam batt{ rie;-;, so talled in contradistinction to steamers-of-war, should be
of a temporary charact(·r, and ut:ictl ·only for the defence of ports, or bays, or
road._teads, and of thesP there would be uo necessity of having many in commission, excepting at times wlwn the enemy might be expected, as they could
be prepared in a very short time-the cities and towns which they may be
wanted to defend all furnishing the means of their equipment and the requisite
crews.
In a communication accompanied by drawings submitted to the Navy Depa~ent some years ago, I demonstrated the practicability of equipping and
mannmg at the port of New York powerful and efficient floating batteries in less
than three days.
1\71erever steam vessels can be found to furnish the moving· power and small
coa ter. to he used for floating the guns, as both can be found as well as guns
at most of our largest ports, temporary batteries capable of attacking the largest
ail -hip can he speedily equipped, care being taken to protect, by a mode pointed
out, the machinery and the entire hull of the steamer which, without being
0

These works covered the rear of the navy yar<l., Brooklyn .
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her3elf armed, is to furnish the power of moving the batteries from one point to
another.
Modern discoveries in the use of warlike 1,rojectiles have shown, and especially in the use of explosive shells, that wooden bulwarks, however massive
they may be, so far from giving protection fo those behind them, cause by their
splinters greater havoc; hence the inutility of such defences in the proposed
floating batteries, which, by means of the steam power attached to them, may
be easily kept at long range with the enemy and beyond grape or canister
distance.
But no one can foretell or scarcely imagine the changes in the art of war that
steam and other natural elements more recently brought into use are to produce.
On a late occasion I had the hono1; of sug·gesting to the Navy Department a
new mode of attack by steamers-of-war. 'The opinions then advanced have
been more and more confirmed by further reflection and consultation with intelligent engineers and ship-builders, and I am now well satisfied that, besides the
use of an ordinary war steamer, as a striking body, in the manner explained in
the communication referred to, a steam vessel, to be moved by a submerged propeller and capable of traversing any of our inland waters, may be constructed
and advantageously used solely as a projectile (using the term in this sense.)
This vessel should be long and narrow, an:l of unusual proportional depth to
accommodate the engines and boilers, and the crew, (if desirable,) below the
water line. She should be of wedge-shape forward, with the most approved
line. for speed, considering her depth and her whole construction, whether built
of wood or iron, of sufficient strength to give the requisite momentum, and the
power to withstand the most violent shocks produced by collision with other
bodies.
.
A ve~sel of this description, say of two thousand tons measurement, would
weigh, with her machinery, &c., nearly four thousand tons, and might be propelled with engines of extra proportional power at the rate of fourteen statute
miles per hour. We have thus a projectile (still using the term) of this weight
moved upon the surface of the water at the velocity of twenty feet per second.
Can any one imagine the overwhelming effect of a contact of this moving body
with anything capable of floating upon the ocean? 'l'his is no visionary project,
but one of simple demonstration and practicable accomplishment.
In reply to the tliird inquiry, as follows: '' Is it necessary or expedient to
continue the system of fortifications on the shores of the northern lakes?" I anwcr fr1 the negative, and for the very obvious reason that we have now the
command of the lakes so far as regards an aggregate supcric,rity of tonnage and
seamen, and it would be strange indeed if, ·with the well-or;:anized militia of the
'tn.te Lorclering on and contiguous to these waters, and tbr facilitie. for transportation to the scene of war of any number of regular · and volunteer" with
th_ r qui ite munition , we did not, at the least, preserve the integrity of the
011, and th navy would be recreant to its former reputation did it not weep
from thr inland sea every vestig·e of an oppo ing force.
In r f 'r nc , th refore, to the foregoing remark , I re pectfully ubmit'l'hat n ad litional fortifi ·ation be commenced on the Atlantic eaboarcl, leavincr it <p1 .·tionabl whether tho ·e already commenced ·hould b completed to
tlte exll-t2l orirrinally de. igned.
'fliat v ·ry /Yr :it rclianc can b, plac cl upon st •am ·r~-of-war and :4t am batt ri ' a · auxiliari to th• militar work now cornpl ·t cl or in pro<rr .. s f com1,l ·ti 11.
And la tl · it i.- alto 0 ther unn · ~. ary and in .· •dient cvcm to pro!rre, · any
furthn with th uncompl t d work which hav b 11 eomm ·need n th ·bor
of th · 11orth ·rn lak :,.
1' r m ·.; ·If cannot ut ·rtain th icl a that w an· alway· to act on th cl f n iY ·: n th · contrary, it i mor rea nabl to ,,nppo. that, in th ·v t of
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other war, the power of the United States will be felt beyond their own ~mme<liate coasts; most certainly it ought to be, f?r we have the means of pla_cmg
·elYes upon an equality of naval strength with any of the Em:opean nat10ns.
Looking to the inexhaustible resources of the c~unt~y, the ~arhke and advenrnrous spirit of the people, its extensive and rapidly mcreasmg: commerce, and
.he acknowledged superiority of the Americans in the_ c?nstructlon ~1:1-d management of ships, whether navigated by sails or steam-is 1t not surpnsmg that all
nr military plans have hitherto been confined to the mere defence of our fire,ide~ against an enemy, always supposed to be able, in order to 1:each us, to cross
llith a superior force intact a wide expanse of ocean, and knockmg at our doors,
·o cause the whole country to be thrown into alarm?
Why should we barricade ourselves and wait within our defences the coming
of the enemy 1 Why not do that which is more congenial to our national spiritmeet them beyond the threshold, and thus preserve our waters and our soil innolate 1 Wc possess the power; why not exercise it ? In truth, the destinies
f the nation are inevitably leading to events which will sooner or later make
~ superior on the ocean, and instead of tamely waiting the approach of the foe,
e hall be more apt to turn the tide of war eastward.
The grea~ battles for national mastery are to be fought upon the ocean, and
the ooner we prepare for the struggle the better.
Hence it is evident that upon the navy the country should chiefly depend
for its protection from invasion, not under its present organization, but upon a
navy commensurate in extent to the commercial resources and wealth of the
natiop.; we should have naval strength sufficient to protect our commerce in
every sea, and in time of war to assume the offensive.
Still it would be unwise to neglect a reasonable system of permanent defences
apon the coast, but not by any means to the ex.tent contemplated by the system
of 1816.
In the opinions which I have ventured to advance upon the fortifications of
the country I have intended to allude only to the Atlantic seaboard and the
hores of the northern lakes. Believing that the seaboard on the Pacific ocean
i infinitely more exposed to successful attack from either of the great naval
powers of Europe-England, France, and Russia, and may require additional
defi lC<'S; but not being well acquainted with that coast, I abstain from any
rem~11k npon the subject. In connexion with this report, however, I propose
"'ubrnit, at a future time, some remarks upon the importance of securing the
naval command of the Gulf of Mexico, with special reference to the better proction of our Pacific possessions.
With great respect, I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,
M. C. PERRY.

No. 3.

Report

ef

Commander R. B. Cunninglwm.
UNITED STATES NAVY YARD,

Gosport, Virginia, September 29, 1851.
• rR: In pursuance of an order from the honorable Secretary of the Navy,
d June 23, 1851, enclosing a copy of a letter from you to him, with a copy
·rtain resolutions of the House of Representatives of the last session of
...,on gre,_s, pertaining to a propo, ed modification of our system of defences by
C< n; of fortifications on horc; and directing that I should give to the subject
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my best reflections, and communicate the result in season to be reviewed by you
prior to your report in obedience to resolutions aforesaid in December next.
With a diffidence I have never before experienced in drawing up an official
communication, I will endeavor to give you my views on this important question
of national policy with as much brevity as its magnitude will admit of; but I
beg leave to state that, while I feel myself highly honored by the consideration
so undeservedly bestowed upon me by the honorable Secretary of the Navy in
selecting me for a duty of so much consequence, and which calls for scientific
attainments in its execution that I do not aspire to, I must claim your indulgence when, in all sincerity, I state to you that my remarks are drawn from my
very limited practical observation and experience only.
'l'o the first inquiry, viz: "To what extent, if to any, ought the present
system of fortifications for the protection of our seaboard to be modified in consequence of the application of steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvement of projectiles, or other changes that have taken place since it was adopted
in the year 18161"
I would respectfully reply that the important improvements in the application
of ·team to ships-of-war and sea-going ships, and the certainty that railroads
will be continuous in a few years from l\faine to Texas, and that by these
facilitie, , troops, munitions of ,var, and stores of all kinds can be transported
with such expedition tl1at in a very short space of time large bodies of men,
with the necessary artillery, can be concentrated upon any intermediate point
between permanent fortifications fully prepared to meet an invading foe before an
invader could make any material progress in the erection of fortifications for his
defence, hould, in my opinion, induce the government to direct its attention
alone to those points in our seaboard where the protection of our cities and such
roadsteach as are calculated for naval depots, and where large fleets can rendezvous, be sheltered, and ride in safety at their anchors at all seasons of the
yefil.

.

It can hardly be supposed that any nation would be so reckless as to attempt
an invasion of our Atlantic coast at the present day; but a large and powerful
fleet could approach within gun-shot and batter clown our cities if they were not
prepared with fortifications in all respects adequate for their protection and
d<>fcnce.
The, ·e fortifications shoulcl be so located as to command the channel way; and
at the inner extremity of every reach there should Le a batt<>ry erected, if practical>lc,, o a,· to commence a raking fire upon an enemy thr mom ·ut he approached
within the rang of its guns.
Th gun. for the batteries should be of the largest calibre and of the o-reate t
rm1g-<', a the effect of the shot would be more de tructive ancl the enemy ooner
r achc·d.
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· en taken apart, and when carefully pac~ed, stowed in suitable storehouses_and
kept ready for use; and that the materials for the ~ulls of these steame1 be
procured, and the timber properly stowed in well ventilated sheds
The steamers should be built of logs, their length not less than two hundred
a.ncl fifty feet, with sufficient breadth to admit of batteries a?ross a~ e~ch end of
,ix ten-inch guns, and three mortar beds betwee~ the ba_ttenes. 1_he1r bottoms
-hould not be perfectly fiat, but formed with a slight ellipse, the b1lg·e round?d,
and their extremities handsomeiy tapered, so as to enable them to pass easily
·h.rough the water.
. .
.
.
These steamers are intended to be shot-proof, as 1t 1s designed to have iron
plate~ one inch and a half thick and six inches wide let into their ide from
~tern to stern, and about two and a half inches apart, this to be extend d from
!!'unwale to two feet below deep load line; and when it is remembered that they ~re
to fight end on, and built of long easy lines from stem to stern, the couclu 10n
i5 irresistible that a shot touching those plates will most assuredly glance off.
In all works intended for public defence, as a system, two strong points should
always be borne in mind, viz: simplicity and economy; and as these ves. els are
to be of the simplest mode of structure, and built of the cheapest material,
while at the same time it is as durable as any other, (white pine,) and the con_truction of them so simple, that carpenters, joiners, and, in fact, all who can
use the broad-axe and adze, can be profitably employed in their construction
when they are needed.
Another peculiarity in these vessels is to have their sterns perpendicular, of
~eat thickness, and an iron cut-water firmly attached thereto, and in a width of
two and a half feet, bearded off to half its thickness at the stern, so that when
in action, and the enemy at hand with his broadside presented, the steamer, with
Ler greatest momentum, is to drive directly into him; and it cannot be doubted
that this operation once performed would require no repetition, as nothing heretofore built in the shape of a ship could withstand the concussion.
'l'he mortar beds are intended to be used in the event of an enemy's obtaining a,
landing at a point where he could be sheltered from the operation of battery guns,
but accessible to shells from mortars ; and as these steamers will be of light
draught of water, they will be enabled to approach the shore much nearer than
other vessels of equal size if differently constructed.
It has long been my opinion that steamers are more to be feared from the
power they possess of running into an enemy than from any other cause, either
from their great weight of metal and consequent extended rnnge, the choice
which they are enabled to make of position, or any other superiority claimed for
them, for in all these respects ships-of-war can be built to equal them; but if
con tructed as here described, and properly managed, they are not to be
re isted.
. "\\:ith one more remark I will close my response to the first branch of your
inquiry.
The telegraph, in the event of war, will keep them constantly informed at
headquarters of the movements of our enemy's fleet on our Atlantic coast, and
the old ru, e of making a demonstration at one point for the purpose of effecting
a landing at another, can no longer be practiced with the usual success, as their
movements will be anticipated, and the necessary preparations made to receive
them. This great invention offers an additional argument for the discontinuance
of intermediate fortifications.
In reference to our possessions on the Pacific, a little deviation from the
c ur..:e recommendecl to be observed on this side would be advisable. '.rhere it
~ill be neces~ary to con. truct the permanent fortifications, so as to enable them
:::tand a ..,iege, a. invaf-\ion in that remote quarter is probable, iu the event of
·ar with a trong maritime power; but in all other respects the course to be pursued
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should be the same as on this side, as it is to be presumed that the telegraph
will soon be extended there, and in the course of time railroads also.
To the second, viz: '' What reliance could be placed on vessels-of-war, or of
commerce, floating· batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitute, for permanent fortifications 1"
'I.1he indispensable, and, in fact, imperative necessity of having strong permanent
fortifications at the points before referred to, is a settled and decided conviction
of my mind; they will admit of no substitute.
Steam batteries, such a"' have been recommended in my reply to your first
interrogatory as a modification, would unquestionably prove an important and
powerful auxiliary, and in all probability would, in the day of battle, if properly
managed, be the more destructive of the two; but, like all ships, the materials of
which they must necessarily be constructed are perishable; and possibly, at the
moment their services are most required, a broken shaft, or some other of the
numerom; accidents to which all such ships are liable, would render them
unavailable, if not altogether useless; and hence the riRk a nation would encounter
in adopting any substitute for permanent fortifications when there existed a
possibility of its failure.
Third. "Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications
on the ·hores of the northern lakes 1"
To this, your last inquiry, I would state, that the uuprecedented change
which the entire shores of our northern lakes has undergone since the termination of the late war with Great Britain renders it very improbable that invasion
will ever take place from the opposite shore. Certain destruction would await
an enemy who attempted it. 'l.,hen the population was comparatively sparse;
now cities and villages are to be seen in every direction, occupying places which
were then an uninterrupted wilderness, and hosts of stout hearts ready to do
battl , if needed; besides the numerous and increasing facilities for building
, hip ai1d for transporting· munitions of war forbid the idea that the northern
lakes will ever again constitute an arena for naval combats.
In the vent of another war with Great Britain we would be able to build and
equip five ships to her one; this fact alone affords a conclusive reason why the
goYernment should run to no unnecessary expense in its preparation, for war in
that quarter.
ur tonnage will, as it is now, always be greater in the lakes than that of
Great Britain, which mu. t secure to us the supremacy in the event of war, a
many of those vessels, steamers and others, could be converted into crui"ers,
whi~h would not only protect our shores from invasion, but push the war into
the en my' country.
Port. s 1 ctcd for na-.;-al depots .J1oulcl ha-.;-c heavy guu:-1 rcacly for their prot ctiou; and park.· of artillery, composed of heavy orclnancr, should be kept in rcadirn·., at the cliffi rent military 1)0sts for immediat use or tran portation. Further
than thi~, I think th government is not called upon to provid«· for defenc .
In ·oncln. ion, I beg lea';-e to state that if there , houlcl be another war with
on of th<' , trono- maritim nation of EuroiJe, the trial of trencrth must he upon
tl1e or·cr,n, ancl it brhoov .· th United 'tate:-i to b wrll upon their o-uarcl. .A,
to the· opinion" hi h is rife among us, that team alone can con. titnte an fli i nt
11aYY, mul tha th - nation who can ommancl th o-r at ~t number of. team r ito l;olcl ,uprc•ni:tey on the oe •an, I r o-arcl a one of tho:- vi iouary , p ·ulationha ·p1l l'Htin·l upon the opinion. of m r throrists. Th ir flici ncy for towin!!'
, hip. imo po:-ition ancl for tr:rn, portino- munition:,, of war, I admit.
If we li:ul tm :-hip of two Jrnuclrccl mul forty fi ·t in length, with a propor i nnblc· lm aclth of bPam, ancl hnilt to ('arr thl'ir uwtal upon two deck.· in ·t ·a
·
four, ancl their hattr.rir.:- throuo-hont to he• of t1·n-in ·h crun;·, b Ji v it w ul
tak,. t hi c-omhin ·cl t ·am nav • of Ur ·at 13ritain to copr. with th m.
'1 wo y ar. war, witl1 a laro- . t ·mn nav · to . upport and kr. p in con, an
T
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rrice, would bring any power in Europe to bankr~ptcy ; and I trust_ our
!0-rernment will not be drawn into so unwise and expensive a system of national
:efence.
I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,
R. B. CUNNINGHAM,
Commander U.S. Navy.
Hon. C. M. CONRAD,
Secretary of War, Washington.

No. 4.
Report

ef C?mmander

S. F. Dupont.

Report on the national defence, in reply to the following questions, submitted
by the Department of War.
First. "To what extent, if any, ought the· present system of fortifications, for
the protection of our seaboard, to be modified, in consequence of the application
of steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvement of projectiles, or other
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 18161"
Second. "·what reliance could be placed in ves-sels-of-war, or of commerce,
ffoating batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent fortifications 1"
Tkird. "Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications
-0n the shores of northern lakes?"
Whether treated distinctively or generally, these inquiries may be supposed to
amount to this: Shall we expend as much as we have hitherto done for defence
upon fortifications? and how have these been affected by the introduction of
,ome new elements in war, such as steam power, and enormous projectiles of an
ex:plosive character?
This subject is one which involves the honor and safety of the country; it
ha been critically examined by distinguished military men and eminent statesmen, and I do not venture to think that I can throw much new light upon it.
In uch an investigation one's profession and esprit du corps would naturally
lead in any scheme, for the general defence, to bring the navy prominently forward. But this question is too broad and national to be viewed from any such
narrow limits, and in examining it an officer should discard from his mind to
Which arm of the public service he belongs. In my apprehension, however, the
lllo t extended system of fortifications for the defence of our seaboard will still
leave enough for the navy to do; a navy, too, carried far beyond its present
number and strength. Indeed, this :;irm can only fill its special mission in war,·
that of aggression, by being enabled to leave the great seaports and exposed
points of our maritime frontier to a more certain and more economical system of
~totection, in order to carry the "sword of the state" upon the broad ocean,
'\\'"eep from it the enemy's commerce, capture or scatter the vessels-of-war protecting it, cover and convoy our own to its destined havens, and be ready to
llleet hostile fleets; in other words, to contend for the mastery of the seas where
alone it can be obtained, on the sea itself.
. Y et it is not to be denied that theories have sprung up, assigning much less
llllportance than formerly to fortifications, in a system of national defence, under
the influence of opinions which doubtless have some truth in them, but which are
liable to be carried to a dangerous extent. Various reasoni:; might be assigned
for this change of opinion-speculation, supposed economy, a mistaken desire to
H. Ex. Doc. 92--21
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advance the interests of the navy, in short, the characteristic pursuit of theories
into the field of extravagance.
But it may be still more probable that these views mainly spring from some
misconception. as to the extent proposed for a system of permanent defences.
Some would seem to believe that our seaboard and lake frontier were to be
bound by a Chinese wall, and that all the salient points on the coasts were to
be crowned by castles, the cross-fires of which would cover the intervening
space; in other words, that the system of fortifications proposed to protect some
four thousand miles of sea-coast from the possibility of invasion or attack. But
is there any cause to apprehend such extreme views 1 And if they should exist,
is that a sufficient reason for rejecting a wise and practical system of permanent
defences vitally essential to the safety of important points, and so clearly within
the means of the country to provide 1
In treating this branch of the subject, can we do better than examine the objections presented and the modification proposed, from sources entitled to the
gravest consideration 1
Holding the first position among these is the report of a -distinguished statesman, then occupying the Department of War, and still holding a prominent place
in the public councils- a gentleman, too, familiar with arms in early life, and
one of the defenders of his country in the war of 1812. His views, set forth
with great ability, received the indorsement of another distinguished personage,
President Jackson, and were submitted to the national legislature in the year
1836.- (Doc. No. 243, 24th Congress, Gen. Cass's report.)
Now, it is submitted that there has been an equal misconception as to the scope
and tendency of this able report, as with the views considered extreme, on the
other side. In the one, modifications recommended in reference to special features have been considered as objections to the whole system; in the other, an
extended scale of defence, because we had an extended frontier, was looked
upon as a desire to cover the whole surface of the land with forts and field
works, and to rely upon these alone for defence. Whereas the only difference
related to the character and extent of tlie works to be constructed, based upon
the consideration that there was scarcely a possibility of the. e works bein<r
called upon to repel attacks by land, as well as by water, and repeating the
hypothe is that an enemy will ever attempt to make a more or less permanent
establishment in the country. Such an establishment as would induce him to
make a formal investment of some of the e first cla s works, requiring a larg
army with its battering trains and other preparations for siege. View on theer
points are presented in full, and with great force, yet the objection are trictly
confined to what is conceived to be the unnece~sary magnitude of ome of these
work , Lut not to the system of permanent defences, for the di tingui .. h d author
of the report tells us with equal explicitness:
"I con ider the duty of the government to afford adequate protection of th
• · a-coa, ta ubject of paramount obligation, and I b lieve we are called up n hy
v ·ry con icl ration of policy to push the necessary arrangem nt a ntpidly a~
th circumstances of the country and the proper execution of the w rk will
allow. I think every town large enouo-h to tempt the cupidity of an n mv
ehoulcl b d ·fi nded by works, fixed or floating, suited to it" local po ition and
uffi ·i ntly .·t n iv to r i t uch att mpts as would probably be mad ag-ain-·
it. Th r will of cou.r. c, after 1ayino- down ucb a gen ral rul , be much 1 itud of di er tion a to it application. Upon this branch of the ubj
I
would criv to th opinion of the eno-ine r officer almo t controlino- w io-ht,
prop r limit tion · are tabli bed." •
•
•
•
•
•
' All th <let nc
hould b · proj ct d upon a scale proportionate to 11
portance of th pl c , and hould b calculated to re i..t any naral atta ·
any sudden a ault that a body of land troops might make upon it." •
•
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·, is to be observed that the great object of our fortifications is to exclude a
nu force from our harbors· this end they ought fully to answer."
In truth, it cannot be que;tioned that our principal seaports, naval depots, _and
important points on our seaboard, should recei:e commensurate pr?tect1~n;
·mer should there be, in our judgment, a quest10n as to the mode m which
• ·! protection should be given.
It would seem unnece_ssar:z to set ~orth the adtages for such purposes of fixed defences or fo~t1~cat~ons. 1~ese advan€ have been shown over and over again by our d1stmgU1shed engmeers, and
... er controverted. To run over some of these once more, it may be said of
s that they are the only permanent defences, and the mos~ economical, fo ~,
· h the present science in construction and choic~ of matenal, the outlay 1s
ere once for all, for the repairs are next to nothmg. Forts offer means by
which a small force is enabled to resist a large one ; a small number of men a
o-e army. In the event of an attack by a competent power upon a place
· hle to be put under contribution, the injury might·be accomplished before suf:ieient means of resistance could be assembled. ]?orts can be made impregnable
gain t any naval force that could be brought against them, and are needed for
e protection of our own fleets while preparing for hostilities on the .ocean.
They are secure depots for munitions of war, and render defence certam and
ea~y, and above all, a defence which rarely involves loss of life, leaving the ordinary tate of society undisturbed. No alarms are created ; no calling of men
m their ordinary business. In short, by rendering success impossible, they
lerive immunity from attack.
It i impossible to view with favor the substitution of floating or steam batlerie~ for permanent defences, the preparation of which will be ever deferred, on
ace~:mnt of their perishable nature, until danger is pending; and if ready in time,
1b.e1r value ceases with the occasion which called them forth, for their decay is
te"rtain and speedy. Their unsuitableness and want of adaptation to the altera_'on c_o ns~antly made in the means and implements of war are also elements of
msecur1ty m these wood and iron defences for harbors. There can never be any
tertainty that some recent discovery has not lessened our effective force, without
aay remissness on our part; there can be no certainty that we may not be sudomly call ed on to renew our expenditures before our last appropriations have
Deen spent. For example, a well-known, and scientific, and practical gentleman. obtained the contract, under a law of Congress, to construct for harbor defe11ce an iron floating battery, which was to be shot and shell proof-in fact,
invulnerable in every respect. A target, constructed after the manner he pro~sed for the sides of his battery, was subj ected to the test of one of Commodore
Stockton's large guns. It presented little or no resistance ; the ball passed
lnrough without difficulty, tearing out large fragments formed of seven thickneE~e ~ of boiler-iron, well bolted and rivetted together. There is no desire,
nowever, to be understood as excluding altogether these costly and unwieldly
lllachine ; they may serve as important auxiliaries to forts, in broad sheets of
liater, or pecial localities not within the range of the fixed work ; though, in
all probability, in most cases the hulls of stout merchant ships, strengthened and
~tepared for mounting one or more pieces of heavy ordnance, would· be sooner
)ot ready and answer an equally good purpose. But to leave the whole defence
if our harbors to such temporary expedients, built of materials as vulnerable and
!Jeris able a ships, would be expending enormous sums in order to invite at~ck .
'rhrouo-hout this report I was at first disposed ~to take for granted that no
l(Jea_ could prevail in this country, to any extent at least, that would desire to
teta.i
t~e "!avy proper-by which is meant efficient steam and sailing ships-ofar:- -CWithm the harbors, for harbor defence; but it seems to be included in the
~pe of one of the inquiries, and cannot be overlooked.
W- at, then, is the first object and main purpose of a navy but the defence
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and protection of our comme_rce? It is the only form in which that protection
can be given; but this is essentially taken away when it has assigned to it the
defence of our seaports. It may be said that the navy will be increased to such
a size as to be able to perform this double duty. There is nothing in our past
history to authorize such a belief; and in time of peace the people of the United
States will never support such a naval force. They object to spending much
money on the personnel of military establishments. Nor does it belong to the:ir
temper, or their position among nations, to indulge in apprehensions of war;
their time is too much occupied with the noble arts and pursuits of peace to
feel such an interest in this subject as must be fel~ to bring them to such large
expenditures upon perishable materials.
If our country had to rely upon naval defences, it may well be questioned
whether any portion of the navy would be suffered to leave our coasts for the
protection and preservation of our foreign commerce, while we were under the
alarm of war. However great the naval force might be, it would not be thought
sufficient. 'l'he dangers nearest home would command our interest and sympathy; the preservation of our great emporiums of commerce froin sudden devastation would cause the single trading ships upon the ocean to be forg·otten.
And how would a naval force, for home defence, be partitioned out to the different cities and stations, without endless vexation, dissatisfaction, and dispute 1
To employ our active navy, in whole or in part, to the entire or partial abandonment of our system of fortifications, would be to supplant impregnable bulwarks by pregnable ones-a fixed security by a changeable one- placing perishable materials in lieu of those that are durable; it would be exposing ourselves
to the chance of being suddenly left, for a time, without defence, through new
discoveries in the art of war; it would be opening the way to expenditures of
money which no estimate could count the sums; it would be depriving our
commerce of its legitimate protection, and would be resigning our sense of security, peace of mind, and continuance in our pursuits without interruption, in the
event of war. But there are objections to such a plan still more fatal: it involves the sacrifice of the lives of our fellow-citizens, and proposes to make their
bodies, since they are br~ve and willing, the walls of defence for the enemy to
:fire at, instead of stone or mortar; it is compelling the conclusions of science to
give way to mere speculations, and rejecting the experience of the world. Nor
is this all that is involved in so destructive a proposition: it would divert the
navy from its highest duty; deprive it of its chief honor aud merit, and best claim
to the respect and support of the people, that is, the vindication of the national
honor, and the maintenance of the national freedom and independence upon th~
high seas. Again, if naval defences are relied on, they will either be mannea
or not. If manned, what shall we say of the effects of such a life upon men
and o:ffic rs ?-would it not be destructive of all those characteristics of kill
daring, and endurance which give to the seaman his power and prestige upon
the oc an? If not manned, then, compared to forts, they are what wooden cloc~are to ton docks. In either case, more men will be required to keep them u:
r ,pair than fort .
n th qu tion of economy, let us further consider the cost that would be
ent, ~l d upon the nation, by the alarm of an inva ion or the appearance of &
ho, tJl fl t on the coa t.
·
'Ih . udd n quipment and preparation of an army, and its maintainance' ·
fi i ntly lono- to remove all apprehen ion, would cost more, at every princi
port none ino-le occa ion, than all the forts. Then what would be the firt
tbino- that an army rould do, belched forth by the tens of thousand from e, .
r~ ilr a tation a?d t rminu , but to et to work and throw up the be t fortili ,.
1 n t
uld m th cmero- ncy? Would not every musket be !!rounded ·
tak up pick and , hovel ? Again : hall we dwell upon the state of the pub
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dnd, in one of our chief cities if its approaches were left without forts, equipped
.:id manned 1
I~ there any exaggeration in the picture of an enemy's fleet. of so~e ~hirty
-:ramers watching an opportunity, and through the ever recurrmg v1c1ss1tudes
n the ocean, familiar to professional men, eluding a naval force of our own,
hich it would not have been willing to encounter, running up New York harbor,
choring from the North to the East river, in a semicircle round the battery,
»:rrling destruction with its new and gigantic projectiles, setting fire to the forests
'i shipping, and burning the navy yard; and retreating the moment the tempo.-.:.ry and hurried defences began to tell against them, destroying more propeny in a few hours than would cover the shores of Raritan bay, the Narrows,
d the islands of the Sound, with fortifications 7 Now, this is the kind of
arfare we must look to, and that we must carry on ourselves.
The greater the injury we -0an inflict, the more rapidly this injury is repeated,
and the sooner we will obtain redress and bring an unnatural condition of affairs
t 11. clo c. The position of Halifax, Bermuda, and the West Indies, must ever
be borne in mind, where fleets may wait for a fitting opportunity for incursions;
:o suppose that there are to be no such thing as surprises, because railroads have
been invented and hollow shot cast, seems to be taking for granted that human
·e ha changed. Indeed, those who indulge in such theoretical securities are
preparing for themselves surprises, perilous ones too.
team will be the great agent in giving to the new elements of destruction
powers of ubiquity. Wherever there is a vulnerable spot, there we must dash,
and there an active enemy will dash at us. But it must be remembered that
'-O far as the improvements in projectiles, specially referred to in the inquiries
under consideration, are concerned, these have, relatively to ships, strengthened
forts. Hollow shot crumble into fragments and fall harmless when directed
a~..,t stone walls. At the siege of Antwerp, under Marshal Girard, they were
thrown from heavy mortars without effect, and experiments at home have further
e~rablished the fact. It takes solid shot to batter walls and make breachesplenty of them, and rapidly discharged, and concentrated upon or near one
::pot.
On the other hand, we have only to imagine a few eight and ten-inch shells
pa,;sing through the side of a line-of-battle ship into the main or lower gun-deck,
and 1:here exploding amidst the dense crowd at the batteries, every fragment
multiplying itself in countless splinters of wood and iron as destructive as itself,
and if it should fail to burst, still doing all the injury a solid shot could do. Or,
le one enter on the orlop deck among the passers of powder; or, lower still,
striking at the water line, tearing out large irregular fragments, and leaving
opening. defying all shot-plugs. Change the scene to a steamer, with all the
cu-cumstances above mentioned of pervious sides and crowded decks, and conceive a few exploding in the engine room; for truly has it been said that, compared to a sailing ship, a steamer has twenty mortal parts to one! No! when
i comes to using hollow shot a ship will prefer engaging something similarly
con;:;tructed. No ship or ships can lay under a fort at this day ; no American
ort, at least, with its furnaces for hot shot in addition to these murderous
shelL.
In tbi connexion it may be well to make a passing allusion to the past succe-~e: of hips-of-war against forts.
They are certainly striking examples of naval prowess, and should always
catl.5e a thrill of profe sional pride in the breast of every seaman, let his flag be
hat it may ; and they should be remembered and studied by officers to incite
·o de cl.· of daring, to self reliance, and to faith in that "fortune which favors
brave." But there is no foundation for the theory attempted to be raised
n th,
·ucce.., .. es. 'I.1he attack on Algiers by Lord Exmoutb, commanding
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the combined English and Dutch fleets, take it all in all, is probably the greatest
naval achievement in this line.
About two hundred guns could be brought to bear against about one thousand
in the fleet, and the fire of the admiral's ship, the Queen Charlotte, is considered
generally by the profession to be equal to any on record; but she was permitted
to come in close to the mole, take up her position, swing round her broadside,
and make fast to an adjoining vessel, before- a shot was fired upon her. This
fact alone gives an idea how the defence was conducted; the batteries were
defective and unskilfully served, yet the ships hauled off, and the batteries were
not silenced, though redress was obtained. Indeed, it is admitted by Lord
Exmouth that he could not have continued the contest.
Nearer the present day the capture of Acre is equally celebrated, and is interesting, as the new elements in war, steam power and hollow projectiles, were
brought to bear.
The highest military authority in England expressed the opinion in Parliament
that this was one of the greatest achievements of modern times ; but the same
authority added it was also connected with peculiar circumstances which they
could not always hope to occur, and warned their lordships that they must not
always expect that ships, however well commanded, or however gallant their
seamen might be, were capable of commonly engaging successfully with stone
walls.
The works in question were in a bad condition and were undergoing repairs.
Their position permitted an. approach through a channel where only a few guns
could be brought to bear against the fleet, most of which took this passage. But
few of the guns of the fort were heavy or effective, and only one battery of five
guns well served. About :five hundred guns were brought to bear on the
fort ; the walls were not breached, but a large magazine blew up, and, producing
a panic, the fort surrendered, which, it must be remembered, was besieged by
land also.
We have merely alluded to these two justly celebrated attacks of ships against
forts to invite an examin&tion into their details, and into the circum tance of
other similar achievements nearly as striking, with the conviction that few persons could be found who would use these instances of succe , as an argument
again t the necessity of permanent defence . Surely we cannot mea ure w~at
has been done in thi way, when the preparations for defence and the res1 tanc<' were conducted by those whose bravery, as in the ca. cs cited, wa left
unaided by , kill or cience. Neither let it be suppo ed, where . hip have attacked fort. , the result have always been the ..;ame; far from it; and it i.- only
nee ,sary to allnd to the affairs of Fort Moultrie, an<l, latrr, to l\lobile Point,
tonington, Fort IcIIenry, &c., from our o,rn national expcri(·nce.
Arr w' entir<'ly to r<'j<'ct, in this qur tion, the r_·pericncc and practice of t~e
gr<'at European powers, Eng·land and Franc ? The former, with h r O'ig-:m 1c
navy, n.ccording to the modf'rn hypothr:-:i , would ·(;Pm to r r1uirc no p •11nnnen
dcfrnc :e ; nor the latter, with her incrca ing mariw•, already brought to a very
formidal,1 • ·onclition in numbers, mafrri ·l, ancl cli,ciJJlinc.
Yc·t thP:-r two 11ation., while buildin"' without ccn:-iug war .. t amer.::, ar ontinnallv ac1c1inrr to tlie fixc•cl d ·follcf':'-l of their spaho:ml. arnl thi.:, too, with a Yi
of makinu thr-ir n:n-i •:-: nH>r<' efficient in thr·ir ,lum· of tlH· national rl nc ·
} rant·f', iu ('Oll:-idPration of th<' chan°·p likrl·v to nccnr fr11m th n w ,] m nt, in
war 1111w 11u<lr-r eo11:-icfor:1tio11. ha:-: Jiacl r'c~1th· her. a- ·oa,t n•-cxamin d b_- ,
lti.rd1 c·ommi,:-i,m n·pr ·:-r>ntino- aJI arm:- in Ji,.r :rnpm1dou military or~:miz, i n:
and th r ,ult wa to orclt r ,till furtllf'r 1n· t ction to nnm r11n, point
n h
no tml r rnl rerl nc ·1 . iblt' liy li!.d1t 1lra11ght :-tPam r-. m,mntin!?' h ,. •
n, u . 1]1 ir fort, t b( ;.;-arri. 1111 d in titn1, of ll<'<'cl hv tllf' local militi,. ( !.! ~
i atirmal .) Ju Lll'~I. n] th ·all i: fo1· gr ater a •tfrit,: in matt ri:11 and p
n
m · u of de I'll · , par i ·ularlr iu th • ·a of r ·ftwe ~ harb r . ..:uch ~ >
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and Dover, while the fortifications of her great arsenals have all recently been
mengthened.
. .
.
.
After mature examination, I am of the opnnon that m a system of na~10nal
defence forts cannot be dispensed with without entailin~ enormous_ expenditures
for uncertain results. The invention of cannon and thell' constant 1mprovements
have changed the form of fortifications, and added to the size, d'l.uability, and ·
massiveness of their construction. Now the invention of cannon was a greater
change in the art of war than any that has occurred in_ this centt~ry, and with
regard to one of the principal improvements of the day m destructive agentsexplosive slwt-the advantage has been given decidedly to fort .
.
On the other hand, if we cannot dispense with forts, can they not be modified? Is there no middle course i Fortifications in military science are regarded
a a temporary means of resistance, by which an enemy is kept in check until
relief is afforded.
In this view of their functions it seems probable that as, on the one hand,
they might be more effectually assailed by steamers-of-war towing in heavy
~hips, both ships and steamers mounting the heavy ordnance which has be~n
mtroduced, throwing solid as well as hollow shot, so, on the other hand, rehef
being more easily procured, their style of construction might be more economical. .But this is a question belonging to the engineers.
.
_It 1s one, however, which may be interesting just now with reference to fortifying our new coast on the Pacific-a work which surely ought not to be delayed.
~ere we are, as it were, building up another nation, and it must be built up
with arms as well as arts ; for without arms :no nation was ever safe, much less
great.
The position of Halifax, Bermudas, and the West Indies have been alluded
to above in reference to our Atlantic and Gulf coasts. In the Pacific we have already outposts on our flanks, in the hands of first class powers. The French
h~-ve a protectorate government in the Society Islands ; they hold the Marquesas
still nearer, with its superior harbors, and have been looking for years for some
excuse for seizing the Sandwich group ; for this is the only way to account for the
manner in which they have ever countenanced the unjust and ungenerous demands
of their agents in those islands. 'fhat they have not now possession of them is
due, probably, to what has been stated of the determination of the government of
the _islands to hoist the American flag, and call upon the United States for pro~ection or incorporation. It is impossible to estimate too highly the value and
rmp?rtance of the Sandwich Islands, whether in a commercial or military point
of view. Should circumstances ever place them in our hands they would prove
the mo:4t important acquisition we could make in the whole Pacific ocean-an
acqui:3ition intimately connected with our commercial and naval supremacy in
!ho'"'e sea·. Re this as it may, these islands should never be permitted to pass
mto the pos~ession of any European power. Then we have British Oregon, with
Vancouver's island, the Halifax of the Pacific coast; and last, though perhaps
not the least, the Russian possessions of the Sitka, &c., in the north ; and all
these in an ocean above all others adapted to the use of steam.
The third inquiry submitted by the department is whether it be necessary or
expedient to continue the system of fortifications on the shores of the northern

lake~.
The fir:-it view of thi, branch of the subject would probably lead to the conion that, a· we di. pensed with forts during the war of 1812, we need them
~till le::t:-- now ; that the contiguity of the two frontiers will enable us to keep
pace ,vith any vidence of preparation on the other side ; that our progress in
population and re ources, rendered ,·o immediately available by the increase of
at r communication wjth all parts of the border States, especially with such
nnportant point a the city of Albany, which, in its turn, is connected with all .
ction: of the country by its great river, railroads, and canals, was far greater

e m
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than any progress within the CanadaR. Yet the advance there has been highly
respectable, and very extensive public works, intimately connected with a sys-tem of defence, have been completed.
But this very progress on our lake frontier, showing itself in large and populous towns with a rapidly increasing commerce, all exposed to sudden assaults,
naturally lead• one to pause well before advancing the opinion that the general
government is absolved from giving adequate protection to all exposed and important points, whether on our lake or sea-coast.
Why should not Bqffalo and Oswego be protected, as w~ll as Savannah and
Mobile 1 Not by extensive and costly works, capable of resisting invasion or
siege, but sufficiently strong not to excite the cupidity or daring spirit of an enemy,
who, in a rapid incursion, might, as elsewhere, destroy an enormous amount of
property before any resistance could be brought against him. To conduct a
surprise may be difficult on the lakes; but we have had, within a few years,
full proof that it is possible.
In case of a war with England her provinces will, in all probability, be invaded,
and this invasion, according to the declaration of a distinguished citizen, will be
one almost en masse. He predicts that an army of a hundred thousand men
will march upon the heart and capital of the country, and settle all at one blow;
that neither forts nor ships will be wanted ; and that the rivers and lakes, instead of obstacles, would become bridges to the invaders. One cannot fail to
be stirred up by this captivating picture; but in the only trial heretofore made
upon Quebec the river was not found to be a bridge, and the campaign failed
for want of one. Suffice it, however, to say, if we carry on war on a largescale without being governed by the art of war, by science, and past experience,
we may, and doubtless will, still be successful; but this res-ult will be obtained
by an increased expenditure of blood and treasure.
While an army, however large, was marching upon a vital point, millions of
property might be destroyed along the lake shore , making a heavy discount on
the fruits of the victory, which might be prevented by moderate expenditures.
Our large frontier towns, where great injury could be suddenly inflicted, , hould
be protected from liability to· a coup de main by forts of moderate dimen ion",
to be garrisoned, in time of need, by those whose hearth they :4helter. All
lake harbors, whose position, depth of water, and accessibility would render
them important as refuge harbors to our own' hips or to tho, e of the enemy,
should also be defended by adequate work, . All materials not peri bable
should be gradually collected for the construction of ships and teamers. 'fhe_e
preparations become invaluable where war threaten, or come, r neither are they
Jo t if it should not overtake us, for they may have had an important part in
averting it .
. In many particulars, and according to the opinion of men of the most. ~xper1e_nce, On_tario is the mo t important in the erie of inland ea i~ n: military
pomt of vi w, and at this time the English , team tonnag upon 1t 1s O'f atcr
than our own. 'I'hi. fact alone i one for con, id ration.
, I~.. onn xion :vith th movement, of larg armir nothing ha be n. aid of
fort1fymcr .s·traterrzc point on the line of offcnfliv · operation:--, brcau. th1-- <JU ,_
tion _i a. pur_ ly military one, ancl b •lonO'" o e. pecially to anotlwr branch of th
·rv1c that 1t ,rould L • m •r !)resumption to touch upon it h r ·.
Thou,rh not ·p ially r f rrcd to in th qu , tion: under C'Onsicl •ration it may
b xp ·ct 1 that :-:om notiC'c will h · tak n of th facilitic:- to be d riv d, in a
y t ·m of n: tional def •n · from rH}'id railroad intercommunication and tmn,portati 11. 'I h · c rtain]y can conf •r a err at and r al 1 n fit am untin_
p rhap · to po itiv · .· mption from the: I o:-:-ibilit,r of inva i m. ~ n arm.
i 1i
it. barrgao- ', can nccompli. h an ordinary march of twpnty-fiv • clay in on d .
and r a h th t rruinu · without fatio-u , all r ady for firrht. Th · ·xp rim n o
trnn portin"" tr 01, · in thi way ha· alr ady l, ·n trit<l in } ranc and. m
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r cently, the emperor of Russia has been am~sing ~imself by sending h~s guar~s,

"th their artillery, to and fro between h1s capital ~nd Moscow, with entire
~cce~s. But it is a misapprehension of means and ideas to suppose that the
eces ity of coast defences will be done away with because w_e posses~ the power
c"" transporting the militia from the interior to the seaboard m the briefest space
nceivable. Are our farmers, mechanics, merchants, doctors, and lawyers to
on titute the defence of our maritime frontier? Are they, in time of war, to
E eep with their knapsacks on their backs and their musket~
their si~es, and
e ready at the sound of bell or steam-whistle to leave famihe~ and busme~s to
man :floating batteries in or near our seaports, or sounds, or rivers ? Besides,
mere numbers, though they may prevent an enemy from land·i ng on ?ur shores,
cannot prevent his ships approaching near enough to hurl destruct10n among
..hemselves, destroy cities, and burn shipping.
.
But if we are to rely upon railroads as one of the modes of repellmg s~dden
attacks, having for their object the destruction of property or the levyrng oi
contributions, it will be well to inquire as to the amount of dependence that can
he placed upon them. The utility of a road may be destroyed in a few minutes
b very little exertion ; a single rail removed will cause delay if not a serious.
accident. During the last revolution in Paris troops were thus prevented from
reaching the city from the departments. In time of war, for those roads at least
which lie along the coasts, a system of frequent inspection may be necessary,
and means of repairing injuries kept at hand.
.
In the first part of this report it has been stated th.at, however complete our
3y~tem of fortifications may be made, a large sphere of action in a scheme of·
national defence will still devolve upon the navy. rrhe general effect of fortifications is to exclude war from our borders, and contribute to the inestimable
a_dvantage of leaving society in an undisturbed state, pursuing its usual avocanons. A navy becomes efficient just in proportion as it is relieved from harbor
defence; and in a war even defensive in its origin and object the navy in almost
every case must assume an offensive attitude. We lose the vantage-grou:nd if'
we wait the assault of an enemy. One would suppose there could scarcely be
a dis"'e~ting opinion in reference to this point ; that the special function of the
avy, m war, is to be aggressive. Our able engineers, and especially their
present distinguished chief, in the admirable reports they have been making for
years on this subject, invariably assign this high and all-important position to

?Y

the navy.

General Cass tells us, " Our great battle upon the ocean is yet to be fought,
a~d _we sl~a11 gain nothing by shutting our ey es to the nature of the struggle."
) rm1lar views are held abroad as to the true sphere of a navy. The Duke of
W ~ll~g~on, while urging increa8ed activity in the permanent defences of Great
B_ntam, m the strengthening of forts, the construction of barracks, and place
a annes to be walled in, still considers the navy of England, through its powers
" a r.rgression, its most essential defence.
The extraordinary expansion of this country and its development in every
d ·partment, shown especially in a comm(;,rce which, long since whitening every
::ea, ba received a marvellous stimulant recently, by the accession of a thou-an_d m~ of coast on the Pacific, by new channels of trade, and by the modifica_t1on m the navigation laws of our great competitor, should lead all reflecting
mI~d · to consider how great would be the revulsion in our prosperity if, through
any u~toward event, we should lose the means of protecting this commerce ..
+anding now in the front rank with our great commercial rival, shall we neglect
Id aphorism of Sir Walter Raleigh, most cogent still : "Whosoever comnd · the ·ea commands the trade, and whosoever commands the trade comd the riche of the world 1"
~ - ow, i our navy, in point of e:ffi.ci ncy and numbers, what it should be?.
~ ate, men con. tantly allude to it as the right arm of the nation's power;,
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yet has this arm been kept in any degree of vigor commensurate with the work
it may have to perform or in keeping with our position among the nations 1 Is
it equal to the ordinary exigencies occurring almost daily? The law passed
some years since limiting the number of seamen still exists. Since its passage
-0ur commerce has nearly doubled, and our squadrons are too small to give it
adequate protection or to keep up a healthful spirit and experience in the naval
profession. Recently the government had not at its disposal the means to prevent an unlawful aggression on the territory of a friendly power; nor was the
force sufficiently respectable afterwards to infuse, by its presence alone, a little
mercy into Spanish justice. But are we yet through with this question of Cuba 1
Are we not threatened with a foreign intervention 1 At any rate, does it not
offer another striking instance to be added to the long list of dangers which, at
.different periods, have suddenly sprung upon us, and to which this day of special
international amity has proved no exception 1 The French claims, the northeastern boundary, the affair of the Caroline, the Oregon controversy, have all
shaken for the time being our relations with the two most formidable powers of
Europe-formidable to us only because they have powerful navies-a collision
with either of which would be rather a different affair from that with our neighboring republic, with whom similar disturbances ripened into actual hostilities.
'J.1he naval power of England is greater than ever before in her history, and
the disparity between us is yearly increasing, particularly in her steam navy.
In the admiralty navy list for April, 1850, we find one hundred and fifty
steamers of war; of course many of these are already obsolete in construction
and machinery, but she is building new ones and launching numbers every year.
In addition to these, especially constructed for war purposes, she has between
;sixty and seventy mercantile steamers, capable of being armed with thirty- two
pounder cannon, for which the guns, carriages, and ammunition are actually
prepared. She has, still further, two hundred and forty more, capable of mounting a lighter armament, and some six hundred besides, which might be of service to resist invasion from her neighbors. Exclusive of her squadrons abroad,
which are large and efficient, with a due proportion of steamers to each, in
.January, 1851, she had in commission at home fourteen sail of the line, three
of them screw steamers, ten frigates, four of them steamers, beside several
steam sloops, all ready for sea. She has also ready for commissioning twenty
other powerful steamers, viz : eight large frigates and twelve sloops.
The training of officers and men is in full k eeping with this colos al force.
Her quadron of evolutions offers the :finest school for both, and the gunnery
hip: are making her able seamen expert artilleri t , good wordsmen, and capital
, hot with pi ·tol and carbine.
Th navy of France is also powerful; it ha ri·en entirely from it ' almost
total ·-·tinction during the long ancl bloody contests from 17 9 to 1 15. In
t<'amPr of war, at the commencement of this year, . he hacl on line-of-battle
·hip o~ nin_ety o-~m , witl~ crew propellers, fourteen Hteam frigate ' of fir:-t cla-~ ·,
m1Jtmtrno- from ·1ght to s1xtc n guns of heavy ordnance; fiftren i;t am corvette.::-,
ancl fort ' cle. patch 'teamer. , mo.'t of them mounting from two to four i::h 11o-un ..- (,'c Etat 1 1;neral c1e la )farine t de Colonie:-, for J:iebrnary, 1 51.)
Both thl'~C n:rvie:- Jun-<' reach cl the highe.'t tatc of efficiency, .:kill, and <li~ciplin ·, ancl th ir morale 1wv r wa. hi~h r: that of E,wlan<l, rou. eel to th·
maint nance of iL hoa,-tecl .-uprcmacy on the ocean; tlrnt of } ranee, lmmin2'
f ran opp rtunity to :-how thr ,,·orl<l that it ' }Jractical :-kill i. now 'r1n, l to th
· ·i nc•' ancl hrav ry which w ·r 0v •r C'on:-:picuou:.
'\Yh ·n complet cl. wi . hall havf' in our navy fiv<' tmm fri<Ta.te:- anrt
t am . loop. The•:- v
I mount or will mount from i.· to t u ~un-.,
th ·m f I· rg-r. cnlihr ·; th ·y am ·trong, WPll-bnilt, anrl •ffici ·nt vc ··el., n
m r f th1 m CJ.Hit· Pqnal. if not . up rior, to Hnything of th · same cl ~ a r
ti tl1i . t. t .ment ·omp:ir ·<l with th two mnde abov~ of the rnn-i , of F~n!!'I
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and France, shows terrible odds against us. It is well to remember this; but
it is not exhibited here with the intention of making it the basis of an argument
:ro show that we should set to work and erect such fleets here. The temper of
-0ur people in relation to any such expenditures has already been spoken of, and
here is no desire to advocate extravagal).t cost for contingent advantages.
But this disparity between us and other nations in our means of offe_nce and
defence, already so great, is yearly increasing. How is it to be go~ nd of _or
le sened 1 The reply is often made : Has it not ever been so 1 was 1t not qmte
great when we went into the war of 18121 And it may well be asked ho:""
that disparity was overcome in that memorable contest. In the first place, it
was lessened by the skill, courage, and coolness of our officers, united to the
fine spirit, good gunnery, and high discipline of the crews. In the second
place, by a process equalling the greatest piece of strategy ever pei~formed_ on
land by the greatest military captains. We built frigates which in size, calibre
of guns, and in the brave hearts who took charge of them, literally struck off
from the British navy list everything below a line-of-battle ship, at least so far
a~ these frigates were concerned.
The first encounter of our frigates with theirs astounded Britain. In accounting for her defeats, it was natural for her only to have seen the disparity in size
and armament, but the official account of these frigates shows something more,
and this is now acknowledged with becoming candor by some of her distingui hed men. Sir Francis Head, in a recent work, says : "Gunnery was, in
naval warfare, in the extraordinary state of ignorance we have just described,
when our lean children, the American people, taught us, rod in hand, our first
lesson in tlie art." Certain it is that the British admiralty board thought it
necessary to put a stop to what they conceived to be a very unequal contest,
a~d accordingly intimated confidentially to the capta~ns of their ships that they
did not conceive that any of his Majesty's frigates should engage single-handed
the larger class of American ships, which, though they may be called frigates,
are of a size, complement, and weight of metal much beyond that class, and
more resembling line-of-battle ships.
:row, can we not once more render obsolete one-half or two-thirds of the
Engli. h and French navies, and compel these powers to remodel their steam as
well as sailing ships 1 It is the opinion of officers who have closely examined
this subject, aided by actual experiments, that we have not yet reached the
maximum point in the use afloat of heavy ordnance.
It is proposed to build ships that will carry guns of larger calibre and longer
range than any heretofore used; to have auxiliary steam power, with the machinery out of reach of shot or shell, to be disencumbered of side-wheels, and,
when not using this auxiliary power, to be fast and manageable under canvasvery much such a ship as the Princeton was, on a larger scale, and with the
improvements which seven years have introduced. All candid minds will now
admit that the conception and principle involved in the construction and armament of this ship was in advance of her day, for in casting round we have found
nothing combining so ma.ny requisites for a steamer of war.
Th~ advantage of guns with long ranges is feelingly dwelt upon by Sir
Franci. Head, already q_uotecl. Speaking of the American navy in the last
v.,.- r, l1e say. : '' They not only converted their seamen into pmcticed gunners
an 1 <·xpert artillerymen, but, by , ubstituting long guns instead of our short
one . they, ecured for th m. elve. the immense advantage of being able, without
lo~ - or danger, luxuriously to pummel us to death, at ranges at which they had
p e alculat ,a they would be completely out of our reach."
It ·would ,·e m unnece.· ~ary to mention that al1 improvements in the implem ~n - <,f war, the moment th y are proved effective, will, of course, be seized
u 01 by other powers, for concealment in these matters is no longer attempted.
B
th great point to be gained i. to compel these powers, as it were, to
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start, de novo, with us, and to render comparatively valueless their gigantic
naval establishments. In the building of a steam navy we have scarcely commenced, and it is rather mortifying to think that even Spain has as many
steamers of war as we have. Candor compels the admission, however, that circumstances have greatly favored us 1 and though this extreme economy or indifference might have cost us dear, certain it is that many millions of dollars
have been saved by the delay. England and France have been going through
the usual costly process in such matters before reaching a measure of excellenceone improvement almost immediately laid aside for another, and this one as
rapidly giving way to something still better; while all this time we have been
dealing most sparingly with this very expensive agent, steam power. But now
that a great degree of perfection has been reached in its application, that the
science and mechanical skill of the country are at so high a point, that our
wealth and resources have so increased, shall we continue to refuse a reasonable
measure of preparation for future exigencies?
Allusion has been made to the assistance England is prepared to receive from
her mercantile steam vessels; and H may be said we have the same resources, so
far as they go, of falling back upon our splendid mail steamers. These vessels
would doubtless prove serviceable in many ways; they may carry a few guns
of very respectable, though not of the largest calibre; built for speed, they would
be admirable despatch vessels, serve to reconnoitre with safety the movements
of an enemy, give warning of his approach, and the amount of his force-in
short, be what Nelson termed his frigates, "the eyes of the fleet." But these
steamers cannot form the basis of a steam navy; such an idea would be fatal to
our naval efficiency. It is not intended by this to object to government's giving
adequate protection to these mail steamers, in order to carry out the internationaJ.
postal arrangements. But they are not such steamers as the government would
now build for war purposes; the side-wheel may be said to be almost ob olete,
and their machinery is altogether too much exposed to shot and shell; ships so
costly mu 't, at least, be made less vulnerable. But if the mail steamers are to
be depenclecl upon, as our steam navy, and not as auxiliaries to it, as the English
and }.,rench mercantile steamers are to their navies, then another q ue tion
presents itself. At what stage of an impending emergency i the government,
in conformity with the right granted in the contract, to take the.;e steamer 1
If thi8 be deferred until a late moment, there may b no time to fit them for
war ervice, for very material alteration will Im vc to Le made. If further
dcfi rred, until hostilities break out, they certainly will not be ready for the fir t
bruJh, aud half of them may be picked up abroad by the malle t armed crui~er.
hould they be taken by the government prematurely, their bu._ine s and profit
arc broken up, and pa, s into the hand· of their rival s, who may run their teamer
to the la:-it moment con is tent with afoty; for by the other power:-, a.· tated
abov , th y are only held as auxiliaries.
A f' ·w nlarrn.·, then, leadin(J' to no rupture, may , acldl th government with
a cla: .. of teamer not :fit for tlrn navy pro1_wr, to be di po ·eel of at an normoulo. s; for th alt ration which will have b en mad to conv 'rt them into "menof-war" will hav wholly unfitt cl tll'm for th ir p ac fol pur,-uit:s; j?,t a·.
much ·o a th e~·orbitant exp nditur for th • luxuriout:t accommod: t1on ot
pa· eu"' r i wholly 111111cc 's.·ary for a :-1t •am frio-ate. In truth, in th tran~fer
of the., mail. t •am ·r; thi, itC'm may b, ·o r at that it ~hould not be altoo-·ther
ov •rlo k ·cl. It ha· b ·c·n .-tated that th Raloon:, ·abini;, aucl cl ,comtion f on
of th c lin . lH ve co::t from on, hunclr
thou,.;and to on · huuclr ·d and tw my
1
thou·and dollar p r J1ip, which, of c:onr e, nm t b paid f r, thoucrh not on
dollar of it would b r ·quir cl for na al u,·c. Two iron hook· t win~ h.
hamm ck, mak the birth of th . 'anum, , ml a fi·w pin b ard · comp ~ th
bunk of th offic r..
1n couclu j n, what Y r may b d •cid d in relation to th · nation. d fi
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ortification, whether these be continued, extended, or modified, I beg leave to
express an emphatic dissent from all theories having for t~eir object the s~b.::titution of active ships-of-war for permanent works. This would be placmg
the navy in a false position before the country; gi,:in g it duti~s to -rerform for
which its organization is inapplicable; preparing for its future discredit and loss,
-hrough failures to execute that which should never have been und_ertaken,
which is not embraced in the general scope and design of a naval establishment.
T o retain the navy for harbor defence was entertained at the commencement
of the last war with England; the proposition to do so sprung from the apprehension that it could not compete with the vastly superior English forces upon
the ocean. But at that time some brave and sagacious officers in the high ranks
saved the navy from the fate that threatened it, and to these gentlemen it owes
all its subsequent honors, usefulness, and prosperity. If any such ideas prevail,
at this day, in or out of the profession, those holding them would do well to
pause and consider what the navy would have lost, and what the country would
have lost, if our ships-of-war had at that eventful period been deprived of the
opportunity of filling so bright a page in the nation's history by their achievements upon the ocean. In this connexion an eloquent passage in the speech of
a great statesman is recalled, delivered in the Senate of the United States in
1 3 . After alluding to our being at war with England, at a moment when
she had gained an ascendancy on the seM over the whole combined powers of
Europe, and quoting the familiar verse of her poet,
·
·
'' Her march is o'er the mountain wave,
Her home is on the deep,"

Mr. Webster says: "Now, sir, since we were at war with her I was for intercept ing this march; I was for calling upon her, and paying our respects to her
at h ome; I was for giving her to know that we, too, had a right of way over
the seas, and that our officers and our sailors were not entire strangers on the
1:>osom of the deep; I was for doing something m0re with our navy than to keep
1,t on our shores for the prottction ef our own coasts and our own harbors; I was
for g iving play to its gallant and burning spirit; for allowing it to go forth upon
the seas, and to encounter on an open and an equal field whatever the proudest or
the b ravest of the enemy could bring against it. I knew the character of its officers
and the spirit of its seamen, and I knew that in their hands, though the flag of
the country might go down to the bottom, while they went with it, yet that it
could never be dishonored or disgraced.
"Since she was our enemy, and a most powerful enemy, I was for touching
~er , if we could, in the very apple of her eye; for reaching the highest feather
m her cap; for clutching at the very highest jewel in her crown." * * * *
" The ocean, therefore, was the proper theatre for deciding this controversy with
our enemy; and on that theatre my ardent wish was that our own power should
b e concentrated to the utmost."
It w ould be ill suited, indeed, to the spirit of this nation to retain its naval
£orces in its own waters during a war, especially if that war was with a naval
power. Steam, this new element in the affairs of the world, has very materially
changed our position with reference to other nations. Our distance from Eur~p. , mea ured in ti~e, is now reduced to a brief period of ten days. These
n1ted tates have hitherto been advancing the general cause of human liberty
y an active and progressive peace; but do not events abroad more and more
indica te that we may, at no distant day, be forced into our own defence-to aid
hi~ cau .. e of freedom by an active war 7
Re pectfully submitted.
S. F. DUPO:NT,
Commander United States Navy
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No. 5.

Report

ef Lieutenant J.

Lanman.

NEW YORK NAVY YARD, September 20, 1851.
Sm: In obedience to the within order of the honorable the Secretary of the
Navy, I have the honor to submit the following, as the result of my best reflections upon the subject referred to in your communication of the 17th June last,
addressed to the honorable the Secretary of the Navy :
1st. "To what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications forthe protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application
of steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvement of projectiles, or other
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 18161"
The great change produced upon all maritime nations by the application of
steam must, of course, have a most important bearing in regard to the system
of our national defences, as adopted in the year 1816, and that system most
applicable to the same purpose at the present day.
I desire to say that should a foreign power design hostilities against the
United States, their steamers, with transport ships in tow, would not attempt
to pass our fortifications, but could land thousands of troops upon our shores
at the numerous points convenient for so doing, and free from the annoyance of
any battery.
At the same time, I conceive it all important that our seaports should be
protected; yet the great improvements made in proj ectiles, and the advancement in the science of gunnery would suggest that our fortifications need not
be so extensive, and consequently erected at much less expense. Though I
would not demolish any of the works now completed, yet those being erected
could be so modified as to receive the heavy armament of the present day, and
be :finished at much less expense than by canying out the designs of fortifications planned many years since and not yet completed.
2d. "What reliance could be placed on vessels-of-war, or of commerce, floating
batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent fortifications 1"
In reply I would say that great reliance could be placed on war steamers of
moderate draught of water, armed with our efficient eight and ten-inch columbiads, as they should at all times be in readiness to take in tow any armed
ve els at the naval station, and in -a few hours from port could oppose the
]anding of the enemy upon any part of the adjacent coa,_t.
ailing vessel of the commercial marine and river steamers, (suitable for the
purpose,) would be available mean. of transporting troop,:; to oppose the landing
upon our hor of any ho tile force.
Floating batterie and gunboats, and other temporary ub titutes for perman nt fortification ·, I conceive to be heavy expenditure of the public trea ury
and not of the lea t po sible benefit to the government. Of course I vould
xccpt such temporary means of defence a a ca c of emergency might demand,
wh n th p ople of our country are ever r ady to look out for them elves.
3d. "I. it n c s ry or xpedi nt to continue the sy tern of fortification ~ on
the hore f th north rn lakes 1"
The sam , n ·wer will apply to tho e work that I have made in reo-ard t
the fortifiC< tion on our eaboard. '1.'ho e unfini.. , hed hould be modernized, and
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:hose in service armed with projectiles and otherwise adapted to the improvements of the year 1851.
I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
JOSEPH LANMAN,
Lieutenant United States Navy.

Hon. 0. M.

CONRAD,

Secretary

of War.

No. 6.

Report

of Lieutenant Jl:I.

F. Maury.

NATIONAL OBSERVATORY, Washington, August, 1851.
Sm: I have received a communication from the Secretary of the Navy, covering the copy of a letter from yourself of June 17, 1851, requesting him t_o
communicate certain resolutions of Congress concerning land defences and fort,fications to several officers of the navy, and " to obtain their separate opinions
in writing " upon the following points, viz :
L t. "To what extent, if any, ought the present system of fortifications for
the p rotection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application
of steam to vessels-of-war, the in-vention or improvement of projectiles, or other
chan ges that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 18161"
2 d. "What reliance could be placed on vessels-of-war, or of commerce, floating
batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent fortifica· ons 1"
3d. " Is it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications on
the n orthern lakes 1"
The resolutions are :
4
' 1st. Resolved, That the Secretary of War be
directed to report to this
House, the second Monday in December next, on the subject of the land defences of the country, in which he will review the general system adopted after
he war with Great Britain, and since pursued in regard to the permanent fortifications then deemed necessary for the national defence ; and that he report
whether the general plan may not now be essentially modified by reducing the
number of works proposed to be erected, and by abandoning some of the forts
now in progress of construction."
" 2d. Re olved, That the Secretary of W ar also report the number of fortifications which have been built, including those nearly completed under the general ystem, the number in progress of construction, and the number not yet
commenced, but proposed to be erected, and in such form as will conveniently
how the States and 'l,erritories in which the several forts are situated or to be
located , when the work was commenced, when completed or expected to be
fini ... hed, the number and calibre of the guns mounted or to be mounted, the
e:;;timated cost, the amount expended, and the sums yet required to finish or
con truct, as the case may be, each work."
I am directed by the Secretary of the Navy to give this subject my "best
efl ction , and to communicate the result to the Secretary of War."
To make clear the result of my reflections upon this subject it is first necesary to pa s, at least briefly, in review the condition of the country immediately
preceding the y ear 1816, when the present system of fortifications was adopted,
and to contrast the condition and military resources of the United States then>
~ith their condition and military resomc~s now.
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In 1816 our population was eight millions; we had just come out of a trying
and expensive war with ' the most po"'."erful nation in the world; our soil had
been invaded, the Capitol burned, towns had been besieged, villages laid waste,
and the people greatly harassed by the presence among them of an insolent foe.
The application of steam as a motive power, even to river craft, was but an
experiment, and men had not yet waked from their dream in which they first
saw upon the ocean visions of steam navigation. Railroads had not then begun
to thread themselves over the country, nor had the first telegraphic ·wire streaked
the horizon. The country had been and might again be invaded; the alarm
could be spread only at the rnte of one hundred miles a day; and to repel the
enemy our generals could bring up their forces only at the rate of what, in this
day of steam and railroad car, would be considered as a snail's pace; twenty
miles was a good day's march for an army.
Under these circumstances, with the horrors of war and the dread of invasion
fresh in the minds of the people, it was natural that the attention of the government should be directed to a system of defence along our borders which, in
another war, should make the weak points strong, the salient impregnable, and
the exposed, the rich, and the tempting secure; thus rendering the country in
another war safe from invasion. Accordingly, the plan was to line the seaboards
with forts and castles, which should oppose the advances of the enemy, beat
him back, resist sieges, and support garrisons for defence, until reinforcements
should arrive or the patience and the energies of the assailants should become
exhausted. Under these circumstances the present system of fortifications was
commenced.
For defending the approaches to any particular part of the coast, the engineer, in planning his works, had to take into account the importance to us of
the place to be defended; the importance which the enemy would probably
attach to its occupation by himself; and the force that he would or could,
probably, bring against it. Also, an element which entered largely into the
engineer's plans was the kind of force, the calibre of guns, &c., that his fort
would have to withstand.
But since that time great changes have taken place. The relative importance
of ports and harbors, and places to be defended along the coast, has greatly
changed. The implements of warfare and the means of attack and defence
have changed; structures that were well calculated to resist the batteries of the
best appointed ships in 1816, would now tumble down before the appliance of
mod rn warfare. The improvements which have since taken place in hip ,
their armaments and locomotion, are vast; and therefore works may be found
along our coast which, though sufficient in their day, would now br wholly
inad quat to the purpose for which they were intended.
.
. .
At be· t, a fort can actually defend so much of the coa t only a he w1thm
th rm~O' of its guns; outside of this range an enemy may disembark an army,
land h1. h avy ordnance in the very ,jo-ht of the stronge t ca tle, a we our. Iv . have ince done at V ra Cruz, and proceed to inve t, from the rear, ~he
~tron°·holc1 of the country. It was therefore practicable for a bold and da hwa
ncmy, notwith tanding the powerful and costly work at Old Point omfort,
in Virginia, to land in . ight of the e work an army, in Lynn Haven bay, mar h
up to -•orfolk without ·oming in reach of the protecting battery, and invc,t the
city and the navy yard-th v ry place::- the guns of th e fort were intPnd
to prot t.
'l rue it wa practi abl to r ct work of d fence at Lynn Hav n b y: bot
b inO' r ct d, the .. ao-acity of ur n°'in r p r eiv d th re wer ·till 01!1 r
lac and tim at which an en my mi,,.ht land and mar h up to orfolk .
ut once coming in ran"' of th Lynn Hav n gun . 'I'he country a, th
and p re ived that ffi tually to pr vent an enemy of naval r our
ro
landino- on our coa t in war would r uir a structur but little hort of
T
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inese wall, with bastions mounting guns to range and rake every point, from
e end of our extended sea-front to the other.
"olomon's exchequer could not withstand the drafts w~ich such ~ complete
;y~tem of defence would make upon the treasury ; a:1d ne~ther the m1~ds of the
ple nor the purse of the public was prepared to mcur 1t. Acc?rdmgly, the
nst important points were selected for fortifications, which, even 1f completed,
uld not have protected the country from invasion; they would only have
re,ented the enemy from anchoring with his fleet iu the most safe roadsten.ds,
d from landing with his forces at the most convenient places, and from batter• II' down oN.r cities with the guns of his men-of-war.
And upon the carrying out of this system, as incomplete as it necessarily was,
· ere was involved, according to the estimates of the most skilful and accorn,khed engineers, a sum of money which it would be difficult for the imagination
· conceive, for it required eight or nine places of :figures to comprehend it, so
enormous was the amount.
"\Vhile this system, expensive and defective as it was, was in progress, comneed those changes in the country to which I have alluded; a change of
pulation from eight to twenty odd millions, in the means of spreading the
alarm of an intended invasion ; a change from the signal :fire on the mountain
and the horse and his rider, to the fiery footed messenger of heaven, to raise the
c-0untry. For the foot pace of twenty miles a day, as the weary rate of our
ad-ancing armies, a change which ties infantry, cavalry, and artillery all to the
t ; of the iron horse, mounts them on railroads, and speeds off with them at the
rate ?f twenty times twenty miles a day, with the ability to land them at the
apromted place at the appointed time, refreshed with the ride and ready for
battle ; a change in ordnance and missiles of death, which are far more destructfre and much more terrible in battle than any ever known in the annals of
military warfare, Anno domini 1816.
The e changes are enough to revolutionize the system of coast defences.
They have rendered effete in part the system of 1816.
~ ilroads are now already completed, or actually in process of construction,
leadmg from New York up among the granite hills of New England-back to
the lakes and beyond the mountains-cuts the great Miami bottom, and spreading themselves out over the rich prairies beyond.
From No1folk they go north and south, and are ramifying themselves far
away into the back country, with the intent of reaching the very heart of the
nation in the good valley of the west.
~ - ow, were it possible for an enemy, with the greatest army that ever was led
into battle by the greatest captain, to take the country by surprise, and to land
at Long Island sound, or in Lynn Haven bay, and to be disembarking his last
piece of artillery before he was discovered, these railroads, the power of steam,
,rith the aiJ of lightning, would enable the government, before he could reach
the heights of Brooklyn, or the outskirts of Norfolk, to have there in waiting
an.d ready to receive him and beat him back into the sea, a force two to one
greater than his, however strong.
:· uppo, e that in 1847 there had been in active operation between Vera Cruz
and the city of Mexico a line of magnetic telegraph and such a railroad as is
the Erie road of New York, can it be supposed that our generals, being cogniZa + o the facts, would have so much as entertained the idea of landing
here a~ they did and laying siege to the town.
~ 1 the world knows where our railroads are, and that the. country is protect
from military surpri:e and invasion from the sea by a net-work of tele~aphic wire. ; the mere knowledge of the fact that Norfolk and New York
C::tn hriTw to their clefenc such re. ourccs will forever prevent even the thought
in
e inincl of an enemy of landing in force at Lynn Haven bay or on Long

tland.
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'l.,hose road~, therefore, render a siege to any of the works of defence before
those places out of the question.
.
'I'o lay siege to any place along our sea-front involves not only the disembarking of an army, but the landing also of the siege-train. 'l,his requires time.
From the time that the head of our invading column jumped out of the boats,
up to their waists in the water, at Vera Cruz, till General Scott was ready to
send his summons to the city, was thirteen days, and it was four days more
before bis heavy artillery drew overtures from the besieged-total, seventeen
days.
Imagine an army, the best equipped it may be the world ever saw, that should
attempt to beleaguer one of our strongholds for seventeen days. Within that
time we could bring against him, by railroads and steamboats, millions of the
freemen, which this country ever holds in reserve, to fight its battles. It might
be Boston, before which this imaginary army is supposed to set down in imaginary siege, or it may be New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Charleston, or
New Orleans-it is immaterial where. In less than half the Vera Cruz time
we could throw millions of men into any on~ of these places, and subsist them,
in the meantime, by a daily market train of cars and steamboats, catering for
them in the abundant markets of the Mississippi valley.
It is impossible that any army, however brave, spirited, and daring, should
ever think of invading a country like this, and attacking us upon our own
ground, when we have under our command such powers of concentration and
such force in reserve as twenty millions of freemen, the electric telegraph, the
railroad car, the locomotive, and the steamboat.
The present system of fortifying the coast is founded on the principle of
making the fortifications "strong in proportion to the value of the great objects
to be secured."*
This is the principle npon which every system of national defence must rest;
and as to this principle itself there can be no difference of opinion. 'I1be question is, in what shall the strength of a fortification consist 1 For a fortification
that is strong against the most powerful weapon s and modes of attack known
to our age ma,y be weak before those that the inventions and improvements of
another age may call forth.
In the feudal times castles were built to enable those within to withstand the
attack of spearsmcn and archers. These old castles were strong in their day,
but in ours they are impotent and of no avail.
'I'he fortifications of 1816 were built to with._tancl the armaments which were
mounted upon the ships of that clay; and what were they?
In 1 , 12 the Duke of \Vellington, whrn pr<·parino- to be iege Badajos, wrote
to Admiral Berkley, commanding th Li:-:hon station, to rcque~t the loan of
twenty twenty-four pounders from the :fleet. Admiral Berkley, in reply to the
r CJ n ·. t for twenty-four poundcrf-l, stated that no i-;hip under his command carried
gun of . o lteary a naturr; hut offcrecl to upply twenty righteen pound r--.
with cnrriagc:-: and ammunition cnmplctc.t It would be difficult to find now-adayt-1 auy ;-;hip iu any fie t with gun o "mall a n, twenty-four pound r.
Tow it hn. 00. n prowu, or m:ul probable·, that it i practicabl to put on
board ~hip:-: carry to :-:<'a ·with . af ty, ancl manag with ·ffrct, ]mw o-tm with a
·alihr for :-:hol of 01w lrnn<lr<>il nrnl thirty-five pound .. at 1 a:c:t · and it would
a. n•a..:nn:d,lc to c·.·pe ·t a fo11ification wliid1 wa _ bnilt to re:-i,.t . hot of i!!ht
or tw ·nt. ·-four, or <·V<·n of t l1irty-two or forty-two 1)om1clt' to with:-taucl th c n·n ·:ion of ·hit of 011 • hundn•(l anc1 tltirt c-fivc pound· w ight a:- ~t would
• ' -~ r port of the lioa1d of army oftic r , 1 10, on the mi!Jitnry <l •fcoet- of th
try- p11per that i. ,ha\\ n with "rt11 auiJity, nud to wh:ch I hall, cca. ooally r fer.
ontairu·d in J>uli. Doc. 'o 2u1;, Hou ·e of Rt!J ., 1 ts·· i n 2titb ,u ugrt .
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pect a thirty-two pounder to strike harmlessly against a wall which was built
nly to resist a ten pound shot.
.
.
•.
.
In 1816 our fortifications had to be provided with the means of w1thstandmg
,if!!e. Hence, they were required to be as strong in the rear as in the front,
and to be equally invulperable from every direction. But now steam and electricity render our seaboard fortifications invulnerable in the rear and protect
them against sieges. Attempts to carry by storm may be made; but as for an
r:nemy who sees and understands, as the leader of every army must see and
understand, the powers of concentration which steam gives us-as for such an
enemy to think of setting down before one of our strongholds and proceeding
regularly to invest it, by executing parallels, building fascill:es, ~ig~ing trenches,
throwing up enbankments, making approaches and the hke, 1t is out of the
que~tion. Our railroads perfectly protect the entire coast line from Maine to
Georgia from any such attempt. We may be blockaded by sea, and harassed
from ships, but we cannot be beleagured on the land.
These are the changes which have rendered necessary a change in the whole
,ystem of national defence, and the cliiif stationary works rf defence which we
now want along the Atlantic seaboard, are those that will protect our cities and
01J;ris from the great guns of big ships.
1Ve may admit, in imagination, now, a dashing enemy again into the Ohesa:ieake; we may suppose him landed, with all his forces, and to be, without op' oflition, in the act of taking up his line of march again for this city.
Now, is it not obvious-supposing the country to be in a reasonable state of
reparation at the commencement of war-supposing this much, is it not obvious,
· y sending telegraphic messages, and using the powers of steam for conveyance,
rhe .American general might sit down here, in Washington, and at daylight the
next morning commence an attack upon that enemy, both in front and in rear,
with almo~t any amount of force, consisting of regulars, volunteers, and militia,
that can be named. Retreat, for such a foe, would be out of the question, and
r -embarkation an impossibility.
.
Therefore, so far as the system 0f 1816 was intended to defend the country
from invasion along the Atlantic seaboard, steam, railroads, and the telegraph
ham rern1cred it as effete as did the .invention of fire-arms the defences which
the milit,:~·y ,·cicnce of that age had erected against the shafts of the archer.
It is not ,~oii1g too fa,r to say that, as for invasion, we might raze every f01 tification c1lrm;; the Atlantic coast without exposing the country to the danger of
b ing onnuu by an enemy in war. He might, in such a case, take possession
of our , <-<1portH, destroy our clock yards and arsenals, and do an incalculable
amount of mischief, lmt as for his venturing to leave the strongholds on the
seabor<l, aud attempting to penetrate, even for a few miles into the interior,
would be out of the que~tion.
Ile would be besieged from the moment of his landing; he might return to
us our cities in ruins, our dock yards in ashes; bnt as for invading the country,
and marching his armies over it from place to place, our steam machines forbid
it. H nee I maintain, we now want fortifications only to do what railroads and
~ am never can, viz: as before said, to protect our seaport towns from the great
mn.s of big ships .
• ·uPl,o· e the system of 1816 to have been completed; that the fortifications
·herein contemplated had a11 been built, provisioned, equipped, and garrisoned .
.-o :\", ., '\-ino- only those which protect the large cities from the g·uns of men-of'"ar. suppo:;e the alternative should be presented to our military men, whether
'he:- woulcl undertake to defend the country from invasion, with such a complete
·rstcm of fortifications, but without the assistance of railroads, steamers, and
~legraph, or with the aFJr-ristance of railroads, steamers, and telegraph, but with•llt he aid of the fortifications.
I ~uppo e, could such an alternative be submitted to every officer of the army,
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from the oldest down to the youngest, that there would be but one answer, and
that would be, "down with the forts, and give us the railroad, the locomotive,
the steamboat, and the telegraph."
I do not mean to advance the opinion that railroads, steam, and the telegraph,
with the military powers of concentration which they give us, have rendered
fortifications entirel;IJ useless. By no means: steam and electromagnetism on
the land can do but little against the tremendous power of armed ships on the
water; and if these can bring any one of our large cities within the reach of
their guns, its destruction is inevitable, despite all that the powers of the loco.
our motive and the telegraph can do. It is chiefly to keep such ships from burning
cities and liavens, within reach of their broadsides, that we want forts and castles.
Therefore seeing that, in 1816, when the present system of defending the
coast was planned, railroads and the magnetic telegraph were unknown, they
now ought to involve modifications of that system. In military operations they
are powerful auxiliaries. They introduce new elements and new features into
the arts of war;· they bear upon the whole system of attack and defence.
They, therefore, cannot fail to make necessary certain modifications in any
system of coast defence which was planned without regard to them.
With this exposition of my views, I proceed to answer your first question, viz:
"1. To what extent, if any, oug·ht the present system of fortifications for the
protection of our seaboard to be modified, in consequence of the application of
steam to vessels-of-war, the invention or improvement of projectiles, or other
changes that have taken place since it was adopted in the year 18161"
Let us first consider the modification applicable to the Atlantic seaboard, and
.then those that are applicable to the Pacific.
The only fortifications that are wanted along our Atlantic seaboard, except
those at Key West and the Tortugas, at Ship island, and at one or two more
uch places, are those which will protect our cities and towns from the broad&ides of men-of-war.
The forts already completed, or well advanced towards completion, are believed
to be sufficient for this. 1'hcy should, however, be mounted with heavier ordnance,
and pieces of the most effective calibre for throwing explosive shot and shells.
In 1840, the House of Representatives, by resolution of Avril 9th, called
upon the War Department for a report-among other things, '· of a full and connected system of national defence."
The subject was referred to a board of engineer officers, who presented their
views in a masterly manner. I have before referred to this well-drawn paper,
and shall have frequent occasion to refer to it again. That report u:-:tain the
y ·tern of J.816. 'rhe source whence it comes entitle it to far more ·weight than
i. attach ·cl to any of my opinions. Ncverth less, honestly differing with that
board in ome of its position , I hope I may be permitted to expr s:-: that diffcrnc of opinion without laying my elf liable to the charo-e, from any quarter.
of want of re pect for the di. tingui 'l1Cd officers who com po eel that board.
'I hat r J>Ort, which is by far the mo~t abl paper that I have :-:e •n in favor of
th sy:t m of 1816, does not contemplat any gun for our fortification. hea,·i~r
th, n a forty-two pounder, or au in-ht-inch howitzer; of cour e I ~peak techrucall •, and do not allude to mortar .
It m • b con ider d a.- a fact pretty well tahli hcd, that two or thr explo iv nin or t n-inch . h 11:-:, w ,Jl aim cl and prop •rly plant ·d, ar ·nou~h ro
t •ar out th ,·id of th largc.-t .-hip, and c mpl ·tely to dfrahl ·, i not wh II_v to
d · tr y lm·.
I <1uotc from th .·1wrinwnt. nrnd with nine-inch . plo ive shot, in th h, r1,<> • f r · t, upon th· 'a ·ifi ·Ht ur, an cio hty-n-u11 :-chip.•
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The peice to be fired was mounted on a small pontoon, and planted ~ff. upon
the water to the distance of about six hundred and forty yards from the eighty~ ship, which was to be the target.
.
The experiments were made in the presence of a number of the most emment
officers in the French navy.
The first shot sufficed to determine opinions; but, to complete the evidence,
twelve shots were fired.
The following is a summary from the official report on the occasion :
"The first shot struck low, and, as soon as the explosion was heard the
commission repaired on board. A thick smoke filled the between decks, where
the bomb had burst. The fire engine was worked and the smoke lasted ten or
twelve minutes; the bomb had made a breach of eight and a half inches in diameter in the ship's side, which there was twenty-nine inches thick; it had
torn off two feet of the inner plank and then exploded ; made a hole in the orlop
deck of two to three feet square, kncoked away and shattered to atoms more
than one hundred and sixty square feet of timber.
"The second gun traversed the quarter-deck, carrying with it two peices of .
plauk, one of which was five and a quarter feet long, then striking the mainmast
obliquely, it knocked off a splinter from three to four feet long and nine and a
half inches thick, and bursting, tore away a mast band ten and a half feet in
circumference, weighing one hundred and thirty pounds; this mass of iron was
driven -with such a force that one of its halves struck the opposite bulwark, seveuteen feet distant, where it flattened and adhered. The splinters of the bomb
shattered the bitts, cut some of the braces, and would have injured many men
and articles of rigging if the ship had been equipped. The explosion also set
fire to a coil of rope.
" The third bomb entered the side, between two ports, struck and tore off an
oaken knee seven feet five inches long and six and a half to thirteen and threequarter inches thick, which, with its iron fastenings, weighed more than two hundred and six pounds ; then bursting, its splinters knocked down forty of the
wooden figures nailed around the guns to represent men. r.rhe explosion also
shattered one of the beams · supporting the deck f-1,bove, starting several
planks, one of which was ten and a half feet long, and a:µother five and a quarter
feet," &c.
"To abriclge this detail, I will," says the reporter, "only refer to the two
most remarkable shots of the remaining nine.
"Perceiving that the bombs always passed through the side of the vessel,
the charge of the gun was diminished each time. With four and a half pounds
of powder, and always at six hundred and forty yards, a bomb struck in the
,vood, between two ports, and burst, tearing away the frame and planking, and
making a breach of several feet in height and width, so shattered that all present thought that the slwt would lza ve endavgered tlie vessel had it taken effect
near the water-line .
." Be~ides this, two pieces of the iron work, weighing sixteen pounds, were
dnven m board by the force . of the explosion, and nineteen figures knocked
down.
"Fi1~a1ly, the twelfth and last bomb, with the same small charge and at the
same d1::-;tnuce, struck the corner of a port, knocked away a heavy piece of iron
work, and lodged on the other side of the ship against an iron knee five and a
quarter inches in size and firmly supported; the blow made three fissures in
the iron, two of which were four and a quarter inches thick; and the bomb
..;till unbroken buried itself further in the sjde, burst, and knocked down twenty
figure ."
As to the havoc made upon a ship by these projectiles, the French commis-
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sion was of opinion that it was "so terrible and so great that it is thought that
one or two bombs of this kind bursting in a battery would make such confusion
as to cause the surrender of the vessel, or at least conduce materially to it;" and
"to produce, by the power of the bomb and its splinters, such damage in the
frame that if the explosion should take place near the water-line the vessel
would probably sink. There is no doubt on this subject," it was added, "as
may evidently be perceived from the result of bomb No.-, which, had it struck
a few feet lower, would certainly have done irreparable mischief,"
That any ship "must unavoidably give over tlw attack on being struck with
a few shells."
"'I'hat it would be very useful to mount these guns either on floating pontoons, g·nnboats with sweeps, or steamers ; and it is thought that for the defence
qf roads and coasts, or for attacking ships in a calm, or on a lee shore, the
success of the bomb cannon would be infallible."
Furthermore, that commission of distinguished men also expressed the unanimous opinion " that these ~hell guns would be of incalculable utility in coast
batteries, gunboats, or launches, bombardment, floating batteries, steamers," &c.
The subject was brought before the Academy of Science, and the opinion of
the board were indorsed by that body after full deliberation.
Subsequently a second trial was made upon the same ship in the presence of
another board of officers, with like results. This board, after a full discussion
as to the effect of these shells, gave it as their opinion likewise, that "their power
is so terrible that should one or two bombs of this kind burst in a Lattery, the
vessel would be rendered untenable; that the explosion of a bomb in the frame
of a ship would be productive of great mischief; and if this occur at the
water-line, the vessel must founder, as may be inferred from the effect of bomb
No.8."
Respecting the use of this kind of ordnance in fortifications the commission
were unanimously of the opinion that these guns arc capable of prodigious effect
in coast batteries, as no sliip r!f any force could possibly witltstand sur:lt a fire
at 640 guns or l,300 yards; that it will also be _desirable to mount the new
artillery on floating batteries, launches, gunboats, or steamers; and it is believed
that the bomb cannon is well adapted to the defence of roads and coa ts, the
attack of ships in a calm, or on a lee shore," &c.
Moreover, the experiments which have been conducted by the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography of the United States navy, show that guns of this heavy
calibre will carry further and truer, and penetrate deeper than 32-pounderfl; and,
therefore, considering that the navie of thr world are substituting thc'e heavy
gun .. , whenever they can, for the old 32-poun<l<·rs, and considering that it i.;
ships, and not siege. . , that our fortifications arc to be called upon to withstand,
it app ar · to me it would be both prudent and jndicious so to modify the plan
of 1 16 a1, to furnish our forts, as far as practicaLle, with heavy ordnance, all of
the mo.t effective and destructive kind.
1Yhc·t1H·r a . hip's battery, throwino- 10-inch so]icl shot, woulcl not rcal~ly
breach the wall of our str01wcst fort i. worthy of inquiry. The concn"~1011
frorn :uch a broad ide woulcl be trcmcndou . It i, true• there arc no ::;hips at
pr ,:- •nt that can throw :uch a broadside, yet it i.- thonrrht practicaLlc and d ·
·ir,~hln 1,y navy officer to build , nch shipl-l, nncl r.·p riment.' have been mad
wlu ·h l ·ave no doubt that ~ nch ·hip will he !milt. 1\ h ·ther our rampart on
. hor · c"ulcl with.-taml 1-luch ordnance i · 11ot for me to "ay. I therefor· tU..,.!!'C-.t
th inr1uiry.
It i a l'Uriou: fact that, a n ~r-11eral rule, the fir of lnr<re fort:- ha~ ahray..
c 1: proporti?uall · Jr ... .- c1_ •• trnctiW! than thrn- mounting o~ly n. frw gun:--, and
lrn.vuw tho:-- m barLrtte, m opl'n liatt ry, •ith r with or without br •a. t work·.
'l hi..: may L a count ·d for y th mok ; for wild firing applie uot only to
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the guns of a fort, mounted in casemates, but also to the guns of double-decked
ihips.
A single broadside from the gun-deck of a man-of-war will so fi]l her between
decks with smoke as to render the object at which she is firing invisible, and
consequently, unless she will wait for her own smoke to clear off, which requires
ome time, the rest of her firing, as all sea fights prove, is without aim, very
much by guess, and therefore to little purpose.
The same is the case with guns fired from casemates of forts on shore, for in
no other way can we account for the random firing; the very shots, in proportion
to the whole number cast, that tell in the engagements of double-decked ships
and casemated forts.
Two frigates or two seventy-fours will engage each other within pistol shot,
or a fleet will attack a fort, and when we come to count the shot that have been
fired, and to compare those that have told with those that have been thrown
away, and then recollect the size of the target, we aie astonished.
In the action between the Constitution and the Guerricre, which lasted for
about half an hour, the two ships being within pistol shot, the former sufferrecl
"very little in her hull, and lost but seven men."*
In the fight between the United States and Macedonian, the two ships were
at close quarters for one hour. The former had five men killed. "'l'he United
States," says the same authority, "suffered surprisingly little, considering the
length of the cannonade."
In the case of the Constitution and the Java, the action lasted two hours.
The Constitution lost nine men, and only "received a few round shot in her
hull." Perhaps in this time the Java did not fire less than two thousand shot,
and fifty of them, well placed in the hull of her antagonist, would have sunk her.
The Hornet and the Peacock were single-decked ships; their smoke would
clear, and the Hornet could see to take aim. In less than fifteen minutes sl1 e
sunk her antagonist.
In the battle of the Nile, where seventy-fours were principally engaged, and
they in smooth water at anchor, and close, too, lasted through a part of three
days. (No firing here like the Hornet'e, though her target was so small in
comparison. The secret is, she fired with aim; they, blinded in smoke, without.)
The action between the Wasp and the Frolic, also single-decked vessels,
lasted forty-three minutes, in which time the killed and wounded aboard the
Frolic amounted to between nine~y and one hundred. These · small vessels are
more unsteady in a sea-way than large ones; they do not offer so large a target,
and yet their fire is so destructive. How else is it to be accounted for 1
In the battle of Trafalgar, which was of long duration, and mostly between
ships-of-the line, the loss was only about six men to every ten guns engaged,
not one-tenth part of what it was in the action of the Wasp.
'l'he use that I intend to make of these facts may be objected to, on the
ITTound that I deduce a principle from the sea and apply it to the land, viz :
that, because at sea, guns fired in the open air are much more destructive than
those about which the decks confine the smoke, it does not follow that guns,
when served from behind sand bags or mud banks on shore, are more destructive
than they would be if served in casemates, by a crew blinded with smoke. I
will quote cases directly in point : our army in Mexico, with guns behind sand
bag:;, battered down the walls of Vera Cruz, and lost only some half dozen men
in the siege.
At the battle of Fuenterabia, in 1836, the town, with two guns of small calibre
behind an old wall, and a third of large calibre, which was added on the evening
"Cooper's N::wn.l History.
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of the attack, was successfully defended for a whole day from a ~ombined attack
of British a11d Spaniards, in six armed steamers and a number of gunboats.*
Then there was the famous case of the Martello tower, in the bay of l\fartello,
in Corsica; one heavy gun, on the top of a tower, beat off in 1794 "one or two
Britisli sliips-ef-war, without sustaining any material injury from their fires."
"This circumstance," says Colonel Pasley. in his rules for conducting the
prncticn1 operations of a siege, "ought merely to have proved the superiority
which guns on shore must always, in certain situationF, possess over those of
shipping, no matter 1dietlier the former are mounted on a tower or not."
This is quoted with approbation by Colonel Totten, in his celebrated report
of 1840, as an example of the superiority of forts over ships. But it appears to
me only to prove and beautifully to illustrate the superiority of one gun, so
mounted that it can fire witli aim, over many guns that are enveloped in smoke,
and fired without aim.
But if this Martello case affords grounds really for the "just decision" claimed
by thet1e two distinguished military authorities, then why have any forts at all 1
"Why Fhould our army engineers advocate so elaborately in 1836, and with so
much ingenuity in 1840, the continuance of the system of 1816, if one gun on
shore, "whether mountecl on a tower or not," can and ought to beat off" one or
two Briti::;h ship::;-of-war 1" May I not, therefore, in proposing to reply, in part,
upon open batteries on the shore for coast defence, urge the modification as a
thing proved by actual experiment, and, by legitimate conclusion, quote in favor
of , uch modification the opinion of our most distinguished engineers 1 vV e can
never expect our works on the seashore to have anything stronger to resist than
"Briti ·h ships-of-war;" and if one gun, in open battery on the shore, "whether
mounted on a tower or not," be superior to "one or two" of those ships, surely
our eaport towns of second and third rate importance may safely rely upon
open batteries on the beach to J_Jrotect them from "British" or any other "menof-war."
Colonel Jones, another authority of equal weight in military matters, quotes
N el Ron' attack upon Copenhng·en, Sir John Duckworth 's daring passage of the
Darc1annelles, the attack at Acre in 1840, and Lord Exmouth's cannonade of
Algi 'r:-;, n. cases which lean to the supposition t11at land batteries cannot re 'i::;t
an attack by fleets. The Queen Charlotte, bearing Lord Exmouth's flag, being
brought within fifty yards of the lVIole, at Algiers, "poured such an irresistible
fir on the works around," says Colonel Jones, "as to Hence every gun, and
wa.' ultimately compelled to withdraw, with the loss of only eight men killed
and 011e hundred and thirty-one wounded."
'l'h' Hide::i of a hiJ_J are of wood; it i combustible, the walls of a fort are not;
ancl 011 board hip, in a fig-ht it i the Rplinters that do the mischief. One gun,
·v ·n in open battery on the hore, has greatly the advantage of one gun on
b ard , hip. The former can take better aim, ha.· 11othi1w to fear from plinters,
arnl pre:-:c•ut., a very small target; wherea it ha, the whole ·hip, with all it
vuln ·ral,ility for a target. Hut as to the superiority of ships over forL, it
app<'ar-, to me th re ifl carcely room for the question; each in it own sphere i
·uperior to the other.
.1 ucl that th '
\'. ur n lrnrlotte , hould . ilencc the molr battery, i to be acount •rl for upon the principle of firiiio- with and without aim. 'he wa. within
tift_,. ·:ml:- of it; it tl,c·refor' occupiecl nearly or quite one-half of her horizon.
and :-he ,:o,,lrl 110I 11,i.ss it, it wa:-1 :-o Jarg . ln omparfr1011 to the fort :-lw wa a
mall targt•t, and it n·q 11ir ·cl . om ' attl'ntion to aim to hit h l" hut th , . mokc n
'
Loth :-iclc·"'. prl'n·11t1-cl rlii:-.
Th ·r ·fore·, . nppo ing that in tlir attack of hip againt1t fort., th guu, on
·a ·h ·icl • lH· :- •n-t>cl with <' 1nal lml.Ycry, th qur tion of . np r:iority r ,oh· ...
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·self almost entirely into a question of marksmanship. A shot that is fired
without aim is generally a shot thrown away,
.
.
Xevertheless, the gallant colonel very properly caut10ns the . '' engm:er
tharged with the defences of maintainin_g a t:ortress, so to anange his batter~es
.hat the defence may be from several pomts distant from each other, arll;ed with
~ -six pounders as the lowest c,alibre."
.
The system of 1816, according to the report of the board of army officers rn
:.AO, does not contemplate a single gun heavier than a forty-two ~ounde:, or an
.:-:ght-inch howitzer. It contemplates mortars, but mortars agamst sh1ps and
:andom shots.
Previous to the attack of the junk ships in 1782, Gibraltar resisted a bom',ardment for two years.*
In 1789, Admiral Rodney threw into Havre de Grace 19,000 heavy shells,
..nd 1,150 careasses, in fifty-two hours, "to destroy a few boats."t
In 1792, the Duke of Saxe Tessehen threw into Lille, in one hundred and
rty hours, "without effect, 30,000 hot shot and six hundred shells.":j:
In 1795, Pichegree threw 3,000 shells into Manheim, and f>,000 into the Fort
of the Rhine.§
·
In 1807, at Copenhagen, in three days of partial heavy firing, 6,412 shells,
be~ides carcasses were thrown.\! All these were thrown to no purpose.
At Fort Browne, on the Rio Grande, our men dodged the shells thrown by
the .Mexicans from Matamoras.
·
At Fort McHenry "the bomb bmsting in air" furnished the poet with a
..,tanzas ; they produced no other effect.
Bonaparte's opinion of them may be learned from the instructions which he
caused to be issued to the governors of besieged towns.
"Quant aux effets des born bes, et des autres projectiles incendiaires, nous exa.minerons plus tard, les moyens de les diminuer; mais nous observerons des ce
momen t, qu'ils n'ont jamais contraint une place, bien defendue ase rendre. Les
anciens sieges, en offrent la preuve; et les examples tout reens de Lille, de
Theonville, et de Mayence, la confoiment."
Theref()re let us modify the system, so far as most of the mortars and all the
6,309 pieces of ordnance, from a twelve up to a long forty-two pounder, required
by the plan of 1816, are concerned, and substitute for them the heavy calibres
of the present day-the nine, ten, and eleven-inch solid shot and shell guns.
Tak ing the Martello tower for our guide, let us also, instead of building forts
of the second and third class, contemplated in the system of 1816, send to every
to"''"Il al~ng the seaboard, that an enemy could reach in his ships, one or more
lieavy pieces, and plant them there in open battery upon the beach, for the defence of the place, "no matter whether they be mounted in a tower or not."
By a proper organization, easy to be effected and kept up without any draft
11pon the treasury whatever, except for powder and ball to practice, volunteer
crews for these guns may be procured from the towns themselves. Well-trained
officers of the army should be sent to instruct them. In such hands each gun so
planted and served out in the open air, having an embankment or a few sandbags for protection, will be more than a match for "two British ships-of-war."
Sir 'idney Smith, whose dashing gallantry and skilful bravery have been so
llluch admired, attacked and felt the force of one of these open batteries in 1806.
lre was in the Porn pee, an eighty-gun ship, and accompanied by two frigates;
he anchored about seven hundred yards from a battery of two guns, situated on
the e:x.trenrity of Cape Licosa.
u The line-0f-battle-ship and frigates fired successive broadsides till their amll:iuni tion was nearly expended; the battery continually replying with a slow
o Sir J. T . Jones's Journal of Sieges in Spain, vol. II, page 374.
n,i<l.
Ibid.
§ Ibid.
11 Ibid.
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but destructive effect. 'l'he Pompec, at which ship alone it directed its :fire, had
forty shot in her hull; her mizzentapmast carried awa-y; a lieutenant, midshipman, and five men killed, and thirty men wounded. At length, force proving
ineffectual, negotiation was resorted to, and after some hours' parley, the officer,
a Corsican, and a relation of Napoleon, capitulated. It then appeared that the
carriage of one of the two guns had failed on the second shot, and the gun had
consequently been fired lying on the sill of the embrasure; so that, in fact, the
attack qf an eighty-gun ship and two .frigates liad been resisted by a single
piece ef ordnance."*
vVhatever Napoleon's cousin could do with a gun, our officers, our soldiers,
:md the yeoman of this country can do as well.
This turning out of the citizens to defend their town, with a gun in open battery,
against the attack of ships-of-war, is no experiment with us. The thing has
been handsomely, gallantly, and successfully done.
"The affair of Stonington," says General 'rotten in his report of 18-10,
"during the last war, affords another instance of successful defences by a battery.
In this case there were only two guns (eighteen pounders) in a battery which
was only three feet high, and with embrasures. 'l'he battery being manned exclusively by citizen volunteers from the town, repelled a persevering attack of a
sloop-of-war, causing serious loss and dangrr, but suffering none."
In the war of 1828, between Peru and Uolumbia, I was serving on the PacHic
station. Admiral Guise, a dashing officer and brave Scotchman, attacked the
city of Guayaquil with the Peruvian squadron, which consisted of a frigate, a
sloop-of-war, and several brigs and schooners. The approaches to the city were
undefended. He took up his position without molestation within musket shot
of it and commenced his fire.
Under cover of the dark the besieged threw up an embankment, and planting
two or three field-pieces behind it opened a fire upon the ships at daylight, killed
tho admiral, and beat off his squadron.
'The annals of war, the written arguments of the most distinguished officers
of the engineer corps, and the facts which I shall state, afford, to my judgment
ancl reason, ample gr0unds for the position which I maintain as to the dispen ·ing
with fortifications, in a large majority of cases, along the seaboard; and of
sub tituting therefor a few pieces of this new, heavy, and de~tructiYe ordnance,
without the protection of any mason work whatever. If these fact , annals,
and arguments do not impre s conviction upon your mind a:; stron crly a they
do upon mine, jt is not bocau e of their insufficirney-but because, in attempting
to apply and illustrate them, I have obscured their bearing and weakened their
force.
"The fortifications of the coast," Flays the board of army officers, wbo-.e able
report of 1 110 quieted the public mind, and fa tcnc<l for t n years loncrer upon
th country the effete y tern of 1 16; "Th fortification of the coa~t:" ·?Y
they, "must be compet •nt to the double ta,;k of int1·rdi ·ting the pa~, ao-c ot .,h1p~
and r .:i, ti1w land atta ·k~-two distinct and indepe,ufrllt qualities. Th~ fir,t
dc11w,uls merely an, array in, suitable 1mmbers antl in, proper proportt(J11 ef
ltca~·.'I ,::uns, con red by parapets, proef against slwt a11d slzel/s."t
.
.
~ owl propo:-r t i-how that the railroad. ancl th, m ·an of locomo 10n m
thi. conn tr · ~uflici ntly defend our fortification from land attacb; and that
con r1n ·11tl.' the principal rcqui. ite lH·nccforward in a ~y. tern of fortific:u~ n
for the ·oa t, i. mer •ly an array in ,;uitaulc nnmLcr ancl in proper proporn n
f h ·av crun · alon" tho b •ach to cov ·r the approachc of ... hip fr lll .. 'a to
•np rt town·.
OJournal of ·ie"t . - vlond Jones.
tPu c 41, Ooc. 206, Hou c Hep, l t ·e :ion 26th C:ongre·.
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To upport the propof:>itions taken by General Totten in favor ~f the system
of 1 16, both in his report of 1840 and 1836, there was a table m the latter
e:timating the number of men that, according to. the cen_sus of ,1830, co1;1ld be
concentrated in Boston, Newport, New York, Ph1ladelpl11a, Norfolk, Baltimore,
Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans in eleven days.
This table was made the basis of important deductions in favor of the present
~y.,tem ; ancl as the state of things now is so entirely different f1:om what it was
dien, I quote the table in order to show that the changes which have taken
place in our means of concentrating and moving forces in war leave abundant
room for many modifications in the old system of 1816.
TABLE

F.*

Exhibiting the amount ef militia force that may be conr:entrated at Boston,
.;.\'ewport, New York, Pliiladelp/1.ia, Nmfolk, Baltimore, Cluirleston, Sa,vannak, and New Orleans successi,v ely,from the first to the ele,ventli day; each
day's march being computed at.fifteen miles-founded on the census of 1830.
Days.

Boston.

Newp·1rt, New York.
ll. r.

Philadelp11ia.

-- - - - - - 1
2
~

4
b

6
7
8
9
10
ii

5,4:li
28,35 L
3-t, 138
3!1,561
4!1,E!7
59,R9:l
8l.8ti7
97,tig?
lll,fi55
lil5,3:l6
144,076

1,397
2,37:3
12,:J40
17,H::l
3::l,l12l
4'2,807
61,:!35
65,583
83, LI l

lli9, 268
13U,8J4

Norfolk.

Baltimore.

:J6, 132
26.521
3'\,450
69,100
711,608
127,666
151,036
167, 703
195,265
2 :9,983
221,603

1.864
2,880
4.416
7,608
11, lUI

14,511
20,fi!J9
28,039
32,562
36,446
45,549

ton.

New Or!tans.

--- --- ---

--20,218
28, 13L
44,123
57,9J5
59,4 '8
81,252
104, 180
137,048
152,t!H
164,116
191,35::l

Charles- Savannah.

J0.046
18,042
2!,266
27,916
31,e97
49,648
65,:J82

77,543

78,164
87.520
101,970

2,51::l
7,160
9,475
14,601
18,443
2il,4!JO
2-1,39:J
29,416
40,835
45,582
59,701

I, 173
3,960
5,948
6,588
9,263
19,725
21,90::l
25,220
36,631)
41,345
.60,42il

3.032
7,836
8,716
12,4!J9

iN~;

17:906
22,561
26.433
28,140
31,647

This possible concentration of forces, which it required eleven days to make
in 1836, may be now doubled and trebled, and made in as many houre; surely,

therefore, this process of concentration-this immense artificial military aid
1\-hich team and electricity now afford, and which was not anticipated nor
wun · upon in 1816, when the foundations of the system were laid; surely
!hey, by protecting our forts against sieges, call for modifications and suggest
changes which it would be wise to consi<ler and prudent to make.
In thi. country, more than in any other, the genius of free institutions compels
lhe government to keep pace with the improvement of the age. The people do
it, and they are the government. But in military establishments there is evioently a cfo,position to lag liehind.
" In 1 708 l\Iarshal Bouffiers, by authority from the King, given on the advice
or the most experienced generals of that warlike age, ceded the strongest fortress
i11 France to Prince Eugene and the Duke of Marlborough, to avoid the risk of
lh.e breaches being carried by storm; and in those day::i the superiority of the
assailants was never doubted. The art of attack has since that period received
~a.rinus improvements, and the art of defence remains the same."t
The edition from which I quote was publishecl in 1846-the work is one of
acknowledged authority among military men-and according to it, it would be
hetter to give our forts away than actually to subject them to a siege. Neither
\'era Cruz nor any other fort in Mexico could withstand a siege from us. How
illl.portant therefore is it that we should introduce in our system of coast defences
o Page 7 L, Doc. 293, firi:it e:ession twenty.fourth Uongre,:;s,
See Journal of Sieges in Spain, vol. 2, page 336.

t
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some of the "various improvements" which the art of attack lrns received since
1708, and of which the art of defence has received so few! That instead of
fighting ships from batteries of old-fashioned carronades, long twelves, eig,hteens,
and twenty-fours; instead of the old-fashioned mortars, which Napoleon put his
seal against, let us have in our forts the improved shell guns and heavy ordnance
of the present day, which will plant shot and shell where they are aimed, and
ca1Ty destruction to a distance which not a gun with which our forts (according
to the list by the army board in 1840) are to be furnished can ever reach.
I am permitted by Commodore Warrington to quote from experiments which
he l1as caused to be made in naval gunnery at the Washington navy yard.
These experiments are going on there daily; any one who pleases may witness
them. I cite from them to illustrate the position I maintain as to the destructive
powers of this new and heavy ordnance, the accuracy of its fire, &c.
The figures are copied from the note-book of Lieutenant Dahlgren, United
States navy, the officer who conducts the experiments.
'The target is built of one upright and two horizontal layers of stout oak logs,
bolted and fastened together in the most substantial manner. It is two and a
half feet thick. 'rhese experiments were not conducted to represent the effects
of this heavy ordnance upon forts and their walls, but upon wooden walls and
the sides of ships. 'rherefore shells were used in the eight and nine-inch pieces
to contrast their range and probable effect with the range and probable effect of
a solid 32-pound shot.
rrhe charge of powder used with the 32-pound shot was twenty-eight per cent.
of its weight. The charge used with the two shells was only about thirteen per
cent. of their weight, or, in proportion, not half as much as that used with the
solid shot. Figures 1, 2, and 3 exhibit a horizontal section of the target, made to
show the penetration of the shot.
Fig. 1.

8-inch shell, seven pounds of powder.

The penetration of the 8-inch shell was the lC'a ·t. It was unloaded. Had it
bem charged it would bave been lodg in the bc1-1t place; for, exploding in the
rnidc1le of the target built to represent the sid of a man-of-war, it would ban:
torn it to pieces.
} ignre 2 i the 32-ponnd shot. The hole that it leave brhind it i so fille<l
up with . plintcn, that a common knitting-needle cannot b thru t iu after it.
uch a hot a figure 2 woulcl do no scriou hurt to a ::,hip' iu .

,a

Fig. 2.

32-pounder ,lwl, nine pound, of pou:dtr.
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· Figure 3 is the 9-inch shell. Here the shot
went through and dropped down on the other
side of the target, as shown in the drawing. It
tore off the logs and scattered the splinters in
the most frightful manner. Much more ·would
it have gone through had the shot been solid
instead of hollow, and had it been fired with
a full instead of a very reduced charge of
powder.
·
rrhese big hollow shot, and the bigger the
better, are the things for our forts to use
against ships; whereas it is the big solid shot
that ships want to use against forts, for shells,
after striking, are apt to explode without penetrating or breaking a stone wall.
Figure 4 illustrates a common example of
target firing in the open air. rrhis target is
not one-fourth the size of that presented by
the cross section of a frigate. One nine or
ten~inch shell lodged in the ship's bows as
she approaches, and exploding, would probably sink or destroy her. Neither of the two
gentlemen named on figure 4 (whose balls
were so well planted) ever saw a shotted
gun fired before. They pointed and aimed
it themselves; and it is a fair example of
,,.,hat an unpracticed eye may do with a gqn
when planted where it may be fired with aim.
Certainly we have nothing like invasion by
sea to fear from any nation on this side of the
water, and it is hardly probable that any of
the crowned heads on the other side would
have the hardihood to send into this country
invading armies from beyond the sea. 1'he
very air we breathe protects us from any
such liability. It is free air. Our republican
institutions are dangerous to kings; and, in
the minds of the kings, the effect of these
institutions upon the soldiers of royal armies
is far more dreadful than would be the system of 18-16, witli all its panoply of big forts
and great guns.
_

It is, therefore, that our forts should be constructed and armed almost exclusively for resisting and repeling the attack of ships.
According to the Paixhan experiments and the opinion of the French officer,
one or two shot from an eight-inch gun lodged in the side of a seventy-four
, -ould di. able her. vVhat would be the effect, therefore, of one or two, twice as
1 ~ rg", from a ten-inch gun, striking a frigate or a steamer 1
In turn, and per contra, suppose the battery of this heavy ordnance intendeJ
to k ep . hip off from all our towns, except the principal cities, to be planted on
the beach without any parapet. The target that one of these guns and its crew
"'--ould expose to the ship i:; very small, and when we consider the English mode
o-f :firing, and their sea fight , it would not be oue i-:hot in a hundred that, being
fired from a ship, would trike such a target; her own smoke would conceal it
f'rom her. It affords no urface for splinters which do the mischief. So that
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unless the shot would strike the gun or its carriage, and there is no necessity of
having them. as exposed as in this hypothetical case I have represented them to
be, a shot from the ship might pass, even among the men, without its striking
any of them, and consequently without doing any mischief.
Fig. 4.
Experimental battery.

Practice with 9-inc;h shell guni:;, January 2, 185 1.

Scretn, 550 yards.

Shell, 73 poimds.

Oharges, 9& pounds.

Present: Hon. Mr. Stanton (chairman) and Hon. Mr. White, (memher,) of tbr N:wal Committee of the House of .Representatives. Some of the shot were fired uy th, se g"nt le!.Ileu .
. The lower shell,; were tired with the quadrant, (54'.) the upper by the sigh t" ~lone.

On account of the above recited facts and circumstances, on account of the
considerations and reasons which they suggest, I propose, in answer to your
£rst question, modifications to our present system of fortifications, &c., in the
following particulars, to wit:
1st. That inasmuch as the new and improved hravy ordnn.nce for thro\ving
shot, both hollow and solid, bas a longer range, giV<'s greater accuracy, ancl is
far mo1·e destructive than most of the ordnance with which our fort are now
furnished, or than that by which, according to the report of 1840, it is intended
to furnish them; therefore, I recommend that most of this ordnance of inferior
rang , penetration, accuracy, and destructiveness, be disposed of; that the suppli ,· of more be discontinued; and that the new and improved ordnance be
suh. titut cl in it stead.
I would not recommend that any of the old ordnance hould be sold or melted
down until tlrn supplies of the new are complet d, or nearly so, for occa:ion
may ari"c, before we can be completely furnit,hed with the new, when the old
would be of rrrcat "ervice.
2d. 'I he t no further expense be incurred foi- preparing our fortifications along
th
tlan6 · , ra.hoarcl, to withstand sieges by land.
3d. That nonr of the work (exc 'Pt thosr in Port. mouth harbor) propo. cd in
th army r port of 1 40, • tahlc D, "as worls to be first commenced," nor in
talil , E a. ' work. to b ·ommrnced n<'xt after tho, e in D;" nor in taLl } ~
'' work: to hr. la t commcnc: c1," b comm en ·eel nt all.
4th. 'I hat for th pr tr. ti n f th town..,, villa.er ~, ancl landino-:--, th 1·cin o
h , provicl<· 1 for, cm or 11 re pie· :--, a· ·ording t th conditi n of th plac
th · mo:t ·fl<· ·tiYc onlnan · , be 111:i.nt ·d at . uitaLl point b •hin<l. :-:impl · mL ukm nt r m·tlt ·n parap ·t .
•

•c p!\"C H-7, Doc.... o 206 Hou c Rep. 1st c· ·ion.

MILITARY AND NAVAL

DEFENCES.

351

The carriao-es of the O'uns so mounted should be constructed with the view
,f easy transportation f;om one point to another along tl~e shores of the harbor
;o be defended; so that on rails, paved or plank roads bmlt for the purpose, these
pieces mio-ht in fact constitute a locomotive battery along· the beach, and not
'.eilrn it, a~ all shore-batteries have done, entirely optional with the assailants to
choose position. As far as the defences of the town against ships are coneerned,
diis improved ordnance may thus be converted int? a sort of ''. fly~ng artillery."
5th. Instead of supporting garrisons at the pubbc expense, m times of peace,
;or the care and management of these gun , it is proposed that they and their
munitions, properly secured·, be given in charge of the State, or of the authoriies of the place to be defended; first taking such legislative steps in the. matter as will induce the formation of one or more volunteer artillery compames at
nch place for the purpose of exercising the guns, learning the practice, keeping
,hem in order, and ready for use, &c.
Officers of the army should be detailed to instruct the volunteers thus o.ffermg, in the great gun exercise; to examine and report upon the state of these compmies and batteries, and keep the government informed, at all times, as to the
efficiency and condition of each.
The whole seaboard defences of this kind should be classed in divisions, each
in charge of an artillery, or engineer or ordnance officer of rank, with a proper
-raff.
The headquarters of each division should be the principal place in it, as at
Old Point for one, New York for another, Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans,
&c., for others. Each of these places should be provided with the means of
great gun exercise, including a field of practice, targets, the kind of roads for
manreuvring this kind of ordnance, &c.
The commander of each division should have authority to invite, annually, or
a;i often as necessary, these volunteer artillery companies, or the best disciplined
(If them, to visit his headquarters and exercise in the practicing fielp., at target
firing, &c.; the government paying the expenses of the trip, by allowing so
much mileage, and so much per day during the visit .
. 1Ve ~ee our volunteer companies now are continually in the habit of visiting
d1:--tant towns and villages, as a body, in their military capacity, and at their own
expense. The practicilig an<l. the exercise with such terrible pieces would draw
together a large concours~ of people. rrhis would give eclat, and the presentation
of a sword, or some other reward for the best shot, would invest this feature of
the modified system of defence with much animation, and infuse into these
volunteer artillery men a spirit, a nerve, and skill wl:iich, in the day of battle,
, ·ould make their pieces as firm as "Bragg's battery," and far more terrible and
dr,structive than they would be ·if casemated in stone walls and enYeloped all
the time with their own smoke.
'
So far my remarks, in reply to your first question, relate to the defences of
tl e Atlantic seaboard only. I proceed now to consider how far, and to what
extent, the system of 1816 may be modified with regard to the defences of 01N
Gulf and Pacific coasts.
·
I will peak first of the defences for the Gulf of Mexico.
,ve have seen that the system of 1816, as extravagant as it is, was never
intended, in the mind even of its strongest advocates, to provide fortifications
f r erer.1J port, harbor, and anchorage along the seaboard in which an enemy
II.light find helter, take refuge, or form rendezvous in time of war.
:Fortre.' Monroe ,vould not prevent an enemy from enterin g the 0hes~peake
bay, nor hinder him from anchoring Rafcly with his fleet at 'l1angier island, nor
at the mouth of the Rappahannock, the York, or tho Potomac river, nor at any
rmc of the numcrou safe and commodious anchorages that are to be found above
Old Point. As far as any pcrmn.nent fortifications that it is possible to erect at
Fortrc~:, )Ionroe and the Rip Raps are concerntd, an enemy might select any
0
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one of the above-named places as a rendezvous for his fleet, and make that his
centre of operations against t.he whole bay coast, the rivers and towns alono- it,
and carry on his depredating 'and marauding expeditions with just as much
impunity as though no such fortress had been built.
It protects Norfolk and the navy yard from a fleet, but it does not prevent
that same fleet from running up to York river, or the Rappahannock, or the
Potomac, or up the bay, nor does it prevent it from landing an army at any one
of these places, and marching it off against Richmond, Fredericksburg, \Y a~hington, or Baltimore. 'l'he railroad and telegraph do that.
The circumstances that such a fortress as l\Ionroe, with an important navy
yard under its cover, is between his fleet and the sea, might somewhat cramp or
embarrass such an enemy in his operations is admitted, but it would not, therefore, prevent them, for if his naval forces in the bay were superior to our own,
he would command the bay in spite of the fort.
Even if the Chesapeake bay was lined with works from head to mouth, and
on both sides, such a chain of military posts, however strong and costly, could
not prevent an enemy from entering the bay with his fleet, aml saft·ly riding
upon its broad bosom, out of the reach of their guns. He might still make it
the centre of his operations; most of the time the anchorage is ::;afe in any part
of the bay; these forts would be immovable; they could not go after him; and
at most, they would only prevent him from selecting the most convenient places
for shelter, and the best points from which to operate. That is all.
The same is the case in the Gulf of Mexico. For ejght or nine month. in the
year vessels may ride in safety at anchor off the shore, anywhere between Pensacola and Galveston. The land there forms a lee, and affords a shelter from
the northers. From two to twenty miles from the land, and iu depth varyinofrom three or four to twenty-five or thirty fathoms, the anchorage i:; good.
Now, if we rely upon fortifications to protect that coast, it will be ob Nerved,
the whole Gulf front might be lined with them, a11d still they would hr harmlesa
against a fleet with its powers of locomotion. It could string it--elf at anchor
along the coast, in sjght of the very works built for defending it; and if our
reliance were upon them, it might capture or dam up in f-taguant ruin, all the
commerce of the 1Iissi sippi vall 'Y· ln the Gulf, as well as in the 'hc-;:-.apeakc,
and in our own waters generally, we must have the naval supremacy. lu :my
plan of providing for the national defences that is an e cntial featun•, and it
ought to be sine qua non with Congress.
'l'hc plan, therefore, of providiug p ermanent fortification!"I for the (folf, ~ m~
to be thi : that we hould elect a f ·w of the poiut · which would he mo,t important for us a plac s of r fnge and r ·nd 'zvous, aud ·whi('h: if occupinl by an
nc•my in w:ir, would nable him the most to annoy ut-1, ancl fortify thum.
The.· poi11t; are Kry vVest and the Tortuga:-\, and p ·rhap:-1 tihip and at
i land.:. In a commercial and military ,.f'n"e, the Gulf of )Icxico and th
m;bb •an 'ca arc but an expan ion of the }Iis. iKsippi and Amazon river~. In
thi.· vi w of the ubject, the mouth of the :Mi:,;i:·vippi is not at the Bali:t , n r
that of th Amazon at Paia; they arc both in the Florida pa·., b twc n ~ Y
\Y ' t ancl uba.
1! or nc-half the y ar th r i a, . ort of mon, oon in th 1 ulf of ~I .·ico : urin
thi p riod the wind ar from th :-outhea:-:t; at thi ·ca:-ion, tl1<•refore. th ,-in
aucl thP. ·urrent in the Yu ·atan 1m:: ar ·uch a to pn•v ·ut th, p,t, ng · th
wa • of n. 'C'l from th 1 ulf.
• [ r ·ov ·r, th<' i-.Ianrl f J amai a, wh r th Eno-li:h h:n·<· n naval t i
v rlook · th · Yucatan pa: . "\Yhc·n th northr.a. t wiu,l: prPvail th · 'u ,
pa .: i: op ·n to . ailino- vi·;:- 1. · lm a f ·w ;t ·am ·rs, with Jamaica a tJ1
of op ·ration., w ulcl ·lo <· it to our 01nm r .
·1i n th . 0utlwa:t wind~ pr ·vail th rout of a . , ilin,~ vc~.-rl bmm
ulf t Jamaica, i n t throu ·h th strait· of · u ·a rn; it i thr u:!h
0
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orida Pass by Key West, and then back on the south side of Cuba. Now a
ritime enemy seizing upon Key W ~st ~nd the r.rortuga~ could ~and a few
heavy guns from his ship and make it difficult for us to dislodge him. Here
railroads and the telegraph do not reach, an~ as long as he should ~ol_d ~ha~
po ition., so long would he control the commercial mouth of the great Mississippi
,alley.
In that position he would shut up in the Gulf whatever force inferior _to h~s
own we might have there. He would prevent re-enforcements, sent to relieve it
from Boston, New York, and Norfolk, from entering the Gulf. Indeed, in a war
with England, the l'ortugas and Key vV est being in her possession, it might be
more advisable, instead of sending from our Atlantic dock yards a fleet to the
Gulf, to send it over to the British islands and sound the Irish people as to
throwing off allegiance.
This country is too rich and powerful to confine itself to a system of national
defences which looks to a passive state for it in any war. It cannot content
i ~elf by waiting for the enemy to come, that we may simply beat him off from
our shores. Neither is it sufficient for it to have the ability to send out a few
cruisers and armed privateers to prey upon the commerce of an enemy,.
\Ve have seen its free institutions, by their silent operations in times of peace,
.,haking the thrones of Europe, and causing the crowned heads that sit upon
them to tremble. In time of war . it must liave the ability to re-enforce that
influence with its strong "right arm." The sensibilities of the people everywhere are alive to that influence-their sympathies are so strongly with us, that
hould it become necessary to carry war into any of the maritime States of
christendom, the .American legions would be regarded by the masses as friends
and deliverers, not as enemies.
Therefore, instead of being content with the capture of a few men-of-war and
unoffending merchantmen for prizes, we want a system of defences which shall
enable us to send naval expeditions against the enemy's country, invite and
a~~ist the down-trodden millions to throw off the hateful yoke, to break their
bonds asunder, and to stand up as freemen, like ourselves.
In an expedition upon Jamaica, Key West being in the hands of the enemy,
it would be difficult for our Gulf and Atlantic forces to unite.
Therefore the works at Key West and the Tortugas should be provided with
shell-guns of the most destructive calibre, and their walls should be substantial
enough to resist the concussion of a man-of-war broadside. rl'hey are wanted
to give protection to our fleeing merchantmen, to afford a refuge to our fleets
until time and opportunity and circumstances serve for striking the blow, or
making a move. They are wanted by us, because they would be so immensely
valuable to an enemy.
The railroads that will be in operation from Pensacola and Mobile soon, and
probably before any additional fortifications can be erected there, will secure
these places from invasion and seizure; and the works already there, with a few
more gun in open battery along the beach, would effectually protect them from
the great guns of ships. Still, an enemy with a .fleet superior to the one we
might h ave in the Gulf could anchor along the shore, as he can in the Uhesa.:
peak , and greatly harass our commerce there. No system of fortifications can
prevent that.
In the next maritime war, (and in such a war we have nothing to fear from
any quarter except one,) it i, not upon the Atlantic, properly speaking, that the
gr at ea-fight i to take place: it i in the Gulf of Mexico, or near the English
.,hr
Jamaica i an important naval station; it commands one entrance to the Gulf.
Th •re 'rcat Britain can as emble her fleet, and within three days have it off
the Baliz , in po ition to strike a terrible blow at the commerce of that valley.

H. Ex. Doc. 92--23
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Shutting up the Florida Pass, she would have complete control of the Gulf·
Norfolk and New York are inconvenient!y situated to defend it. Some years
ago a man-of-war was sent with despatches from Norfolk to Pensacola; she was
fifty-odd days in making the passage.
The means of defence for the Gulf should be within tl1e valley that belongs
to it. The resources of this valley are ample, its means most abundant, and it.s
people are its best and most appropriate defenders. Pensacola should therefore
be built up as a naval station, and the depot at Memphis fosteTed with care and
solicitude. Instead of draining the treasury for forts, under the system of 1816,
these two places should be put in condition for building, equipping, and fitting,
upon a scale sufficient to secure to us, in war, the naval supremacy at least in
the Gulf.
In a war with England, and with those two places as the centres of operations, it probably would be found desirable to move upon Jamaica and other
British islands in that quarter. New York and the Atlantic dock yards would
probably be the centre of other operations; and if Jamaica fall in such a war,
it must fall under the guns and before the gallantry of the west-the east will
have need and occupation for all its forces in other quarters.
Memphis is fast rising in importance as a place of construction. P1·ivate
enterprise has already commenced to establish building-yards there; and in that
teeming region there is no lack of naval and maritime resources. The ropewalk
there is of no consequence. We want docks, storehouses, machine-shops, and
founderies for casting, forging, making, and building anchors and cables, ships
and engines; and for preparing and keeping in store, out of the excellent materials to be found in that valley, all the arms and munitions of war which would
be required for the defence of the Gulf, the capture of Jamaica or any other
British possession, if Britain be the enemy.
The affections of these islanders for the mother country cannot, in the nature
of things, be as strong or as abiding as those of our citizens for their own homes;
and therefore it may be imagined that an attempt by us to invade and get po"ses ion of these islands would be quite a different affair from an attempt, on her
part, at invasion and conquest here. A tower of strength has this nation in the
brave hearts and strong arms of its gallant yeomanry. Small indeed would be
the degree of aid and comfort which a national enemy would derive from disloyalty and disaffection of American citizens.
I have, on former occasions, presented my views at large with regard to the
importance of Memphis a,.· a naval depot. These views are before the public,
and therefore I deem it unnecessary to repeat them here. We have turned the
corn r, and are now going ahead in the peaceful race for the commercial ~upr macy of the seas; the next trial is to be for maritime upremacy of another
ort. It i hoped that the day for that contest is far di.·tant. But every p ople
ar liable to war; and it i a fact which we cannot blink, that, in providu1 g fi r
th c ntingency, our tatesmen and warrior mu t, for many year to com have
an y to th fore s which r at Britain, rather than any other po,ver, can brinrr
ao-ain t u . But let that onte t come when it may, it is mo t lik ly t b d iclcd in th
ulf of :i\I xico, and it· twin ba in, the Caribbean ea; they P th
r ·ptacl of all that th two grand . t y t m of riv r ba ins in th · rid
will have to pour int th lap of comm rec. Th vall 'Y of the Mi~~i. i1>pi on
on ic1 , and the vaJl y f th ' Amazon on the other, will in time mak th '
wo a1 . of th
a th comm ·rcial ntr of th world.
'I h mouth of the ..\mazon, th m uth of the rin o, and th mouth f h
fao-dal na ar , commer ·ially :-:peaki1w, almo. t a mu h in th :E lorida J> " '
i th mouth of th ... Ii :-i ippi riv r.
'u h i the cours of th CWT nh •
, u ·h th dir tion f th wind. in that part of th worl l that < v ., . . l , iii fr m th mouth of an · n · of tlir.· riv r: for Ili d au •iro in Br, zil. r
In i, , r for the mark t f th
a ·ific around ap Horn, or for Africa. or r
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Europe, has first to steer to the northward and westward until she reaches the
parallel of 250 or 30° north. This brings her off our own shores; and it is_ impossible for her to pursue any other route, so long as the northeast trade-wmds
prevail, or the great equatorial current which feeds the Gulf Stream continues to
flow across the Atlantic. No vessel trading under canvas from the mouth of
these· rivers to the markets of South America, Europe, Asia, or Africa, can go
any other way. They must pass by our doors.
Therefore, in planning a system of national defences, who can overestimate
the importance of the Gulf of Mexico as a nucleus of naval means, the centre of
naval operations 1 That centre is at K ey West and the r.rortugas; h ence the
great need of strong works there.
Interests of the most delicate, valuable, and, to an enemy, of the most attractive
kind, are even now daily springing up, and expanding themselves out upon the
waters and about the borders of the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean sea-interests
which , if they should be injured or put in needless j eopardy, will create a greater
sensation throughout this country than would the landing of a hundred thousand
men-at-arms upon our shores. These interests are maritime-they are American; th eir defences nnd protection are naval; they must be watched and guarded
from the Mississippi valley. Memphis and Pensacola by nature are, by rights
ought to be, and by legislation should be, the centres of operations in the case.
Panama, Nicaragua, and Tehuantep echave, or are about to impose new obli~ations upon us. We must look. to them, and, in providing for the common
~efence, take them into consideration. They are links in the chain which binds
!he most remote corners of the republic together. 'l'hey are the gateways between distant parts of the Union; and they must therefore be cared for in peace,
~ar ded and protected in war.
.
T he Amazonian basin, embracing an area more than twice the extent of
our great Mississippi valley, fills too large a space in the world to escape at_tenlion from us, when we are in the very act of laying the foundations- for a permanent system of national defence. With all the climates of India, with unheard
of capacities of production, and the most boundless sources of wealth in the field,
the forest, and the mine, that valley, so soon as it shall begin to feel the axe and
the plough, will pour into our lap a commerce, the value of which is as limitless
as are its own vast resources. Nature has placed us in the position to command
that commerce. rl'he great business of fetching and carrying there must be ours.
Por coming and for going, the winds are fair for us; and' we are the only nation
for whose shipping they are so fair.
'1,hat arm of the ocean which severs the continent nearly in twain, to make
between the "Father of W aters," at the north, and the "King of Rivers," at the
south, a receptacle for their commerce, is receiving from the Mississippi valley
alone an amount of produce that astonishes the world. Yet the Mississippi valley is not h alf peopled up. What, therefore, will this oceanic basin, this comlllercial receptacle for the surplus produce of the two grandest systems of river
basins on the face of the earth be, when the great Amazonian valley, of double
area, with its everlasting summer and its endless round of harvests, comes to be
su.bdued and brought into cultivation 1 What the Gulf 0£ Mexico is now, is as
nothing to what it is to be. It abounds with commercial elements that cannot
be comprehended for their magnitude; and in proportion as it becomes the seat
of maritime wealth and greatnes,·, so, too, must it become the centre of naval
strength and power. A s Columbus la.y sick., it was upon the waters of this seaba~in that the angel visited him in a dream, an.d told him that God had made
his name great and sent him to "unbar the gates of ocean.'.'' 'l'he k ey s to these
gates are at Key W est and the T ortugas, Memphis and Pensaoola. . Nature has
placed th m among the wonderful resources of the great valley; and to stand as
ga.tck •ep ·r before them is th e mission of those nav.al for ces that naturally centre in the Gulf.
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OF THE PACIFIC SEABOA'RD.

No American statesman will, I imagine, rest content with any plan of national
defence which does not contemplate for HS at least the naval supremacy in our
own waters. rrhat is the starting point-and that is the point which, in the
erection of military works on the land, in the construction of floating batteries
for our harbors, or in the building of ships and steamers for the sea, should be
constantly kept in view. It is the true basis to work upon.
In a military point of view, California and Oregon are colonies. Far remote
from the heart 0f the country and the strength of the nation, they are young and
feeble, open to attack, and inviting to conquest. In war no relief can be sent
them, however beset, unless at great risk and with an enormous expenditure of
both time and money.
The voyage by sea from the Atlantic to the Pacific ports of the United States
is the longest voyage in the world. Within the whole scope and range ~f commerce, there are no two shore-lines so remote from each other, in time, as these
are.
The average passage of all the vessels which sailed from the Atlantic ports for
California in 1850 was one hundred and eighty-seven days-six months. These
:vessels went singly, each making the best of her way without regard to the others. In a fleet, it is the dullest vessel which regulates the speed of all; the
fastest must reduce canvas, yard, and stand along under easy sail, that the
slow vessels may keep up.
Bound hence with a fleet for the relief of California, our ships would have to
pass no less than three important naval stations, all belonging to the same power.
One of them, St. Helena, is on the wayside; the two others, Bermuda and the
}-,alkland Islands, are right in the middle of the road.
If the fleet should escape the vigilance and annoyance of the men-of-war stationed at those islands, there are still before it the storms of Cape Horn, the
dangers of the sea, and the war of the elements for it to encounter and contend
with.
Such would be the length of the voyage, and such the difficulties and the risks
to be encountered by the way, that the practicability of sending succor to California around Cape Horn, in a war with England, may be considered out of the
question.
Single ships might find their way in safety around, but as for a large fleet,
coverin °· as it goes miles in extent, and attracting the attention of the enemy
with the multitude of its ships- escaping all the danger that would be et it by
th way-surely no one would count upon it, and it would be folly to expect it.
Calif rnia and Or gon must, ther fore, rely upon the mean of defence which
can h ent forth from their own harbor in war; and the que tion i , how hall
tho.· m an· be provided in p ace 1
'hall tl1 "'y t m of 1 16, which ha. been tried and found too co tly and de£ ctiv for the .Atlantic seaboard, Le transfcrr cl to the Pacific, and engraftcd upon
it. ,J10r , for anoth r third of a c ntury 1
r hall the o-ovenuncnt re::-ort to
railroa l~, ·t am and th navy, and do for that country what ha be n found to
an :w r ~o well for thi. ?
1h · ·.·t nt of our. a front on th Pacific, compar d with 0 1r a front on
th
tlanti ·, i. a io-htrcn t twenty-four· that i:-, th
acific i · three-fourth-.
th ·- ·tmt oi th
tlanti · . ahoarcl. 'I' appl th :y ·t m of 1 16 to th£' form?
would, ,in m • jnd!!ln nt, b' injncli ·ion. a. to polic ·, .·travao-:mt a. to exp 1~d1tur 1 ncl inad ·quat a to pnrpo. <'; aucl ther forr th . ·. t m of 1 16 c.·c ptm!!'
in o far a tw or thrc• w rk. :tr one ru cl, houlcl not b n1>pli •tl t th
l'a ifi ·. .\Y waut no fort alono- that , a front, ,av only tho.:c that arc 11
1
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sary to keep hostile ships, with their great guns, out of the reach of our cities·,
and to give protection to our dock yards.
.
There is not at this time a single dock yard upon the waters of the Pacific,
belonging to any nation, at which even a fri_gate c~n be built and e~uipped.
All the maritime powers are far removed, with then- naval resources, fro°:1 ~he
eastern shores of that ocean. By establishing a dock ~ar~ there, and pro:1dmg
it with the means and facilities for repairing and eqmppmg, we may , without
difficulty, secure the naval supremacy upon that ocean; and once p ossessed, it
will not be an easy matter for any power to wrest it from such hands.
The most desirable means of defence for those regions are such as we have on
the ..Atlantic-a navy, steam, the railway and the locomotive, with their powers
of concentration.
The characteristic feature which the improvements of the age have impressed
npon military operations is mobility. To the degree with which armaments
and armed forces' are invested with locomotion and with celerity in movement,
to that degree and in that ratio are they provided with the elements of power
and destruction. It is its mobility, imparting toil in the field of battle, a sort of
ubiquity, that makes flying artillery such a tremendous arm in modem warfare.
It is the swift foot of the armed steamer which has given her such tremendous
force for battle that has appalled the most able sea captains, and left the military men of the world at variance as to the extent of her powers, so transcendent
are they in the minds of all.
The part · that railroads and magnetic telegraphs are to play in the great
drama of war with this country has not yet been cast, much less enacted. In
a military point of view, they convert whole States into compact and armed
masses. They can convey forces from one section of the Union to another as
quickly as re-enforcements can be marched from one part of an old-fashioned
battle-field to another.
The money that is expended in the erection of a fort adds nothing to the
national wealth, but the money that is spent in fortifying with railroads, while
it gives the military strength required, vastly increases also the elements of
national power, wealth, and greatness.
,
T her e have been expended by the States and people of the States, on this
side of th e Rocky mountains, about four hundred millions of dollars in building
ten thousand miles of railroads and canals. These works have not only effectually p rovided for the common defence so far as invasion is concerned, but,
besides reimbursing the projectors of them, in most cases, they have in all increased the value of the land in their vicinity, advanced trade and commerce,
promoted the general welfare, and in the aggregate added not less than a thousand m illion of dollars to the gross sum of the national wealth.
T he money that has been expended under the system of 1816 has added
nothing t o the value of the soil; it has afforded no facilities to commerce; it has
not increased the national prosperity in any manner whatever; and, therefore,
as to the alternative of providing for the defences of the Pacific coast by lining
it with forts and castles, or by sending a railroad there and collecting naval
m eans, it appears to me there is no choice, no need for deliberation, no necessity
for argument.
The strongest work that stone and mortar can make, being erected at the
mouth of the harbor of San Francisco, would not interrupt a blockade, nor prevent an enemy from starving California into terms. It is the navy alone that
can do this ; and vessels, with munitions of war sufficient for the purpose, should
b e placed under cover there now.
California does not produce breadstuffs enough for her own consumption,
proba ly she never will. It is worthy of remark, that not one of our New
England States, including N ew York, does that. Mining, commerce, and manu-
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factures, rather than agriculture, will probably ever constitute the chief industrial pursuits of that distant State.
.
And until California has the means of deriving a support from the back country she must look for it to the sea; therefore an enemy, by taking up his position
before the harbor of California in force sufficient to establish a rigid blockade,
may, without striking a blow, starve the people into terms of surrender.
The greater the number of men in garrison, in such a case, and the larger the
army sent there by us for its defence, the greater the distress; for the rea~on
that they would the sooner eat out the substance of the land, and so assist the
enemy in his work of starvation.
A. railway to California would make that country as invulnerable and as secure from invasion as railroads have made the country on this side of the Rocky
mountains; and with a railway a blockade would only annoy commerce, not
starve the people.
In a consideration of the soundest policy this railway is called for. I have
studied the subject, and the result of my best reflections with regard to it has
led me to the opinion that the general government cannot too soon take the
steps necessary and proper for procuring it to be built, and for collecting at the
other end of it the nucleus of a navy, with powers of expansion sufficient to meet
any probable emergency.
The vessels of our navy serving in the Pacific, instead of being brought home
around Cape Horn for repairs, should be laid up in ordinary in California until
sufficient numbers are gradually collected there to form this nucleus. The commerce of the country will supply the seamen for them whenever they shall be
required.
My answer to your second question, viz: "What reliance could be placed on
vessels-of-war, or of commerce, fioating batteries, gunboats, and other temporary
substitutes for permanent fortifications 1" is, to a great extent, included in the
answer just given to your first.
'.rhe defences upon which this country must and ought to rely are locomotive;
therefore, to employ naval means to build floating batteries, which would have
to be confined to the limits of the harbor, would be a waste of money, when we
might, with that same money, give them wings or impart to them the breath of
steam, and send them here and there wherever they would be of most avail.
The money which a floating battery would cost might keep a steamer afloat;
which, with its powers of locomotion, might reduplicate itself, as it were, along
the coast, by appearing successively before a number of places, and arriving at
each place exactly at the right time, If the enemy would not come to the
:floa6ng battery it would be of little use; but as for the steamer, if the enemy
would not come to it, it could go to the enemy; it could select its own time,
maun r, and point of attack, and thus make up by activity, skill, and manreuvre,
. wl:tt it wants in trengtb,
Th reliance to be placed on vessels of commerce for coast defences i ca...,nal
and ac ic1ental; upon an mcrgcncy they might be armed and ent to sea to
h:m
th comm rce of the n my; they might be u eel a. tran port or tr
fir -:-hip~; r th y rnio-ht be unk in cbnnnel-way. to block up entrance.· -c.,
and to a:-. i, t the work on bore to prot ct th to1vi1s. When want d, they will
be at hand; , nd in plan11ing military exp dition,, or preparino- for defence. it i~
n ugh for ur a captain and gr at g n ral to know tliat th commercial
m~rin -olcl hulk , nd n w v
I -are among th ir m an of attack and
d ·fi n · and con titut an important part of th · military r ource which they
h ld in r<·~ rv -whi ·h ar at all time availabl and which th r ·for , m,, be
r )U<rht int 1 lay , rh 'll r quir d.
'
'
•
'I h .' r ·p r f the b , rd of nein er. of 1 40 tr at the ubj ct f :fl n in_
b tt ri .; at 1 ngth. It .how c nclu i ly that they arc ncith r tu m ~-
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efficient, effective, nor judicious shape into which the money voted for nationa
defence may be put.
.
.
.
The arguments of the board upon this part of.their subJect appe~r to me c~nclusive; and, therefore, further remarks here with regard to fl.oatmg battenes
would be useless .
.A. prominent idea upon which the system of 18_16. appears to _hav~ ~een
founded is, that we as a naval power were to remam m hopeless mfenonty ;
and hence the burden of the argument for a system of national defe_nce has been
"build stationary works-works that the enemy must come after; lme the coasts
with forts and castles to save the country from invasion, our women and children
from the violence of enemies."
Railroads and steam have converted every village into a camp, every telegraph
office into a watch-tower, on which is placed a sentinel more sleepless than
Argus, for guarding and defending the coast from invasion. Steam, and railroads, and canals have connected every forest in the land into a timber shed for
the navy, and our merchants and ship-builders have established scores of dock
yards along the sea shore, and upon the banks of :mr rivers, at which keels
may he laid and vessels launched and equipped with a rapidity that has never
before been known in any age or country.
In 1836 General Cass, then Secretary of War, assumed the position, and
General Jackson indorsed it,* that for tlte df:/ence ef the r.oast tlie cliief reliance
should be on tkena·vy; and that t!ie system ef 1816 (that ef tlw board ef engineers)
comprises works w~ick are unriecessarily large for the purposes which they have
to fulfil.
At that time steam navigation was a problem ;which had yet to be solved
upon the ocean. Dr. Lardner had attempted it in the closet, and proved, as he
said, that the conditions of the · problem involved an impossibility. He therefore pronounced it an absurdity; and so men generally considered it. At that
time railroads were much less complete, and far less numerous than they now
are. The electric telegraph was also unknown.
Now the ocean is clouded with the smoke of sea steamers ; the country is
laced with lines of telegraph, and fretted with a network of railways-all tending to make reliance upon the navy still more exclusive, dependence upon the
system of 1816 still more needless.
.
The board of engineers, to show how erroneous, in their judgment, this opinion
of General ,Tackson was, supposed a case in 1836, and cited it again in 1840
as an illustration.
'l'he case was well put; it produced a great effect upon the public mind ; ancl
as it is the hinge upon which the continuation of the present system was made
to turn, I beg leave. to quote the case now, that we may see how it will stand
the te t of the new condition of things ; how the improvements that have since ·
taken place will affect it, and how far it may be modified by the , ground I have
been endeavoring to make good.
"In the report," says the board of 1840,t presented by the engineer department in March, 1836, (Senate Document, 1st session 24th Congress, vol. 4,
~~ o. 293) "there is a demonstration of the actual economy that will result from
an efficient system of sea-coast defence ; which is to the following effect, referring to the document itself for detail.:
" There is first supposed to be an expedition of twenty thousand men at
Bermuda or Halifax ready to fall upon the coast. 1'his will make it necessary,
if there be no fortifications, to have ready a force at least equal at each of the
followjng points, namely: 1st, Portsmouth and navy yard; 2d, Boston and navy
0
ee p,1.ge 5, No. 206 H. Doc., 1st session 26th Congress.
Doc , 1st se ;;ion 24th 1 ·ongress.
t Pa.ge 70, No. 2U6 H. Doc., 1st se,;sion 26th Congress.

See also page 1, No. 293 S.
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yard; 3d, N arraganset roads ; 4th, New York and navy yard; 5th, Philadelphia and navy yard; 6th, Baltimore ; 7th, Norfolk and navy yard; 8th, Charleston, South Carolina; 9th, Savannah; and 10th, New Orleans, to say nothing
of other important places.
"At each of these places, except the last, ten thousand men drawn :from the
interior, and kept under pay, will suffice, the vicinity being relied on to supply
the remainder. At New Orleans, seventeen thousand men must be drawn from
a distance. In a campaign of six months, the whole force will cost at least
$26,750,000.
" The garrisons necessary to be kept under pay for the fortifications in these
places will cost for the same time $8,430,500. The difference ($18,319,500)
will then be only $3,448,150 less than the whole expense of building these
defences, viz : $21,767,656; whence it follows that the expense of these erections would be nearly compensated by the saving they would cause in a single
campaign."
This is the demonstration, first given in 1836, and repeated in 1840, to prove
the very great economy and complete efficiency of the system of 1816; and in
order to complete this demonstration, it was required that twenty-one millions
of money and upwards should be first given to fortify only ten places along a
Rea front of two thousand :five hundred* miles in extent; for there were " other
important places," of which nothing was to be said.
Now let us suppose that, in conformity with the modifications which I have
suggested, and according to the idea of maintaining such a system of national
defence tliat will secure to us tlte naval supremacy in our own waters, a portion
of this $8,430,500 which the plan of the board requires to keep for six months
only tlie "necessary garrisons" in the powerful works which are supposed to be
erected at each one of the ten threatened places. Let us suppose, I say, that,
according to the proposed mocli:ficati.ons of the system, a part of this eight and
a half millions had been applied to the building of some twenty or twenty-five
men-of-war steamers, such a force of steamers would be required, even under
the system of the engineers, to serve as a coast guard in war, to brush from the
outside of our harbors, which are protected on the inside by forts, any blockading ships that the enemy may station there, and to keep straggling cruisers
from capturing and plundering our merchantmen in the sight of these same
fort , and along our shores generally.
To keep up the proposed garrisons for one year at the ten threatened places
onl.lJ, would require, according to the estimate of the board of engineers them
e1v , . 16, 61,000.
Th
teamers will last many years; and according to the estimate of th
navy board,+ made at the ame time, would cost, for the twenty-five, $5,625,000,
r oul • about one-third of the actual co, t of the ga1Tisons for one year, after the
fort. w r built at a co t of $21, 767,656.f
The tw nty-five steamers would be tationed along the coa t, and di tribut c1, we may , uppo e, in the following manner, viz: two with their headquarter
at JJ rt:--mouth, thr at Bo ton, four at ... ew York, two at Charleston, two at
P n:--a ·ola an l two at the BaJiz .
1 h a. put , uppo
it to b known that this exp dition of twenty thoui-ancl m 11 wh ar about to fovad a country of more than twenty million~, ha~
r ·ndf·Zv u d c t alifax or B rmuda, , uppo e it to be at Halifax.
tw 1 ty-fiv , mart, activ teamer are " nt to watch
r thr of' the
m v m nt . A ,· on
h ut to ca and tak , hi departur
our coa t, and th r deliv r~ to the
ak . for th n ar t J)
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magnetic telegraph the intelligence that the enemy has put to sea, and is steer0', with his expedition of twenty thousand strong, to:"ards Charleston.
The
effect is electrical; instantly bodies of armed men heedmg the summons wo1;1ld
5pring up, not from bush and brake, in a single glen, as at ~he s_ound of Roden~k
Dhu's whistle, but from every town and hamlet, mountam side_ and va~ley m
the land. Harnessing up the iron war-horse, they would hold him, pantmg on
the rail way, ready at the word to speed off with them for the appointed place, at
the rate of thirty, forty, or fifty miles th_e hour, accor~ing to the ~mer~ency.
In the meantime, and without confus10n, message 1s sent by hghtnmg for the
look-out steamers and naval forces in the Gulf to proceed towards Savannah,
and for those at the north to steer south and look into the Chesapeake for further
orders. Or they may be directed to cross the enemy's hause and bring him to
action, or cut off his stragglers, or otherwise harass and annoy him.
At the end of three or four days, or it may be a week or more, according to
the weather, and the great variety of circumstances that tend to retard the
movements of such a force at sea, another of the guarda costa steamers puts into
the capes of the Delaware or elsewhere, with the certain intelligence that the
enemy is bound for Charleston. Because his rate of sailing is regulatec1 by the
Epeed of the slowest vessel in the fleet, he is yet three days from Charleston at
the least .
..All our ships-of-war that have returned from cruises, that are just fitting out,
or that may happen to be in port, together with the whole coast guard of twentylive steamers which, at the commencement of the war, were found on hand, may
lhus appear off Charleston as soon as he: certainly they would be there before
lie could disembark. And should he be so infatuated as to attempt a landing, it
rnuld be practicable for us to have there, in force ready to receive him, an army,
ritb a regiment even of foot, from every State in the Union, except perhaps
·
California and Oregon.
Is it possible that an enemy could be tempted by any inducement whatever
lo land in such a country, provided with such means of defence, invested with
such armed ubiquity, and such powers of concentration 1
Fort Moultrie, which has beleagured an enemy before, and has demonstrated
that it can hold a force from sea in check long enough at least for the lightning
to go for help, and for steam to come with it, is there to beleaguer him again;
and our coast fleet, which we have supposed to be assembled there as a witness
to this hypothetical attempt at invasion, would be ready at the bar to receive
th.is discomfited and crippled foe as he attempted to escape. Great would be
!lie disappointment to the country if such a fleet should fail to give an account
of such an enemy.
The present system of fortifications seems to have been planned upon the
iu.ea that in all wars this country was to stand on the defensive, and that all the
energies of the enemy would be directed to siege and invasion.
But in the death struggle, what have we to fear from invasion 1 There is no
pillar nor post in this country which, like the Paris of :b7 rance, when it falls,
carrie the whole political edifice with it. There is no Paris in America. Unlike
Burope, the armed occupation of a capital here would be no more than the occ11pation of any other town by an enemy; unlike Europe, there are no disaffected people in this country for a foe to tamper with. 'I'he government is by
th.e people, for the people, and with the people. It is the people. And as for
htva,_ion, there would be neither danger to the country, nor its government, nor
it5 institutions. Our free institutions are our best fortifications to protect the
country from siege, and the land from invasion. Captivating the minds of his
Soldiers, the civil and political freedom enjoyed by all in these United States
1vould convert the rank and file of an invading foe into friends. An enemy
planting his foot upon our oil could at best hold no more of it than that upon
which he actually stands and covers with his guns. If he attempted to move,
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in whatever direction he shou,ld take up the line of march, the people in front he
would find enemies, and those that he left behind, emboldened by his own deserters,
would rise up in arms against him the moment his presence was withdrawn from
them.
What attempts at invasion did England make during the last war 1 She was
afraid of desertion and the propagandism of republican institutions then. It is
true, she made a foray upon Washington, but found a precipitate retreat necessary, and that foray was as barren and empty of military result as a cloud
without water. She attempted New Orleans, but there she encountered one of
those sand-bag or cotton-bag forts, and her hosts fell Lefore it.
In the war of 1812 we were young and feeble; England was at the summit
of her power. The difference between the military condition of the two countries
was immense ; yet upon what point along the seaboard did she attempt invasion?
Against what battery did she lay siege 1 If in the defenceless state of the
country then-a country that had a navy to build, that had yet to plan its system of fortifications, to concentrate means of defence-if, under those circumstances, sieges were not laid nor invasion attempted at any point along an open
sea front, with its indentations and windings of six thousand miles-if but with
one-third of our present population-if with not one-tenth part of our present
military resources, nor not the twentieth of our present powers of concentration,
siege and invasion were not attempted then by a most haughty and proud foe,
is it likely that in case of war now, when she looks upon us as her equal, and
at least as her match in everything· except in the number of " wooden walls " is it probable or possible that, with such a power for an enemy now, anything
like siege or invasion from the sea would be attempted or thought of 1
With a home squadron comprised chiefly of steamers, it would be difficult to
conceive how an enemy should so threaten as to make it necessary to establish
a garriRon of 17,000 or even 10,000 men for six months at Uharleston or any
one of the ten places named in the report. ·
The operations of these twenty-five steamers would be mostly confined to our
own waters in war, for with want of depots of coal abroad they would be required
to return into port at the end of every two or three weeks at least for a fresh
supply of fuel.
Now bearing in mind my answer to your first question, and always suppo..,ing
that one of the principal features in the system of national defence hereafter to
be provided for this country is naval supremacy for it in its own waters, my
an wer to your second quc$tion is, with the modifications already propo eel, that
all neecfful "reliance" for coast defence can be placed on vessels-of-war and of
commerce, upon open shore batteries, steam, railroads, and telegraph, o R FREE
IX "TIT TION , and such like " ubs6tute, for permanent fortification ."
Iu r ply to your third and last que tion, a to the expediency of continuing
th pr nt sy tern of fortification on the shores of the north rn lake", I ha·rn
to r mark that. in my judgment, it i neither nece ru·y nor expedient ._,o to do.
A . , for inva ion from that quarter, the difference in political condition between
auad· and th
nited , 'tat i an ample fortification for us.
Large bodi . of th p oplc there n w are known to be in favor either of
paration from th moth r c untry or of ann xation to th United tat :- .
11 i. mcrican fil'lllY, th r for , oino- over int Canada in a war with En o-land
w ul 1 L, I k d u1 11 by a laro- numb r of the people there a friend ' and
d liv r ·r not a. n mi . and ppr . , or .
'l h he t war on th wat r f th lak wa a war of hip-buildinO'.
H who ulcl mu:-t r th · tr 110- • t naval fore
th y h, cl o
r ·at · -h l th· . upr ma ·y.
ncl if, in ca
f wru· now, England . h uld
u · cl in a tin"' , h a 1 f u with h r naval fi r ·
u th lake .J1 cou) l
infli · ,rn injury. .i fi·w cla • f uuint rrupt d c ntr 1th r by a fi w nnn
,.
·l-, in ignifi nt alt g th r · . t ab lute fore , would mak dreadful }m·oe
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npon our lake shipping, our lake commerce, and our lake towns, if no precautions
ere taken to guard against it.
The commerce of the lakes will soon be worth to us as much or more than
the commerce of the Atlantic.
During the season of lake navigation there is put afloat up_on those waters
every week, on the average, millions of American property, besides vessels and
the lives of American citizens.
,
In no part of the world, except in the offings and harbors of the great commercial emporiums, is there to be found such a concentration of merchandise afloat.
Xor is there, in case of our naval inferiority upon the lakes, any part of the
world that affords such an abundant harvest of prizes to tempt the cupidity of
Eeamen.
It is the policy of this country never to be the aggressor; it loves peace and
hates war, and therefore it is not likely ever to be the party to strike the first
blow in war. That is an advantage at which Great Britain generally aims, and
that she fully understands and appreciates the importance of striking quickly
upon the lakes in case of war with this country we have evidence conclusive.
Before she sent her minister plenipotentiary here with his ultimatum, when
the friendly relations between the two countries a few y ears ago seemed to be so
much in danger, she first assembled a fleet of fifty-odd sail in our waters, and
upon our frontiers one-third of the whole British army, notwithstanding that
she was at that time engaged in two distant and expensive foreign wars.
No one who, calling to mind those times, will examine her military journals
of that day can fail to be impressed with the fact that her forces were especially
arranged with a view to Canada and the lakes, and that there the first blow, or
a blow synchronous with the first, was to be struck. Her intentions then were
too manifest to be forgotten or disregarded even now.
It is true the war might commence during the season when the navigation of
the lakes is annually closed, and when, consequently, all naval forces would be
~ed up. In that case we should have nothing to fear. But it might commence
tn the height of the commercial season ; and the war might be commenced on
her par t by first admitting from the sea a fleet of small-class vessels, passing
them up through the Canadian ship-canals into the lakes, and there letting the
declaration of her intentions consist in an attack upon Buffalo, Chicago, and
other lake towns with their shipping.
These interests are too valuable and important to be left at the mercy of an
enemy even for a day. Therefore it would be advisable, ·so long as Canada is
an. English colony, to provide against a naval surprise on the lakes.
For this purpose it is only necessary to look to the means of assembling
quickly a small naval force on the lakes, and, in the meantime, to place at the
several cities and towns, and at the termini of the various railroads and canals
along the lake shores, a few pieces of ordnance, according to the plan suggested
for the towns generally along the Atlantic seaboard.
The forts which are already on the lakes need not be garrisoned in war only
Until we acquire the naval supremacy there.
-We have canals and railroads by which we could send the frames of vessels
and alI requisite naval means to the lakes at short notice and in time to re-enforce
\\>hat we might suddenly assemble there.
It ~eems, therefore, that, acting upon the policy of so shaping our system of
nation.al defence as to secure the naval supremacy in our own waters, we should
proceed to build the engines, provide the armaments, and get out at the navy
Jard of 1Iemphis and New York the frames of a few small men-of-war steamers
for th lake . The engines and the armaments might be placed upon the lake
shore at once. The frames, on the first appearance of the war cloud, could be
ent there by the Erie and the Michigan canals, put together, and be ready for
launching at a moment's warning.
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The Mediterranean is an inland sea, so are our lakes and rivers. Eminently
continental in its proportions and maritime in its features, our country looks out
upon blue water to the east, the south, and the west; the ocean front of the
United States alone is greater in extent than the ocean front of the whole of
Europe. Therefore, like action to the orator, a navy to us is the first, second,
and third chief requisite to any effective system of national defence.
Respectfully, &c.,
M. F. MAURY,
Lieutenant United States :Navy.
Hon. CHARLES M. CONRAD,
Secretary ef War.

No. 7.
Report

ef Lieutenant J.

A. Dahlgren.
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materially affecting the power of forts. For whether it be use~ as a chief mot~ve
power or as an auxiliary, it gives great facility in ~oncentratm~ and a~pearrng
:uddenly on given points, and in assuring a certam and rapid transit when
required to pass the fire of a fort.
.
.. . .
In the defence of nearly every one of the large commercial cities, it w~Jl be
observed that the chief reliance to prevent the approach of an enemy 1s. by
'ortifying some approach to it; the naval question mere!Y. tou:hes the practicability of passing the fire of these works, and not of sustammg it any longer than
may be necessary in the most rapid movement that the ship is capable of.
To illustrate this practically let us turn to the mode proposed in the engineer's
report* for excluding an enemy from the lower bay of New York by a fort on
~andy Hook, with floating batteries and bomb ketches inside.
'r he ordnance commonly mounted in the coast fortifications are 32-pounders,
42-pounders, and eight-inch howitzers. 'l'he effective fire of the 32-pounder can
hardly be said to extend beyond a mile where heavy ships are concerned .
.At that distance the penetration will not exceed fourteen inches when the
~hot strikes the surface fairly and directly. If the impact be oblique or on
ricochet, the penetration is decreased accordingly. The effect of the fire is
further decreased by the unavoidable deviation of shot at the distance of a mile,
and by the movement of the object which is changing its position in direction
and distance. It would be difficult to estimate correctly the number of shot
which would have a maximum penetration under these circumstances, but
perhaps not more than one in ten. 'rhe forty-two pounder and army eight-inch
howitzer will not vary this capacity considerably, and it seems reasonable to
as umc that, if the distance be greater than a mile no material injury will be
experienced from such pieces by a heavy ship when under way.
The sketch annexed represents the localities in question as given by the chart
of the Coast Survey. The track at mean low water allowed to the heaviest
~teamerst is shown by the coloring.
The effective fire for the proposed fort as indicated by the circle, evidently
covers no considerable part of the passage, and if a steamer chose to take the
main channel she would, by keeping its extreme right, be under fire about six
or seven minutes, and never approach the guns of the fort nearer than fourteen
hundred yards, thus rendering the chances of any damage exceedingly slight.
But the swash channel offers sufficient depth for her draught, and by using it
the teamer would pass entirely out of reach of the fort. The sole reliance,
then, to exclude the fleet becomes the floating batteries and bomb ketches ;
whether they may be trusted or not will be cons;dered subsequently; the present
object is merely to inquire if the fort has the power of itself to exclude shipping.
It seems evident, therefore, that while it is very doubtful whether forts have
gained any advantage from the use of shells, it is certain their efficacy has been
con. ·iderably diminished by the application of steam to the vessels-of-war,
which by their decreased draught are enabled to enter channels not accessible
to ...,hips-of-the-line, and when obliged to pass the fire of permanent works are
enabled to do ,·o in so little time as hardly to afford the batteries an opportunity
to effect any e. Rcntial damage.
Query 2.-·what reliance could be placed on vessels of war or of commerce,
fl ating batteries, gunboats, and other temporary substitutes for permanent fortifications 1
In proceeding to an wer this query, I find the ground already occupied by
c e rtain propositions contained in an official document drawn up in 1840 in relati Jll to the defen ce. of the coast. 'l.1110 source from which these views emanate
and th<.'ir official character entitle them to full consideration, so that I do not
o To War D partment, 1840.
Su quchanna, full loaded, draws nineteen feet eleven inches.

t
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Sketch of Hook with fort-Its fire and channel way.
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To the first proposition there lies a reasonable demurrer, because, unde~ t~e
eircumstances likely to attend the defence of any harbor or roadstead which 1s
pproached by a channel, great disadvantage must acc~mpany t?-e at'.te~pt,
micularly when the passage lies among the shoals, of which there 1s no _md1cacion, save by artificial marks or the lead. Where the moveme_nts of ~h1ps are
nly limited by bold shores there can be little embarrassT?e~t m k eepmg them
rrom danger; but where the keenest eye can detect notl:mg on the surfac~ of
· e water to give warning of the risk, and a slight erro~· m the course or a t1~edy may ground a ship directly under fire, it is evident that the attent10n
requisite to clear these obstacles successfully will prevent the officers o~ a fleet
il'O m giving full directions to its offensive powers, though at the very time the
pposing ship may be concentrating a deliberate and destructive fire on ~he
a.ding ship attempting to enter, or the assailants may be compelled by wmd
a.nd weather to postpone essaying the entrance, even under these disadvantages;
hile thus detained he must be exposed to the severe gales and to much damage,
a consideration not to be overlooked on our coast, even in the summer months.
In 1778 the Engli;h and French fleets, then off Rhode Island, were separated
from each other while manamvring for the weather gauge during the month of
August, and many of the heaviest ships dismasted on both sides.
On the other hand, the defending force, fully cognizant of the difficulties
· hich await the enemy, either take such position at anchor, or under way with
team or sail, as will be best suited to annoy the enemy when most occupied in
clearing the intricacies of unknown shoals, and increase the danger by concentrating a deliberate fire at a moment critical not only to the vessel most exposed
to it, but to those which follow and are liable to be thrown into disorder by the
least mishap.
,
Be it remembered that this capacity of transferring the power of its armament
from one point to another is the essential quality in the present case which the
fort does not possess.
Under such circumstances the most cool and brave are apt to hasten too
much, naturally desiring to shorten the time of inaction, and t0 make some
return to the fire of the enemy ; hence the liability to lose the services of one or
more . hips in the moment of greatest need.
Well known instances of this may be cited. While standing in to attack the
French at the Nile, Nelson lost the use of the Culloden, 74, which grounded on
a ·hoal, though not even under fire at the time, and remained there useless
during the whole action. At Copenhagen three of his line grounded on a shoalthe .Agamemnon, 7 4, the Russell, 7 4, and Bellona, 7 4; and, in leaving their
anchors during the suspension of hostilities, the Defiance and Nelson's own
Ehip, the Elephant, with several others, grounded under the guns of the ThreeOro-,vn battery.
The defending force has, moreover, the advantage, if anchored, of being able
to po t ome guns ashore so as to enfilade vessels taking the direction of its own
line, and also prevent the weather ships from being doubled on by the enemy.
Every naval man will comprehend the difficulties of navigating a fleet of
h.eavy ships along channels skirted closely by shoals and commanded throughout their extent by the guns of an enemy's line; and the advantages, on the
other side, of being able deliberately to rake ships approaching in that way will
he very apparent .
.Among the events of the revolution may be found an apt illustration of this :
1778 a large force wa. de patched from France with the view of surprising
I
the En 001i. h fleet in the Delaware. Philadelphia had been evacuated, however.
'r e 1 ount de E taing followed to N cw York, and appeared off that harbor
ur the 10th of July. Lord Ilowe was by no means prepared for his arrival,
a
1,u , n<.:verth 1 . , he proce dcd with energy and judgment to defend the entrance
,v:t:h a f rec ya ·tly inferior to that of the enemy.
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The French admiral, after deliberating some ten days, finally declined to
attack, and on the 22d of July departed on another expedition.
On this occasion there were strong motives for bring-ing the English fleet to
action. Their army now occupied no other of the large cities than New York.
The recent evacuation of Philadelphia was · not calculated to encourage the
hopes of the royalists, and if "the men-of-war were defeated at this time, the
fleet of transports and victuallers must have been destroyed, and the army of
course fallen with them."-(Eakin, page 77.) The re-enforcements, too, arriving
to succor the fleet, would have been cut off in detail. The consequence might
have been immediately fatal to the hopes of the British, though favorable to the
cause of humanity, by terminating a struggle which endured four years subsequently.
The difference in force seemed sufficient to justify an engagement under any
circumstances. rrhe French had twelve ships of the line, carrying eight hundred and seventy-six guns. The English only nine ships that could be brought
into line, and these mounting five hundred and thirty-four gup.s. The disparity
was even greater than that expressed by these figures, as the French carried
their guns in ships far superior in size and strength to those of the British.
The main channel which the French were obliged to make use of was thus
defended by Lord Howe: Five ships of fifty-four guns and one of fifty were
anchored in line bearing about W.NW. from the easternmost vessel that lay
near to a storeship which was armed with some guns, and anchored close in
with the Hook. A battery of two howitzers and another of three 18-pounders
were posted on the shore close to the weather-ship to prevent th1t end from
being doubled on, and four regiments landed on the Hook to repel any attempt
of the French to disembark troops and destroy the batteries. Three hips were
placed near the bar to embarrass the passage, and a sixty-four, with frig·ates,
lay in side of the line to be used as occasion might require.
· w hen the French had pa sed the bar iu sufficient force, the three ships were
to retire and take the rear of the line, "which would bring their broadsides to
bear upon the direct line of approach in the narrowest part of it, when, by
veering again, they would resume their situations, and continue to command the
long line of course which the enemy must pursue as he advances, while the
smaller vessels were so placed as to harass and distress him from inaccessible
po itions."-(Eakin, page 86.)
'l'he plan of defence was weJl conceived, and would no doubt have been carefully xccuted.
'l'hc l:!"'rench admiral declined to attack under these circum tance , and in all
probability would have suffered great damage, if not defoat, if he had made the
att mpt.
' h
uperiority which a naval force derived from it mobility over the
·trong 'Rt work i very apparent in thi ca e.
The .Fr n ·h .,hip could not CY n pa!-< th bar at 1 i ur ; th y would have
br.m umler fire from th firRt in v nturing to cl · o, and b xpo d to a rakinO'
fire· in approa ·hino- th Br:it:i h lin which th y w •r not ev n at liberty to pa:---a · tlu·: ·oul<l ha.v don , if thr atcn cl 1 y th• fire f a fort only but wouhl
li v l · ·n ohlio- ·cl to uo-ag and to cl •:troy it a au indi. p n abl preliminary
t an_· forth •r op r, tion .
'l ou ·hi1w th · . · ·oncl propo:,;iti n, it may he , aid that th re i n doubt now
f th · tim · that will
r <1uir d t
arry int •llio-en · fr m any on poin t r
:moth •r nor of that which may L n • ·d d to trau f r aid fr m p int t poin
al 11!? th
·aboard.
Tlu., appc·aran ·
f an n mY hi~ for·
.,
·w rl an almo"t in taut]_· aft1·r it i ht wn at 13 ::t n and at an. · J ·ut
h t \" ' ' Jl Ji . ·1t1 · , nd "hat \· r -.t1•Hm for • m; V hav h<• r n p -.t ,j}
lh
111-iu ·ip tl ntr, 11 •
.m
trnn f ·rrc<l fr Ill uc of th •m to an th r at a
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Defence of New York harbor, by Lord Howe, against the French fleet,, July, 1778.
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The question, tlwrefore, is not whether the inferior force stationed at a p01·t
may be able to make good a final defence against an enemy appearing suddenly, bu~ wlietlier it may liave tlie power to delay kis movements until aid
shall arrii:e from another quarter.
'rhus, in thirteen hours after the first sight of an enemy from the Neversink
h eights, a squadron from the Delaware would be off Sandy Hook; and twentyeight hours would bring up a force from the Chesapeake.
.
If the hostile fleet shall not be able to pass the channel, destroy the squadron
that defends it, and still be in a state to attempt the passage of the Narrows in
less than thirteen hours, it is very certain that a fresh squadron, even though
somewhat inferior, will afford him good reason to look to his own defence, and
think of retreating, instead of venturing to prosecute his operations. Finally,
the Chesapeake vessels, arriving in fifteen hours after the D elaware steamers,
will give more than a chance for capturing at lea[:\t every steamer of the enemy
that has been crippled in the engagement with the New York squadron.
The means requisite, therefore, at each port, are those that will insure the
time needed to concentrate the other portions of the home squadron.
The result of the preceding propositions, as announced in the third, has
received its practical application in a preceding passage,* thus: "The preparation by the enemy of twenty team frigates would require the construction of
two hundred of equal force on our part, supposing that we design to cover but
ten of our principal harbors, leaving all others at his mercy."
The principal objection to the defensive position thus assumed to be imposed
on the two hundred steamers, by the necessities of the first ancl second propositions, would be the impossibility of carrying it into execution. There is certainly
110 precedent for such a sy tern of inaction; and if any naval officer were so
dispot:icd, it is more than J_Jrobablc that public opinion would hardly permit the
precedent to occur here. Novel it would be to sec two hundred steamers divided
into squadrons at distant points, quietly awaiting the onset of one-tenth their
whol number. The enemy him ·elf would probably be alarmed at ...,uch a
p culiar demonstration, and rather be inclined to look upon it as a trap for bis
twenty ships.
Admitting, for an instant, that any necessity could exist for pur...,uing a plan
so strictly defensive in it. character, would it not be b tter to send the ..;hip out
to " ·a, ·where the public attention would not be enforced to the humiliating
character of the operation, and cause them to form a cordon alonO' the coast,
from l\laine to Florida 1 'l1hit:i di.-t:mce of fourteen hundred miles could be easily
lin ·c1 by two hunch·ed ship , CY n mile ~rund •r; and being within the notice
of any unu. ual signal from each other, the nemy's twenty hip , in attemptinoto pa~:; th lin , would be · n and ov rhaulccl by the r ady concentration of an
·qual m1mL •r from the cordon, b •fore h could reach th port to be a . . :-ailccl .
.Uc· that a it may, no naYal fficer can doubt that if th "United 'tate. had
fully available two lnmdr .cl war-.'t 'amcr. of th • laro·c ·t cla , or ~ailinO' --hip · of
·q nal tomrng , the qu :-tion would be cntir •ly in r O'ard to the charact ·r of
<t//'l'll, ·ire ope1ations. It would no longrr L an object to d fend our own ports,
lm to ·aptur · ancl d :--troy th 'nern · ·hip. in cli:-t:mt :,,1c>a~ "hil protf'ctin!!
hi: ·olonil·. and tra le - to intc•r 'C'pt hi commPrCP 'V r ·whrr - to li--pnt<' th
·ommarnl of the: high , c·:1. with hi miO'hti :-t fl • ·t ·, and l,lockatl cn:ry n:l\', I
t:ition nf hi: i:-:1:mcl c·mpir .
t i. nnt n 'CC'", ary to pro: ·utC' forth r ohjc tion. to the:-• propo,iti 11, .
• ·aYal nwn, with harclly an c·.· cc ption, woulrl tak • tll<' y r · onnr. c of th fir,
, lHl . · ·oncl prop :itiou-. :md uttnfr prot • 't ng·ain:t th, 011 e Jlll nt cont in _d_ in
tlw thircl. , tron!!<'l" n•n ·1111,. ha,·<· Y ·t tn 1, • adclu · cl to mal·c croocl th· p ,1 l
that cl ti•nc-c 1, · m nn. 1·.·cl u. fr ·IY ;m,·al i:-: im1mt ·ti ·abh• for ~he na OJ !!fr .,.
n tla

tl,r ·c propo itio" .
OEoginc r' re

1t 1 l age H.
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The practical interpretation of the second query, however,_ has no reference
:o the question of an exclusive defence by_ the forts or ships, so far as the
l tlantic coast is coneerned, if I understand rightly. The answer must necessarily be based upon the existing state of _things; and as a great part of !he contemplatecl system of coast fortification has been completed, the expediency_ of
~ubstituting ships, &c., has reference only to such of the system as remams
unfinished.
,
The works for the protection of Boston and of the navy yard at Norfolk are
already completed. At New York, likewise, excepting the fort on Sandy Hook.
The approach to Philadelphia, however, and the anchorage at the breakwater
are yet undefended, though the works have been planned and perhaps partly
appropriated for.
I have no doubt when these places, and some harbor on the southeast coast,
have received whatever aid can be furnished by the art of the engineer, that a
naval force of no immoderate extent will be fully competent to defend the
A tlantic seacoast from any attempts which an enemy would find it advisable to
·
make.
Under no circumstances, except of the most unquestionable superiority at sea,
is it presumed that it would be well to resort to a defence exclm:\ively naval.
The ship and the fort have each a particular province in every general system of
well r egulated national defence, and if these can be ngreed on the result will be
reliable and economical. I do not mean to apply the latter word to the least
po~sible outlay of means, but to the judicious expenditure of whatever may be
req uired to effect the end proposed.
It is not needful here to enter into any statement of the part properly allotted
to fort s ; this has been ably and frequently expounded by the chief engineer.
Admitting them fully, and the necessity also for the works in the principal
points above alluded to, as the base for the naval operations that are to guard
the intermediate points, it may be well to examine whether even the great harbor s and watercourses are fully defensible by fortifications, when of the most
ext e n s ive character.
L e t u s again revert to the defences of New York.
The first object is to prevent the occupation of the lower harbor by a hostile
[eet, for if able to effect this the enemy would obtain the following advantages,
acc o rding to the report of the board of engineers, (page 54:)
"~t\._n enemy's squadron being in the bay, into which entrance is very easy,
would set a seal upon this outlet of the harbor. Not a vessel could enter or
depart at any season of the year. And it would also intercept the water comtn.u n ica tion, by way of the Raritan, between New York and Philadelphia.
H The same squadron could land a force on the beach of Gravesend bay, (the
place o f the landing of the British, which brought on the battle of Long Island,
in t he r e volutionary war,) within seven miles of the city of Brooklyn, of its
c0 Il]JI1a nding heights, and of the navy yard, with no intervening obstacle of any
Sort.
H Thi · danger ·is imminent, and it would not fai], in the event of war, to be as
fully r cafo~ed a. it was during the last war, when, on the rumor of an expedition. being in preparation in England, 27,000 militia were assembled to cover
the c i ty from an attack of this sort. It is apparent that the defences near the
c:ity and th o of the Narrows, indispensn.ble a:; they are for other purposes,
tan -iot h e made to prevent this enterprise."
,.-There can be no doubt of the great damage that would be wrought to the
teve.nue of the government, and to the immense interesLs of various sections, by
the pre::, nee of an enemy's force in the lower harbor. A heavy-expenditure
,,, 0 u_Jd b · well laid out in e tabli hing the means of prevention, a~1d · this should
c:ertsinly be looked to in time.
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What fortifications, then, can be applied to the purpose, and how far will they
be efficacious in excluding a fleet 1
A glance at the chart will show a wide extent of water between the outer
extremes of land that form the harbor from Sandy Hook to Coney island;
the distance is about seven miles. Large ships, however, are not at liberty to
pass over any part of this entrance. Their course is confined to two channels,
the principal one of which is near the Hook, and another somewhat to the northward of it, (the swash.) Line-of-battle ships can use the first only, but the
heaviest steam frigate in our service, when loaded for a long cruise, only draws
twenty feet, (the Susquehanna,) and therefore has sufficiBnt water to pass in by
the swash channel.
According to their report the board of engineei·s propose to fortify tlie east
brancli and middle ground, under the belief that the bottom was sufficiently
permanent to receive such works. Recent surveys, however, have so far shaken
such opinion as to induce them to forego the project.
The report goes on to state, (page 55 :) "This may, however, be said with
certainty, namely: that, all other means failing, works may be erected on Sandy
Hook which will have a good action upon the channel, and under cover of
which bomb ketches or steam batteries, or both, may lie. With such an arrangement there would be little probability of the lower bay being occupied as a
blockading station."
I have already endeavored to make it apparent that any works on the Hook
would, of themselves, be insufficient to prevent the passage of ships into the
lower harbor, and it will be perceived that this is also fairly inferable from the
passage just quoted, as it includes other aid in the arrangement desjgned to prevent the occupation of the lower harbor.
Line-of-battle ships, in taking the main channel, would, however, sustain the
fire of a fort without material detriment for the eight or ten minutes required to
pass it, with a fo,ir wind and tide; and, if annoyed by the floating batteries and
ketches, wonlcl not hesitate to run close to them and brush them with a few
broadsides, which would probably leave them little more to do than to take care
of themscl ves.
The heaviest steamers, by taking the swash channel, would avoid the fire of
the fort and floating batteries altogether, and afterward have leisure to destroy
the latter from the anchorage of the lower harbor.
So far, therefore, from believing that, "with such an arrangement, there would
be little probability of the lower bay being occupied as a blockading station,"
it eems conchrnive that the occupa,tion of the lower harbor by a naval force
would be liable to the least degree of 'interruption from the defences planned for
that pm1>0 ·c. The report itself admits the nece ity of uRing floating batteries
and bomb ketches as auxiliarie , which, of all the naval meanR, are certainlv
the least worthy of reliance. With the limited preventive power· of a fort, ~
far a. pa:4Rag-e i · concerned, they have in no d<·gr e the least of its capacity to
ndure battc·riucr, their material being a. vulnerable as that of a ship, without
it. great aclvant:we of passing from one point to another, whether for or n ar.
And a::: for hornh ketche. again t objects no larger than Rhip., aud tho;.e in rapid
motion, it mny hr aid that the chanccH of even a sino-le bomb dropping- upon
them arc too rc·m<>t to be taken into account as a mean of defence in the condition· of thi ca: .
1
oncl·i,·i1w, tlu·refor , the entrance of an enemy into the lower harhor to be
fairly fi a ..ihle, tl1e rn·.·t matter for con.·ideratiou i th capacity of the inner
d ·frucc. to pr<'Vl'Ht ntranc into the upper hm·hor and th dr.:truction of :c:uch
mr:m ~ 1f war :tll(l r .-cnne a. ma he found in ancl about the city, ~uc:h n, t11c·
v .. cl:---of-war lrnilt or huilclino- at thr navy ·arcl, of th timb r, ordnance, nnd
tor .·, anc1, above all, of th xt n. iv<' privat ~tabfo,hm •nt. for manufoc:turin!!'
t am- •ngin .: ; a purpo ·c which, if ·ffectccl, would crippl the nation iu c,·er:T
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enterprise of offence and defence, and probably could not be remedied in the
course of a war.
The levying of contributions might n?t
disregarded where_ means so ample
1rere placed by the chances of war w1tlun the_ ~rasp of an mvader. These
objects individually are sufficient to warrant a military attempt 0;1 a large scale.
The number and character of the works arranged by the engmeers are best
set forth in the language of the "Report," page 54:
"At the Narrows, about seven miles below the city, the passage becomes so
contracted as to permit good disposition to be made for defence. On the Long
Island side of the Narrows is Fort Lafayette, which is a strong water battery,
·tanding on a reef at some distance from the shore ; and immediately behind it,
on the top of the bank, is a small but strong work called Fort Hamilton.
Some repairs being applied to these works, this position may be regarded as
well occupied.
"On the west side or Staten Island side of the Narrows are the following
works belonging to the State of New York, viz : Fort Richmond, which is a
water battery; Battery Hudson, which is at some height above the water ;
Battery Morton, which is a small battery on the top of the hill ; and Fort
Tompkins, which is also on the top of the hill, and is the principal work. All
these need great repairs, but, being once in proper order, would afford a very •
important contribution to the defence of the passage, nothing further indeed
being contemplated for this position except the construction of a small redoubt
on a commanding hill a little to the southwest. The repairs of these works
cannot too soon be taken in hand, and it is hoped some arrangements may soon
be made with the State authorities to that end.
.
"With the Narrows thus defended, and the works near the city in perfect
order, New York might be regarded as pretty well protected against any attack
by water through this passage."
That these works are themselves perfectly capable of resisting the attack of
~ny fleet there is no doubt, but that they are able to interdict the passage to a
like _naval force is very far from being certain; on the contrary, the chances o_f
passmg, without suffering to any material extent, are reasonable enough to
warrant the attempt in view of the great results to be derived therefrom.
'l'he distance between the nearest batteries is seventeen hundred yards. The
water is deep to the very shore of Staten Island, and the edge of the reef well
marked, on the Long Island side, by the water battery. The largest ship,
therefore, may choose the course likely to be most advantageous in receiving
the least weight of metal.
If the officer in command run mid-channel he will be under the fire of both
sides at a most effective distance (eight hundred yards) when rjght abreast of
them, but by taking one side or the other he will recede from one fire, and in
approaching the other be exposed to no great increase of effect.
~uppose h_e choose to keep the left shore and 1·isk the fire of these batteries,
w~Ile, by domg so, he will place fourteen or fifteen hundred yards between his
ships and the Long Island batteries.
. 'rhe sketch annexed shows the course within the scope of effective fire, which
1s about two statute miles. It will hardly be questioned that a decent sea
steamer should run ten knots hourly (sea miles) in smooth water; these are
equal to eleven and a half statute miles. Of course, she takes the strength of a
flood tide and spreads every stitch of canvas to a fair wind, which ought ·to add
another mile, making the total speed twelve and a half statute miles per hour,
(three hundred and sixty-seven yards per minute,) at which rate she will pass
over a mile in four and three-fourth minutes.
Tracing the assigned course through the scope of the guns on both sides,
marked by the circles, it will be found that the distance run is about two miles;
that is, the steamer will not be more than ten minutes under fire.

?e
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The 3~-pounders and the 42-pounders of the Long Island water battery will
require an elevation of about three degrees to reach the enemy, the 8-inch seacoast howitzers about four degrees-both unfavorable to ricochet; for the projectiles will bound high in rising, and with a power much diminished even when
the weather is e-mooth; but with the ripple occasioned by the moderate breeze,
which is supposed to be taken advantage of, the ricochet could not be depended
on for direction or force, and therefore the direct firing only will be available on
the right hand, especially from Fort Hamilton, which is five hundred yards in
rear of the water battery, and the guns there mounted would need at least five
degrees; their shot could have no ricochet whatever, and would genemlly sink
where they strike the water.
Taking into consideration the deviation of the projectiles and the rapid movement of the steamers, the chances of oblique impact from the incurvation of the
trajectory, the variety of curved surfaces forming a ship's side, and the constant
change in their manner of presentation to the direction of the ball, it is probable
that not more than one shot or shell in ten can be relied on at this distance to
produce a maximum penetration.
The principal work on the left, Fort Tompkins, is situated on a high hiJl, and
two other batteries (Hudson and Morton) are in elevated positions.=li< Their fire
is therefore not so efficacious for short distances.
To an enemy which should thus attempt to escape the fire of Fort Lafayette,
by steering in with the Staten Island shore, the guns of the water battery (Fort
Richmond) would be very formidable.
1'his work mounts twenty-seven 42-pounders,* of which it is probable that
not more than a third can be made to bear on any one point.
At tvrn hundred yards, which is to be the nearest approach of the ships in
pas ing, the maximum penetration of 42-pounder shot in oak will not exceed
fifty iuches.
'l'he time of exposure to the fire of the fort would be about fifteen minutes for
a sailing hip at the rate of eight knots, and about ten minutes for a steamer
going elev n knots.
Would the damage received in that time be likely to injure so many vessels
as to prevent the design on the city entirely, in consequence of the reduction of
the force 1
In attempting to arrive at some satisfactory response to this query, one is
bound to avoid possible contingencies, and to adhere to those which experience
ha indicated a probable.
A hell properly placed will sink a ship ; a hot shot will set her on fire ; but
it would b very unwise thence to infer that this would necessarily be the effect
of vc·ry shot fired at the ship.
1'he Horn t ank the Peacock in fifteen minutes; but no naval offic r would
int r from the fact that a sloop-of-.war could generally obtain a like re:;ult. So
far from that, it i unprecedeuted and may hardly occur again.
ucntainty a to the distance, change of po ition, interposition of the i::moke
in a ov r d batt ry, lack of delib ration, will cause the failure of many hot to
"trik th • ol~jc• ·t at all.
'l'he <·.·a ·tly fatal ,·pot i limited to a few inche of urface near the water
line; in ther place a hip will , u tain a large numb r of h 11, .
' h • pro lig-iou, nclurauc of line-of-battle hips will appear to any one who
will look ov r th r c rd of a fighti-. Ilour after hour th y have been known
to u:-itain an unc a.-in fir at each other, with very gun on th whol broador two c . of inking during a fight will be found.
0

See report of Board of Engineers.
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I'assage through the Narr,ws, NPw York harbor.
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Let us note a few instances of endurance that have occurred in well known
engagf'ments :
In 1770 the Sandwich, ninety-eight, received seventy shot holes, seventeen
of them between wind and Vi'ater, (Rodney and DcGuichen.) She continncd to
fonn part of the English fleet, and cruised actively, as the flag-ship, until Rodney
went home, eighteen months afterwards.
At Copenhagen, N clson anchored his ships about three hundred yards from
the Danish line, and received its fire £or more than three hours. Of the fleet
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not one was Rufficiently injured to interfere with the active operations against
SwPden and Russia that followed.
More recently, in an affair ill calculated to maintain the prestige of ships in
attackjng batteries, it will be seen that a line-of-battle ship received the fire of
two batteries, of four g·uns each, during seven hours. The deliberate operation
of one of these witli lwt shot, through the whole afternoon, was entirely unmo}c<::ted by the fire from the ship, as it appears hardly more than half a dozen
shots from her struck near the battery; yet she did not take :fire until six in the
evening. I allude to the action of the Danish ship Christiana VIII, of eightyfour guns, Eckenfjorde, 1849 .
.At Alg·iers (1816) the Impregnable received two hundred and sixty-eight
shots in her hull, of which fifty penetrated below the lower deck, and three, of
68-pounders, six feet below the water line.
Even frigates will endure severe service. The lVIacedonian received one hundred shots in her hull in the engagement with the frig·ate United States, and was
brought E-lafely into port. After receiving repairs in her topworks sh e was used
in the United States navy for sixteen years, after which she ·was broken up and
rclmilt entirely.
In 1810 the Galatea, a small thirty-two gun frigate of eight hundred tons,
rec ·ived seventy-eight shots in her hull,* many between wind and water. She
continued to cruise, however.
A fleet of line-of-battle ships, then, would have little to dread, it is believed,
from Fort Richmond in attempting to pass it, and could probably do so without
material damage. If the enemy should deem it advisable to allow the leading
hiJ_J to anchor abreast the battery during the thirty minutes occupied by the
line in passing, the other ships would be insured against the severest of the fire,
and the entire loss devolved on one which certainly ought to endure this without
being disabled.
Steamers have the additional liability of injury to the machinery or boilers,
thereby suspending the action of the engine. But if their sides are lined, as
they should be, with the coal bunkers, their contents would suffice to arrest the
JH'0O'ress of the shot or shells, and prevent damage to the machinery; the exploF<ion of the latter might be rendered comparatively harmless in the loose masses
of coal, unless it were bituminous, and on that account susceptible of being
ignitrd.
The fire of the ships would, of course, be kept up, though probably with very
littl r damage to casemated works. 'l'he smoke enveloping the hulls would,
J10wrv •r, tend to increase the di:fficultie of dii-;tinguishing from the fort su:fficimtly, and would embarrass the aim, while the entrance of an occasional 8hot
jnto an ·mbra<::ure might di8mount a gun ancl fracture the cast iron cas mate
·
carriag into atoms, thereby doing· infinite mischief.
It ha· b en as urned that the enemy attempts tlrn pa . age of the Narrows in
!>r<ilHl clay. But upposc he choose a dark night and mid-channel. 'l'he strait
1i- more than thre -fourth· of a mile wide, without a ·hoaJ nearer than the :;hore.
'l'l1rr<· i. 11 •ith •r difficulty nor dangrr, .,o far a· the navigation is concerned; and
th · random fir of gun at eight hundred yards, from both ·ide of the shore,
wonlcl h a ,·mall matt •r.
Th bri ·f utlin of th probable re. ult of a ·w 11 designed and w 11 conducted
ncl ·avor t pa th
arrow may perbap. fail to . hake the faith of military
mc·n in th capa ·ity of the work to exclude .,hip . But would it be wi, to
tru:-t th fa.t of th city v n to a chanc , r mote a: it may b 7 For if ·ucc ,~fol ,. u th board of 1win' r. would hardly r ly ou the work about th city
0 In
quaclron that apturcd the French frig-nte Rcnommec, afrerward, named thP .r v:1.
and 01ken by the nitccl tatc hip Coa titution.
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-~a means of further prevention. Speaking of them, (Fort Columbus, &r:,,) t~e
report says, (page 53:)
.
..
. .
.
"It is a disadvantage of their pos1t10ns, h~wever, that the destrnct10n of the
city might be going on simultaneously with the contest between these forts and
the fleet."
If the Narrows are forced certain it is that in less tl1an half an hour the
,team frigates will be. within' range of the batteries 9f Governor's island and
1he "mall forts about the city. What now will intervene to prevent the ~estr~crion of the public works 1 Should the enemy choose to pass some of his slups
round to the northward of Governor's island, every shot from our own guns
that misses his hulls will tell on the devoted city, and effect more damage than
the enemy himself would, in cold blood, be willing to inflict. A force now may
abo be detached to the navy yard and other places. Ro~kets, carcasses, ::u~d
~hell put in operation, and in a few hours the flamrs will stnp us of the pubhc
and private resources. If a detachment be landed, meanwhile, to aid, the work
will be done effectually; and the ebbing tide convey the fleet to the lower
harbor, there to intercept the commerce and to blockade. Two or three steamers
of the attacking force may be destroyed, the detachment on shore cut off; but
what would such losses be in comparison to those inflicted 1
.
In the conclusion from certain premises, then, the views here entcrtamed
accord with that of the engineer's report, as thus expressed:
"If the mere passing under sail, with a leading wind and tide, one or even
two sets of batteries, and then carrying on operations out of the reach of these
or any other, were all, the enemy might perhaps aceomplish it."
At the same time there can be no doubt that the defence of a port may be
made good, when its shore line permits of the condition prescribed by the report
as sufficient, thus:
"Batteries should succeed each other along the channel, so that the enemy
may nowhere find shelter from the effective range of shot and shells while within
the harbor, even should he succeed in passing the first batteries. Provided the
shor es admit this disposition, and the defences be supplied with an armament,
numerous, heavy, and selected with reference to the effects on shipping, the facts
we have quoted from history show that these defences may be relied on."
'rhe only question will be as to the certainty of so disposing the land works.
Other p_assages which occur in the report of the board of engineers seem far
more applicable to the case under consideration, aud I cheerfully avail myself
of them as folly expressing all that I desire to add on this head.
"There are, doubtless, situations where it may be necessary for us to present
a defensive array, at the same time that to do so by fortifications alone would be
impracticable; and it is not, therefore, prejudging the question we are about to
exa1nine; it is neither unc1erratin o· fortifications, nor overrating these floating
defeuces, to say that these last ar;, some or all of them, indispensable 'in such
position.
"Any very broad water, where deep soundings may be carried at a distance
from the shores greater than effective gun-range, and where no insular spot,
natural or artificial, can be found or formed nearer the track of ships, will present
such a situation, and we may take some of our great bays as examples.
" Broad sounds and wide roac1steads, affording secure anchorage beyond good
gun-range from the shores, will afford examples of another sort; and harbors
with very wide entrances and large surfaces exhibit examples of still another
kind.
'' As in all such cases fortifications alone will be ineffectual, and, nevertheless,
recourse to defences of some sort may be unavoidable, it has not failed to be a
reco1nmcndation in the several reports on the defence of the coast since 1818,
that there should be a suitable and timely provision of appropriate floating
defences. And until the invention of man shall have caused an entire revolution
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in the nature of maritime attack and defence, these or kindred means must be
resorted to; not, however, because they are means intrinsically good, or suitable
under other circumstances, but because they are the only means applicable."
Admitting, then, that "any very broad water, where deep soundings may be
carried at a distance from the shores greater than effective gun-range, and where
no insular spots, natural or artificial, can be found or formed nearer the track of
ships, will present such a situation; and we may take some of our great bays as
examples," as a premise to the second query, then what auxiliaries shall be
resorted to 1 Of all those which, in connexion with permanent works, might be
selected to control effectually the channels of our principal watercourses and
harbors, none are less reliable than floating batteries and gunboats.
In the well-constructed fort, the chief merit is a capacity of endurance almost
impregnable to the aseiaults of shipping.
In the ship, a mobility which gives the facility of transferring the great power
of her battery to any part of the channel that may need it. The disadvantage
of one is its immobility, which restricts it to a fixed point, whence it can control
nothing beyond gun range; of the other, a vulnerable material very susceptible
of damage from protracted battering.
The floating battery unites the weak points of both fort and ship. It is
neither spear nor shield, and is altogether objectionable, as inefficient, costly, and
unsuited to the character and resources of a great nation. Its worthlessness as
a defence is well manifested by the affair at Copenhagen in 1800, under circumstauces when, of all others, it would have been most gratifying to every sense
of justice that it should have protected the neutral rights of a brave but feeble
nation. On that occasion there were six hundred and twenty-eight guns mounted
on a line of floating defences, supported, as well as the urgency of the case admitted, by several forts and a reserve of heavy ships.
Nine English line-of-battle ships entered the channel skirted by the .Danish
line; commenced action at distances varying two hundred to four hundred yards,
captured and destroyed the Danish floating batteries in three or four hours, and
sustained no damage sufficient to interfere with their proceeding against the
other parties to "armed neutrality "-Sweden and Russia.
The report of the board of engineers, previously referred to, embodies many
interesting details of this event, to which the only material obj ection is the
mocle of stating the force.
1st. The B ellona, 7 4, and Russell, 7 4, grounded on the edge of the shoal, having
their own liue directly between them and the Danes, so that their fire could be
of littl a.vail, though themselves might be much damaged by the shot from the
enemy which missed the EngliRh line.
2d. 'l'he frigates and sloops had been directed to take the stations of these
hip oppo. ite the tick rouer battery, so that of the twelve line-of-battle ships
onl nine w re opposed to the floating batteries, being about.fifty guns stronger
than th Dani h line, aud not tliree /iundred and eigl,,ty-two, as the report infers.
11<' of th' board of engineers' deductions from this engagement is so concluivc that it may be quoted without further comment. It is thus (page 20 :)
"'I hat it illu trate strikingly the advantages that a fleet possesse over a
stationary line of floating defences. Lord N cl on was uperior to the whole of
hi aclver ·:u· ,, floating fore ; but not being dispo,' ecl to run any unnecc ~ary
hazard h clir t d all hi force upon a part of the Danioch line, which wa of
cour:-i c1<>fi·at c1 ; and hacl there been no other than a floating force pre ent, 1-0 of
coun'I would haYe b n the r maind r, had it b en twice the streno-th it was.
'Ihi.· . ampl fully confirm what we have before urged on th:i topic."
'omc id a of th xp n
of large floating batter:i may be gathered from
th pap r of
neral 1 ain
n coa t defence. Tho c propo ed by him were to
carry on<.: hundred and tw nty to two hundred c nnon. The e timatc<l cu t by
0
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:he chief naval architect was $1,400,000, for each of the batteries with its tow
.-Oat ; which sum would build three line-of-battle ships or two war st~ame~s.
It is further to be urged, that any such passive system of defence is _entirely
·t ,ariance with the tone and temper of our people, and the reputation of a
poweiful nation. The national policy may be strictly defensive, but w!1en _co:11~ed to resort to war, its system of operations should be rather offensive m its
Jiaracter, if it were only to enforce the sound maxim of preserving its own soil
J'Om the desolating presence of an enemy.
.
If the floating battery is the most use~ess of all the stationary defences, t!ie
::unboat may be considered as the most nuserable of all the war craft that sail ;
;othing more effectual could possibly be devised to render skill ai~d bravery
Eavailing. The experience which we have already had has sufficiently con:irmed opinion in the navy as to the dependence that may be placed on the per;ormance of these pigmy warriors, and renders it needless to occupy time in any
:abored exposition of their worthlessness. In reciting the events of past days,
,u.r own naval historian (Cooper) has very distinctly given his estimate of their
demerits, which, by the way, he does not altogether confine to the question now
at issue, of capacity for offence and defence, if we may judge from the following
pithy pa~agraph:
"'I,his was the development of the much condemned' gunboat syf.4tem,' which
for a short time threatened destruction to the pride, discipline, tone, and even
morals of the service."
It is singular, however, that two distinguished statesmen should, about the
same time, have given their faith to the efficacy of the gunboat-one in England,
and the other here. Mr. William Pitt, about the year 1803, in a motion cenmring the ministry, found a strong reason in their neglect to provide more gunboats. Admiral Sir E. Pellow, then in Parliament, was unable to sustain his
( political friends in the measure, and in a short and characteristic speech used
thes e words :
".As to the gunboats which have been so strongly recommended, this mosquito
fleet, they are the most contemptible force that can be employed."
.
About thirteen years later it fell to his lot to verify this opinion. In his
memorable attack. on Algiers, it is stated that "soon after the battle began the
enemy~ flotilla of gunboats advanced, with a daring which deserved a better
fate, to board the Queen Charlotte and Leander. 'rhe smoke covered them at
firt, but as soon as they were seen, a few guns, chiefly from the L eander, sent
thirty-three out of thirty-seven to the bottom."
Dispensing, then, with such inefficient aids, there remains for consideration
the n avy proper, which, it may be asserted, is indeed not only a sure reliance,
if it b e properly constituted, but is indispensable to any degree of security along
our line of coast, now washed for thousands of miles by the two great oceans ;
and also to maintain the communication by water and the isthmus between the
A..tlan tic and Pacific States, where forts, floating batteries, and gunboats can no
longer enter into the question, even were they a perfect defence for every other
intere t covered by our flag.
In the first place, it is believed to be susceptible of proof that a naval force,
i=:omew h at greater than the attacking force, may be relied on in connexion with
the present or proposed works at Boston, New York, Delaware, Chesapeake,
and some southeast port, to protect the coast from Florida to Maine, and (as
corollary to this proposition,) will destroy or capture the enemy that may commit it..,elf seriously against either of these ports.
To illustrate this, I will assume the attacking force to be tlz.c twenty steam
frigate. of the engineer's report of 1840. To New York harbor, to D elaware
and Chesapeake bays, would be assigned a certain number of ships, varying
with the peculiar circumstances of the time ; for the present, let us assume the
fofonding force to be stationed thus: N ew York t en ships, Delaware eight, and
/
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Chesapeake seven; and to avoid the recounting of local details, I again recur
to New York as the object selected by the enemy.
The stationary :floating defence to be used will be the old sailing frigates and.
line-of-battle ships of the navy, having heavy batteries on the gun-decks, and.
pivot pieces of tho largest calibre on the upper deck. Every spar taken out,
even to the lower masts, and the ships well secured with several chains to their
moorings; one at A, to bear on the ships in crossing the bar; three at B, C, and
D, to close the swash channel; and one at E, inside of the southwest spit;
which, with the fort on the Hook, is to assist in defending the main channel.
'l'he enemy's twenty ships are signalled from the Neversink h eights, and in
half an hour the Delaware and Chesapeake squadrons are at sea steering north.
It is obvious that any loss of time from irresolution or from want of information which is to be obtained by reconnoitring, must be to the disadvantage of
the enemy.
Suppose him well supplied with pilots, which, in a war, the Cunard line can
furnish abundantly, and aware that reinforcements are on the way, it is probable
that the attack will be commenced without delay.
The first point of defence is at the bar ; the deep water here is so narrow
that the enemy will hardly risk his ships in any one channel, even ip. two columns, and his line is therefore exposed to the concentrated fire of our ten ships,
and of the line-of-battle ship at A.
After crossing, the van will endeavor to form the line abreast, as far as the
channel admits, in order to relieve the leading ships ; but our own ships recede
before them, and by this time the guns of the line-of-battle ships B and C are
beginning to tell. Following our steamers, the enemy soon comes within the
fire of the fort, and adv"ancing onward, the line-of-battle-ship at E is brought
into play. The headmost of his ships have now for more than half an hour
been under the concentrated fire of four hundred pieces of the heaviest calibre;
and it is hardly possible that they should not be incapacitated for moving with
any rapidity. Even if their offensive powers be undisabled, they must therefore be soon dropped astern by their main body moving with full speed, and
their force be lost in the rest of the day's operations. On the other hand, our
own ships have felt the fire of the enemy's leading ships only, and if any one
be damag d, can anchor near the fort or line-of-battle ships, and do good service on the passing ships.
It is probable that in rounding the southwest spit, the number of the hostile
fleet will be reduced to fifteen or sixteen ships, capable of full motive power, if
an av rage degree of success have attended the defending force. And these
mu the Lrought to action before reaching the city.
·w ithout pr tending to indicate the precise time and place most proper for
thil'l, . uppo. e that it be decided to mnke a stand before entering the Narrows.
1·
1Vhru it i evident that the enemy will not attempt to force the a,va h, and
lia f 1low d the main channel, the line-of-battle hips A, B, C may ·lip their
mooriug and be towed by river steamers on each side up the swa:::h, their
dran~ht having b en adapted to that purpo. e, and take in moorings pre-viou..Jy
proYHl ·cl at thr dehouclie of the chann 1 into the main course below the . . arrowe.
)nr own . t < m r will here prepare to receive the attack, or to mak it if
d_ clin ·cl by th en my, who may adhere to the main purpo e of reaching the

I

CitY.

1.'h a tion will, of cour e, terminate in the d feat of the-weaker pm·ty, thoull"h
not 11 • • •• arily in th cle truction or captur of hi hip . But in what condition
will th· ·ncmy find hi. hip:-.? How many of hi teamer will there remain to
att ·mp the pa. ~acre, and what will be their capacity to do it after th roull"h
han<lli11 "' that ha l, .en XJ ri n d?
t 111 v be that not on f hi, v :4 ·l h,
truck it fl C'I' or i.. di~ahled but the
}JOw ·r of moYinrr with c rtainty and ;p di cripple , and their xpo urc
the
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Proposed defence of New York har~or.

fire of the forts therefore so much in creased in time as to render the attempt
haz ard ou s. Pieces of heavy ordnance can also be mounted. on stout merchant
&
hips and. steamers, forming a reserve to be placed along the passage where the
guns o f the forts do not command, so as to sustain a steady cannonade on whatever s hips of the enemy may remain in a condition to proceed. Meanwhile a
few h ours will bring up a fresh squadron, and soon after this will be r einforced,
so that fifteen steamers in perfect order will enter the bay. 'l'he result must be
the capture and destruction of the invading force.
,.._['his is the view which I consider fairly presentable of the favorite case so
ft-equf>ntly urged, wherein the advantage is enjoyed by the assailing party of
selP.cting time and place without warning to the defending force.
I t seems highly probable that the defence of any important point, with some
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exception as it regards the southeast and Gulf coasts, can be made g?o~ with no
greater additional force in the aggregate than above mentioned, adm1ttmg every
advantage that can be claimed for this arrangement of the enemy.
.
That advantage is limited to a space in time that admits of no accident to
force, speed, or any of the multifarious details of a fleet. Its operations must
be as precise and perfect as those of the machine that moves each steamer.
From the moment that the hostile fleet comes in sight there is a sure concentration of a superior force, and in a few hours there will no longer be the power
to choose. An action is inevitable ; and whatever be the result to our own
squadron, that of the enemy will certainly be unable to prosecute any enterprise
. against harbors or coasts for the time.
It is, however, out of the question for any such fleet to hazard itself on a
coast where the certain superiority, no matter how small, exists ; and the entire
line of shore northward would therefore be fully secured against an enemy's vessel.
South ward of Hatteras the necessity of naval means for defence is even more
stringent than to the northward.
The objects of attack differ as widely also from those just under consideration
as the manner in which shipping must be applied to defence in order to be
available.
The resources of private enterprise are no longer aggregated so densely, but
are scattered along the country bordering on the coast in a manner that renders
it difficult for the most eager marauder to do much in his line.
The commercial cities are pretty well defended from the extensive movements
of large fleets by the bars _which border the channel-ways to their harbors.
The interior lines of communication formed by the long downs of sand that
skirt the Atlantic shore are, however, accessible to vessels of inferior force, and
the command of these would give the control of all the trade that by its light
draught finds convenience in the smoother waters of the inlet. The most important debouch, however, for the resources of the country is the outlet of the
JHi , issippi, through which is poured, in a never-failing tide, the rich products
of the great valley of the river. To check this, to impede it, to harass in the
lea t degree, would be an evil of the greatest magnitud.e, and be felt in the remotest regions of the west.
The general character of the southern shore of itself prevents the operations
of vessels of heavy draught; hence the defence must be nearly the reverse of
that r commended for the shores north of Hatteras. 'There heavy ships will lie
inshore, and light crui ers be thrown out seaward to watch the motion of the
main force of the enemy, and coastwise to check small marauders or parties for
wood and water. On the southeast and Gulf coast the light steamers and vessels
of th third cla s would k eep the inlets and their approaches and the various
av mH'H contiguou to the Mississippi. "While seaward the heaviest sl1ips must
ahicl' the fir. t brunt of the attack and defence at all risk, so as to cripple the
forces of the as ailant should be be strong enough to close with the inshore
qu:u1ron.
'I lH· tru and only key, however, to the defence of these shores, a11d to the
imrnens inter ·t there collected, is the Ifavana. The island to which it belono-'
nt .r.· it: w •.-t rn xtreme into the Gulf, leaving but two pa, ages for -vc cl . . o
narrow a: to be commanded with the gr at st facility; the e are the great
thorou···hfare' of trade and the mail teamer· from ew Orleans to California
and ~ w Tork. ll n e if the use of the llavana be ven at the di. po. al of an
n ·my whil in th hand of a n utral power, each and all of the:;c intere t '
oulcl 1, · with difficulty le£ nded, v n by a uperior naval force, and never
gu 1rant<·c•d arrain.-t n·re lo~. :'I. '\Vhilc from it a~ a T nited tatc' port :1.
:-qu, dr 11 of mo r1natc .-i:w would coYcr tlw .-rmtlH'ast and ¾ulf coa::-t:-, pro t •ct th e
for i•rn mul iu. lwrc trac1er::-, and ; cnr tli • linrs from ... w rl anr-: or ... •w York
t tl1 · >acilic 'tate · 1,y way f tlic I. thmu ·, it::1 occupation would nee --~:uily
T
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; the object of every expedition, military or naval, preliminary to any attempt
~ the southern trade or territory.
.
lt present the force of large vessels for the southeast coast would be obl_1ged
use the harbor of Brunswick as their depot, refuge, and centre of operat10ns.
JJe report of the commissioners has already decided this to be the best south
f the Chesapeake. With the command afloat, Key West and the Tortugas
)ght be used, but not otherwise, as no supplies are to be had at either, and no
ater at the latter. Pensacola would have to answer for the Gulf shore.
The coast of the Pacific States differs in many respe~ts from th~t of the At..mtic in formation as well as in condition.
The circumstances of settlement, product, and trade have yet to determine·
::Juch that will govern in the extent and application of the elements of defence.
At present there can be no doubt that the two great harbors at San :Francisco
md the Columbia river will require immediate measures for their protection.
The sites of land works have probably been vindicated by the eng·ineers sent
or that purpose, though some time must elapse before these can be completed.
It seems, therefore, that the naval force in these regions should be of the
mo t effective character in power and number, singly and collectively, inasmuch
aa it must for a while be the exclusive reliance for a defence of any kind of
harbors, as well as of coasts. rrhe squadron should always be able to land at
any point a force of two thousand seamen and :five hundred marines, which,
with twenty or thirty of the boat howitzers on their field carriages, would be
found an effective auxiliary in emergencies.
The manner in which our own squadron operated along the coast of Califo1;nia
while held by the Mexicans will best exhibit the character of the attempts
likely to be made by an enemy against our own people now inhabiting that
utate. If the views above expressed, in relation to the defence of the United
tates harbors and coasts, be correct, it then remains to consider the species of
naval force which will be required to perform the part assigned to it.
By referring to the navy list it will be seen that the number of heavy ships
·hat is available, or could be made so by necessary repairs, consists of nine lineof-battle ships, twelve frigates, and five steamers .
. This force is obviously too small for the objects for which a navy should be de·1gned. If the number already assumed to be required for the defence of the
.~tlantic coast in war be applied to that purpose, it would leave a very insufficient force for the Pacific shores, for the protection of the line of communication
by sea between the Atlantic and Pacific States, and for general cruising· to cover
our own commerce, and annoy that of the enemy.
Not only is the effective number of the present navy too small, but the charicter of the force has been depreciated to a very serious extent by the superior
p~wers of offence that have been conferred on the large steamers that now con·trtute part of a navy here and elsewhere. The cannon carried usually as the
main reliance of line-of-battle ships and frigates are thirty-two and forty-twopounders . In our service the latter calibre may be considered as except10nable,
ruasmuch as it is not recognized by the regulations of 1845.
'l'he war steamers carry sixty-four pounders. 1tis true that the line-of-battle
hip:; ma.y have one hundred of the thirty-two-pounders, while a steamer of the
amc tonnage has but three of the sixty-four-pounders.
But it will be admitted that if the constituent of one battery is deficient in
any one element of power, which is possessed by that of another battery, that
110 mere increase in the number will compensate for this defect.
Thus, if the
thirty-two-pounder shot fired with nine pounds of powder be inferior to a shot
Jf sixty-four pounds fired with sixteen pounds of powder in the distance to
d1ic:h it will range with sufficient force to do material damage, then it is plain
hat i;o long as that distance can be preserved it will matter little whether a
~hip oppo:,e oue hunch ed or one thousand thirty-two-pounders to the three sixty-
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four-pounders: she will receive constant damage from the repeated efforts of the
small number of large pieces without the power of inflicting any harm by her
large number of small pieces. A similar relation, in effect, may be noted in the
effects of oth er military projectiles. '.rhus, we know that grape from a thirtytwo-pounder would be harmless against the side of a ship, when the shot would
pa;:;s through easily, and yet the ,c,tand of grape is composed of three-pound
shot which, even if fired separately, would still be very little nearer the effect
of the thirty-two-pounder shot.
The important question is in relation to the capacity of the stcnmer to maintain the distance suited to her powers of annoyance-and of this there can be
little doubt since the passage between the United States and England is made
with ease and certainty in the severest winter weather by the steam packets,
their averag·e speed being then seven to eig·ht knots with fair and foul winds,
and they could in all probability go very little below their hig·hest r ate in any
weather in which cannon could be used.
Those wh o have witnessed the performan..:e of the Mississippi in some of the
lUexican "northers" know what can be done by a good steamer in a strong gale.
Thus the twenty steam frigates would be very unequally matched in action, by
our covering squadron of sailing ships with the thirty-two and forty-two-pounders,
if it could be said that they were matched at all. Th e remedy for this is not
difficult, and can readily be attained by a reorganization of our armament,
though it would be more expensive to adapt the present sailing ships folly
to the ordnance which experimental practice has indicated as preferable than to
build new ships. Thus a two-deck er would carry the same weig·ht of metal, but
not the same number of canno"n. Hence, it would become necessary to reduce
the immbcr of ports, and to re-distribute them along the broadside; and to do
this, the whole planking and frame, nearly to the water's edge, must be remowd
and replaced to suit the changes required in piercing the side with the proper
numLcr of ports-involving an expense equal to half the cost of a new s1i p .
rl'l10y would still neecl an addition that could not be dispensed with, ·which
is an auxiliary steam power sufficient to give a moderate rate in a calm, in
man ceuvring or in getting out and in harbor. ~.,or thi::i purpose, greater length
would. be required than any of our present frigates p ossess, as they now barely
stow the provisions and water required for di::3tant crui.::ing. If these shivs be
cut and lengthened, the cost in connexion with that necessary for heavier ordnance will be folly equal to the expense of building new ships with e,ery disadvantage that can attach to a sacrifice of unity of de ·ign in model; for no
kill in the builder could possibly develop any one essential of form iu this
piecr of patchwork, except by mere accident.
'I'lw true policy, not only as regards economy, but iu reference al. o to accom pli:--hi1 w th oLjcct in view, is to commence without d fay the reorganization of
our naval power by the gradual addition of ship Luilt upon the IDOl-<t r~cent
mod<·l.·, and to carry heavy ordnance a, well as an auxiliary steam power.
Th e (•,·prrimcntal practice at the naYy yard ha developed ome point of
int('l'c·.~t ill rdation to the piece likely to combine th everal csseutiab of accurnc-y, m11cr , and force, and the bearing of all the rcKult:- ha~ incluct•d me to
propo. e th ' ·on:truction of a claK:-i of .. hip · defli 0 ·ned to unite a higher dPgn·<> of
fficic·ncy than any frigate or He,·enty-four mounting the 1>res nt armament, &c.
ln t-tc:ul of tw ·nty-. i.· thirty-two-pounder.., and four •i 0 ·ht-iuch p}i('}l gun.-; on
th crun c1Pck, the new fricrate i. to carry t,Ycnty-six uin -inch r-hell gun:-. The
comp· ratiYc: pcnctrati1w power of th · two pieces is :-1hown in the r-kNth annexed: 'l h thirty-two-pound ·r . hot pa::.;e cl twc•nty-on iuche into an 0 .1k
. tar•.,.r.t, thrc -fourth · of a mil• di~tcmt. Th nine-inch :-1h •11, m1charcrecl lirok~
through the whol thicknc:; · of thirty inch ·s.
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Fig. 1.

9wt,from a lwg 32-pounder, charge 9 lbs.-I'enetration in oak, distant 1,300 yards, thickness 30 in.

The diminution of force which both would
undergo at greater distances would lesson
the power of the thirty-two-pounder shot
yet more, while the nine-inch shell would
still retain every advantage arising from its
explosive power. The only pieces of the
present force that would approach it being
the two eight-inch shell guns, which, in number -and intensity of effect, are not comparable to the thirteen nine-inch shell guns.
If the distance were lessened, the broadside of nine-inch shell guns would in weight
of metal alone be nearly double that of the
thirty-two-pounder and eight-inch shell
guns.
On the spar deck are to be no broadside
guns, but, in lieu thereof, seven shell guns,
of ten or eleven-inch calibre, on pivots, and
capable of being pointed around the circle in
every direction.
.
An auxiliary propeller power will be placed
astern, for which purpose the length of the
< ship must be adapted to its convenient reception.
~
The points of this ship will be:

·f
~

-s - 1st. Cost ef Construction.-This ought
-f not to exceed the cost of an ordinary sailing
~

frigate, with the additional expense of steam
equipment.
'.rhe St. Lawrence cost about $350,000;
and the cost of a suitable engine, boilers,
&c., as furnished by Kemble~ would be about
$70,000 ;-total, $420,000.
The Susquehanna steam frigate cost very
little less than $700,000.
2d. Force. - 'l'he broadside weight of
metal of the new frigate would be about
1,800 pounds. The Pennsylvanian, three
decker, present armament, 2,100 pounds.
The Ohio, two decker, 1,500 pounds.

H. Ex. Doc. 92--25
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Comparing tlie long range with that of the steamfrigate.
New ship, seven pivot guns, 11-inch ....................... .
Susquehanna, three 64-pounders ........................... .

940 pounds.
192
"

3d. Cost in commission.-Only greater than that of a sailing frigate when
steam is used, the crew not exceeding six hundred men, which is about that of
the Congress frigate.
Comparing such a frigate with the heaviest steam frigate, it will be seen that
the advantages are, far greater superiority in range and force, as the propeller
frigate opposes seven 11-incb shell guns to three 64-pounders, the relations of which
arc about those of the 9-inch to the 32-pounders; and though her speed by steam
is not equal, yet if the steam frigate once commit herself to the chances of a combat she will be beaten, for her motive power is far more vulnerable in nearly every
point, and if deranged in the least by any of the contingencies of an engagement,
she is at once exposed to the nearer approach of the propeller, and consequently
to the full effect of the broadside guns, while her opponent loses but an auxiliary
power, if any of her machinery be touched, her defence being made good against
the steamer at any distance or position which the latter may select.
If opposed by the ordinary line-of-battle-ship with the present armament of
32-pounders and 42-pound-crs, the propeller frigate may, at a long range, play
her seven pivot guns with comparative impunity, or she may close and bring into
action the whole broadside.
Of course it is not designed to assert that the navy would be constituted of
this force exclusively, but only that on such a class of ships reliance might safely
be placed for defence of the coasts and harbors against any of the heaviest ships
in foreign service. In time of peace they would cruise as flag-ships, while the inferior cla ses might receive pieces of such calibre and number as would be suitable.
'l1he second class would be ships with a light deck over the battery and a pivot
gun on the to'gallant forecastle and poop.
The third class, ships with a light deck over a broadside battery, or else neither
light deck nor broadside pieces, but heavy pivot guns to the extent of the accommodation.
All the vessels of lower rate to be steamers of five hundred to one thousand
tons, mounti11g two pivot guns.
Query 3. I. it necessary or expedient to continue the system of fortifications
on the shores of the northern lakes 1
It would be a loss of expenditure already incurred not to finish the works which
lrnv h en commenc d on the northern frontier, and these would certainly be usefnl in the initial operation, of a war; though there can be but little doubt that if
it Y<:r bPcomC' nece . ..,ary to direct the military operations of the United States
to tha quarter, the population of the i tnte that border thereon would fm·nish a
force fully Hnffici nt to n. prompt and :final i. sue again. t any army that could be
~f'nt fr m l~ngland. It may indeed be questioned wh tlrnr any decent opportunity for . eYeting a connexion o expC'm,iv-e and unprodllctive would not Le very
acccptahl to the o-overnm0nt of reat Britain.
I hnYe the: honur to be, very re:--pectfully, your ohedi nt servant,
JN . .A. DAHLGREN,
Lieutenant United States ...Yary.
Hon. . L CoXRAD, i ' cretary ef JVar.
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F.
Order to the Chief Engineer.
WAR DEPARTMENT,

April 17, 1851.

The chief engineer will please prepare and report to ~he department the infor::iation called for by the second of the enclo~ed resolut10~s.
.
He will also, at as early a period as practicable, submit to the depar~ment his
iews and opinions on the subject embraced in the first of these resolutions, and
v-i.11 request Colonel Thayer, Lieutenant Colonel De Russy, Major Delafield, and
.llajor Chase to submit to the department their views and opinions in relation to
:his subject.
It is desired that the chief engineer and the above-named officers should direct
:heir inquiries particularly to the following points:
1st. How far the invention and extension of railroads have superseded or diminiEhed the necessity of fortifications on the seaboard.
2d. In what manner and to what extent the navigation of the ocean by steam,
and particularly the application of steam to vessels-of-war, and recent improvements in artillery and other military inventions and discoveries, affect this
question.
3d. How far vessels-of-war, steam batteries, ordinary merchant ships and
steamers, and other temporary expedients, can be relied upon as a substitute for
permanent fortifications for the defence of our seaports.
4th. How far the increase of populatio.n on the northern frontier, and of the
mercantile marine on the northern lakes, obviates or diminishes the necessity of
continuing the system of fortifications on these lakes.
0. M. CONRAD, Secretary of War.

The

CHIEF ENGINEER.

No. 8.

Report of Lieutenant Colonel R. E. De Russy.
FORT 1\foNROE, VIRGINIA,

July 26, 1851.

SIR: Being called upon by the instructions of the Hon. the Secretary of War

to present my views and opinions on certain points specified in his letter to the
engineer department of April 17, 1851, I beg leave to place before you the following observations upon the subject, which I request you will lay before the
Secretary of War.
Fortifications had their origin with the Greeks, and have been adopted, improved, and perfected by all civilized nations from that time to this. They long
since have become a combination of sciences, involving _mathematics, pyrotechny,
strategy, and the art of war. The objects of fortifications are to make strong by
art what otherwise would need an accumulation of active physical means, as also
to protect exposed positions from sudden assaults of an enemy. In producing
the first rc1mlt, they leave at the disposal of the country invaded or attacked an
aetive force which otherwise might be kept in check by an equal or superior one.
!o-ain, they secure in a great degree, within certain distances, positions rendered
i~portant either by their location or the magnitude of their commerce and
resource ; hence all important seaports should, in my opinion, be protected by
Sri.table fortifications.
•
1;:;t. Because otherwise an enemy's fleet might for a time with impunity ride
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in safety in our harbors, and harass or even destroy the commerce and property
in those harbors.
2d. Because they become dangerous barriers, which an enemy is seldom disposed to leave behind him, the custom of war being to attack fortifications when
offensive operations are intended to be carried on by an enemy beyond their
localities ; and finally, a fortification is the usual depot for all munitions of war,
both in implements and provisions. The heavy ordnance, so essential to our
present system of defence, could hardly be stored in safety elsewhere, unless at
such distances from the seaboard as to render their transportation tardy and perhaps hazardous to the several points where they might be immediately needed.
I will close these preliminary remarks by adding, that fortifications give confidence at home and mistrust to an enemy, and compel him to make additional
and costly preparations, both in money and time, when he expects to come in
contact with them.
I will now proceed to give my views and opinions on the several points enumerated in the Secretary's letter to the chief engineer, and will discuss these in the
·
order in which they are presented.
. 1st. I look upon the invention and extension of railroads as of important advantage during a state of war, so far as the rapid transit of both troops and munitions
are concerned, but that advantage might be too much depended upon.
Railroads are so easily impaired or destroyed that it would be dangerous to
depend entirely upon their use. An enemy would naturally weigh the value or
importance of such conveyances, and would offer such high rewards for their
destruction as would be likely to meet with success. It is well known that our
railroads are generally constructed through the most uninhabited portions of our
country, and are in consequence liable to be approached and destroyed by mercenaries, who would run many risks to obtain rewards commensurate with the
importance of the undertaking.
I have already remarked that without fortifications our harbors and seaports
would be exposed to an enemy's fleet, and I now give it as my opinion that all
the facilities afforded by the railroads that centre, for instance, in and about the
city of New York would not prevent an enemy's fleet from destroying that city,
were it not protected by suitable fortifications. The same result would undoubtedly attend any other of our important commercial cities on the seaboard; this
opinion is based upon the supposition that an active and competent naval force
would be employed by the enemy to attain these important results by a sudden
attack, and that, too, combined with an adequate number of troops in case it
would be found necessary to make a simultaneous one.
We have had during the late war with Great Britain many instances to wan-ant
this opinion. I will cite a few of them to show the necessity of fortifications in
our harbors.
The defence of Fort McHenry saved the city of Baltimore. The defence of
ran y i, land saved Norfolk and the navy yard at Gosport. The temporary
dct nc •s at andy Hook, New York, prevented the blockadiug squadron from
ent rino- ·within the waters of the Lay, and compelled the ships every evening to
mak an offing, ther by giving an opportunity to our merchant ves · ls to lip
out of th harbor. The e latter defonc , were in ignificant in them elve._, but
th y act d in conjunction with some fift en or twenty gunboat , each mounting
one gun, which were g nerally anchor d in the cove, and ready at any time to
co-op rat with the fort and block-hou e erected on the Hook; and had Fort
1 a hinc,,t n
n defend d in t ad of b hw de troyed, it i my opinion that the
a11itol of the nion woul l have r main d unmole ted durinO' that war.
2d. Th navig, ti n f the oc an y team, and th application of . tP-am to
v · ·l. - ,f-war, would
rn, in my opinion, to incr a e tl1 ne e. ity of fortit~·inr,
a-coa t.. The gr at , dv ntan- f t am pow r li mor in tl1c c ·rt: inty
mpli ·hing an obj ct in a giv ·n tim than in incr iug the ,.trength and
0
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i)i)wer of an enemy. In other words, an exp~dition planned for a particular
:•jint on our sea-coast by a transatlantic power can be calculated to a day wh~n
-ieam vessels are being employed for the purpose ; but those steam _v~ssels, m
·be presence of or passing our fortifications, are more exposed to be lllJUred by
,nr forts than ships-of-war would be. The machinery of the one cannot be well
. rotected, consequently is easily impaired, and when impaired, the ?teamer's
'!!!Otive power is either retarded ,or entirely suspended, whilst the other 1s so conm-ucted as to be at times crippled in her hull and even her spars by sho_ts,
irithout losing much, if any, of her way in passing a battery. ,
I have just said that the certainty of arriving at a particular point at an appointed time is the advantage obtained by the use of steam in vessels-of-war;
ihat advantage is a great one, and the only means to counteract it is ~o have
permanent defences where it is likely an enemy would endeavor to surprise any
one or more of our seaports.
I believe it to be demonstrable that, with our present system of fortifications,
provided, as they are intended to be, with the heaviest mortars, howitzers, and
col~mbiads, the advantage on our side would be increased had we to contend
agamst war steamers instead of ships-of-the-line .
. 'rhe difference of speed between the two kinds of vessels when within shot
distance from our forts is more than counterbalanced by the greater surface
offered in the length and breadth of the deck of a steamer, and the constant
exposure of her machinery to curved fires.
The machinery of these war steamers is supposed to occupy about one-fifth
o_f the length of the vessel; one single shell or shot passing through that portion of her bull would in all probability injure some part of that machinery, and
il~lay or stay her progress. With our heavy guns we may calculate to reach
with certainty and effect an enemy's vessel at the distance of two miles. If
that vessel is compelled to pass under our guns, she will, sailing at the rate of
twelve miles per hour, be within reach of our pieces, say twenty minutes; in
those twenty minutes each gun will, upon an average, discharge twelve shots,
eonsequently a battery of say forty guns will discharge four hundred and eighty
shots and shells, which, when directed with skill, will, in most instances, have
their effect against passing vessels.
In answering the third point in the Secretary's letter to the chief engineer, I
would say that vessels-of-war would at all times afford important services in
the defence of our seaports ; and could they be so multiplied as to be found at
each port in sufficient numbers to cope, with the assistance of auxiliary means
obtained on the spur of the moment, with a powerful naval force, then they
would in a measure remove the necessity of creating another species of defence;
but this state of things cannot well take place. Our navy can never attain such
pre-eminence, and consequently must, while subdivided along the coast, as it
irill be in time of war, be found in the minority by an invading force, and thereby
be compelled to seek for protection under our fortifications. Their co-operating
with the _defences in our harbors, they will become extremely important and of
~eat ass1stance.
·
Steam batteries have often been spoken of, and might, perhaps, be of service
where the channel-way is narrow, and can afford them protection from the
shores; but in open roadsteads I would not rely much upon them; they neces1:arily must be slow and unwieldly, and in consequence liable to be turned and
even avoided by an active naval force. All other temporary expedients, such
as arming merchant ships, steamers, &c., might, perhaps, be made useful for a
ehort time, and upon a particular emergency, but no reliance could be placed
upon them. 'l'he immense expense attending the transformation of these vessels, together with the cost of their impeifect armament, would hardly warmnt
tl e introduction of such a doubtful system of casual defence in our large seaports. The havoc which would naturally result to these light vessels, when
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engaged with heavy ships-of-the-line and war steamers, would, I am inclined to
believe, be extremely disastrous. 'rhe expense, moreover, for such temporary
means would, I believe, exceed the cost of the permanent fortifications constructed for the same object.
Permit me for a moment to digress, by stating that there is one consideration
attending our expenditures for fortifications which, in my opinion, is far from
being· unimportant to the general welfare of the country, aside from the importance I attach to fortifications as national defences, and which but few, perhaps,
have considered; it is, that every article used for our defences is found in a
crude state in our country, and generally in the neighborhood of our important
works. The manipulation of these materials gives employment to a large and
useful class of our citizens, and creates, as it were, a sort of revenue which
benefits both the laborer and the government, first by rewarding industry,
and that industry, by the natural course of things, bringing back to the aid of
the general government portions of the revenue which that industry enables the
laborer to obtain from abroad through our custom-houses. For instance, a
quarry, when worked, requires many hands; these hands, devoting all their
time to their arduous labor, -find it necessary to exchange the price of that labor
for the necessaries of life, hence imported goods of many kinds must find a
market with them. The manufacturers of bricks, cement, lime, lumber, iron,
and other materials used in the construction of our fortifications come under the
same rule, and, independent of the mechanics and laborers employed in our
public works, form a large and useful class of our citizens, all returning to the
general fund a portion of revenue created, in fact, only by their industry.
I name this fact to show that, although many look upon our system of defence
as costly, yet the advantages of it, independent of the security it affords to the
country in a military point of view, are substantial and important to the community at large, inasmuch as they create a revenue by bringing out the latent
resources of the country.
The fourth point relates to our northern frontier and its defences. I can but
look upon that frontier as an exposed one, and consequently requiring the watchful eye and fostering care of the government. Our neighbors have been diligently employed since the war of 1814 in strengthening her borders, and many
va t improvements have been made by them to keep pace with our increa ing
strength in population on the lakes. Their population, too, is increa. inc:r, and
the 1'Velland canal has removed obstacles which g·ives them now the advantage
of an inland navigation from the St. Lawrence through to all the lake.:. If there
ever was a time when a system of defence planned and executed for the protection of our exten ive northern frontier, it i8 the present one, when we C.'ln
~v igh the advantage. that could be deriv d from the great improvem •ut:, already
m cvidmce on the opposite sid of th lake . If reat Britain houlcl CY r heraft ·r b . found at war with us, a portion of the naval force ,vould b found on
th lake , and interforino- with our frontier town· and citic and om· inland mn~<·rc . 'l'he r clundancy of her population at horn· would natur, Hy pl.1c · at her
d1~po. al th<: m an of incr a,.ing h r fore in tho~c inland ea:, and b)· a ,y,tem of lo omotiY w:ufnr, di tnrh and mmo_ · a population uu 1crically much
,tr 11w,·r than th fore· ,:h would oppo~ • to th ·rn.
'1 o m t tlii~ tat· of thing it would c•rm incli~p 1L·ablc to fortif)- p nnan n 1y
·. rtain point in our llOrth rn frontier, not only for the prot ctiou f h , I , ·.
t1 11 and n. ,lc•pot for provi ion· and munition · of wnr, hut
!!'I' •
J int for ti militi. and oth ·r troop .
'1 h r1 mark I hav nlrt>·tdy made upon th
ul~j ct , f na i n 1 d
h
b . rd, in onn • i n ,·ith an. ·iliary m •·m , will uppl • t t • 1 •
for H th Jl1 f nnmu 111lllill i ' llCC'rll C • th • • mi•rht b 0111 f ll
rt
r pr t ct h 'p rrnun #nt fortifi ·a io1; but 1, ~ t tJ1 m "
t
JJ_, b
J> ct d co1>c with v
I -of-, •ar.
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In the war of 1812 and 1814 the ascendancy on the lakes between the British
navy and ours fluctuated according to the number of vessels constructed ancl
the time they took their element ;· one single vessel added to the one or the
other would give, for the time being, the preponderance to that side; but the
time is past when we ought to think of adopting the same system, since, by the
vigilance of Great Britain, she has opened the way for any number of armed
vessels she may be able to spare from her own coast. These circumstances
would, of themselves, seem to indicate the neces:3ity of fortifying the vulnerable
as well as the important points on the lakes.
'l'he few defences temporarily erected during that war on the northern frontier
bore testimony of their great usefulness in checking the. enemy's ingress. At
Plattsburg, for instance, when our navy, protected under the guns of the forts,
gained a brilliant victory over the enemy; Sir George Prevost, with an army of
fourteen thousand men, found there an opposition which compelled him to retreat
precipitately, leaving his sick and wounded at the mercy of the American
general commanding. 'I'hus a garrison of fourteen hundred men, which was the
force of General Macomb, within well planned defences, protected our navy on
Lake Champlain, and taking the offensive as well as the defensive, compelled
an army of fourteen thousand men to abandon the project of invading the
country, which was understood to be the avowed intention of the British commander.
Many other instances of the kind occurred during that war w)1ich could be
mentioned to show the importance of works of defence on our inland borders .
. In conclusion, permit me to say that to protect the lives of its citizens is a
high consideration with every government, but with none can it be so important
as with ours, when it is considered that our population is yet too thin and sparse
to furnish large masses for war services. We must, in consequence, use all
~e~ns at our disposal to reduce the number of troops required for active service
m time of war, and these should, so far as practicable, be protected by these
means; I know of none more effectual for this important object than permanent
fortifications. By multiplying them you relieve a portion of your useful citizens
from the perils and hardships incident to the fields of battle, and leave them at
home to pursue their useful avocations.
In presenting this feeble view of the subject, could I persuacle myself that
any portion of it would be acceptable or useful to the honorable the Secretary
of \Var, it would be most gratifying to me; as imperfect as it is, I submit it
with all respect.
R. E. DE RUSSY,

Lieutenant Colonel Eng£neers.
Brigadier General Jos. G. 'l'oTTEN,

Clt,ief Engineer

ef tlie

United States, vVasliington.

No. 9.

Report

ef Major w:

H Chase.

OIIASEFIELD, NEAR PE~. AC0LA, April 17, 1 ~: 1.
The undersigned, in compliance with the orders of the Secret.try of War,
communicated through the chief engineer, ha .the honor to submit to the \Var
Departmmt the following vi ws and opinions of the subject embraced in the
fir t resolution of the series adopted by the House of Representatives of the
United States during its ·ession on the 3d of .i.\ larch, 185 l.
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In viewing "the general system adopted after the war with Great Britain,
and since pursued in regard to the permanent fortifications then deemed necessary for the national defence," it will be relevant to the subject to allude to the
condition of that defence when the United States declared themselves independent of Great Britain, and prepared to sustain that declaration by force of arms
during the period of peace from 1783 to 1812, and during the war of 1812-'15.
In the first period the defences on the seaboard of the colonies, extending
from Nova Scotia to Florida, were confined to a few points. England having
driven the French from their North American colonies, ha<} little fear of any
future attempt on the part of France either to regain her lost possessions or to
attack the other possessions of England in America.
In the course of the war of independence the English were driven in succession from Boston, New York., Yorktown, and other places, and finally from the
whole country, by which the power of the United States, even in its incipiency
to resist aggression from the most powerful of nations, was favorably exhibited.
:Few or no additional sea-coast defences were constructed during the war,
yet the public and private armed ships, issuing from the ports of the United
Stntes, did immense injury to British commerce, and even kept the whole
western coasts of England and Scotland in constant alarm. Some hastily raised
redoubts on Dorchester heights, compelled the English to retreat from Boston
with their fleet and army; and the castle defending the entrance to the harbor,
falling into tlie hands of the Americans, together with some temporary erections
of earth on the surrounding heights and islands, secured Boston from again
b ing occupied by the enemy. Charleston was successfully defended by the
Palmetto fort against a squadron of ships ; and the success generally of the
Amercan arms up to the surrender of Yorktown, demonstrated, if not the
impossfoility of reducing the colonies to suLjection, at least the enormous expenditure of life and money attendant on the attempt.
This truth led, with other things, to a change of policy in England in regard
to the united States. The new administration made peace · with the colonies;
and the 1vise statemen of Englaud saw that an intimate commercial intercourse
with the United States as an independent power would probably be more
advantageous to the interests of their country than the po se sion of colonies
that would require much blood and treasure to regain and l}.old; whilst the tra~e
with the same would be interrupted and precarious. The foundation of th1s
poli y \Va. the preservation for the fntur of uninterrupted friendly relatio~n
1,ctwC'en England and America; ancl it was the determination of the party m
1Jower to .Jccnrc at all hazards and at all times peace with the United tate ·.
]{ut tmfortnnatcJy for a i;trict adherence to these views, the great wars groWlllg
ont of the :E rench revolution placecl England in position to tru o-le for
lier vr, -y ·xi:--tenc a. an independent power; and in the cour e of the cont ':'t prin ·iple:'l h1 relation to n ·utrality 1rcre adopted, and so rigidly adhered to,
that th· int •rc., ts and honor of neutral nation.:, and of the Uuiteu tate~ in
p:utic-nlar, w< ·re cornpromi. ed. In pcr;-;i. tino- to a::crt her arroo-ant pr ·ten--ion;;
the gc,nrnnwut f England wa, d1;ceiYccl by it, diplomatic agent and friend
a · t tl11 fliet produced iu America. Tb·.·c,jud,ring of th• ..,tr ngth of the
p· rtY i 01,pn. itiun to 3fr. i\Iadi.-:011':- aclmini. tration, ancl of the talent and
inll11Pt1 ·r• of the principn] m<·n f that part·, con. tantl r pr ·· ut · 1 to the
1-:ug-li,h g-,,v m1111·11t thnt th , Pr·. iclcut woulu uot recomm ·ml to I ng-r " a
,1 · ·larati n f w, r :F•ai11.-:t Lnglancl ju the foC'c of the pow rful part. - pp • d
to . u ·h a m : ,urc. -\
·r ·tan· of 11 ", ti n in 1Va ·hiJJ<rton wa.: th onlv c
-11 Jl(l ·nt ut th· Lng-li h mini ti:.,. wh~: und •r:-toocl th· ·.·act . t, te o tJ1u1!!', in
th -nit, <l • tat··. l · r I ·at 1. · :t Yi:- •<1 tlr rnini,ter of for ·i!!'Il • ffair, h
the I I t r, ·:• 11 t · lT<· tly in , 1111l'U , f tl1 f f'lin~ iii Am •ri ·a: anrl Jm uni "
li
r "1 in
uu ·il , · r" r Yvl· d nu, oth ·r olm ·i:nt 111 a: ur - ncl
nlJ t
\· r · uld · rtninl • b cl ·lnr · ao-aiu t Euglaud b • th
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.At last the secretary was listened to, and the orders in council were repealed;
but before the news reached the United States war had been declared . . The
messengers bearing respectively the declaration of war and the order removing
the principal cause which led to the declaration, passed each other on the ocean.
Thus was the war of 1812-'15, or, as it has been termed, "the second war
of independence," a blunder which England lost no tin:;te in remedying, by seeking for and concluding a peace with the United States as soon as she could do
so with honor to herself.
\
At the time peace was made England was never more powerful. Triumphant
over all her enemies in Europe by sea and land, she w!1s left by the ~ener~l
peace of 1814 in possession of vast means, ready organized and practiced m
Wal', with which she might have given the United States ~ome severe thoug!1
not fatal blows. But however much her pride of power might have been gratified by can·ying her triumphant arms to America, she preferred at once to resume
peaceful and intimate relations with the United States, and to secure all the
ad,antages flowing therefrom, then and forever. Her far-seeing statesmen knew
that the true policy to be followed in respect to the United States in 1815 was,
with increased reasons for its adoption, that indicated by the statesmen of 1783;
and they resolved that no future blunder should lead to a war between the
L"nited States and England so far as the latter could prevent it. In this favorable state of the political atmosphere, the clouds that lowered over the northeastern boundary, over Canada during the patriot demonstration, and over Oregon,
were soon cleared away. It is true that the United States yielded in these
instances something more than was due to England's just claims; but it was
rather the graceful yielding of a daughter to a mother's solicitation than the
acknowledgment of any power of coercion possessed by England. If the
peaceful views of England were not then generally acknowledged, they are now
made manifest. England is not only at this time to a great degree dependent
on the United States in commercial matters, but signs are significant that she
considers her future fate depends on maintaining the most friendly relations with
the United States, so that they would, from interest in commercial matters, and
perhaps from a better feeling for their noble mother, look with disfavor on any
combination ef the European powers to liumble and crush lier.
Frnnce also gave evidence how much importance she attached to the maintenance of the most intimate relations in trade with this country, and how
reluctantly, if at all, she would resort to hostilities with the United States. The
King of the French, supported by public opinion, was enabled to overcome the
opposition of the chambers to the payment of the amount stipulated by treaty
to be paid for spoliations on our commerce. This public opinion was especially
expressed by numerous petitions, coming up from the great commercial and
manufacturing districts of the kingdom, praying that the difficulties with
America might be settled and peace preserved.
During the period extending from 1783 to 1812, considerable expenditures
were made from time to time on the forts and batteries at the principal seaports,
in anticipation of possible war growing out of the l!.,rench revolution, and more
recently in consequence of the continued aggression on our commerce by English
crui ers; , o that .when war actually broke out in 1812 there was not a town of
any magnitude that was not supplied with one or more batteries. Nevertheless,
there were a great many small towns exposed without defence to the enemy, and
were left unmolc..ted Ly him, seeing that their destruction or injury could in nowi..e facHitate his operationH, whilst such acts of vandalism would serve only to
hold him up to the execration of the civilized world.
n the c~ur e of the war of 1812-'15 the defences of the country were con~id ·rably increased in value hy the construction of field-works; and in no
in tance w re ·uch clcfeuccs, supported by well-trained and patriotic volunteers,
ever overcome. Attacks were made on l!'ort Boyer at Mobile, on l!.,ort Mcllenry
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forces operating on the rear and flanks. Works were th~s constructe~, to s1:1stain
a siege from ten to fifty days, in the midst of a population from which r~hef to
the invested work could be drawn in twenty-four hours. The expensive arranirement of these land defences have greatly increased the cost of the works,
alre~dy from their nature very costly; and at this day excite the surprise of the
professional examiner, acquainted with the vast means of collateral defe1:ce possessed by the United States, that anything more should have been reqmred for
most of the works, than security against assault by escalade.
'l'he report to be made by the chief engineer of the United States, on the
second resolution of the series before mentioned, will exhibit the exact condition
of the works composing "the third system of defence," the number and strength
of the works; the first estimates of cost; their extent, capacity, armament, and
actual cost; and an estimate of the sums necessary to complete them.
This exhibition will prove what has been herein stated, tliat tlie Uni'.ted States,
at tltis time, possess the best fortified sea-coast in tll.e world.
Whilst the defence of the coast has been gradually accomplished in the course
of thirty-five years by the construction of permanent, extensive, and expensive
fortifications, new and important elements in the national defence and security
have been rapidly, almost magically, developed. Our population has increased
from 8,000,000 to 23,000,000. The progress of improvement in agriculture,
manufactures and commerce, and in the facile lines of intercommunication necessary to meet the demands of the growing prosperity of the country, has
advanced in a ratio even greater than that of the population.
'I,he lines of communication, in combination with the electric telegraph, whilst
they impart new life and vigor to the country, bring distant sections of it in
easy correspondence with the centre, at once affording security against foreign
aggression, and making the people more interested in preserving those glorious institutions under which, for seventy years, they have happily lived and
prospered.
The interior and exterior commerce of the country have advanced with surpri _ing strides. the latter has become so necessary to the leading commercial
nat10ns of the world, that its intenuption would produce disastrous results to
t~o~e nations. The stoppage of the supply of cotton following a war with the
United States, would be attended in England by the most serious consequences
to her trade and finances-consequences deemed by many as being fatal to the
political institutions of that country.
In this brief review we have passed through three epochs: that of the revolutionary war ; that of the war of 1812-' 15 ; and that of the elapsed time from
1816 to 1851.
ID: the first epoch it has been shown that the power of England, although
relatively greater than it is now in respect to this country, aided also as it was
a considerable portion 0f the inhabitants remaining loyal to England, was
madequate to subdue our people, or to retain any portion of our soil.
In the ccond epoch it bas also been shown that though the national defence
by permanent fortifications was weak in comparison with the present one, and
he mean for the operation of the mobile forces were limited and difficult in
their use, the mo t formidal1le demonstrations of the enemy were easily defeated
and the country preserved from any injurious attacks of the enemy, except in
one or two instance .
~ nd in the third poch it is shown that, in the several international difficulties
hich have arisen with :B ranee and England, those powerful nations gave evidence
hroughout the pending neg,Jtiations, of their desire to maintain that pacific policy
· :-:<·ntial to the pro ecutio 1 of the commercial and manufacturiug pursuit 3 which
have be ·n extended so rapidly in their respective countries during the last thirty
year-.
'Ihi epoch, now of thirty -five years duration, is distinguished for the profound

?Y

1

396

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

peace which has been maintained throughout the civilized world without interruption, except in the instances of the Mexican war, and of some unimportant .
conflicts in Europe; and that whilst it has thus been distinguished, it is no less
so on account of the wonderful progress made in the arts and sciences, by whose
influence the character of nations and of their governments have been greatly
changed for the better, affording new guarantees that the pacific policy, so loug
and profitably maintained by the leading commercial nations, will continue to
be cherished toward all countries and toward ours in particular.
In view, then, of all these things, and especially of the new elements, moral,
political, and physical, claimed to have been developed and to have greatly increased the power of the United States, and whicli must be considered in relation
to tlie future arrangement ef tlie national defence, the undersigned thinks that
the general plan adopted thirty-five years ago should be essentially modified,
by reducing the number and size of the works proposed to be constructed, and
by abandoning some of the defences now in progress of construction, or which
are about to be co11structed under existing appropriations made by Congress.
The undersigned is also of the opiniou that the best inte1~sts of the country
require that the subject of modification should be submitted to a board composed
of artillery and engineer officers, and some eminent civiliami. That no new
work should be commenced, even if it has been appropriated for by Congress;
and that no appropriation should be made by Congress for the completion and
repairs of existing works, until the whole subject of the national defence has
been considered and reported by the said board.
The Secretary of War desires "that the chief engineer and the above-named
officers (Colonel 'l,hayer, Lieutenant Colonel De Russy, Major Delafield, and
Major Chase) should direct their inquiries particularly to the following points:
"1st. How far the invention and extension of railways have superseded or
diminished the necessity of fortifications on the seaboard 1
"2d. In what manner and to what extent the navigation of the ocean by
steam, and particularly the application of steam to vessels-of-war, and recent
improvements in artillery and other military inventions and discoveries, affect
the quc tion 1
"3d. How far vessels-of-war, steam batterie , ordinary merchant ships and
teamers, and oth~r temporary expedients can be relied upon as sub. titutes for
p rm.anent fortification for the d fonce of the large seaport 1
"4th. How far the increase of the population on the northern fronti<'r, and_ of
th m ·rcantile marine on the northern lakes, can obviate or dimini h the neces 1ty
of continuing the sy tern of fortification· on those lakes 1"
Th r '" ult of the inquiries made by the undersigned in the premise , are
cxprc· d a follows :
1 t. ~l'h • inn?ntiou and exten ·ion of railway. and of the lectric tclccrraph, i~
conn x1011 with th gr at increa:- in the number and ize of steam v ~-.:el~ mmgati11: t_hP. river , ba • , fak s, and ocean, lrn.v, added greatly to the "tr('l1crth o!
th
mou Ly bringing th mo t di. taut cctions within a few a~ y ' travel ot
th c ·~tr , and do thu contribute to pr erve tranquillity at home and repel
' C'l'!!l' • • 10n mm abr ad.
' h lin of railway., a . mning the radiating point at ...cw York, will lio~ly
< .·tcrnl 11 t
mo. of th impnrta11t . •aboard and inland town in th
mc
ti··. 'l h t •I "Taph lin · following th rail-1, and al o divcrgin"' fr m th m.
b rriunin"' to int ·la· th onntry in v ·ry clir tion.
y the"' m nn _and
rapid incr ·n. of our opulntim1 iudig •nouJy and by immi..,.ration, a-:rncultur ancl 111 mnfn ·tur , hnv · h n nrp1i~ingl • <·xt ncl cl throu ·hout ur
d mnin : n i nn in •mal mm re l1 •. ari. ·n L ·th, int r ·hang' f th J>
art au of ur Yariou ·Jim t • which i. ·on ·id •r •cl t lJ • of ar , t •r
·t rior comm re of th ·ou try. \Yith the .xc 1>tion of a
0
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onr artificial and natural productions embrace everything that can be produced
in any part of the world.
These are immense elements of strength to a nation, and insure its power and
prosperity. This is the moral effect.
.
.
.
The existence of these railways and telegraphs contribute directly and physically to the defence of the country, by enabling men and mil~tar.y supplies to ?e
collected promptly and moved rapidly to points threatened with mvas1on. Rmlways extend already along the coast, in some instances, in double l~nes, from
Portland to Savannah, connecting all the intermediate cities and other important
points with the canals and rivers and the naval and military arsenals and depots.
From this great base line, other lines convergent and divergent, have _reached
lakes Erie, Ontario, and Champlain, and they are rapidly approachmg and
crossing the great lakes and rivers of the west. And it is hoped that Congress
will not long delay, in conjunction with the State of Texas, in making such a
d~nation of _lands as will enable private enterprise to com~ence and complete a
railway leadmgfrom some point between the mouth of Red river and New Orleans,
through Louisiana and 'rexas to El Paso, and thence through the valley of the
Gila to San Diego, in California.
. A single example of the pervading extent of the railway system will at once
illustrate the subject, and exhibit in a favorable light these new means for the
national defence. The completion of the railway now in course of completion,
from Wilmington, in North Carolina, to Manchester, in South Carolina, will
enable troops to be transported continuously, by railway, from the valley of the
Tennessee to Norfolk in two days, to Washington in two and a lialf days, and
to . Charleston and Savannah in one day. The extension of the railway now
bemg made from Chattanooga, on the Tennessee river, to Nashville, will enable
the volunteers from the superb military population of 'Tennessee to be carried to
the most distant points of the north and south Atlantic, almost at a moment's
warning, and in the course of three or four days ; whilst the speedy completion
of the road from Atlanta, in Georgia, to Montgomery, in .Alabama, and the
pr?bable construction of a road from Montgomery to Mobile and Pensacola, will
;,_mng the Gulf of Mexico within a day's travel of the same great State of 'Tennessee.
At the north the system of railways is much more extended. The New
York and Erie road, now complete, is proposed to be extended along the shore
of Lake Erie to Cleveland, and thence to Detroit, from whence a road has been
carried to Chicago, on Lake Michigan. 'rhe seaboard base of rail ways will
thu,..: be 1:~:ought within easy communicatioig_ of the most distant lake frontier.
The Massachusetts, Vermont, St. Lawrence, and Montreal railways will bring
the whole Canada frontier, extending from Lake Ontario down to Montreal,
·ithin twenty-four hours' travel, on an average, of Boston, Portland, and New

York.
The transportation of troops on railways may be effected with great promptness . The first regiment of P ennsylvania, raised in Philadelphia, the most distant point from the scene of action, were transported so rapidly to New Orleans,
?:ia Pittsburg and the P ennsylvania railways, that the regiment, one thousand
rong, Wa!'I placed in the van of the volunteer forces, raised for the campaign
a.gaiu. t Mexico, under General Scott.
'ufficient has been said to show that railways and the electric telegraph cond 1te largely to the national defence ; that the works covering our large seal ort..'3 and other important points, placed in connexion with the railw:ays and
-le,rraph, if they were now to be constructed, might be much reduced in si,zc
and co. t, if not in number ; that the facility with which these works could be
r "li ·v ·d, in ca e of an attempted siege, would have rendered it only necessary
£ r them to be made s cure against a coup-de-main.
• nder thcoe viewi:; of the subject, it is at once perceived that, whilst the ex-
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tension and invention of railways and the electric telegraph do not supersede,
they gTeatly diminish the necessity of adding to the number and cost of the
fortifications on the seaboard ; or, in other words, that the future prosecution of
the system of defence by permanent fortifications should be on a very reduced
scale in comparison with the magnificent one adopted thirty-five years ago.
2d. The navigation of the ocean by steam, and the application of steam to
vessels-of-war, have certainly added to the facilities of naval operations in
making attacks and transporting troops. But such operations are necessarily
confined to short lines, like those between Fi·ance and England, in the Mediterranean, or on the lakes between Canada and the United States.
Attacks by steamers can only be formidable when they are numerous and
filled with troops destined for a grand attack; but when they are thus filled
with troops, munitions of war, provil:lions, armament, and their regular crews,
little room is left for the fuel necessary to propel them to the scene of action
and in retreat. Such steamers cannot be propelled either conveniently or rapidly
until the propelling power can be produced at a less outlay for fuel. At the
rate supposed to be the maximum of speed of war-steamers, lines of operations
over one thousand miles (five hundred in advance and five hundred in retreat)
cannot be occupied advantageously, or with the efficiency necessary to a great
movement of a strategic or direct attack. Numerous transports would be necesRary to convey supplies of coal to convenient places on the coast, where depots
for the same would have to be established and defended at great cost, for they
would be constantly in danger of attack by sea and land from enterprising assailants. Besides, the great loads of men, munitions, armaments, provisions,
and fuel that war and transport steamers would be obliged to cany, multiply
the dangers of navigation.
Certainly steamers could make sudden and brief attempts to enter harbors
and destroy towns, but fast-sailing ships with favorable winds could do the same,
if this kind of marauding and piratical warfare was carried on by any Christian
nation calling itself civilized, and if not opposed by the same machines of war
a tho e used by the enemy and by acts of retaliation.
8uch attempts might be succes~ful in attack and retreat, if made in the night,
even if the harbor was strongly fortified, if the fortifications were unaided by
rafts and hulks lying· across the channels.
But a demonstration on a large ..,calc against the important ports and arsenal..,
for the purpose of taking pos cs ion and levying contributions, require coni::id mble land forces, even again t such point as were not defended by batterie:s,
for at ench points, in time of war, earth erections would be made and ca ily uppli d with cannon of heavy calibre, that would do great damage, Ly direct an<l
YPrti al cannonade, to the n my's ve. scls and forces afloat after they had cut rc<l
tl11 harbor, and probably comp 1 them to leave it, and force him to t- ·lcct a more
distant point for th initiative of attack.
If th1· n my, . trong in hip· and solcli r,, could be cfrivcn from Bo.,ton by
th' r ction of t-om r doubts in the cour,e of one night, it i · hardly to b ·nppo. eel that h would att ·mpt to r captur the po ition, or to attack any other
.,
po:-ition irni1ar1y ;itu t cl.
...\ny . u h dcrnon tration at th pre. nt day would he checked by th m n
ju~t mun ·rat Pel, arnl b met on it flank. and in front Ly the mobil • fi re •, rnJ.
Ii d by th t 1 "mph t > th" point of att: ·k.
'.rl1 · irn roY<'mc11t i_1 : rtill ry, a r '",ll'<l~ siz • nd cffici •ncy, h. · h H f L
y · r. Y ry ~'T t, but 1t mur ' mor t th • hen ·fit of th d ·f 11 • • th n th
In tl1 J . am ~·ny t]i. t, ~f t •run ppli ·cl to ,·hip~-of-war ff rel nn n h· nt: !! t
tl1 · t ·k, t · m appli 1 on nnlw t • , ombin <l with th •1 ·tri t zr.i h.
aff rd r • t r . clrnut " to t11 • ctPti·n • 1,y r
n of th • !!T t r fi ili •· ·th
w}1i h for • m, y b mo,·<·<1 b • th latt r m an:-t.
} m nll which it IO y b
·ly
rt
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Y
1

1

T

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES,

399

i!eam, the application of steam to vessels-of-war,_ ~nd recent improvement in
millery and other military inventions, do not exhibit the attack of _forts ?n the
aboard superior to the defence, where those forts are connected with railways
md are brought within succor of the surrounding population, nor do they render
.dditions to the present fortifications in number, size, or cost in anywise neces' ry. But, on the contrary, the improvement in artillery, if those fortifications
:iad now to be built, would enable their plans to be reduced one-half in size and
e annament onefourth, in amount.
The substitution of the 10-inch columbiad for the mixed and most inefficient
:mnaments with which our fortifications have been garnished at great expense,
·, already forced upon us by the introduction of those superb guns · on board of
-e~sels-of-war. It would be ridiculous, if it be intended to adhere in any degree
·o the present system of sea-coast defence, to retain the present armaments,
Cl}mposed principally as they are of 12, 18, 24, 32, and 42-pounders. It is the
~pinion of many persons, entertained for years past, that but one class of guns
hould be generally used in our batteries on the coast, and that these guns
:.Jould be of the largest calibre which experiment has demonstrated could be
efficiently used.
.,
Fort McKee, in the harbor of Pensacola, is supplied with one hundred and
b-enty guns, composed of about equal numbers of 24, 32, and 42-pounders.
The average effective range of these guns may be stated at 1,100 yards, and
the weight of metal that may be projected from the entire battery at 3,920
pounds. Now thirty 10-inch columbiads would throw the same weight of solid
.. hot and strike an object with precision at 2,200 yards distant; so that whilst
the number of guns at Fort McKee might be reduced seventy-five in one hundred, the effective range by solid and hollow shot would be increased one hundred i1: one hundred, and the efficiency of the batteries greatly increased, at the
same time the size of that work might be reduced at least one-half.
3d. Our large seaports and naval depots being already covered by extensive
works, and requiring but small additional defences, the discussion of the question
as ~o the superiority of those defences over vessels-of-war, floating batteries,
ordinary merchant vessels and steamers, and other temporary expedients, would
ee~ to be unnecessary All experience, however, has shown that any kind of
floatrng defences is inferior, on every score, to land batteries where the localities
will permit the latter to be used. This subject has been ably discussed and
illustrated in the report made by a board of officers to the Secretary of War in
1 40, on the national defences. Other temporary expedients, such as rafts,
h~k~ sunk in c_hannels, and riages of stone thrown across the same, could be
relied upon, in most instances, only as auxiliary defence to land batteries.
4th. In considering how far the increase of population on the northern frontier,
and of the mercantile marine on the northern lakes, obviates the necessity of continuing the system of fortifications on those lak es, it will be necessary to bring
into view some of the elements of strength, moral, physical, and political
possessed by the United States, and which have already been alluded to in this
report.
The chief moral and political element is the aversion to war with the United
Stat s felt by Great Britain, whose present superiority in naval means of attack
makes her, of all nations, alone formidable to us. This aversion arises from the
intimate and entangling relations in commerce with this country, and from the
d pendencc of England upon the United States for the chief supply of cotton to
t e leading branch of her manufactures. And this aversion to the slightest
a proach of international hostility is not abated by the consideration that the
toward event of war with the United States would prompt Russia and France
carry out their long-cherished designs of aggrandizement in Turkey, Syria,
and India.
~I h principal physical clements are: first, the facility with which, by means
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of existing railways, we could approach Montreal with a large force, and drive
thence the British forces to seek shelter under the walls of Quebec, and finally
from all Canada; by which simple and rapid movement the two provinces would ·
fall without a strug·gle into our possession, with one-half of its population, at
least, inclined to a change of sovereignty; and second, the superiority of our
mercantile marine, affording convertible means for a naval force, giving· us the
mastery of the lakes, and enabling us to crush any partizan attempts coming
from the Canada shore; and third, the superiority of our advantages on the
score of a military population lying along the whole northern and lake frontier.
These great moral, physical, and political advantages being undeniable, the
continuation of the system of fortifications on the northern and lake frontier
would involve a useless wast~ of public money.
The large sums of money expended and proposed to be expended on the
defensive works extending from Rouse's Point to the Sault of St. Marie would
have been, and will be more beneficially applied to the improvement of the lake
harbors and dependent rivers, thus promoting the interests of commerce in time
of peace, and affording depots for our naval forces in time of war.

By demonstrating that sucli an application ef tlw public money would dfrectly
promote the national defence, not only on the lakes, i·n substitution qf fortifications, but on the seaboard, in aiding tlie defence by fortifications, muclz, ef the
opposition entertained, 0n constitutional grounds, towards internal improvements,
would be removed.
Under these views, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the whole system
of fortifications for the defence of the northern and lake frontiers should at once
be abandoned, and that no more money be applied even for the ·repairs or completion of the existing works.
The undersigned, in conclusion, would express his opinion in repetition, that
a board of artillery and engineer officers and civilians should be formed to take
into consideration the whole subject of the national defences, as called for by the
resolutions of the House of Representatives, passed in the e sion of March 3,
1 51, and as particularly and earchingly alluded to by the Secretary of '\Vai·,
in his order of April 17, 1 51, with a view to the changes nece sary to be made
in "the third system of defence," commenced thirty-five years ago; and of the
adaptation of the same, in·versely, to the increased power, political, pl1y ·ical, and
moral, of the United States.
The composition of such a board being well calculated to have the whole
subj •ct opened fairly and di cuHftecl freely, by which error of opinion , particularly tho e ari ing from profo. ional prejudice and interest , would be
e. po cd and corrected, the trnth in the premise. made mauifest, and the good
of th commonwealth ecurccl.
'ivili, n vcr cd in national and international policy, and officer known to be
ppoi::cd to the y tern of defence on it present , cale, a well a tho .. c who he Ye
cl ·clar ·d in it · favor, would cau. c the pour and contre to be fairly l-.t·lted, and
nll ·ophi try and fa]~ prin ·ipl · · to be cl ·tcct cl and di carded.
In th ' v nt of uch a board being form d, it i uglJ'c:-;tcrl. that the (1 ye. and
nor. on ull important quc tions hould Le ordered to be tak n and r corded.
H '"P · tfully , ubrnitt d,

W:M.H. OH., E,
1llajor of E ngi
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No.10.

Report of Major R. D elafield .
Views and opinions of Major Richard D elafield, of th e corps of engineers! on:
the following points connected with the defence of the coasts of the Umted
tates, called for by the Secretary of War in his communication of the 17th of'
April, 1851:
1st. How far the invention and extension of railr'oads have superseded or
diminished the necessity of fortifications on the seaboard 1
No member of the ,corps of engineers, so far as I am acquainted, has ever
considered it expedient to construct permanent fortifications along our seaboard,
to defend it against armies operating on the land. The art of fortification, in
such an emergency, is principally confined to temporary field-works, thrown up
after the enemy has_effected a landing, and selected his route of approach.
Such fortifications ai·e only needed to oppose infantry and field artillery,
requiring little less than earth for their construction, and executed. by the troops
in the field, and with a few days' labor.
To the more speedy accomplishment of this particular, in the defence of the
nation, railroads have contributed greatly.
.
Fortifications of a permanent character, requiring a long time to construct and
perfect, are, however, considered indispensably necessary to prevent the ingress
of the powerful floating batteries that can sail or steam into our harbors, against
which railroads can oppose, neither directly nor indirectly, ~n efficient resistance.
The city of New York, for example, is within three hours' sail of the ocean.
Ships-of-war of the heaviest class, and war steamers with troops, can come to
the docks of this city, or lay at anchor in the East and North rivers, and do as
much injury and destruction as may suit an enemy's purpose. Now, afthough
several railroads centre in this city from distant and most populous sections of
our country, they can bring nothing to prevent the entrance of a maritime force.
No number of men that can be concentrated in New York, or along the shores
ot: the water approaches, however well disciplined they may be, can oppose,
with any probability of success, the passage of a hostile fleet from the sea to
the city, or prevent its destroying its mercantile marine and real estate. Field
artillery, infantry, cavalry, and riflemen can have no effect upon ships-of-theline ; and the increase of numbers would but swell the loss of our citizens by
uselessly exposing them to a ship's broadsides.
The many thousands of uniformed militia that could, within forty-eight hours,
be concentrated by railroad and river steamers in New York and its vicinity,
could do positively nothing in arresting a hostile fleet from destroying the city. ,
It will be asked, then, are railroads of no value or use in the defence of the
ea-coast1 :Most certainly, they are a valuable auxiliary; economizing time
and trea,·ure, and preventing many a predatory expedition that an enemy might
otherwi e undertake.
L andings for supplies of provisions, water, or for any hostile purpose against
all the cities and towns of the Union, are rendered much more difficult and hazardous to an enemy . Ere he can effect a landing, march to the city, and destroy
or lay it under contribution, the railroads and river steamers could transport
fro m hundreds of miles the uniform militia of the country in far greater numl er ~ than any fleet can be expected to bring across the ocean; provided, we can
cau :e such landings to be made at such a distance from the cities as to give time
for th e railroads an d steamers to transport the militia after they are assembled.
In all such landings an enemy can have J:\O other description of force than we
can bring to oppo e him. H e has, in such case, been compelled to leave his
heavy battering, hip .
H . E x . D oc. 92--26
•

402

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

MILITARY .A.ND NAVAL DEFENCES.

403

ments in artillery and other military inventions and discoveries affect this
question1
The navigation of the ocean by steam has had a great influence upon the
defence of our seaboard. "The heavy ar,mament of war steamers, their ample
i!orage and accommodation for troops, the rapidity of their evolutions and facility
of transport, altogether constitute them convenient and formidable instruments
for offensive waifare, particularly for making a descent upon any line of coast
with a powerful army. Since 1815 it has enabled seamen to set the elements
at defiance, and this would lead hostile powers to consider us more open to
invasion."
B_efore its introduction, it required an immense marine and lon~ time for :Rr~paration ere an enemy could effect an invasion of our shores. . 1 he exped1t10n
fitted out by England against New Orleans was known by us to be in preparation, for some part of our coast, six months before its arrival. After sailing, it
~ad to rendezvous at Jamaica, (from whence, also, we heard of its concentration,) and again at Ship island, before commencing to disembark. This gave
~uch time for us to prepare. At that date we may be considered as having had
ix months' notice of an intended expedition.
At the present time, with the aid of steam, the notice comes with the blow;
~ few days now suffices to invade either Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, Charleston, or Savannah, from Bermuda. It is the introducti~n of steam navigation that has given such an advantage over us, compared
w1th the sailing vessels of 1815.
In 1812 Great Britain considered Halifax a ·suitable place for her naval
depot, and stores for her fleet on our coast. It so continued until a recent date,
:When they discovered that our proximity by land enabled us to reach and destroy
it, _beyond their power to prevent it. The consequence has been, that a central
p~mt o.l'posite our Atlantic .seaboard (Bermuda) has been selected, fortified, and
till bemg fortified with great care and strength, and fitted as a naval depot.
To it, already, have all the naval stores been removed from Halifax. It is
ecure against the power or force we can most readily command, (an army,) and,
by fortifications, is secure against any naval armament we are likely to possess.
From this point an army can embark in steamers, and in three days be
anchored in our harbors, without any other notice than their coming in sight of
our headland, but not long enough to enable us to draw together militia to
oppose them. Hence it is that we are comparatively weaker, at this time, by
the introduction of steam navigation.
Another important facility to an enemy, and to our disadvantage, is gained
by the steamship. Fifteen such vessels as have lately been built will carry au
army of ten thousarnl men, with their munitions, to any point on our Atlantic
coabt in a given space of time, ancl without any necessity for other rendezvous
than the point of attack. Whereas, some hundred sailing transports would be
required for the same army, and no calculation made of their arriving at their
de tination within days of each other.
The de£ nces of the coast of }trance and England, on the channel, forcibly
illu._trate the change effected by ocean steam navigation. England considered
Ler.·elf safe from inva ion, by the strength of her cliannel fleet. France conidered herself equally safe, by the fortification of her harbors. For a long
p eriod n •ither power could injure each othrr, guarded a. they were. 'l'he fleets
of En°·land mad many demon, tration upon the coasts of France, but never
ffe ·t d anything of importance, and N apo1eon made a powerful combined demo n tration with hi, army and fl t, and failed by the superiority of the English

eet.
But · inc team ha. rir< n to its pre, cut importance, these two nations are
con~id ·r d a. having mat ·rially changed their relations of defence.
ranc ', with her pr ponderating land force, transported by steamers, can
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readily invade England. The channel fleet of old would no longer be a pro
tection. The statesmen of England, fully aware of this state of things, hav,
for some time past been endeavoring to restore their ascendency.
A channel fleet combined with the aid of fortification, '' which experience ii
war and science can suggest," (Duke of Wellington to the chief engineers,) i
now their reliance, but it is a fleet of steam ships-of-war. Several of ther
ships-of-the-line have been fitted with screw propelling engines, as an auxiliarJ
power, retaining the sails and their powe1ful broadsides. The first ship buil
in the English dock yards of this class is the Sanspareil of eighty-one guns
2,'235 tons; carrying on her lower deck thirty 32-pounders of fifty-six hundredweight, nine feet six inches long; main deck, thirty eight-inch guns of fifty-twc
hundredweight, eight feet long; quarter deck and forecastle, twenty 32-pounders of twenty-five hundredweight, six feet long, one ten-inch gun of eightyfour hundredweight, nine feet four inches long, with a three hundred and fifty
horse-power engine, launched at Davenport in April, 1851. With vessels of
this description they hope to retain their ascendency on the water, and protect
their ports, in the absence of the fleet, against sudden attacks of an enemy's
steamers, by fortifications.
In relation to the application of steam to ships-of-war, up to the building of
the above vessel, the problem had not been solved. Not a single steamship
had been built calculated to contend with a land battery, or a broadside of a
ship-of-the-line. We have not, to this day, an instance of steamers having
exposed themselves succes fully or for any determined purpose to hostile guns,
with the exception of the little English iron steamer Nemesis in the Chinese
war, where she accomplished much, but against batteries of no value.
As transports and tow-boats, they have contributed greatly to the success of
fleets on the invasion of Algiers by the French under Beaumont; the fleet was
towed into position abreast the Algerine batteries by their war steamers. At
Vera Cruz they made the ame use of their steamers- at Beyrout, on the coast
of Syria, although the English had the best of their war steamers, they were
only u, ed as tow-boats- taking distant stations in the latter part of the action
and shelling the fortification.
The French army that recently operated against Rome was transported from
Toulon by steamers, carrying artillery, cavah·y, and infantry.
The result, then, of the navigation of the ocean by steam goes to prove a
greater necessity than ever for defending our cities, harbors and dock yards by
ome efficient mean , whether by fortifications, steam vessels-of-war, or other
means, is yet to be consid red.
'.fhe next branch of .inquiry under thi second head if'I : "In what manner and
to what extent has the rec nt improvements in artillery and other military
iuv nti n and discoveries affected thi que tion 1"
Th r cent improvement in artillery, I a1Jpr hend, are rather the re~ult of
calling Id thing by new nam , and thu bringing them afre h into notice.
than any ub tantial advantag .
Th u of what i g nerally call d the Paixhan gun is uppo"ed to lia,e
pr due d a gr at r volution in the a-coa t d fcnc . It i no more nor 1 ,,
than firino- h 11 w h t horizon lly, a practice tlrnt ha pr vail d a Iona- a., th
howitz r ha. b n kn wn (about 1693.) The only diffi rence between tJ1 Ii ·ld
• and i g howitz r nnd ol n 1 Pai lian': gun i , that he ake his ~un lo11g
and y hi writin"' , ha au l th m to be introcluc d a aain on board .. hip - w r, and probabl mor u l f r · a- a t batt ri, .
In our o,vn nri
w h d m d u e of uch ]on howitz rti for
d f. nc y ar · ef r o] n_ I i.· h n
anything to th public on th
1 call d th m col um 1ad., many of which ar now to b
non T ,.
i land in thi harbor that w r in u from 1 12 to 1 15.
n th
· an th u.. • of h 11 w b t fir d horizontally wa made by
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De Grasse, off the Chesapeake, during our revolutionary war, and abandoned in
eonsequence of the serious injury caused by the accidental explosion of the
iliells about the decks.
Since their re-introduction similar results have occurred. The steamer Medea,
111e of Admiral Stopford's fleet, operating against the Egyptians in 1840, when
,,if Alexandria, was seriously injured by the bursting of a shell that, with five
1iliers, had been got on deck for examination; one beam was split asunder, the
hole deck raised, and every buckhead in the captain's cabin, ward, and gunrooms torn to shreds, and the vessel set on fire .
.About the same period (December, 1840,) a similar accident occurred on board
the Excellent, the gunnery ship at Portsmouth, on trying some shells after hearing
of the accident on board of the Medea. The fuses, in both cases, were metal
( nith screw caps, supposecl to be a secure preventive against accidents on board
,e~sels. The use, therefore, of this improvement in artillery, for steamers, and
on board ships-of-war is, I conceive, quite problematical, while, on the other
hand, its value in the sea-coast batteries is increased by the greater ranges,
pr~~ision of fire, and facility of causing the explosion about the intend_e d and
cnt1cal moment.
While such shells fired from ships against stone walls and earthen parapets
are harmless, breaking to pieces in the one case, and throwing up a few yards of
earth only in the other, the injury to the steamer or ship is far greater than from
any other artillery in use.
~t may not be amiss, under this head, to show the effect of this species of
artillery upon vessels, proving, as I think, very conclusively, the safe reliance
we may have in defending our harbors by them if mounted in favorable positions.
The effect of hot shot and shells from these columbiads (I must be permitted
to use _the American name as of prior invention) against shipping was shown by
Cap tam Hastings, in the service of the Greeks, who, at Salona, in 1826-'7, fired
not only hot shells, which he substituted for hot shot, as by their weight they
broke through both sides of small vessels, but he fired carcasses and shells from
68-pounder guns. During tlle affair ~t Salona, he says, by the time he had fired
tmce, a brig-of-war blew up, owing to a shell exploding in her magazine. An
armed transport brig sank forward owing to a shell exploding in her bow, and
was set on fire aft by a hot shell. At 'l1rickere he burnt a brig-of-war with hot
sho~- During an attack of the Greeks against a monastery at Pirn:{ms, within the
straits between Salonis and Megara, and for the relief of A.thens, the 'l,urkish
pacha opened a battery of five guns upon the Greek steamer Perseverance, two_
of them long five-inch howitzers, producing considerable effect. One shot struck
the caniage of a long 68-pounder and exploded there, another exploded in the
wunter of the P erseverance and tore out two streaks for a length of six feet,
a.:nd tarted out the planking from two adjacent streaks, when the steamer
retreated from this dangerous position.
In the attack on the harbor of Tolo, the Greeks directed the fire of 68-pounders'
shell on a brig-a shell struck her, exploding in her hull and blew her foremast
int:o th water. They afterwards made an attack upon a Turkish squadron of
lline v s. el ·, and opened a fire upon the Turkish admiral's ship, distant about
five hundred yards, with hot shells. The second fire of two hot shells from the
loner gun. and two carcas. es from carronad~s, one lodo·ed in the hull of the
Turki h commodore, and, reaching the magazine, blew h~r up. A. carcase shell
exploded in the bow of a brig next to the commodore; she sank fo1 ward, while
a hot h ·11 tii.king her stern, which stood up in shallow water, soon enveloped
h.er -n flam . In a £ w minute another vessel was on fire, and an A.lgeii.ne
\"" -,_ 1 having r c ived a shell, which exploded between decks, was abandoned
!) ~ b r er w.
3
In th harbor of Patra, , the Greek made an attack upon an Austrian bii.g
load d for the 'rurki. h army, by opening upon her a fire of shelh; from 68-
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pounders; one of them exploded in her hull near the water's edge, tore out a
great part of her side, when she sank almost immediately.
All these results arc calculated to show the effect of hollow shot fired horizontally from what is generally called Paixhan guns against shipping, and proves
the efficacy of sea-coast defences armed with such artillery.
Of the effect of such a fire against forts, from ships or steamers, I recall to
mind that of the French fleet under J oumanville, against the castle of St. Juan
d'Ulloa, when a shell entering an embrasure, passed into a magazine through
an unprotected door, and blew it up.
In 1840, the steam frigates Phrenix, Stranbole, Gorgon, and Vesuvius, were
of the fleet that made an attack upon St. Jean d' Acre. They shelled tke town
with long guns, from positi0ns beyond gun-range of the batteries, during the
attack by the ships-of-the-line, keeping beyond the range of the shore batteries.
During the Carlist war, in Spain, several English steamers presented themselves against the land batteries, but retired on receiving the first :fire from the
land.
Other than the several instances herein referred to I can recall to mind now,
and they all go to show that the u e of columbiads is a most reliable means of
protecting our harbors against ships or steamers.
Another improvement having a bearing on this subject is that of submarine
artillery. Fulton's efforts with torpedoes were of little avail during his lifetime.
The attempts upon the Engli h ship Plantagenet, in Lynnhaven bay, and upon
Admiral W arrcn's fleet, off New London, during the war of 1812 to 1815, which
proved abortive, are the only instances I am aware of with these machines.
Since his death, however, a new ag nt-that of electro-galvanism-has come
into use, enabling us to explode a hell or magazine of powder under water at
any particular in, tant of time. 'rhi ' power may be made auxiliary in the defence
of our coa t, in the channels over which hostile vessels must pa, s in approaching
our cities; but it can only be of u, e in connexion with forts, from ·which the
electro-agent is ·worked, and from whence to protect the torpedoes until the
proper moment of u ing them, as well a, from whence to a certain the exact
instant of time in firing them. An undefended position will not admit of their
ucces ful application. It is an unc 'rtain auxiliary in the defence of our :-hip
channel , yet one that would b re ort d to by officers acquainted with i
advantage . Gutta-percha 'la tic tube , within which the wires may be !rotected, i another modc•rn inv ·ntion, facilitating· th u; of the electro-galvanic
mod of in tantaneou, <>xplor-;ion.
The cffi ct of the railroad j., to economiz<> greatly the military resource:- oft~
nation, by relying upon a much c:mallcr di, ciplin •d forc:r to act ao-aim;t ho~tile
land in r:4. :F or xam pl , th 14am troop, that would op rate acrain t a 110-:til
anny moving on Bo. ton, would :-:uffice to act against the rune force that . , bould
af't,rwarcl. attempt to march upon ..1..:r w York, I)hilad<'lphia, or Baltimor .
1Va. hintrton. Bc·forc~ their tran14port.' could paRs from one to the oth<-r, the rmlroad could tr:m:-;port th army to oppo. r thc·m.
It i. a know} clgc of an ·n my'· movcrnmt.' only that i n c ,-ary to C'Illl I
u.: to tak · aclv:rnta,,.e of the railroad :-pPNl of trnn>1portation; and h rc them
r c ·nt di..;co,,. ·ry of th<' l<· tr -tel g-raph eomc• · into valuabl u. . But th re
L nothincr in tlw, inv •ntion. or irnprov ·ment: that l •, ·nt th importune• an
n c ·.it' of opp,. i1w tlw p ,wnful floating armam nt. that can b l,r u!!h
again~t u b • 1·11tia1ly pownfol hatt ·ri<· · for I •t me acrain r p at that a mJ·ri:I
of m n, with riti a)l(l oth ·r . maJJ a11n , i. nothino- ao-ain,·t
hip:: Lrona-id .
On · othc·r ·lurn"<' in mod ·rn artill r • dl'...:crvc~ t Le noti cl: urincr th I •
half · ·ntury th calibr of tlw ·~m mount :cl n board hip~- f-, ·ar ha: !!'ft •
in r >a:- d, and made it 11 c._· • nry t in ·r ·a:- , th pow •r of th , batt ri ,.. th
I • n .. truct d t oppo · tlinn.
j · ·ti 11 ~ hav
mc·tim · b n tak u t
110w •r f our ,ea-coa,t batt ri · ; n littl r fl cti 11 wm, I d ubt not ho
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necessity of their being made equal, in all respects, to the batteries by which
tliey can be assailed.
.
.
From 1776 to 1783 frio-ates of thirty-two, twenty-e1ght, and twenty-four
run mounted twelve-pounders on their main deck.
e In 1800 most of the English friga'.tes mounted twelve _and e_ighteen-pounders.
In February of that year the admiralty ordere~ all sh1ps of twenty-four a1:d
twenty guns to be :fitted on the main deck for thirty-two pounder carronades, m
lieu of the long NINE-POUNDERS hitherto carried.
The Danish forty-gun ship Freya mounted eighteen-pounders. 'l'he Danish
vessels at Copenhagen, attacked by Nelson, mountedForty-eight thirty-six-pounders.
Three hundred and sixty twenty-four-pounders.
Seventy eighteen-pounders.
Ninety-eight twelve-pounders.
Fifty-two eight-pounders.
Nelson's fleet mountedOne hundred and forty thirty-two-pounders.
Seventy-four twenty-four-pounders.
One hundred and ninety-two eighteen-pounders.
Twenty-two twelve-pounders.
One hundred and fourteen nine-pounders.
Six six-pounders; together with carronades.
1805. The Victory, Nelson's flagship at Trafalgar, mounted on her first deck,
long thirty-two-pounders; second deck, long twenty-four-pounders; third deck,
long twelve-pounders; quarter deck and forecastle, twelve-pounders, and two
1-ixty-eight-pounders, carronades. · The French admiral's ship, in the s~me
action, mounted thirty-two and eighteen-pounders; thirty of the eighteenpounders on her upper deck. The 'l'arinant, of ninety guns, mounted eighteenpounders on her main deck. The Belle Isle has twenty-four-pounders on her
main deck. The San Ildefonsa had :fifty-eight long twenty-four-pounders on
the :first and second decks; four long eight-pounders and ten thirty-six-pounders, carronades, on the quarter deck and forecastle.
1808. 'J.1he Caledonia, English ship of one hundred and twenty-two guns,
launched this year, mounted on first deck, thirty-two-pounders; second deck,
twenty-four-pounders; third deck, eighteen-pounders; quarter deck, twelvepounders and thirty-two-pounders, carronades, and the same calibre on the foreca tle; on the roundhouse she carried eighteen-pounders.
1811. France had no frigate, and England only four that carried long twentyfour-pounders, at this date.
1820. At this date France ordered tliirty and thirty-two-pounders for all
tlteir ships-of-war.
1839. Finally, the English, on the 20th of :February of this year, ordered
all her ships-of-war to be armed with thirty-two and sixty-eight-pounders.
1 51. By referring to ari-0ther part of this memoir, it will be seen that an
ighty-one-gun ship-of-the-line is now mounted with the tremendous battery of
thirty-two-pounders and eight-inch guns.
Thi. regular increase demands, on our part, a like armament, and that we
r,~lax nothing in the artillery for the defence of the coast, requiring more time
t, buHd, and stronger works to receive and resist such artillery.
3 . How far vessels-of-war, ~team batteries, ordinary merchant ships, and
. teamer:-, and other temporary expedients, can be relied upon as a substitute for
permanent fortification, for the defence of our large seaports 1
It follow , from what ha been said under the two previous heads, that a
nation may rely upon a navy a. a substitute for fortifications, in a great measure, for the defence of not only her large seaports, but for her coasts generally.
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The two cases of France and England exemplifying that either a fleet or fortifications have heretofore sufficed.
The great question that arises, in adapting the one or the other exclusively,
will be the cost, the efficiency a1f'the eventful moment, and the consequences, in
a political point of view, of directing such immense resources as dependence
upon a fleet would require to a system that has its advantage in throwirfg the
evils of war from our shores at the same time that its success brings a spirit of
conquest and aggrandizement, limited only by the extent to which the nation
may be led by the glory its arms shall achieve.
My opinion is, that sound policy calls upon us to adopt the mixed system of
pem1anent batteries in conjunction with ships-of-the-line and war steamers.
If we adopt a floating system, we must make ourselves superior afloat to our
enemy. Every seaport and dock yard must be provided with its own floating
batteries, available for its waters and adjacent shoals. The great estuaries
leading into the heart of the country must each be watched and protected.
The floating defences that will protect Boston cannot secure the Hudson, Delaware, Chesapeake, southern coa t, Gulf of Mexico, and Pacific, at one and the
same time. Nor can we place reliance upon our superior fleet blockading our
enemy in his ports. The fallacy of this reliance is exemplified by the sailing
of the Yavlau fleet and transports no less than three times without being perceived, and being afloat in the narrow sea of the Mediterranean fifty-two days,
notwith, tanding all the watchfulnes, of the English fleet; a ingle detachment
of the en my's fleet escaping the blockade, sails for any of our harbors, where
it must be met either by floating or land batteries. Hence, we have no alternative but a decided superiority, if we place reliance upon floating batteries .
'l'heRc floating defence, arc of th most pcri, hable character, and cnormou ly
cxpen ivc in first cost and r pair..,, compared with land batteries. 'ro have some
id ·a of the co, t of fleets, let u.· look to the hi tory of Europ ·.
The French estimate that a , hip will last but twelve year8 ; and to have forty
ship -of-the-line and fifty frigate in commi ion, it is necessary to have fiftythr e "hips-of-the-line and ixty frigates, so great and cou8taut are the necessary
r pair, . The fact was tated to the ] r nch Chamber by 0. Dupin, a, deduced
from their own expcri nc .
The cost of maintaining th French fie t annually, from 1689 to 17 9, wa.
av ra()'rd. _.. __ ....... _.. __ . ____ . __ . __ . ____ . ____ . _... ___ $7, 0 ,000
From 1776 to 17 3 was av rao- d ______ . ____ ......... _. __ __ 19,400,000
1783 to 1786 it wa , __ ... ______ . _. __ .. __ . __ ..... _. __ 12,600,000
For th y ar 1797 __ do .. _.. _. _. __________ . ___ .. __ ... __ . . 16,'i00,000
l 05 . . do .. _. _.. _. ___________ . __ . _..... _. _. 2 ,000,000
1 0 _. do ___ . _... ____ ... ______ .. _. ____ . __ __ 22,000,000
1 14 .. do __ . _. _____ .... _... _.. __ .. __ .. __ . _.
10,200,000
1 16 _. do __ ... __ ...... __ . _. __________ .. _. . .
9,600,000
1 1 _. do .... __ . ___ .. _________ . _.. _. ___ .. __
640,000
In 1 7 th<· hamb r. vot d ..... ____ ..... __ . _ .. _.. __ .. ___ 10, 00,000
In 1 4 7 .... - .. do .. _..... _. __ ... _. _.... _... _... ___ ... _. 1 .0.53,90

Tli
o t of main inino- th ' 111n· • ,f
(no in ·ltt inn· 1 11 t 1 U, , p ·ri d f fort ·- n

y , r,.,

urn of ... __ .. _ .... - . - ... - · - - · · - - - - . - - - - .. - ... - - .. - .
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The annual average being (forty-nine years). - - - - - - - - - - - - - From 1799 to 1815, fifteen years of war. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

The annual average being .......... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - From 1816 to 1851, not including 1841 to 1844 - - - - - - - . - - The annual average being (thirty-two years) .. - . - - ... - - - - -
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$46,604,284
1,356,248,803
79,779,341
927,395,437
28,981,106

These enormous sums enable us to form some judgment of the gradual
increase in the annual expenses of maintaining a navy, and the expenses in
periods of peace, compared with war. Now let us examin into the magnitude
of the fleets of Europe, at different points, to form some idea of the number of
5hips we must have to secure that superiority that will justify our reliance upon
:Hoating defences.
The French fleet, by no means the strongest w.e are likely to contend with,
consists of the following number of large ships at the period . tated:
In 1789 ... _.... 81 ships-of-the-line, and 69 frigates .
.llarch, 1791. .. __ . __ 73 __ ._ .. _.do ___ .. __ .67 _.. do.
Dec., 1791 .. __ .. _ . 86 .... _. __ do ________ 78 _.. do.
1792 .....• _. 82 _... __ . _do ....... _68 __ . do.
Feb., 1793 ...... __ 75. __ . _... do __ ... _.. 59 __ . do.
1801. ....... 39 ... __ ... do .. _... _.35 ... do .
.June, 1814 ... __ ... 73 __ . __ ._.do .. _. ___ .41. .. do.
1817 ...... _. 68 _.. __ .. _do. _____ .. 38 _. _do.
1827 ..... __ .59. _._ .... do. __ ..... 51. .. do.
1828 ........ 59 ........ do ........ 51. .. do.
July, f829 ........ 33 ..... _.. do ....... .41. .. do. only.
At this date she was building eighty ships to restore her navy and replace
the rotten and decayed ships.
In 1837 she had one hundred and fifty-three ships afloat, and in 1847 she .
had two hundredj,nd sixteen ships afloat, sixty-six of wMch were steamers.
The study of tiie above shows the losses that the vanquished have to sustain
from time to time-an item to be more particularly stated hereafter.
The following table gives a more enlarged view of the strength of the different naval powers:
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Pleets

<d tlie different nations in

1783, 1793, 1829, and 1840.
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1783.

Ships-of-the-line._--··
Ships of fifty guns •••..
Frigates··---·_·-····
Ships-of-war .••• _ ••..
Smaller vessels •.••••.

50

105

80

13

7

3

132 I 103
2]7 I
86
88
34

48
31
25

32 ·----· ····-· ------ ------ -----28 ·--··· -----· ----- - ·----· -----13 ··---· ----- ··---- ------ -----6

------ ·----- ·----· -----· ·-----

455

319

160

79

------ ------ ------ ------ ------

153
149
109

86
78
82

76
56
72

49
38
32

30
11
60

60
57
3
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246

204

119

101

120

13]
149
336

33
41
14~

6
12
94

12
0
63

615

222

102

49
62
242

3
4
9

11
21
32

14

50
25
40

353

16 1

54

33

J 15

1793.

Shi pa-of-the-line._ • _•.
Frigates ••••.••. _·-··
mailer vessels .. . .••.

------

39 -----21 -- - -- - -----·
140 .. -- -- .. -----200

. _.. • . . - - - • -

1829 .

Shi ps-of-th.e-li n e _.....
Frigates ••...•.. _ . - ..
'ma.lier vessels .. _. _•.

105 ------

32
25
24

2
15

8 1 ------

23 ..••••

6

184-0

hips-of-th e-line. .....
Frigates .••. ..... .•..
:ma.lier ve sels ..••••.

120
141
317
578

I
J

11
~

15 .••• ••
15 ______
18 .••••.

11
30
16

48 ------ ,

57

aptur ii.

20
145

T tal ..... .. ........................... . 165
ani ·h hip durincY th, ~, m w •
and burnt:
4

234
otal ................................... 31
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Loss of the English fleet during the war from May, 1803, to July, 1815~
Captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, and burnt:
Ships-of-the-line ............................... - 13
Under the line._ .......... ...... .. .. - . . . . . . . . . . 304
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
Loss of the enemy's fleet during the same wars, namely, French, Dutch,,
Spanish, Danish, Russian, Turkish, and American. Same causes as above:
Ships-of-the-line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Under the Hne ................................. 108
Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

. In our statements of the cost of maintaining fleets, the total expenditure has.
?een given, including wages of seamen, ordnance, &c. To make some com~ar-·
ison between the cost of building fortifications and building ships, the followmg·
facts may be useful:
The wear and tear of ships of the English fleet, 1799 to 1819,
inclusive, was . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . $322,849,296
The cost of building and repairing ships during the same period,
was . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
70,789,070'
Total cost of wear and tear and building in 21 years ......... .

Or, an average per annum of ............................. .

393,638,366
18,744,784-

The cost of building the ships afloat, comprising the na;y of the
United States in 1842, was ............................ .
The cost of repairs upon the same vessels from time to time, was

$9,052,725
5,579,229'

Total ................ ·.... - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - · · · ·

14,631,984-

=====....::::-_-_-_---

Here we have the repairs to first cost in the ratio of five and a half to nine.
This cost was for fifty vessels, or for five ships-of-the-line, eleven frigates,.
including two steameri:\, and thirty-four smaller vessels, mounting in all 1,440•
gun . The average cost per gun, repairs included, is $10,161. The averageco t per gun, omitting repairs, is $6,286. .
But cost of an exclusive reliance upon floating defences is far greater than
appears by this statement. To it should be added the cost and repairs put upon
the Constellation, Java, Guerriere, two steamers ]folton, and all the other ves-~el · lo t, broken up, foundered, &c., of which I can find no account, and which
of them. elves (the cost) would go far towards building lasting and permanent
defences for some of the harbors on our coast.
I would wi. h to prc~ent the cost of the several fortifications on our coast and
the repair from time to time, but have no data therefor. The only fortification with which I can make the comparison is Fort Schuyler, the cost of which
to this date is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $843, 187·
r_ro thi add for completion, (it is now ready to receive its entire armament, and i a.~ defen ible as can be made ; the work remaining
to be don con i t in conveniences for the garrison,) say...... . .
50, 000
Making th

um of; ............... _. . . . . . . . . . . . .

893, 187
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This work is to be armed wHh one hundred and eighty-four guns, producing
an average of $4,855 per gun. This single fort, calculated to endure for ages,
is consicler~d an equivalent in defence to an enemy's fleet, and a substitute for a
fleet of floating batteries, otherwise necessary.
If we look to permanent land batteries for the defence of our harbors, we
have at all times a suitable disciplined force in the uniform militia of our cities
and to!vns for their garrisons, ready at short notice to man the guns. On the
contrary, for floating defences ·we must look to the more limited number of
sailors, unaccustomed to guns, and to be disciplined for the purpose.
There is no room for doubt, in my mind, that we cannot, wit:1 due reg·ard to
the safety of our cities, towns, and dock yards, rely upon vessels-of-war and
steam batteries, and that economy demands a dependence to be placed in heavy
land batterie::i built in the most permanent manner. 'I1he reliance upon ordinary merchant ships and steamers, as well as any other temporary expedient, I
consider as no dependence whatever. Let us imagine a small fleet only of such
STEAMSHIPS OF THE LINE as that elsewhere described, mounting thirty-two
pound r. and eight and ten-inch columbiadR, and what chance is there against
such broadsides for anything that can be made of merchant ships and mercantile steamers 1 Such vessels are in no manner suited for heavy armaments, and
would, in a measure, have to be rebuilt to fit them for defence. Against a single
ship-of-the-line, becalmed or anchored in smooth water, we might hope to interpoi:;e a formidable r ::iist:mce with temporary batteries on merchant ships' decks,
towed by mercantile Rteamen,; but against several, mutually acting either on the
offen::iive or defensive, and with auxiliary steam power, (or even without,1capable
of flanking each other's position, no defence whatever could be placed in them.
There is no part of our coa t where beneficial results might be better calculated upon from temporary xp client of this character than Loui iana. Tlie
ports being built to keep off the enemy'. heavy batterie., he must take to bfr
boats. These, when transporting troop , could readily be run down and detroyecl by merchant steamer . A ho · tile army that might have gained the dry
land of the :Mis issippi would be exc edingly annoy d by floating batterie on
the decks of ships towed by teamer ; but as a dcfon ive, no reliance could be
plac d upon them. 'I1he facility with which field-gun and howitzer could et
fir to and de troy such floating exp di nt i exemplified by the de truction of
ve. s l · used by u: in the d £ nee of Loni iana in 1 14-'15. Where uch expedi nt. are unexpected, and no uitabl force at hand to contend with them, th y
ar of o-reat value; but 1 t our en my knO"\f that uch i. our only defence, and
h r adily commands them an of d troying them.
4th. How far the increa e of population on the northern fronti r, and of th
m re ntil and marin on the north rn lak , , obviat or climini he the nf'C :-·ity of continuino- th , y t m of fortification. on th . e lake. ?
pon thi. point I am not o w 11 pr par d to pr ent my view fully, havin"
· n hut littl of th ountry and po,:. .. ino- fi w . tafrtical fact. upon which to
r Iv.
•
• n th lakr.., a~ on th
an, w.
movrm nt: f invading armi<',. It i ao-ain.t th op<'ration, of floatino- batt ri .,
· in th· f rn r a. that w lmilcl fort,'. in thi, . ·ction of ur c tmtry. Had
ur nr.io-hb rB no v . . I r m an. f procurin th m w would hav no ne d ot
£ rt · but w know th .·Io. ,... b th a naval an am rcantil marin, of st am
aad . ailincY v ·. ·r.l , ancl hi v • f rtifi d po ·itiou. .·up •rior in tr •nrrth to ur o, ·n
, ithin whi h t prot ct thc·ir mc•r ·antil<! marinr. and, when o ·cu i n otfrr , t
cp1ip th m ·ith r a tl,m p rt, 1• ann .d v .... ·I:.
In the v nt f a war , d •-.p ·rat , c·ffort w nl h, madr. to ,· iz upon •v ry·
thin,,. • Aoat in ur port . r h ! am , ffor w woulcl cloubtl •.. makt to
u
th fl , tin...,. p w r f our n i1rh
kn w how v r, that Yin 0
n h .,
or .r nr pa--t b n fortifi cl an
b Jiev
·till in p - ·
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for the land and water defences of that harbor. So long as they hold it, we
rannot gain the important point of capturing the only means in their possession
toannoy us. An invasion into the heart ~f our country _i s not like~y to . be
thought of; and if undertaken, must result m the destruct10n of the mvadmg
force by the vast increase and present density of our population.
It would not be possible for an invading army to leave the lake shores beyond
a few days' march. With the command of the lakes, our shores and all the
towns and important lines of canals and railroads would be at the mercy of an
enemy to lay under contribution, or burn and destroy, as might be their policyWithout heavy batteries to combat their fleet, we can offer no successful oppo-sition by our superiority of numbers to such predatory naval expeditions.
With a naval superiority we could blockade their ports and have the mean&
of pursuing any vessels that might escape the blockade. To protect ourselves
in this way our force must be decidedly superior ; and our resources would enable·
ua to do so if we can in the commencemeet of a war save even our mercantile
marine and capture that of our enemy. Without fortified harbors I cannot see
how we can gain such results and advantages with an enemy possessing safe
harbors, offering effectual seeurity to his vessels.
Nor could we at once calculate upon reducing Kingston. The fortification&
at that place cannot be taken by assault or destroyed by bombardment. It is
only by the operations of a systematic siege that they can be arrested from the
hands of an enemy. Some time must elapse after the breaking out of the war
before we could hope to take so important a place.
The command of the wider parts of the St. Lawrence is in the hands of the·
power possessing the naval superiority. We could not cross that river, where
it ' banks are beyond gunshot from our shores without such naval ascendency> ,
thereby prolonging the time necessary for reducing Kingston.
The commercial ports, in which self-interest now draws our numerous merchant steamers and ships, should therefore be provided with such heavy land
~atteries as will effectually secure the shipping in the commencement of hostilihe and during any temporary check to our operations on land and water .
. The same protection should be given to inlets, by which vessels could cut the
Imes of our railroads and canal communications.
Such batteries or fortifications , are our only certain security. No increase of
population or of mercantile marine can give us that protection (with the means
our neighbors have at command) in the commencement of hostilities; nor can
we gain the ascendency on the lakes without some fortified harbor, under cover
of ·which to build and eq_uip a fleet. The subjugation of the Oanadas, if
the result of a war, will not be accomplished before Quebec and Kingston are
reduced.
·
'These two places, if defended in proportion to their artificial strength, will
call for harder fighting and more prolonged than any battle we have yet fought.
They certainly can be taken, and we believe we know enough of their constn1ction to fit out the necessary armaments, but it will require time, and large
military resource , during which the lake coast should not be left unguarded
a nd unprotected.
The reduction of these two fortresses cuts off in the one case all further relief
from the northern country, and all means of further annoyance~by water in the
other; but the entire subjugation and annexation of the country to ours depends
roore upon the people. Unless they see fit to govern themselves, as a part of
our conf cl racy, we cannot make them. We may hold it by military power,
b ut with the p •opl opposed, the struggle will not cease with the fall of Quebec
a nd King ton.
11 of which i r '>'pectfully ubrnitted.

RICHARD DELAFIELD,
Major of Engineers.

414

MILITARY AND NAVAL DEFENCES.

Letterftom Charles Stewart, United States navy.
BORDENTOWN, NEW JERSEY,

November 11, 1851.
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as far as reasonably practicable, all the important positions essential to commercial purposes and naval preparations for the lakes. In this direction there is
but one power with whom we may be brought into collision, and that is Great
Britain. She is, however, a power who, on a probability of hostilities with the
United States, would readily throw on to our border and on the lakes a powerful re-enforcement of military and naval annoyance to our lake frontier.
Very respectfully, I have the honor to remain your obedient servant,

CHARLES STEWAR'r.
Hon. C. M.

CONRAD,

Secretary

ef

War, Wasliington, D. C.
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